Musical meaning

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Η παρούσα μελέτη βασίζεται σε αντιλήψεις για τη σημασία της θετικής αυτοεικόνας στην ανάπτυξη της προσωπικότητας του παιδιού, καθώς και στην πεποίθηση για τη συμβολή της μουσικής αγωγής στην καλλιέργεια του συναισθηματικού τομέα. Ο γενικός σκοπός της έρευνας είναι η διερεύνηση της σχέσης της μουσικής αγωγής με την αυτοεκτίμηση μαθητών Μουσικών Γυμνασίων. Συγκεκριμένα, διερευνάται το πώς βλέπουν τα ίδια τα παιδιά τις ικανότητές τους γύρω από τη μουσική και πώς αυτή η μουσική τους αυτοαντίληψη σχετίζεται με την αυτοεκτίμησή τους. Πρώτος στόχος της έρευνας είναι η ανάλυση των σχέσεων μεταξύ: α) «Μουσικής Αυτοαντίληψης» και «Γενικής Αυτοεκτίμησης», β) «επιμέρους αυτοαντιλήψεων μουσικών ικανοτήτων» και «γενικής Μουσικής Αυτοαντίληψης» και γ) «Μουσικής Αυτοαντίληψης»-«Γενικής Αυτοεκτίμησης» και «φύλο» των μαθητών Μουσικών Γυμνασίων. Δεύτερος στόχος είναι η μελέτη διαφορών που τυχόν υπάρχουν όσον αφορά τη «Γενική Αυτοεκτίμηση» μεταξύ μαθητών Μουσικών και Γενικών Γυμνασίων. Από την ανάλυση των δεδομένων προέκυψε ότι: α) η μουσική αυτοαντίληψη των μαθητών Μουσικών Γυμνασίων και ορισμένες επιμέρους αυτοαντιλήψεις μουσικών ικανοτήτων που έχουν σχετίζονται θετικά με την αυτοεκτίμησή τους, β) οι μαθητές συνδέουν νοητικά ορισμένες αυτοαντιλήψεις μουσικών ικανοτήτων με τη γενική μουσική τους ικανότητα, γ) τα κορίτσια παρουσιάζουν υψηλότερη μουσική αυτοαντίληψη από τα αγόρια και δ) οι μαθητές που φοιτούν στα Γενικά Γυμνάσια παρουσιάζουν υψηλότερη αυτοεκτίμηση από τους μαθητές των Μουσικών Γυμνασίων. Επισημαίνεται η σημασία της καλλιέργειας υψηλής μουσικής αυτοαντίληψης και η αναγκαιότητα για αναβάθμιση της μουσικής εκπαιδευτικής πράξης για την ανάπτυξη θετικότερης αυτοεικόνας. Τέλος, προτείνονται τρόποι με τους οποίους οι εκπαιδευτικοί της μουσικής μπορούν να καλλιεργήσουν τη μουσική αυτοαντίληψη, τις επιμέρους αυτοαντιλήψεις μουσικών ικανοτήτων και τη γενικότερη αυτοεκτίμηση των μαθητών τους.

Листовская программность и бодлеровские «соответствия» (на примере пьесы «Angelus!» из «Третьего года странствий» Ф.Листа) .
Liszt's Programmatic Approach and Baudelaire's "Correspondences" (Based on the Example of "Angelus!" from "Years of Pilgrimage: Third Year" by Franz Liszt)

This paper assumes familiarity with Nelson Goodman's philosophy of art. It responds to James Young's recent and earlier criticisms of Goodman on metaphorical exemplification and musical expressiveness, as well as Nemesio Puy's ensuing reply. In addition to responding, I defend a view that highlights the explanatory role of exemplification, also addressing earlier criticisms by Stephen Davies. Young's central claim is that Goodman's theory ultimately collapses into a quirky variant of the resemblance theory. I counter that resemblance theory is, in fact, an incomplete form of exemplification theory, missing a crucial component: the "frame." A frame is a contextual device that shapes resemblances by directing our attention to specific aspects and making them more salient. Although Puy implicitly acknowledges the role of frames, he does not fully explore their implications. I argue that an orthodox Goodmanian stance on resemblance is unnecessary to support a "frame theory" of expressiveness; the latter suffices.

Like the song cycle “An die ferne Geliebte,” Beethoven’s last string quartet, op. 135, begins with a foretaste of its conclusion. Motives presented at the outset of the first return transformed in the last. Key to understanding the quartet is the famous epigraph to the finale, “Der schwer gefasste Entschluss: Muss es sein? Es muss sein! Es muss sein!” (The difficult decision: must it be? It must be! It must be!). This epigraph focuses on a three-note motive stated once in the question and twice in the answer. As clues go, the identity of the motive in the epigraph is less significant than the attention Beethoven draws to the invertibility of question and answer. Text and motive both invert. ‘Muss es sein?’ Becomes ‘Es muss sein,’ and the three note motive changes direction. Previous attempts to interpret the text of the epigraph have looked outside the music for biographical clues. The answer has fueled speculation about the unidentified, inevitable "it", ranging from the imminence of Beethoven's own death, to the unavoidability of relinquishing custody of his suicidal nephew, to the mundane need to pay subscription dues.

After examining motivic relationships between movements, my analysis considers the many disruptive intrusions of e-flat in the outer movements and the scherzo. The prominence given to these e-flats provides a musical basis for interpreting the epigraph. Beethoven's "difficult decision" can be read quite literally as a musical riddle, with ‘Es’ representing the German note name for e-flat, in addition to its function as a pronoun. Accordingly, the question and answer acknowledge the compositional challenge Beethoven set himself in this quartet: the integration of e-flat into an F major work. From beginning to end the status of e-flat changes appreciably.

Whether the e-flat also represents death, the suicide attempt of his nephew Karl, or something else entirely, Beethoven's musical handling of the note seems dramatically conceived. The question "must it be?” and the affirmative answer give an animate focus to an otherwise abstract drama. According to my interpretation, the finale is less likely to represent public comedy than private happiness; not the triumphant happiness of the finale to his Fifth Symphony, but a thankful joy like the post-crucifixion emotion Handel evoked in "O Death, where is thy sting?”, the joy of one who has faced a dreaded fate, and lived to accept it.

This chapter is a substantially expanded version of (and so substantially supersedes) “Words Fail Me. (Stanley Cavell’s Life Out of Music)” that appeared in Inheriting Stanley Cavell: Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Bloomsbury, 2020).  It offers to read Cavell’s claim that “philosophy, of a certain ambition, tends perpetually to intersect the autobiographical.” Its guiding thought is that a life that finds a home in philosophy from out of its devotion to music (as is true of, among others, Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, all philosophers Cavell wrote about and cared about) will take on a certain character. In Cavell’s case, his distinctive orientation in philosophy—call this his lifelong coming to terms with his abandoning a life in music—is guided in part by (1) an interest in those moments in experience where words seem to run out, or veer toward nonsense, leaving in their wake touchstones of ecstasy; and (2) an interest in the education of the senses, without which interest we risk their starvation. These twin claims are illustrated through an interweaving of remarks and reminiscences of Cavell on music that culminate in a reading of his last published pieces devoted to music, primarily “Impressions of Revolution.”

The way we think about disagreement is shaped by the systematic emphasizing of its adversarial, non-cooperative aspects. This is due to a perspective on arguing and disagreeing. Perspectives enable some thoughts and occlude others. We claim that the way some issues are thought of in aesthetics is conditioned by a similar phenomenon we call ‘the Received Image’ (RI), which parallels the influence on ethics of what Bernard Williams called ‘systems of morality’. Peter Kivy argued that disagreements in aesthetics, if genuine, presuppose that contenders are tacit realists about ‘art-relevant properties’: the motivation for arguing lies in making the adversary acknowledge (epistemic) defeat (in pursuing agreement from others). He draws this conclusion from what he sees as a fundamental difference between aesthetics and ethics. However, in our view, Kivy and his opponents in the semantic meta-debate on disagreement think under the aegis of the RI. We look at disagreements about art from a neo-cognitivist perspective, and argue that heuristic similarities between aesthetics and ethics stand out with an understanding-based epistemology coupled with an adequate theory of artistic form: form as a perspective-generating device whose grasping involves ‘infinitely fine adjustments’.

This brief historiographic study shows that French narratology does not divide into a "classical" narratology and "postclassical narratologies" in the way spoken of by David Herman or into the hyphenated "narratologies" identified by Ansgar Nünning. The principal players (Barthes, Todorov, Genette) turned to other pursuits, and Ricoeur's watershed Time and Narrative opposed "semiotic rationality" to "narrative intelligence" of a hermeneutic type while the disappearance of structuralist linguistics as a "pilot science" was not succeeded in France by the "renaissance" of narratology that occurred in other countries starting in the early 1990s. Theoretically oriented research on narrative continued, but not always under the label of narratology, some of it in non-literary fields. French discourse analysis appears to offer a conceptual and methodological framework for addressing the concerns of postclassical narratology.

Between critic and public 1 Between critic and public Listening to the musical work in Stockholm during the long 19 th century Ulrik Volgsten 'The audience, yes-who is it and where can it be found?' With these words Albert Rubenson, composer and music critic in Stockholm, draws attention to a much neglected part of 19 th century music life in Sweden. Writing for the periodical Ny tidning för musik in the summer of 1857, Rubenson paints a rather dull picture. Except for the friends of friends of the concert arranger, the audience is limited to 'a few young idlers, one or other real friend of music … and half a dozen critics, who believe themselves be better off as critics if they have heard the music beforehand' (Rubenson, 1857, p. 218). 1 One might think the writer is promoting a naïve first-time experience of music, but reading further the text rather suggests the impact on Rubenson by Eduard Hanslick's treatise Vom Musikalisch-Schönen, which had been published just a few years earlier. However Rubenson's main issue was not primarily to educate the listener, but to elevate the status and quality of the Swedish composers, above the embarrassing level of the dilettante. 2 The chief task of the critic, therefore, was to aid the composer and mark a distinction between the amateur and the professional (see Reese Willén, 2014). Nevertheless, without the reports of the professional critic, so Rubenson seems to say, the audience is lost to ignorance and lewd enjoyment in its encounter with the music. The listening public and the daily press My first step will be a narrowing-in of the concept of a listening audience. As a more or less cultivated mass of individuals I will regard this audience as a public. And as such I regard this public as partially constituted by what can be considered its mutual counterpart: the public criticism of the mass media. In this I follow the lead of Kristina Widesedt's analysis of music criticism in the Swedish daily press from 1780 to 1995 (as distinct from the scholarly journals more commonly investigated by musicologists and music historians). 13 With reference to Jürgen Habermas, Widestedt states that 'the audience, or the public, is constituted and held together through a criticism that mediates values that most can avow, while the public criticism would be power-and meaningless without anchoring in the audience/public' (Widestedt, 2001, p. 38). At the same time Widestedt stresses (this time with reference to Theodor Adorno) that criticism isn't just, indeed couldn't just be a simple 'incarnation of a self sufficient and indifferent "public opinion" ' (ibid.); criticism is also a cultivator of public taste. Contrary to claims such that during the 19 th century the listening audience goes through a self-disciplining process, aimed mainly at the control of extrovert bodily behaviour (ibid. p. 12ff, Widestedt refers to Johnson, 1995), Widestedt's main thesis is that represented by composers in scores … Once created … existing after their creators have died, and whether or not they are performed or listened to at any given time', existing 'over and above [their] performances and score[s]'

Article abstract
According to Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics, meaning (semiosis) is not an infused concept, but a power to engender interpretants. Semiosis is a triadic, context-sensitive (situated), interpreter-dependent (dialogic), materially extended (embodied and distributed) dynamic process. Although meaning is context-sensitive and materially extended, its locus is not well-captured by the notion of an environment. Inspired by biological concepts, we suggest the locus of meaning to be a niche. Here, we develop a semiotic account of musical meaning that emphasizes the location of musical signs in semiotic niches.

This essay concerns the relationship between Music and Poetry, to arrive to a personal conception of the artwork as an interpretative object. The musico-literature matter is a complex starting point to build an idea according to which the pleasure of understanding is the final purpose of the arts; aim of art is the position of a meaning, but in a realm of ambivalence-ambiguity, or better complexity: the two main examples-very distant but both basic-of Euripides and Mozart constitute the hearth of this contribute. Obviously, the scientific investigation on the relationship betwixt music and poetry knows, at least since two Centuries, a huge bibliography, 2 which is impossible here to talk about in a substantial perspective. We offer only suggestions of analysis, working hypothesis, but also a more organic view of what is for us an artwork. We can trace an ideal segment whose extreme opposite points are represented by the realm of logos (λ) and by that of melos (μ); the middle 1 Roberto Gigliucci is Assistant Professor (Professore Aggregato) at Sapienza University of Rome. He gives courses about Italian and European Literature and Literature and Music since many years. He taught also in Universities abroad, as Oxford, Royal Halloway, Coimbra, Athens, Krakow, Tours, Poitiers etc. He is member of the «Centro Interuniversitário Estudos Camonianos» of Coimbra, Coimbra University. He published many volumes and editions of texts and articles in reviews and books; he contributes also to «Estudos italianos em Portugal».

A ideia de semântica musical parte da teoria de que a música possui significado, e inclui tanto a maneira como uma informação musical é transmitida quanto como ela é interpretada pelo indivíduo (Koelsch, 2013). As etapas desse processo incluem o armazenamento de informação significante, uma ativação de representações dessa significação, uma seleção dessas representações e uma integração entre a informação semântica representada e seu contexto (Koelsch, 2013). Dessa forma, esse processo de atribuir significado está intimamente relacionado a memória. Entendendo que a memória tem por função a “retenção
ao longo do tempo de representações internas dependentes da experiência, ou da capacidade de reativar ou reconstruir tais representações” (Dudai, 2007, p.15), no caso da música, entende-se que seu papel é então fundamental para a construção de significado. Assim, este trabalho visa apresentar os entendimentos de semântica musical conforme descritos pelo psicólogo e neurocientista Stefan Koelsch no livro Brain and Music (2013).

Traditional aesthetics took it for granted that the intersection between artworks and ordinary objects was empty. Artworks and artworks alone could be beautiful and glorious. At the end of the 19th century, artists began giving up on the purpose of creating beautiful works of art. Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades represent the first and decisive step in this direction, a step that is still provoking the artworld. Arthur Danto has used the story of the Biblical Transfiguration of Jesus as a model for understanding the difference between an ordinary object and a work of art. But does the object of an aesthetic attitude undergo an illusionistic change of appearance, a transfiguration? We are raising the question whether what Danto had in mind should not rather be described with the help of the theological notion of transubstantiation. Does Danto’s move take us back to the old doctrine according to which the difference between an artwork and its ordinary counterpart is ontological in kind? ...

I t is a recurrent theme in the history of musical scholarship that music has "meaning"-or "symbolic content," or "semantics," or, at the very least, something we would want to call "significance." It is, of course, a theme with many variations: Schopenhauer will say that music expresses the inner nature of the metaphysical will, Goodman that music metaphorically exemplifies the likes of fragility and heroism, Kuhns that music represents itself: "Tones in music represent other tones. A modulation from major to minor refers as it moves. and establishes referring relationships as it sounds."I The most prevalent strain by far, however, has it that music somehow symbolizes human emotions. Langer will contend that music symbolizes the dynamic forms of human feeling, Collingwood that it expresses an emotion in the mind of the composer, Dowling and Harwood that it "represents emotions in a way that can be recognized by listeners.'" Roger Scruton writes: To understand musical meaning.. .is to understand how the cultivated ear can discern. in what it hears, the occasions for sympathy.. .. [For example, in] the slow movement of Schubert's G Major Quartet, D.887, there is a tremolando passage of the kind that you would describe as foreboding. Suddenly there shoots up from the murmuring sea of anxiety a single terrified gesture, a gesture of utter hopelessness and horror.. .. No one can listen to this passage without instantly sensing the object of this terror-without knowing.. .that death itself has risen on that unseen horizon.. .. In such instances we are being led by the ears towards a knowledge of the human heart.' Like any interesting thesis, the view has its detractors as well. Though much of the skepticism finds expression "in the corridors," as they say, some notable statements can be found in the literature. Peter Kivy writes: Unlike random noise or even ordered, periodic sound, music is quasi-syntactical; and where we have something like syntax, of course, we have one of the necessary properties of language. That is why music so often gives the

plunges, there is, arguably, no real movement involved. This, of course, does not imply that there is something wrong with talk of musical movement. Moreover, the denial that music literally moves is compatible with the claim that there are important similarities between music and human movement. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that the metaphor of movement draws on such similarities. A related and vexed question is that of the emotional response to musical works (Ch. 6). How can it be that sad music evokes sadness in the listener, given that such emotion is not about the music? And how would we want to listen to such music if it makes us sad? Davies argues that the states aroused by music are like moods in that they lack objects. The reason why we do not avoid sad music, Davies claims, is that what gives us pleasure in listening to music is understanding the music. Now, if it is true that, as Davies claims, understanding sad music necessarily involves feeling sad, it seems plausible to argue that the pleasure derived from understanding music compensates for or even cancels the displeasure of the sadness. To assess this solution to the problem posed by sad music, we need to know more about musical understanding. The last chapter of the book is devoted to this question. Davies argues that to understand music, one needs to hear music as music, and he tells us that to achieve this is "to experience the music, in hearing it, as sound organized in accordance with the conventions of style or category applying to it" (p. 325). He denies that "merely intellectual awareness" of the musical conventions is sufficient (p. 325). Moreover, he allows that this knowledge might be expressed as much in technical terms as in nontechnical terms. But he insists on the claim that this knowledge is propositional.

In einem seiner wunderbar anarchischen frühen Kurzfilme, The Pawnshop (Das Pfandhaus), führt Charlie Chaplin vor, wie das Wesen von Analyse und Höranalyse zu definieren sei. Ein Kunde braucht Geld und bringt einen-recht großen-Wecker. Den bewertet Charlie, indem er ihn nach allen Regeln der Kunst analysiert, also in seine Bestandteile auf löst (in der deutschen Musiktheorie des 18. Jahrhunderts heißt das ›zergliedern‹). Chaplins Prinzip ist: Analyse und Werturteil (und das lange vor Carl Dahlhaus!). Charlie bedient sich sogar einiger analytischer Hilfsmittel, die auch heute noch in der Musiktheorie durchaus beliebt sind, nämlich eines überdimensionierten Bohrers und eines Hammers. Das zerlegte Resultat dieser Analyse, so gibt er dem Kunden zu verstehen, ist völlig wertlos. Es tickt nicht mehr richtig. Auf dem Gesicht des Kunden malt sich mehr als nur Erstaunen. Ja, und dann gibt es allen Ernstes auch noch eine Höranalyse, denn Charlie beugt sich lauschend über den Trümmerhaufen, schüttelt den Kopf, nimmt sogar ein Stethoskop, schüttelt wieder den Kopf, und das höranalytische Resultat ist, dass die radikale Werk-Analyse, also die Uhr-Werk-Analyse, ihrem Gegenstand nicht von Nutzen war. Die Trümmer werden in den Hut des Kunden geschoben, und, um vielfältige Erkenntnisse reicher, darf der gehen. Sein Erkenntnis-Zuwachs bezieht sich allerdings weniger auf den Gegenstand der Zergliederung, also den Wecker, sondern er ist nun metatheoretisch geschult in methodischen Adäquatheitskriterien und ihren ökonomischen Fundierungen. Was lernen wir daraus? Als erstes, dass es gut ist, in Situationen wie dieser Chaplin-Filme erzählen zu können. Als zweites, dass der Wecker-Kunde viel über das Wesen und über die Methodik von Analyse und Hör-Analyse erfahren hat. Adäquate Analyse hat etwas mit adäquatem Handwerkszeug zu tun (Bohrer und Holzhammer ja, aber alles zu seiner Zeit), und zu diesem adäquaten Handwerkszeug gehört auch, substantiell, der Kopf des Analysierenden, in dem vielfältiges Wissen über Adäquatheitskriterien

The Annotated Edition of Andrea Alciato’s Emblems (Padua 1621)
The concept of ‘Frame’ and Other Paratextual Elements in a Collection of Topoi

This contribution examines the Libro degli emblemi by the jurist Andrea Alciato (1492-1550). First published in Augsburg (1531), it quickly gained editorial success, receiving reprints and translations throughout Europe. The Paduan edition of 1621 (the second Italian edition after the Venetian print of 1546) is the one that had the greatest influence on the Baroque culture of the peninsula. It consists of 212 emblems organized by themes, accompanied by an epigram. Following them, at the end of each section, the reader also finds a lengthy commentary in latin (edited by Claude Mignault and Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas). This best-seller of the early modern age presents itself as a summa of Italian and European humanistic knowledge: Alciato’s collection is, in fact, a visual collection of topoi upon which the collective imagination of the Cinquecento and Seicento is based. Not only the most important poets (Giambattista Marino) and novelists (Francesco Fulvio Frugoni) of the Baroque era drew from it for the construction of their works, but it is also possible to identify, through it, the graphic-editorial turning point of literature in the subsequent centuries, especially in the 20th century. Our contribution aims to highlight the meaning of the ‘frame’ in a volume where the text, understood as a set of words, is in absentia, and in which the logical-conceptual unity of each section (or paragraph) is provided by the images. Through the analysis of a selection of emblems, the objective is firstly to illustrate the relationship between the icastic function (the icons) and the diegetic function (the epigram) of these visual metaphors. Secondly, we will examine the role of the non-authorial commentary and its paratextual elements, showing how they serve not only to provide a correct interpretation of the images but also to actively engage the candide lector in the process of structuring these emblems.

In this chapter, intermediality is explored from an interdisciplinary perspective that uses neuroscience as well as cognitive-semiotic concerns, and insights from online digital communication, presenting it as a process where biophysical, technological, and interpersonal factors interact. Shared attention as well as spatial and temporal cueing-eye contact and the sonic modality-are explored from a task-oriented and social interactive dimension. The spatiotemporal impact of the mediating context is highlighted by moving from the role of visual cueing, in a brief reference to Al Davison's (2003) autobiographical graphic novel The spiral cage, to a more detailed analysis of Annie Abrahams' (2010) online project A fragmented relation, where cueing is dependent not just on spatial frames but also on the temporal dynamics introduced by the aural dimension recorded in an online environment. The paper tangentially touches upon the role of affect in communication.

In this chapter, intermediality is explored from an interdisciplinary perspective that uses neuroscience as well as cognitive-semiotic concerns, and insights from online digital communication, presenting it as a process where biophysical, technological, and interpersonal factors interact. Shared attention as well as spatial and temporal cueing-eye contact and the sonic modality-are explored from a task-oriented and social interactive dimension. The spatiotemporal impact of the mediating context is highlighted by moving from the role of visual cueing, in a brief reference to Al Davison's (2003) autobiographical graphic novel The spiral cage, to a more detailed analysis of Annie Abrahams' (2010) online project A fragmented relation, where cueing is dependent not just on spatial frames but also on the temporal dynamics introduced by the aural dimension recorded in an online environment. The paper tangentially touches upon the role of affect in communication.

Wittgenstein's remarks about music have motivated philosophers to build a comprehensive picture of his philosophy of music, concentrating on the central issues of musical meaning. It is often claimed that, according to Wittgenstein, understanding music consist in grasping the internal relationships between musical events. Musical practice, however, is naturally saturated with what philosophers often call extra-musical meanings. The present study, by considering a musical issue in Haydn's instrumental music, attempts to show that musical language games in the Wittgensteinian sense involve explanations of music that enhance the listener's ability to understand music by broadening his musical competence. Nevertheless, constituting understanding of music, these explanations might use professional musical terms as well as non-musical terms, comparisons, gestures and so on. Thus, though music does not go beyond itself in the sense of being understood through correlations between purely musical "concepts" and extra-musical contents, it does go beyond itself in musical practice, which involves understanding music through explanations and descriptions of music using various kinds of terms and images.

The aim of this seminar is to offer an introductory overview of narration in factual contexts. The proposal consists in unfolding a trajectory through the uses and functions of factual narration in a wide variety of social domains of discursive production. Emphasizing the synthesis of theory and practice, our approach will facilitate a critical engagement with narratological tools, enabling participants to effectively analyze a range of textual materials. Due to the condensed timeframe (12 hours), our focus will be primarily on the examination of the “time” category and its multifaceted dimensions. The seminar will draw upon a corpus of textual excerpts sourced from Argentina and Latin America, reflecting both historical and contemporary realities within the region.

Since Michel Foucault’s suggestion that ours may be “the epoch of space” ([1984] 1998) and the post-Sojan “spatial turn” (Soja 1989), we often imagine any early theoretical neglect of space in narrative theory has long been compensated. Some may have thus been surprised when, as late as 2006, James Phelan suggested that “narrative space” was one of several directions still to be explored by narratology (Scholes, Phelan and Kellogg 2006: 336). In continental theory, too, Dietrich Jägers (1998) has written of an “erzählten Raum” still largely ignored by German theory, on which Armin von Ungern-Sternberg more recently concurred: “Um den literarischen Raum hat sich die Literaturwissenschaft kaum je gekümmert” (2003: 548). In a more recent overview of notions on space in narrative theory, Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz note that “despite some earlier notable efforts by A.J. Greimas and Gabriel Zoran,” narrative theory has only recently (“as a result of work by David Herman and Susan Stan...

Iw ould like to begin on ap ersonal note. Ih aveb een listening to the John Lee Hooker song "WednesdayE venin' Blues" for over 45 years, and ac ountry song by Hoyt Axton called "Left My Gal in the Mountains" for only30years or so. Simple as they are, both of them sound as fresh to me todayasthe first time Iheard them. In this essay, after an explanation of my cognitive approach to stories and ab rief consideration of the concepts of narrative and narrativity,Iwillc ontrast the lyrics of the two songs. In adopting ac ognitive and narratological perspective on them, Iw ill payp articulara ttention to the minds of the two narrators, the level of self-attribution of mental states and the different sorts of information available to the listener regarding the causes of, and reasons for,t hose mental states. The discussion will show that the country song has much more narrativity than the blues.T he essayw ill then widen in scope, because it will arguet hat this difference is characteristic of the two genres generally. Iwill tentatively suggest some historical reasons for this differencei nn arrativity between the two genres,b ut alsor aise ad ifficulty with this sort of explanation. That is: given the large amount of black/white cross-fertilisation between these genres,w hy has the difference in narrativityr emained? The new subjecta reao fa udionarratology should be flexible enough to encompass av ariety of different approaches towards the narrativest hato ccur in musicals ettings. Fore xample, studies will vary to the extent to which they take account of the role of music in the effects of thosen arratives. The purpose of this essayistoshow that cognitive analyses of song lyrics are worth undertaking.A ss uch, it is not,p rimarily, an examination of the relationship between words and music, although Ir efert ot hat relationship in passingw hile discussing both my examples. Obviously, much more work can be done on the role that music plays in the presentations of fictional minds in musical narratives.

och-samhalle-vmusik-och-politik/. Omslag: Julius Lundin. "Musik & samhälle" finns också på Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Musik-och-samh%C3%A4lle-1529924297269488/?fref=ts Konferensen Musik och samhälle är ett samarbete mellan ABF och Lunds universitet, Institutionen för kulturvetenskaper. M&STE: elektronisk tidskrift för konferensen Musik & samhälle, nr 2, 2016 Innehåll Mikael Askander och Johan A. Lundin: Redaktörerna har ordet….. 1 Camilla Jonasson: Jag har också rätt att ljudsätta världen-genus och musikskapande med digitala verktyg…. 3 Henrik Brissman: "Är det verkligen fred vi vill ha?" Att kommunicera det komplexa fredsbegreppet genom populärmusik…. 19

The three volumes of Time and Narrative (1983-85) were published-and soon translated to English (1984-88)-in a pivotal moment for narrative studies and for narratology. In the middle of the eighties, the interest in narratives began to spread beyond the traditional fields of literary studies and linguistics and to influence almost all humanities disciplines. However, this remarkable expansion of narrative studies is disconnected from the evolution of narratology, which at the same time entered a period of "crisis" (Rimmon-Kenan 1989), before its revival under the label of "postclassical narratology" (Herman 1997). Indeed, there is a tension between, on the one side, the proliferation of narrative studies throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and on the other side, the loss of interest in the theorization of The articles gathered in this issue of Poetics Today follow a workshop organized at the University of Basel in 2018 which focused on Ricoeur's Time and Narrative, with a special insistence on plot and experientiality. This special issue is coordinated with a similar issue published in the electronic journal Les Cahiers de narratologie, which includes a translation of Philippe Carrard's article, and several original papers written in French. We would like to express our deep gratitude to the University of Basel, the University of Lausanne, and the Swiss National Science Foundation (FNS) for their financial support. 1. As Strawson explains, the use of the word Narrative with a capital letter is meant "to denote a specifically psychological property or outlook" (Strawson 2004: 428).

BACKGROUND IN MUSIC THEORY/ANALYSIS There have been some hermeneutic approaches to Mozart's Fantasy in c-minor K. 475 (1785). Among the most recent research, Williams (1991) interprets the bass line in the opening harmonies over its opening bars as 'a long, paraphrased or troped chromatic fourth down from tonic to dominant'. Raf f (2002) shows how Mozart uses temporary tonal deviation as an artificial device. Polth (2006) describes bars 12 and 13 as 'Tonfelder' (Haas, 2004), which refers to Lendvai's pitch axis theory (1971).

From August to October 2020, the Brazilian Society for Music Theory and Analysis (TeMA) held a series of five online meetings, each featuring a well-stablished theorist who presented one of his/her recent publications. Following the guest speaker’s presentation, a discussion session ensued, featuring guests from TeMA. On August 20th, TeMA received Robert Hatten to open the series, who was invited to talk about his most recent book: A Theory of Virtual Agency for Western Art Music (2018). Six guests from TeMA joined Hatten for the discussion session: Maria Lúcia Machado Pascoal, Cristina Capparelli Gerling, Flavio Santos Pereira, Diósnio Machado Neto, Guilherme Sauerbronn de Barros, and Paulo de Tarso Salles. Aiming at bringing Hatten’s presentation and the lively ensuing discussion to a wider audience, this essay presents an edited transcription of this meeting.

I understand ethnography to mean a description of empirical material that is so meticulous that it constitutes part of the scientific analysis. An ethnography of narrating thus would include thorough descriptions of both the act of narrating itself with all its cultural, social, communicative, and emotional aspects, as well as of the narratives, their form, contents, meaning, function, and aesthetics. Katharine Young's idea of describing a narrative situation as consisting of a number (three, four, or many) of worlds or realms (Young 1987) has proven to be extremely useful and productive. Its analytical strength lies in its ability to provide links between text-centred and performance-centred analyses, especially concerning the roles taken by participants during different phases of the narrative event. When applying Young's model to a short excerpt of a taperecorded life history, its potency of reproduction becomes obvious. First, the speaker appears to set up not one, but a number of parallel taleworlds, occupying different positions in time and/or space. Complicated liaisons are established between temporal and spatial elements of these taleworlds. Second, inside Young's 'Realm of the Ordinary' (or, possibly, parallel to Young's 'realm of thought', 'realm of interaction' or 'social world') there seems to be need for a 'Realm of Experience', where all the not-yet-verbalized actions take place. Furthermore, some taleworlds seem to belong to realms of dreams and imagination, while others are situated in the future; still others (letters, diaries) typically are not performed inside live narrating sessions, but appear in frozen form. At different macrolevels we find the taleworlds of the grand narratives.

''spiritual", ''idea", and ''mind", beginning with Scholastic uses, but con centrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke's causal account is discussed in the'final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his-reliance on mental dispositions. Locke's position suffers from the omission of concepts. Chapter I Knowledge, Cognition and Non-Descriptive Concepts. The major distinction we wish to draw between uses of ''idea') ' by our philosophers is between what we shall call occurrences in the mind and dispositions to have such occurrences on the one hand and concepts on the other. Concepts are best explained as that which governs our utterances of verbal tokens so that they have a use. Occurrences in the mind will be explained in analogy with utterances. Only beings governed by rules have concepts and any account of the knowledge we have which is peculiar to us as beings governed by rules and its application to things must assign a principal part to concepts. We can allow that occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them are due to our causal relations with our environment. But concepts are conventional and are imposed on us by our culture. Locke's account of our knowledge suffers from the lack of a notion of concepts, as it must, for it is a causal or genetic account. ''Idea" for Locke means either an occurrence in the mind or a disposition for such occurrences. ''Concept" corresponds to Descartes' ''objective reality" and Malebranche ' s and Leibniz' ''idea". The accounts these philosophers give of the application of the knowledge we have which is peculiar to us as rational beings or beings governed by rules, though attenuated and idealised, is basically sound. However, they maintain that all rational beings naturally have the same set of concepts in all stages of their history and apply them in their natural interaction with their environment. A major reason for this position is their view

Research on the meaning of music has a long tradition, with approaches from several fields, but it lacks a coherent framework for interdisciplinary discussions. As a result, the notion of meaning in music is fragmented among contrasting perspectives. I propose a cognitive-semiotic approach to the analysis of the meaning evoked by music listening, adopting a framework that eludes disciplinary limitations and expands the notion of meaning to the phenomenological concept of intentionality. For this purpose, I apply Zlatev's Semiotic Hierarchy to the experience of listening to music, analysing the diversity of meaningmaking processes involved in music as distributed among several layers of experience. As a result, I propose an updated version of the Semiotic Hierarchy, clarifying its structure as based on possibilities of meaningmaking, and allowing for temporality to pervade experience throughout all layers. I highlight the connectedness and simultaneity of different kinds of intentionality, resulting in the addition of the dimension of aesthetic experience-which I analyze as characterizing culture-general music listening. A key claim is that experiencing music aesthetically articulates the listener's body in their inner sense of space and time, making them feel a sense of movement and vitality. This grounds music as a semiotic system, connecting with and fostering virtually uncountable subject-relative and culture-specific meaning-making acts.

Despite inter-specific kinship sensitivities and indigenous knowledge, the mechanistic and antagonistic concept of 'nature' underpins the use and abuse of biophysical resources. Recent trends in the biological sciences challenge the validity of this model. Plants and fungi are engaged in a mutually beneficial relation and can be said to have memory and intelligence. Simultaneously, vegetal or plant thinking is becoming the focus of philosophical reflection. This article argues that not only do we think like plants, we think with and through them. In order to maintain diversity of thought we must maintain the diversity of old growth forests. This is a noetic challenge to rekindle kinship with our fungal forbears so as to reroot our minds and bodies in the earth. It is also a call for the immediate cessation of mining within the threatened Tarkine Wilderness in Northern Tasmania, home to a plethora of undescribed species of fungi. Rerooting the Rhizome We're tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They've made us suffer too much. (Deleuze and Guattari 15) Ostensibly this is an article about the relation between humans and vegetal life. Actually, this is about the Tarkine. The Tarkine is a large Wilderness in Western Tasmania, an island off the south coast of Australia. The Tarkine continues to be subject to mining and logging despite repeated attempts to include it in the World Heritage list. With Gondwanan flora, it is home to a variety of endemic species and consists of many different landscapes, from callidendrous rainforest to button-grass plains and dunes. In order to put forward an argument in favour of protecting this wilderness on something more than aesthetic grounds, I suggest a descent underground to consider recent tendencies reinventing humanity in symbiotic relation with our fungal forbears. Developments in fungal research are generating a very tangible ethic of inter-special symbiosis. However, simultaneously there is a branching off, where the information transfer and schematics of mycorrhizal relationality and flexibility are being co-opted into biometric networks of population surveillance owned by large digital tech companies. The former describes a natural evolutionary process that has taken many millions of years to develop, from which humans only relatively recently 'separated' and are now to a limited degree realising a desire to rejoin. The latter, which we will call (following Mikulak) the 'rhizomatics of domination', is the development of technologies that are so resource dependent that they actively cause the extinction of the former. This article acknowledges Mikulak's critique of the use of rhizomic theory, and argues that it can go both ways. On the one hand, the immanent future threatens a deeper immersion in rhizomorphic structures of digital biopower, with increasing restrictions and controls placed on individuals rather than on the biosecurity of companies, institutes or corporations (where the threat is much greater). While drawing our gaze away from the diversity of the world around us (and in us) (bio)technologies activate systems of control, both metaphorically and actually, reducing our ability to discern and enact diversity within our own lives. I argue that these technologies mirror natural networks and in so doing activate in us an atavistic desire to become one with the network, providing a false sense of unity and completeness. On the other hand, we have the power to expose the emotive and technological manipulation of our minds and bodies, reject claims to world domination (for example, Facebook's attempt to colonise 100 percent of the earth's population) and think in 'involutionary' symbiotic chains embedded in the real, green terrain of vegetal and fungal living. Mycorrhizal interactions structure the evolution of vegetal life as fungal rhizomorphs coalesced with the early rootless plants and provided them with otherwise unavailable nutrients. The vegetal world is not only structured by aggregates, it is fundamentally symbiotic to a degree that boggles the mind. Interrelations are not limited to those between plants and fungi, but rather a complex system in which roots, rhizomes, bacteria, endophytes interact with rocks and soil and pass on nutrients to larger organisms, from insects to apes: all rely upon one another in order to coexist. Although our language may permit the inclusion of arborescent metaphors, the deeply embedded collusion of metaphors within the signifying chain should alert us to the real nature of more than linguistic entanglement that structures our thought and our (unconscious) minds. Rather than isolating nature to the symbolic order structured by transcendental signifiers and polarities (like nature/culture, man/woman), we can allow an earthly metaphorics to draw us down into the soil in order to rethink the human being as a being-innature. This is not a call to reinstate a relationship with nature, because this overlooks the impossibility of having severed this relation in the first place. In the absence of a transcendental creator or an alien intervention, human thought is always already and necessarily earthly, originating in and sustained by the biosphere, from the air we breathe to the fruits that nourished our natality and growth. If, like good students of Lacan, we accept that there is no prelinguistic mythical state of oneness with nature, it doesn't matter that 'nature' is a useless category framing human nature and culture in the binary of self and other, because our language is already intrinsically vegetal, as well as animistic, geological, astrophysical. The word 'Nature' is not only another transcendental signifier, but it also assumes a split between the human/nonhuman and organic/inorganic. Just as Timothy Morton (Being Ecological) argues that we are already ecological, I argue that we are already vegetal. While Western philosophy has objectified Nature, the dependence upon a variety of species (the tree being a favourite) to provide metaphors, concepts and philosophemes as the basis of argument ('if a tree falls in the wood') should alert us to the fact that we do not only think about these species, but with and through them. A tree remains in philosophy, whether it is 'growing in the mind' or the actual trees pulped to make the pages. 'Aren't you sometimes frightened at being planted out here, with nobody to take care of you?' 'There's the tree in the middle,' said the Rose: 'what else is it good for?' (Lewis Carroll) Deleuze and Guattari's term Rhizome finds its root in Ancient Greek, the preferred language of western philosophy. Rizoma in Ancient Greek is, according to Theophrastus in his Enquiry into Plants, the mass of roots of a plant (a mass noun), riza a single root (3.3.4; 1.1.9). Root on the other hand finds an ambivalent etymology in German, Scandinavian, Old English: it is the mass of roots under the ground, but it is also the plant itself, figuratively it is also the origin and cause. In Australia (where we lay our scene) the word has sexual connotations.

Är musik verkligen en sten? Några reflektioner över musikens epistemiska och ontologiska egenskaper Arvidson, Mats 2015 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Arvidson, M. (2015). Är musik verkligen en sten? Några reflektioner över musikens epistemiska och ontologiska egenskaper. Abstract från Musik och samhälle VII, Lund, Sverige.

The art scene in Berlin is political." "The Atlanta hip hop scene is red hot!" These are remarks we have heard lately about scenes. Scenes are a commonplace in art talk. But what are scenes, and what is their role in arts? Aestheticians, art theorists, and art historians often pay attention to different scenes. Although many classics in the field are based on comments regarding only one scene, which is, for example, the case with Arthur C. Danto's "The Artworld" (1964) and Susan Sontag's "Notes on Camp" (1964), which both focus on New York, there is still no discussion about scenes themselves. Starting from some contemporary classics of aesthetic theory written on art and culture, and then continuing to discuss what scenes really are, we intend to work out a sketchy understanding about not just what scenes are but how we should take them into account when we write about art and aesthetics.

The purpose of the study was to find out and analyze themes and patterns in the ads of Islamic religious events like 'Urs and Milad. We have applied semiotic visual analysis to the found images of the communication devices of these events. We collected the data for the study using a Google Images search as well as the posters on the walls of bazaars and religious places. We have identified some recurring themes in these ads, like the use of the domes of the mausoleums as symbols of the prophet and saints; the pictures of the religious personalities; and the use of techniques like imagery to establish the credibility of sponsors of these events. The symbols were used in a hierarchical order. The ads can further be divided into three categories: typographical, with dominant imagery supported by text, and text supported by imagery. This classification corresponds to the previous classifications found in the literature. Alternative psychology-based explanations are also discussed. However, like any classification efforts, these can turn out ridiculous.

Bir anlam aktarım aracı olarak müziği ele aldığımızda müzikteki salt tınıların anlamı ne denli kesin ve doğrudan aktarabileceği belirsizdir. Müziği oluşturan ezgi, ritim, armoni vb. unsurların dinleyici tarafından nasıl alımlanacağı ve yorumlanacağı büyük değişkenlik arz eder. Diğer yandan şarkı türlerinde sözlerin kullanılması görece olarak müziğin anlam aktarım gücünü artırır. Sözler aracılığıyla şarkının kodaçımı ve analizi mümkün olur. Ancak şarkı yazarı anlamı belli okumalarla sınırlandırmak istese dahi keyfi okumaların önüne geçemeyebilir. Bunda bir ileti/metin olarak şarkının yayımlandığı tarihsel ve kültürel bağlam; alıcıların/dinleyicilerin toplumsal konumları, kültürel deneyimleri ve ideolojik tercihleri etkendir. Ayrıca sanatçının toplum içerisindeki konumu ve yapmış olduğu açıklamalar gibi müzik dışı etkenler de müziğin nasıl alımlandığını etkiler.
SongMeanings.com çeşitli sanatçılara ait şarkı sözlerinin yer aldığı ve kullanıcıların şarkı sözlerini yorumladığı, tartıştığı bir platformdur. Ayrıca kullanıcılar, beğendikleri veya beğenmedikleri yorumlara puan ve yanıt vererek şarkının nasıl “okunması” gerektiğine ilişkin katılım gösterirler. Bu sayede belli okuma biçimlerinin öne çıkmasına veya marjinalleşmesine yol açarlar. Bu çalışmada, müzikte anlam üzerine mücadelenin gerçekleştiği bir alan olan SongMeanings.com özelinde, “Radioactive” adlı şarkının kullanıcılar arasında nasıl farklı şekillerde anlamlandırıldığı, yorumlandığı ve tartışıldığı çeşitli kavramlar temelinde ele alınır.

So in literature we have two (perhaps identical) syntactically articulate vocabularies, the terms of each taking the terms of the other as referents, with both of the resultant systems-the one a system of denotation, the other of exemplification-being syntactically articulate and semantically dense. Thus, even though a literary work is articulate and may exemplify or express what is articulate, endless search is always required here as in other arts to determine precisely what is exemplified or expressed. 1 This passage from Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art is not a paradigmatically obvious or even easily understandable description of the process of literary criticism or its result. Nevertheless I shall argue that, once explained, Goodman's description of the nature of the process of determining what a work of literature exemplifies or expresses offers a good account of a significant part of literary criticism. I will then argue that Goodman's account is quite surprisingly useful in describing the relation of a work of literature to its theme, thesis or 'message'. The element of surprise stems from the fact that if a work of literature is said to express or exemplify its 'message', 'moral' or theme in Goodman's sense, then determining that message is not a matter of ascertaining what the work denotes-its semantic properties-but of choosing a label which denotes it. This, I think, is just the opposite of what one would naturally expect. For purposes of explication we have to accept Goodman's specification of the object of literary criticism as the text, though not, I think, much of his metaphysical view about what a text is. What is important is that Goodman's identity criterion for a literary work ties it quite specifically to a group of words ordered in precisely one way, so that the text becomes in effect a selfinstantiating spelling rule. 2 From this criterion it follows that a reader whose book has a misprint has not, strictly speaking, read the work. Neither have readers of abridged editions or translations. But if this criterion seems excessively restrictive, the worst that can be said of it is that, in proposing it, Goodman has taken an extreme position at that end of a continuum where most theorists are grouped anyway. There is perhaps a heuristic argument

Can music be "understood"?D oest he notion of understanding make sense when applied to music?I ne verydayc ommunication, understanding seems linked to words and (images of)o bjects. "Understanding" works of literary or pictorial arts, therefore, seems to be quite "natural".I ni nstrumental music, however,w herew ords, pictures or narrativep rograms are missing,w e onlycan refer to sounds, the form of their succession and the interrelations between their elements (tones). Twoissues arise here: First,what concept of understanding fits to hearing and interpreting music in general?Second, if thereisno general answer to the question of what understanding music in general means, understanding music might be something different depending on what kind of music we are dealingw ith. 1P references and Aesthetic Appreciation Probablya ll of us, when leaving ac oncert,h aveh eard people commentingo n the music they have just listened to some minutes ago, like this: (1) "Id idn'tl ike that." Or like this: (2) "Id idn'tu nderstand what was going on." Comment (1) is an expression of dislike: The person had no pleasure hearing the music. Comment (2)takes another stance. Instead of just expressingsubjective and momentary negative emotions, it expresses a lack of understanding. The underlyingc onviction will be the following:W hen we talk about music, we should not just express our personal likes or dislikes,rather we should refer to the features of the music and try to understand the music by adequatelyt aking notice of how these features are realized and how the music "works". Besides these two brief and rather simple comments,wecan sometimeshear people sayt hingsl ike the following: (3) "Idon'tlike that kind of stuff, but Idon'tdenythat it is masterful music, intelligent,c omplex, and at an aestheticallyh igh-level." Or this: (4) "It'so nlyr ock 'n' roll, but Il ike it."

 Reflecting on Paul Ricoeur's discussion of historical configuration and fictional emplotment, this article proposes to actualize his model to oppose two prototypes of narrativity, which form two poles between which narrative representations extend. Instead of basing these prototypes on narrative genres such as historiography and fiction, it compares the configuration of narratives designed to inform readers about the signification of a past event with the emplotment of narratives aiming to immerse readers in a simulated past or a fictive storyworld. While contemporary narratology has been mostly concerned with the latter case, we will see that a comparison between narratives belonging to these two poles can help us better understand the functioning of narrative texts, most of them situated between these two extremes. Drawing on stories of a plane crash found in daily newspapers and magazines, the article shows that news stories usually favor the informative function, but when a...