Moral Enhancement

This paper evaluated the performance of an envelope enhancement (EE) algorithm subjectively by children with auditory processing disorder (APD), and objectively through computational models. Speech intelligibility data was collected from children with APD, for unprocessed and envelope- enhanced speech in the presence of stationary and non-stationary background noise at different signal to noise ratios (SNRs), both with and without noise reduction (NR) algorithms as a front-end to the EE algorithm. Furthermore, intrusive and non-intrusive objective speech intelligibility metrics were derived to predict the perceptual impact of this EE algorithm. Subjective data for stationary noise conditions revealed that the combination of NR and EE algorithms significantly improved the speech intelligibility scores at poor SNRs. In contrast, the same combination was ineffective in improving speech intelligibility in non-stationary noise conditions. Taken together, subjective results suggest that exaggerating the envelope cues improves speech identification scores for children with APD. However, the benefit obtained varies depending upon the type and level of the background noise. Both intrusive and non-intrusive objective speech intelligibility estimators exhibited good correlation with the subjective data, with the intrusive metric demonstrating better generalization capabilities. Implications of these results for hearing aid applications for children with APD is discussed.

In this essay I will elaborate the following question: " How important is moral enhancement for mankind in order to survive? From history we know that people harm each other in terrible ways, and that based on state-of-the-art weapons a single individual can kill millions of us. As the technology vastly progresses, also in the weapon-industry, the impact of these weapons is huge , and the chance that an idiot, a crazy agent or a terroristic cell will make use of them, is getting larger daily. The result is that it may end up in a catastrophe for mankind and in general for our beautiful planet. For this essay I am strongly inspired by the article published by (Person, Savulescu, 2008) and (Douglas, 2008). Besides the answer to the question the end result of my argument will be a claim for a moral appeal to the world's authorities to take action to: a. Implement and embed moral enhancement behavior education as soon as children start with elementary school, and after completion, continuing this morality development process based on the principle of Bildung. b. Implement a-by the state-controlled, compulsory measure for each earth citizen to take a morality pill as soon it is available as a tested and validated product without any side effects. c. Organize a yearly morality enhancement conference for the United Nations based on a morality progress roadmap and an implementation control plan with the aim to improve the global morality level of mankind in its full spectrum.

The biotechnological advances obtained in the last decades have configurated a particular scenario about the limits of what we can do with ourselves, especially by revealing that the human enhancement debate still is epistemologically confused and ethically naive. As we intend to discuss, that happens for two reasons: the first one is associated with the moral evaluation of enhancement concepts, in other words, whether or not we would be entitled to promote substantial changes that jeopardize the conservation of our own way of life; the second reason, intrinsically attached to the first one, is to neglect the evolutionary history of human beings and to claim, therefore, that human enhancement should be carefully evaluated because we would not be able to foresee the possible disastrous risks in our future. It is right into these arguments that the debate between bioconservatives and transhumanists becomes epistemologically confused and ethically weak.

Opponents to genetic or biomedical human enhancement often claim that the availability of these technologies would have negative consequences for those who either choose not to utilize these resources or lack access to them. However, Thomas Douglas has argued that this objection has no force against the use of technologies that aim to bring about morally desirable character traits, as the unenhanced would benefit from being surrounded by such people. I will argue that things are not as straightforward as Douglas makes out. The widespread use of moral enhancement would raise the standards for praise and blame worthiness, making it much harder for the unenhanced to perform praiseworthy actions or avoid performing blameworthy actions. This shows that supporters of moral enhancement cannot avoid this challenge in the way that Douglas suggests.

Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate...

Gordon and Burckhart have assembled a collection of essays that are grouped together complimentarily and flow well from one to the next. As to the strengths and weaknesses of the individual essays, they are predominantly well written, well researched, and constructively critical while remaining true to the spirit of Jonas’ thought.

Scientific and scholarly attention to psychedelics has recently faced a resurgence. Recent studies suggest that psychedelic experiences can change values and behavioral dispositions, for example increase appreciation of nature and increase prosocial behavior. For this reason psychedelics have been identified as a promising option for moral neuroenhancement. However, we still struggle to understand these changes in the valuations psychedelics induce, or why exactly they are morally enhancing.

In this thesis I construct a philosophical framework to understand these changes. I combine Iris Murdoch and Abraham Maslow’s thinking with empirical studies on psychedelics and experiences of self-transcendence. Psychedelics induce experiences of self-transcendence which involve evaluative changes. I argue that these changes are not random but result from an intelligible process. I first claim that psychedelics in some cases induce unselfing, that is, perspectival and evaluative changes resulting from reduction of salience attributed to oneself. By reducing egoic centering, unselfing opens our attention to the world and can cause perspectival widening from egocentric into more allocentric (other-directed) or cosmocentric (universal) perspective. The second main claim is that the process of unselfing is often connected to sharpened perception of values. The increased attention to the world and reduced egocentric attributions of salience, resulting from unselfing, can widen our evaluative context and make it possible to perceive or grasp intrinsic values better, thus ‘tuning the moral compass’ away from instrumental egocentric mode of evaluation.

This thesis makes an original contribution to current discussions on moral neuroenhancement by presenting a well-elaborated connection between the experiences of self-transcendence and the evaluative changes. At least some changes in values associated with psychedelic experiences are related to unselfing. Further the framework provided is relevant not only for understanding value changes in psychedelic experiences, but it can be used to understand and to conceptually and theoretically integrate various phenomena which involve unselfing and techniques that aim at spiritual, moral and existential changes. Another original contribution of this thesis is that psychedelic experiences and moral neuroenhancement are discussed with the conceptual means of Murdoch’s and Maslow’s thought.

[English see below] La réception critique du transhumanisme le présente souvent comme un mélange d’espoirs un peu fantasques d’améliorations techniques de l’humain et de projets actuellement élaborés dans le secret de laboratoires ou start-ups. Tant les enthousiastes que les inquiets se plaisent parfois à présenter le transhumanisme comme une révolution inéluctable ; tout en alertant sur ses risques sociaux, politiques, métaphysiques ou symboliques. Mais en quoi consiste précisément ce futur qu’il faudrait nous préparer d’urgence à accueillir ? Cet article propose d’analyser deux régimes de tension traversant le transhumanisme dans son élaboration comme mouvement d’idées ; d’abord par certains bioéthiciens anglo-saxons, puis par des militants réunis en associations ou en groupes plus informels. Nous analysons deux lignes de désaccords internes à ces mouvements, afin d’en faire voir la diversité des attentes d’une part, et d’autre part d’ouvrir une discussion sur le rôle et la performativité de ce mouvement. Nous montrerons par là que les transhumanistes élaborent et sont mobilisés par un imaginaire sociotechnique fait d’interactions constantes entre émancipation et contrainte d’une part, entre fantaisie et rationalisation d’autre part. Ces composantes a priori hétérogènes produisent une tension relative dans les formes fragiles de promotion de futurs désirables, fondées sur des perceptions variables du potentiel des progressions technologiques et des fondements éthiques et politiques des sociétés contemporaines.

***English***
Most philosophical critiques view transhumanism as a mixture of odd hopes regarding human technological enhancement and real projects developed behind closed doors in labs or start-ups. Whether enthusiastic or anxious, these commentators often present transhumanism as an inescapable revolution, while warning about its social, political, metaphysical or symbolic risks. But what exactly is this future that we should so urgently prepare ourselves to embrace? This article aims to analyze two regimes of tension, which are pervasive in the development of transhumanism as a mode of thought; first in the work of some Anglo-Saxon bioethicists, and then within the perspective of activists gathered in associations or more informal groups. We look at two internal opposite lines of argument in order to capture the diversity of expectations and the possibility for an open discussion on the role and performativity of this movement. We will describe how transhumanists together contribute and are entangled in a sociotechnical imaginary constantly oscillating between emancipation and constraint, fantasy and rationalization. These heterogeneous components are particularly apparent in their attempts to promote desirable futures. We show that this movement is based on different perceptions of the potential of technological advances and of the ethical and political foundations of contemporary societies.

Da sempre gli esseri umani hanno utilizzato diversi metodi per diventare moralmente più buoni, più giusti e più altruisti, come hanno insegnato Socrate, Gesù e Gandhi: l'educazione, l'insegnamento, l'autodisciplina, le letture edificanti, la conoscenza. Metodi talvolta efficaci, talvolta insufficienti, soprattutto in un contesto globale in cui la stessa specie umana è minacciata di essere spazzata via da disastri ambientali, pandemie, uso di armi di distruzione di massa.

In sympathy with Francesca Ferrando's book Philosophical Posthumanism, this brief article elaborates on a parallel topic: the ethical implications of current projects to modify humans and their society by using digital emerging technology. [FREE ACCESS TO FULL TEXT HERE: Journal of Posthumanism vol. 1, no. 2, Dec. 2021, pp. 195-8, https://journals.tplondon.com/jp/article/view/1718]

La maternità è ricchezza per la nostra società. Al cuore di questa ricchezza risiede una duplice dimensione, etica e socio-economica. Essa è ricchezza nella sua dimensione etica, in quanto paradigma di autonomia relazionale. È la maternità che ci ricorda che siamo esseri umani dotati di una libertà che non si esprime in una dimensione isolata e isolante rispetto all’altro, ma si esprime al meglio in una dimensione relazionale.
Pertanto, riscoprire la ricchezza della maternità significa in primo luogo riscoprire la centralità e la bellezza del ruolo della donna e il ruolo paradigmatico e fondante che essa può esercitare nella società. In seconda istanza significa riconoscere che il valore non si configura solamente in termini etici, ma anche sociali ed economici, infatti è proprio tale relazione la base per lo sviluppo e il futuro di un paese.

This chapter reviews recent philosophical and neuroethical literature on the morality of moral neuroenhancements. It first briefly outlines the main moral arguments that have been made concerning moral status neuroenhancements. These are neurointerventions that would augment the moral status of human persons. It then surveys recent debate regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements: neurointerventions that augment that the moral desirability of human character traits,
motives or conduct. This debate has contested, among other claims (i) Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s contention that there is a moral imperative to pursue the development of moral desirability neuroenhancements, (ii) Thomas Douglas’ claim that
voluntarily undergoing moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally permissible, and (iii) David DeGrazia’s claim that moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally desirable. The chapter discusses a number of concerns that have been raised regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements, including concerns that they would restrict freedom, would produce only a superficial kind of moral
improvement, would rely on technologies that are liable to be misused, and would frequently misfire, resulting in moral deterioration rather than moral improvement.

The debate on the ethical aspects of moral bioenhancement focuses on the desirability of using biomedical as opposed to traditional means to achieve moral betterment. The aim of this paper is to systematically review the ethical reasons presented in the literature for and against moral bioenhancement. A review was performed and resulted in the inclusion of 85 articles. We classified the arguments used in those articles in the following six clusters: (1) why we (don't) need moral bioenhancement, (2) it will (not) be possible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should involve, (3) the feasibility of moral bioenhancement and the status of current scientific research, (4) means and processes of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically, (5) arguments related to the freedom, identity and autonomy of the individual, and (6) arguments related to social/group effects and dynamics. We discuss each argument separately, and assess the debate as a whole. First, there is lit...

Proponents of moral enhancement believe that we should pursue and apply biotechnological means to morally enhance human beings, as failing to do so is likely to lead to humanity's demise. Unsurprisingly, these proposals have generated a substantial amount of debate about the moral permissibility of using such interventions. Here I put aside concerns about the permissibility of moral enhancement and focus on the conceptual and evidentiary grounds for the moral enhancement project. I argue that such grounds are quite precarious.

Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists writing on the topic have relied almost exclusively on semiotic insights about perception originally designed as part of a sophisticated refutation of idealism. The end result, which has been a form of direct givenness, has thus been far from convincing. In an effort to bring substance to the right-headed suggestion that values are rooted in the biological and conform to species-specific requirements, we present a novel conception that strives to make explicit the elemental structure underlying umwelt normativity. Building and expanding on the seminal work of Ayn Rand in metaethics, we describe values as an intertwined lattice which takes a creature’s own embodied life as its ultimate standard; and endeavour to show how, from this, all subsequent valuations can in principle be determined.

This book analyses recent moves in the debate over human enhancement from two different perspectives: moral philosophy and science. It contains not only a thorough consideration on the promise, limitations, and perils of biotechnological improvement, but also offers a lucid account of a systematic evolution of the idea of excellence from antiquity to the present-day project of the post-human condition. The book examines various approaches to key anthropological concepts such as agency, autonomy, practical rationality, and normativity, pointing out their relevance to philosophical and biomedical research. All these issues are addressed by scholars representing different fields of study including philosophy , law, biophysics, and cognitive science. They attempt to answer the question of whether biotechnological interventions may result in bringing about a better person.

“Committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of medical intervention”, claims Thomas Douglas, who stated in this context that “compulsory uses of medical correctives could in principle be justified.” This article engages critically with his and other arguments on the use of coercive neurocorrectives for criminal offenders. First, the rehabilitation assumption that includes—for coercive neurocorrectives to work as an alternative to incarceration—that rehabilitation is the “only goal” of criminal punishment is criticized. Additionally this article engages with the theoretical difficulty of solely rehabilitative approaches, and discusses why it is unfortunate to design neurocorrectives so as to be particularly harmful in order to imagine administering them as being a punishment. Second, until we know more about specific neurocorrectives, we are well advised not to undermine the most important objection against coercive neurocorrectives, namely offenders’ human rights. This article argues that the use of coercive neurocorrectives would particularly violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees as an absolute right that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, and finally holds that a still weak human right to mental integrity and self-determination should fundamentally come first.

In this paper I discuss the effects of a program of moral bio- enhancement imposed transparently through public policy on individual freedom; some authors propose to distribute these interventions secretly, administering them to citizens without their knowledge, to substantially reduce threats to freedom and increase the effectiveness of these interventions. However, a secret program is incompatible with just institutions and therefore not an acceptable alternative. Nor does a moral bio-enhancement chosen by individuals voluntarily seem to solve the problems. Although it is more respectful of personal liberties, it runs into a paradox: it is very likely that those who are most in need of moral enhancement will have less motivation to resort to it. The conclusion  will therefore be (partially) aporetic.

It has been argued that moral bioenhancement is desirable even if it would make it impossible for us not to do what is morally required. Others find this apparent loss of freedom deplorable. However, it is difficult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil can plausibly be regarded as worse than a world in which people are not only free to do evil, but where they actually do it, which would commit us to the seemingly paradoxical view that, under certain circumstances, the bad can be better than the good. Notwithstanding, this view is defended here.

Tackling climate change is one of the most demanding challenges of humanity in the 21 st century. Still, the efforts to mitigate the current environmental crisis do not seem enough to deal with the increased existential risks for the human being and other species. Persson and Savulescu have proposed that our evolutionarily forged moral psychology is one of the impediments to facing as enormous a problem as global warming. They suggested that if we want to address properly some of the most pressing problems that cause catastrophic harm to our existence, we should enhance our moral behavior by biomedical means. The objective of this paper is, precisely, to reflect on whether a Moral Bio-Enhancement (henceforth MBE) program would be a viable option to confront the climate emergency. To meet this goal, I will propose the Ultimate Mostropic (hereafter UM) thought experiment, a hypothetical situation where we have already discovered the UM, an available, safe (without any deleterious secondary effects), extremely cheap and effective pill to enhance our cognitive, affective and motivational abilities related to morality. After briefly presenting the main argument of Persson and Savulescu regarding MBE and climate change, I will point out some of the difficulties that make MBE a daunting but exciting philosophical and scientific debate. In order to overcome these complications, I will describe the UM thought experiment, which involves two scenarios of the MBE program: (a) the state-driven, compulsory and universal enterprise, and (b) the initiative of voluntary individuals. I will show that the shortcomings of MBE programs through the UM in both scenarios make Persson and Savulescu's proposal a not appealing pathway to mitigate climate change. In the final section, I will suggest that an inaccurate attribution of responsibilities underlies their proposal and that the collective inaction problem should be redirected primarily through a reinforcement of the political nature of the solutions.

Francesca Ferrando's book Philosophical Posthumanism concentrates on some of the ethical issues connected with genetic alteration of the human species.  In sympathy with her analysis, this brief article (commentary) elaborates on a parallel topic: the ethical implications of current projects to modify humans and their society with digital emerging technology.

In this article, we consider contexts or domains in which (future) moral bioen-hancement interventions possibly or most likely will be implemented. By looking closely at similar or related existing practices and their relevant ethical frameworks, we hope to identify ethical considerations that are relevant for evaluating potential moral bioenhance-ment interventions. We examine, fi rst, debates on the proper scope of moral education; second, proposals for identifying early risk factors for antisocial behaviour; and third, the diffi cult balancing of individual freedom and third party concerns in (forensic) psychiatry. In imagining moral bioenhancement in practice, we observe that unlike other forms of enhancement, moral enhancement fundamentally asks how the interests and preferences of the individual and the interests of others should be weighed (in view of public safety and managing public risk). Highly diverse domains such as education, mental health, and the judicial domain might be involved, and moral bioenhancement might challenge existing institutional settings. Given these highly varied contexts and domains, it appears unlikely that there will be a distinct set of practices that will be referred to as " moral bioenhancement. "

Numerous authors have argued that an ambiguity in the conclusion of Aristotle’s Function Argument in book 1, chapter 7 of the Nichomachean Ethics results in the failure of that argument. The ambiguity is that to anthropinon agathon may be read either as ‘the good for humans’ or ‘the good of humans’. John Ackrill, in particular, argues that the Function Argument is intended to prove that doing well at the characteristic human function is good for humans in the sense of benefitting them. Ackrill claims that the function argument does not deliver on this intent, and thus fails to do important work in Aristotle’s larger project. Gavin Lawrence has argued, conversely, that the Function Argument is not intended to clarify the good for humans, but the good of humans in a teleological sense. On Lawrence’s reading, the Function Argument succeeds in this goal and does the important work needed from it in Aristotle’s larger project. I defend Ackrill’s reading against Lawrence’s objections and suggest two textual arguments in favor of the ‘good for humans’ reading. I conclude that the Function Argument fails to do important work in Aristotle’s larger project.

Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate that, by virtue of its traditional or conservative features, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be incorporated into the traditional moral education network. Finally, I conclude that, being a part of the traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be a unique and ethically acceptable option of moral neuroenhancement.

The moral enhancement of humans by biological or genetic means has recently been urged as a response to the pressing concerns facing human civilization. In this paper, I argue that proponents of biological moral enhancement have misrepresented the facts of human moral psychology. As a result, the likely effectiveness of traditional methods of moral enhancement has been underestimated, relative to biological or genetic means. I review arguments in favor of biological moral enhancement and argue that the complexity of moral psychology raises serious problems for such interventions. I offer a programmatic sketch of the ways in which our improved understanding of moral psychology can help facilitate more traditional methods of moral enhancement. I conclude that the best response to the dangers faced by human civilization is the continued use of traditional methods of moral enhancement and the use of our improved understanding of moral psychology to further refine and develop these methods.

In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bioenhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This paper aims to show that the proposal Savulescu & Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of Savulescu’s & Persson’s normative argument unravel once it is suitably clear how aiming to cognitively enhance an individual will in part require that one aim to bring about certain moral goods we show to be essential to cognitive flourishing; conversely, aiming to bring about moral enhancement in an individual must involve aiming to improve certain cognitive capacities we show to be essential to moral flourishing. After developing these points in some detail, and their implication for Savulescu’s & Persson’s proposal, we conclude by outlining some positive suggestions.

Moral enhancement' refers to the project (still purely notional) of enhancing the moral capacities of humanity through drugs, genomic editing and other such technologies. Its supporters present it as expedient, necessary even, to avert the potentially catastrophic misuse of nuclear and biological weaponry and to revive our slackening enthusiasm for the fight against global warming. Technology, they say, has brought us to the brink of disaster; so now we need a new technology, a technology of the self, to reel us back again. 1

Imagine that a criminal offender were provided with a " reform pill " , which significantly weakened his desire to reoffend. After consuming the pill, he obeys the law. Is the offender's subsequent, apparently " good " behaviour genuinely good? Various theorists have intuited that biomedical " moral enhancement " techniques used for the purposes of reducing reoffending could somehow undermine the moral worth of the recipient's future actions. This article draws on the communication theory of punishment in order to shed new light on a potential source of this intuition in relation to the moral bioenhancement of those who have committed serious criminal wrongs. In doing so, it will consider the contention that the ultimate source of this intuition can be attributed to the intrinsically valuable freedom to do wrong before rejecting this account. The article then proceeds to explore the implications of the communication theory of punishment for the question of whether biomedical moral enhancements would undermine the moral worth of offenders' future law-abiding behaviour and highlights the need for the proponents of such interventions to address these issues. The arguments presented in this article have potential implications for biomedical interventions that are currently being used in the criminal justice system.