Modern Theology

The field of science and religion is undergoing a paradigm shift, in no small part due to the historical scholarship of Peter Harrison. With The Territories of Science and Religion (2015), and now Some New World: Myths of Supernatural Belief in a Secular Age (2024), Harrison has called into question some of the fundamental concepts that have tacitly structured the discourse of the field since its inception. Several of the authors in this issue discuss his argument, and we have included an interview with Harrison himself as the conclusion to the issue, so a full summary of his views seems unnecessary here. Suffice it to say that his basic, anti-essentialist thesis is that neither 'science' nor 'religion' exist as the transhistorical, monolithic categories that science-and-religion scholars and the public often assume them to be. The question for the field of science and religion is, as Paul Tyson puts it in his contribution to this issue, "if we are not dialoguing, or conflicting, or integrating science and religion (because they are not 'things' that exist), what are we doing" (7)? Tyson's question expresses the Kuhnian 'crisis' affecting, among other things, the very remit of Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences (PTSc). According to its Editorial Manifesto, "the main task of this journal is … to provide a common platform for dialogue according to rigorous academic standards" (Deane-Drummond, Evers, Peterson, and Gregersen 2014, 3). But if the semantics of dialogue no longer fit a rigorous historical understanding of the multiple practices that, for sake of convenience, we call 'science' and 'religion, ' then what are science-and-religion journals, scholars, and institutions doing? What ought we be doing? This question has been incredibly generative, as the contributions to this issue demonstrate.

We can observe a flight from creatureliness in the modern and late modern age. Agrarian philosopher and essayist Wendell Berry helps us understand that the loss of creatureliness results from several factors, yet a significant reason is the contemporary belief in technology to transcend our creaturely limitations and our life together with fellow creatures in the creation. Berry often laments that Christianity has contributed to rather than hindered the contemporary flight from creatureliness. However, Martin Luther offers a theological vision that embraces creatureliness and the creation. By employing a credal framework as an organizing principle, we can observe how, in Luther’s thought, the triune God is at work to restore human creatures to our creatureliness so that creation is “reopened” to us as a gift to delight in and receive with thanksgiving. Following this credal analysis, this article describes two disciplines God’s restored creatures should cultivate that arise from living in our vocations “down and among” other creatures in our technological age: 1) learning to pray and 2) nurturing place.

Followers of God have always been interested in his creation. After recounting the stars in the heavens, the bestowing of rain, the growth of vegetation and the feeding of wild animals, the psalmist cries out, "How many are your works, O L ORD ! In wisdom you made them all; the earth is full of your creatures" (Ps 104:24). But of all the things in creation, the greatest interest to most of us is our own nature, for we are fascinated with the wonder of ourselves. "For you created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother 's womb. I praise you because I am fearfully and wonderfully made; your works are wonderful, I know that full well" (Ps 139:13-14). As John Calvin (1559/1960) wrote, a human being is a microcosm of the universe, "a rare example of God's power, goodness, and wisdom, and contains within . . . enough miracles to occupy our minds" (p. 54). It should come as no surprise then to learn that Christian thinkers have also thought deeply about "psychology," psychology understood as the rigorous attempt to understand human character and behavior, one grounded in philosophical reflection and examination of the "data" of human experience. Yet Christian interest in human nature has exploded in the last forty years of the twentieth century. Countless books have been written by Christians that describe and reflect on human beings: how we should be raised, the nature of our personalities, our development, our relation- A fuller description of modernism will be given below, but for now let's focus on one feature of modernism: its secularism; that is, its tendency to empty culture of its religious significance, discourse, and symbols. Because of this feature, Christianity and modernism have struggled in the West for cultural dominance. In the main, most contemporary Westerners have been shaped by both modernism and Christianity. However, the secularism that has pervaded the significant writings and major institutions of Western culture in the twentieth century is evidence that modernism has superseded Christianity in influence. Most of the influential authors, thinkers, scientists, and celebrities of the twentieth century were not religious, or if they were, their religion was not visible. Many of the most influential shapers of modern culture openly disparaged traditional religious perspectives (e.

This article provides an English translation of Hans Lassen Martensen’s “The Present Religious Crisis” from 1842. In this work Martensen outlines two important trends that were much discussed at the time. The first part of his article is dedicated to the Anabaptist movement in Denmark, which was in open conflict with the Danish State Church about the question of infant baptism. In the second part, Martensen treats the work of the left Hegelian David Friedrich Strauss and his followers, who regarded the gospel accounts of the life of Jesus as, by and large, myths. Although polar opposites, these two movements are, for Martensen, symptoms of the religious confusion of the day. Martensen attempts to defend the Danish State Church in the face of these criticisms. Kierkegaard seems to refer to Martensen’s article in his “Public Confession,” where he refers to the rise of sects in Denmark and makes explicit reference to both the Anabaptists and the Straussians. Like Martensen, he is at pa...

This chapter presents the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar through, in the first instance, a treatment of his reintegration of theology and spirituality, from which ensues a discussion of major loci such as Trinity, Christology, Creation, Anthropology, and Eschatology. The import of Urkenosis is discussed for each of these topics. The chapter concludes with an assessment of Balthasar's achievement and the prospects for his theology in the contemporary setting.

The Council of Nicaea, convened in 325 CE by Emperor Constantine, marked a transformative moment in Christian history, addressing theological divisions, particularly the Arian controversy over Christ's divinity. This essay examines the council's historical and theological significance, including its efforts to resolve disputes about the nature of Christ and establish the foundational Nicene Creed. It further explores the comparison between Jesus and Dionysus, the Greek god of wine and transformation, highlighting thematic parallels such as rebirth and communal experiences while emphasizing the unique salvific and doctrinal elements of Christian theology. The council's affirmation of Jesus as co-eternal with God the Father delineated Christian orthodoxy from pagan influences, reinforcing a distinct religious identity. The resolutions of the Council of Nicaea not only shaped Christian doctrine and ecclesiastical governance but also established a legacy that continues to influence theological discourse and the broader trajectory of Christianity.

tasks.' Similarly, philosophical theology could benefit from a closer encounter with the great themes of the Christian heritage, and a better understanding of the biblical logic by which these themes emerged into conceptual form. (pp. 348-9) Indeed, continuing the conversation is well worthwhile, and PTET is at least a starting point in this task.

As exemplified by works like Friedrich Schiller’s Lectures on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), French and German intellectuals were sent reeling in the wake of the French Revolution. The close of the Age of Confessionalization (c.1520–1680s) brought with it a broad recasting of the legitimizing structures upon which social, political, and religious systems had
been established for the previous two centuries. In this paper, I consider how Schleiermacher’s intellectual and social formation established the basis for his articulation of a doctrine of God, as reflected in The Christian Faith. I examine how the manner of Schleiermacher’s romantic turn consisted in a movement away from consideration of theology as a science in order to recast it in broadly religious terms such that it became an expressive exercise. It is my contention that Schleiermacher’s more mature emphasis upon the essence of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence led him to reframe the classical doctrine of God’s aseity entirely in terms of God’s relation to humanity rather than in terms of
the divine life in se.

As exemplified by works like Friedrich Schiller’s Lectures on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), French and German intellectuals were sent reeling in the wake of the French Revolution. The close of the Age of Confessionalization (c.1520–1680s) brought with it a broad recasting of the legitimizing structures upon which social, political, and religious systems had
been established for the previous two centuries. In this paper, I consider how Schleiermacher’s intellectual and social formation established the basis for his articulation of a doctrine of God, as reflected in The Christian Faith. I examine how the manner of Schleiermacher’s romantic turn consisted in a movement away from consideration of theology as a science in order to recast it in broadly religious terms such that it became an expressive exercise. It is my contention that Schleiermacher’s more mature emphasis upon the essence of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence led him to reframe the classical doctrine of God’s aseity entirely in terms of God’s relation to humanity rather than in terms of
the divine life in se.

In the traditional study of the problem of evil and its connection to God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, philosophers have often focused on human pain and suffering. However, a fundamental question arises: which forms of pain and suffering should be counted? If human pain and suffering are considered evil, can the pain and suffering of animals also be regarded as such? Some philosophers affirm this, arguing that animals experience extreme pain, which can bolster the argument from evil against the existence of God. Others contend that suffering requires a sense of self, which animals supposedly lack, making the attribution of suffering to them likely anthropomorphic. In this paper, I address two key questions: (1) Shouldn't the pain and suffering of animals be considered when evaluating the problem of evil? (2) Regardless of the theological implications of current pain and suffering, do theists have the right to inflict pain and suffering on animals to achieve greater human good? My answer to the first question is affirmative, and to the second, negative. I argue that because animals are sentient beings, not only should their pain and suffering be accounted for in theological evaluations of the problem of evil, but humans—including theists—are morally obligated to recognize them as independent beings who should not be exploited as a means to achieve the putative human goods.

of the larger philosophical task it shares with all of us who dare to use concept and theory to delineate the definitive conditions for a meaningful human life, to propose ways of living that correspond to that delineation, and to call this twofold task wisdom. Risks are always grounded in hope. I suppose my first hope is that these background assumptions and interests that grip me through Gschwandtner's still mainly exegetical oeuvre may in time emerge to the foreground of her writings.

Браћа Карамазпви и стварност профетског говора Једно је надати се, рачунати је нешто сасвим друго. Безнађе није супротност нади. Напротив. Супротност нади је − рачун вероватноће. Достојевски је то непогрешиво осетио. Човек модерних времена извесност тражи у вероватноћи. Он, калкулише. Живистатистички. Тако поступајући, он се не нада. Он не верује. Он одмерава (прорачунава), покушава пратити трендове вероватноће. Са њима усклађује своја очекивања. 1 У таквом свету, у свету вероватноће, нема много простора за наду.

Scope: This paper examines how deconstruction theologyinspired by Derridean philosophy-intersects with foundational doctrines and emerging ethical challenges in the three Abrahamic traditions. It integrates theological, ethical, and cultural critiques, drawing on 100 scholarly works, including key interdisciplinary books that explore identity, ethics, and the future of faith.

This article is the third author’s article on the political theology of Davor Džal¬to. It provides a comparative analysis of the key ideas of Džalto’s political theology, which were left without consideration in previous articles. The first part of the article reveals sim¬ilarities between Džalto’s concept and the «mystical anarchism» of N. A. Berdyaev. In the second part, the author compares the concept of Jalto with the «sacred anarchy» of Atha¬nasios N. Papathanasiou. The third part of the article is devoted to a comparison of Jalto’s ideas with the views of Pantelis Kalaitzidis. The next part reveals the similarities and dif¬ferences between Džalto’s «Christian anarchism» and E. Namli’s «open universalism». Next, the author analyzes the «politics of deification» of Aristotle Papanikolaou and answers the question whether Džalto’s concept can be called «political Nestorianism»? As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that the approach proposed by Džalto’s political theology makes it possible for theology to cease being an instrument of politics, and for the Church to move from the position of an object of politics to the position of a subject of politics, and at the same time to remain faithful to the Christian principles of freedom, love and peace.

This is the second article by the author dedicated to the eschatological concept of H. U. von Balthasar. In this article, the author examines the response to the criticism of the concept of Balthasar by the adherents of universalist and infernalist views. The first part of the article provides a description of Balthazar’s interpretation of the eschatological passages of the New Testament. In the second part, the author points out the main difference between Balthasar’s «eschatology of hope» and the doctrine of apocatastasis. The third part of the article reproduces ideas about God in infernalism. Further, the author gives Balthazar’s answer to the question: what does a Christian dare to hope for? In the next part, Balthazar’s arguments on the topic are considered: how is the bliss of the righteous in Paradise possible, contemplating the torments of sinners in hell? Further, the focus of the author's attention is the question of the relationship between the hope for the salvation of all and the problem of freedom. The article also discusses Balthazar’s views on the theme of the Last Judgment, hell and the final fate of the devil. In the last part of the article, the author gives assessments of the eschatological concept of Balthasar by various researchers and concludes that it raises a number of questions.

disciplina delle Chiese, poiché corrispondevano a visioni ecclesiologiche contrastanti. Per un verso la Chiesa veniva raffigurata sul modello di un piccolo ed esclusivo gregge di eletti. Per altro verso si considerava la Chiesa come un popolo di santi e di peccatori, aperta all'accoglienza. Si evidenziarono due polarizzazioni dei vescovi, una rigorista e l'altra lassista, nella persuasione di poter offrire ai peccatori una nuova riconciliazione, un secondo battesimo per il perdono dei peccati e per la reintegrazione nella comunità. Questa possibilità, però, restava un'eccezione e non ripetibile. Testimoni della reiterabilità del perdono battesimale sono: a Roma "Il Pastore" di Erma (apparso intorno al 150) 5 ; a Cartagine il trattato di Tertulliano "De paenitentia" (203) 6 ; in Siria la "Didascalia Apostolorum" (220-230) 7. Seppure con sfumature differenti nella sua applicazione in Oriente e in Occidente, questa fu la prassi penitenziale finché iniziarono le violente persecuzioni contro i cristiani ordinate dagli imperatori Decio (250), Valeriano (257-259), Diocleziano (284-305) e Galerio (305-311). Decio intraprese una politica di restaurazione dell'Impero, per la quale andavano eliminati i pericoli che incombevano sulla sua sicurezza e stabilità, e fra questi erano annoverati i cristiani. Perciò l'imperatore ordinò che fosse compiuto formalmente un atto di culto da tutti i sudditi, una sorta di supplicatio straordinaria per il bene dell'impero. Non obbedire significava incorrere nel crimen di lesa maiestatis punito con la morte; in tal modo, secondo Decio, i cristiani avrebbero abbandonato la propria fede; scopo d'editto non era ottenere dei martiri ma l'apostasia dei cristiani. Diversi episcopi si salvarono fuggendo, fra questi lo stesso Cipriano, mentre a Roma moriva martire papa Fabiano 8. Durante la breve e violenta persecuzione di Decio, fu alto il numero degli apostati. Dopo la sua morte (251), innumerevoli apostati pentiti chiedesero di essere accolti nuovamente nelle comunione. Alcuni di essi avevano bruciato incenso agli idoli (thurificati), altri avevano offerto sacrifici (sacrificati) per ottenere il "libellus", cioè il certificato che attestava d'aver adempiuto all'ordine imperiale. Altri (libellatici), invece, erano entrati in possesso del libello corrompendo i funzionari, ma senza aver compiuto alcun sacrificio né rinnegato la fede. Nelle comunità cristiane si trovavano anche i confessores, coloro che avevano perseverato nella fede, subendo le vessazioni dei persecutori, ma erano sopravvissuti ed ora, forti della testimonianza resa, sostituendosi ai vescovi, rivendicavano il diritto di giudicare e interdire ai lapsi la reintegrazione. A Roma e a Cartagine si fronteggiavano posizioni opposte, che alimentarono un dibattito talora aspro. Nella Chiesa africana si diffondeva il movimento lassista rappresentato da Novato 9 , propenso a favorire il perdono degli apostati, mentre a Roma sia Novaziano 10 che i Montanisti 11 erano contrari ad usare indulgenza nei riguardi dei lapsi. Papa Callisto (217-222) si mostrò moderato e permise la riconciliazione degli

This paper critically examines a lecture given in 1869 by Emil Hegg titled, das sogennante apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis (“The So-Called Apostles’ Creed”), which sparked a dispute among ecclesial and civil authorities in Bern, Switzerland, leading to the Reformed Church in Bern becoming Bekenntnisfrei (“confession-free”). Considered by many to be a landmark moment in the modernization, liberalization, and secularization of the Reformed Church in Switzerland, Hegg’s lecture provides vibrant insights into the logic, culture, conflicts, and concerns of modern Swiss Reformers in Bern during a key point of cultural and societal transformation. This inflection reveals a blend of Hegelian speculative theology, strong anti-Catholic tendencies, and a driving emphasis on Protestant reform (both civil and ecclesial). This is mediated by the vital concept of “freedom of conscience”, which allowed the Reformers to expand their focus on civil-ecclesial centralization and the free operation of the sciences in relation to the church. Hegg’s lecture demonstrates this logic and strategy as it is employed successfully by his labor and the work of the larger Reformverein (“Reform-association”) in Bern to enact ecclesial reform, reform that encouraged a more expansive Protestant piety (with its more inclusive confession-less church) and a more civil relation between the church and the academy.

Gustavo Gutiérrez, widely known as the "Father of Liberation Theology," revolutionized Christian thought by integrating theology with the lived realities of social injustice and oppression in the Global South. Born in Lima, Peru, in 1928, Gutiérrez’s groundbreaking work emerged from the struggles of Latin America's marginalized communities, offering a theology deeply rooted in praxis and justice. His seminal book, A Theology of Liberation, challenged traditional paradigms, asserting that faith must actively engage with the socio-political conditions of the poor. This article explores Gutiérrez's profound impact on Christian theology, examining his emphasis on the preferential option for the poor, the interplay between faith and politics, and the transformative potential of spirituality grounded in liberation. As a trailblazer for contextual theology, his contributions extend beyond academia, inspiring movements worldwide to reimagine the church's role in advocating for human dignity, equality, and justice. In reflecting on his legacy, the article underscores the enduring relevance of Gutiérrez's vision in addressing contemporary global inequalities.

Johann Fichte was an intellectual giant at the turn of the 19th century known for his novel revision of Kantian philosophy. Though he influenced a generation of philosophers that followed, there lies within his philosophy a strong motif that leads to the subjection of nature and the denigration of the planet. Friedrich Schleiermacher, in dialogue with Fichte, developed his philosophy in a manner more conducive to German Romantic sensibilities and Christian theology, making a subtle course correction to Fichte’s philosophy that offers some of the earliest modern philosophical and theology resources to address our current ecological crises. Since Fichte’s understanding of nature and the natural realm are wedded to his vision of consciousness, this paper will exposit Fichte and Schleiermacher’s understandings of consciousness and the natural realm, elucidating the ecological implications of their respective positions and how their thought may be used to address our current alienated relationship to the natural world.

This essay looks at Agape Love as the self-declared central theme of the theology of Swedish Lutheran theologian and bishop Gustaf Aulén (1879–1977). I do this by looking at three of his books published in Swedish between 1927 and 1931 when he was Professor in Systematic Theology at Lund University. Having established that he views agape as “spontaneous, self giving, free, sovereign” love, I then go on to critique his Law-Love dichotomy between the two Testaments and question the minimal use of the Trinity in his work. With these correctives in place, I suggest that embracing the OT view-of-God and the NT’s Trinitarianism deepens and enhances Aulén’s understanding of God’s Agape Love.

Keywords: Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor, Agape, Love of God, Lundensian School, Lutheran, Swedish Church, Swedish Lutheran Church, Svenska kyrkan, Trinity, doctrine of God, gudsbild, picture-of-God, view-of-God, conception of God, Krister Stendahl

Famed as a woman philosopher and teacher, Macrina the Younger’s philosophy nevertheless encompassed more than intellectual ideas. Throughout the Vita sanctae macrinae, Gregory lauds his sister’s life practices, depicting her engaged in community acts of mercy. From meeting the needs of the hungry and the sick, to giving largesse to the impoverished and taking on voluntary poverty, and even to abolishing hierarchy for equality, Macrina embodies the life practices Gregory had advocated earlier in De beatitudinibus. Reading Macrina’s Vita in light of Gregory’s understanding of mercy reveals a way life (πολιτεία or διαγωγή) replete with social compassion and actively engaged with the needs of the world. This underscores the living practice expected from philosophy in late ancient Christianity.

The first question to be posed in the delineation of a fundamental semiotics is where purchase is to be found, a moment of stability, in the system it sets out to describe. Without carrying out such a reflection, the semiotics itself may be overtaken by non-semiotic presuppositions which-in unrealised form-attend its foundation. This becomes acute in the case of Christianity where a good number of non-Scriptural and non-Christian modes of thought already exist as well-established adjuncts or avenues of approach to Christian revelation. Secular presuppositions about the nature of the sign, or about the nature of the self, or-which is most probable-preconceived notions about the nature of reason governing valid knowledge, can all subvert the attempt to establish a Christian fundamental semiotics before the task is begun. And even if these subtle pre-judgements can be stripped away, there is the further difficulty of why any one locus in the system is to be taken as the point of departure for this kind of semiotic reflection. This decision may be the result of an act of discrimination which is internal to the system concerned, and may be a realisation of the grammar of that system, but it may also be the result of second-order theological judgements which then act to predetermine the outcome of first-order theological reflection. But the systematic analysis of Christianity must begin somewhere, and I shall proceed on the supposition that the very unity of Christianity, discernable in the pulsation between Christian belief and practice, orality and text, method and charisma, past and presence, end and origin, is itself grounded in Christology. Jesus himself is the one to whom the diverse

In the religiously pluralism came with globalization in our modern time. Following the trend of our time, there seems to be a search for a "theology of religions" by way of "paradigm shift:-from Christo-centrism to Theo-centrism. According the "Frankfurt Statement" which reflected Karl Barth's theology and its position, all religions are the attempt of human sin to rob God's revelation and salvation, and are unfaithful as godless, human affairs. 1 Therefore religious pluralists criticize Barthian Christo-centrism. If we consider this, Barth's Christo-centric revelation idea means that there is an essential self assertion of Christianity, just as other religions have their own doctrines and the self assertions. And the revelation of Christ includes exclusiveness of salvation. However, this understanding has a weak point, i.e. Christianity shows no interest in other religions. Consequently, the problem of exclusiveness and universalism (in Christianity in general and in Barthian theology in particular) is to be solved. I. CONTROVERSY OVER THE THEOLOGY OF RELIGION To solve this problem, some scholars advocate a theo-centrism. G. Rosenkranz, J. Hick, U. Schoen and P. F. Knitter are its representative scholars. 2 A Japanese religious philosopher who changed to the position of religious pluralism is Yagi Seiichi. 3 But the theo-centralism served to dissolve the identity of Christ into relativism and to shake the Trinitarian structure by the relativizing of Christ. On the other hand, Knitter insists that a dialog between religions should be based on personal religious experiences and a steadfast demand for truth. But it is particularity limited by relativism.

Our “true self” is not an interior space but a product of the labors of time and the recognition of others. But how, then, do we move beyond rivalry to a genuinely common good beyond opposition and negotiation? Wise Stoics and Cynics had an answer. So did the Christian Church, based on Jesus’ offer of unconditional access to God for all—a non‐competitive justifying grace. A twofold ethics and spirituality is displayed in Paul and Matthew. Action is judged not by performance nor by motive and intention but “according to its fidelity to the character of God, its ‘epiphanic’ depth”.

Marion here provides a philosophical/exegetical reflection on the Emmaus episode (Luke 24:13–25) with a view to debunking (as both inane and blasphemous) a widely entertained understanding of faith as “a deficit of intuition”—something which has to be “added” to human powers “to compensate faulty intuition”. Rather, Marion argues that faith is not so much required in order to recapture a lack in intuition but more a proper response in the face of an excess of intuition in relation to “a deficiency of statements and a dearth of concepts”.

Recent soteriological discourse has worried that atonement theologies like satisfaction and penal substitution have potentially damaging effects like inoculating us to our violence, further buttressing retributive justice, and inducing passive acquiescence in the face of abuse. Though legitimate concerns in their own right, this essay investigates whether certain views on the atonement do in fact produce the issues of concern. By investigating the thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who believed that God had to punish sin, this article will seek to identify the complex nuances in Bonhoeffer's work that would potentially safeguard against some of the concerns being raised about atonement theologies like his.

This article aims to highlight the sixth and penultimate level that Saint Bonaventure establishes in the contemplative ascent of man towards God, since he begins to consider creatures as vestiges and signs of the Creator until he speculates the transcendental attributes of God as the absolute Being in itself and as the highest Good: this is a complex and mixed process – aesthetic in its beginnings, and ultimately almost mystical– that the Franciscan scholastic teacher outlines in his Itinerarium mentis in Deum. To achieve our goal, we will analyze in detail the subtle epistemo-logical, aesthetic, anthropological and theological disquisitions by which the Seraphic Doctor tries to induce the human being to speculate on God in his uniqueness of substance and in his Trinity of persons. The research allows us to conclude that our author arrives in this case to some markedly Christological and Trinitarian theological conclusions, which can hardly be acceptable to a purely rational(ist) secular mentality

This paper explores the life and teachings of Jesus through the lens of existential philosophy, focusing on the themes of suffering and freedom. Drawing on the works of existentialist thinkers such as Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus, the paper examines how existential questions about the meaning of suffering, the weight of personal freedom, and the responsibility of choice resonate with the Christian narrative, particularly the crucifixion of Jesus.

arrival of an English translation of Alain Badiou's 1986 Seminar on Malebranche marks an important moment within what could plausibly be called the theological turn in late twentieth-century radical political philosophy. Though Marxism's relationship to Christian theology has long been a point of neuralgia, more recent critics have looked with diminishing tentativeness to the Bible and the Christian theological tradition not only as a necessary locus of critical engagement, but as viable source of emancipatory potential. Such figures as Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Francois Laruelle, Antonio Negri, and others have contributed to a sort of "third wave" of theologically determinate religious thinking within leftist thought, refiguring the inherited correlations of religion and alienation. The result has not been the legitimation of religious belief on Marxist grounds, but rather the opening of a horizon within Marxism in which Christianity can be reassessed and re-approached as truly emancipatory discourse. Yet even from within this field, and even from within Badiou's oeuvre, Malebranche is sui generis. Slavoj Žižek, for instance, who has argued vigorously for the emancipatory potential of Christianity, proceeds largely in terms of how Christianity can be understood along Hegelian, Lacanian, and Marxist lines. Likewise, Antonio Negri's The Labor of Job (2002), which follows in the line of Bloch's Atheism in Christianity (1968), performs a class-conscious reading of Scripture. Laruelle, a relative outlier in this camp, investigates the heretical or otherwise heterodox strains of Christianity to model elements of his project of non-philosophy. Even Badiou's own Saint Paul: The Foundations of Universalism (1997) interprets the Pauline corpus in terms of a revolutionary form of universalism, one that in no way presupposes Christian faith. In short, the so-called third wave has almost uniformly kept uncut its umbilicus to the interpretive priority of other discourses in its engagement with Christianity. It is in this way that Malebranche represents a departure. Other discourses remain present, but on the whole they are inveighed to clarify the thought of this relatively obscure seventeenth-century Oratorian priest and Cartesian philosopher, and not the other way around. Whereas Badiou begins St. Paul by asking (and answering) the question "Why Saint Paul?," in Malebranche, the only answer to "Why Malebranche?" is "Why not?" Malebranche is the 1986 installment of Badiou's famous seminar held in the spring of that year, which ran discontinuously from 1966 to 2017, covering a range of figures, including Schopenhauer, Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Lautréamont, Hegel, Plato, and St. Paul, among others. In the preface, Badiou makes an interesting admission: "This seminar is without a doubt the only one in my entire career that, in terms of the construction of my own system, has been of no use to me. But it was a time of true delight . . ." (xxxvii). It is this brief aside that perhaps captures the spirit of the book, what makes it truly an "event" in the properly Badiouan sense: Malebranche represents the gentle eclipse of the hyper-discipline of praxis by the caprice of delight. If there is a single lesson that Badiou is offering his fellow Marxist critics and Christian theologians alike, it is that. Throughout, Badiou exemplifies not only an extraordinary attentiveness, but also intellectual sympathy. With respect to the latter, Badiou is the first to admit the counter-intuitiveness of his interest in a seventeenth-century Catholic priest who spent much of his career embroiled in, by today's standards at least, rather recherché doctrinal and ecclesiastical debates. Moreover, Badiou's atheism is absolute and uncompromising. Yet, unlike in Saint Paul, his atheism is much less heuristically and hermeneutically programmatic in Malebranche. In short, Malebranche, unlike Paul, is read less against his religiosity; moreover, Malebranche's doctrines are held and examined curiously, even lovingly, as objects of vast, if inaccessible, worth. Furthermore, Badiou's treatment of Malebranche is more akin to his treatment of, say, Lacan or Wittgenstein, than that of St. Paul -more accessible, less overdetermined by his fabulative history of reception, more human. In Session 1 Badiou presents the militant figure of Malebranche, situating him within his philosophical and ecclesiastical context. At the core of Malebranche's thought was the conviction of the "intrinsic compatibility between the Christian religion and modern philosophy" (8), which charts his course toward an "interweaving [of] Christianity directly into the Cartesian axiomatic" (11) in which it is shown not only that Christianity is the truth of Cartesianism, but that Cartesianism was unthinkable without it. Thus, Malebranche endeavored to present Christianity as a complete philosophy, structured by four central elements: God, creation, Christ, and Church. Such a philosophical configuration necessitated the interruption of the narrative status of Christianity insofar as these elements were transformed "purely and simply into effects of thought" (11), from "narrative into a conceptual axiomatics" (27), a manifestly baroque

of givenness might be qualified or complemented by the critical role of the one who witnesses revelation's appearing. The lectures are unapologetically Christian in their focus. This could be reasonable in itself, as any author will be most familiar with his or her own tradition. However, it becomes problematic in the absence of any acknowledgement by Marion that this is a limitation within which he operates. His focus on the Christian tradition is presented as though it is the sole approach to revelation, rather than one example among other possibilities. Marion is right to identify givenness and revelation as foundational concepts for phenomenology and theology respectively. His Gifford Lectures helpfully fill out his interest in revelation as a pre-eminent example of phenomenality. This is supported by an elaboration of Christian revelation in terms of God's Trinitarian self-giving as Trinity, where the Trinity is both the content and the mode of giving. However, after the Introduction, the lectures focus much more on the detail of this understanding than on its implications for phenomenality. Thus, they add relatively little to the theory of givenness that Marion has already set out in numerous texts, and are likely to be of more interest for theology than for phenomenology.

Lyotard and Theology stands in the Bloomsbury/T&T Clark "Philosophy and Theology" series that includes a range of twentieth-and twenty-first-century thinkers in dialogue with Christian faith. 1 "Dialogue" may appear too optimistic a word to choose when many of these thinkers-sometimes atheistic in outlook or at least unsympathetic to Christian truth claims-might seem to remain extrinsic to the actual task of theology. Even if they may have something interesting or novel to offer, we might consider them, prima facie, as contemporary artifacts in a museum, housed together in a room that will be dedicated to a time when "the postmodern" at best serves as something overly-intellectual happening around the edges of theology (or at worst, as anathema to theology's very essence). Yet "dialogue" is a significant word in Lieven Boeve's vocabulary, even if he does not mean simply the exchange between or engagement of one point of view with another per se. 2 For Boeve, dialogue is not a matter of adding some useful items to the theological mix but then going back to the way we did things before; with respect to Lyotard, in any case, the "dialogue" marks a qualitative transformation. Theology happens differently because of it, or in Boeve's words, "interacting with Lyotard presents theology with more than simply an encounter with another thinker of difference; it also offers particularly fruitful starting points for theologizing today" (8). 3 The relationship between theology and other discourses-most especially philosophyis perpetually a matter of debate within Christianity. On the one hand, the push for a Jerusalem independent of the influence of Athens is an attempt to affirm the perceived autonomy of theological discourse with respect to the a priori nature of revelation. On the other hand, the recognition that all discourse is contextual prompts difficult questions

Since grace does not destroy but presupposes and perfects nature, the theologian who hopes to reflect critically on the political order must first come to an intellectual conversion. This involves the sustained purgation of biases and the sustained cultivation of the virtues of understanding. Since the theologian operates in a context of collaboration, both with colleagues now living and with his or her predecessors, he or she is in need of a critical dialectic that is able to differentiate bias from true insights in his or her own thinking and in what has been inherited. Yet from time to time circumstances will arise which cast doubts on the soundness of a part or a whole of what has been inherited. The spectacular moral and political breakdowns of twentieth-century totalitarianism provide just such stark, clear circumstances that throw into doubt the entire project of modern political and moral philosophy, as well as any theological traditions they sustain. Something, it is clear, went wrong. The events precipitated by twentieth-century totalitarianism provoked, among other things, a post-modern (or hypermodern) reaction to Enlightenment political philosophy in the Frankfurt school, which purported to pay more attention to praxis than its intellectual predecessors. The Frankfurt school's ferment also led to the establishment of the field of study called political theology, moved forward by J. B. Metz, Wolfhart Pannenberg, J€ urgen Moltmann, and the Latin American liberation theologians. But these schools, as Frederick Lawrence has observed, took the Enlightenment project in political philosophy as its horizon. 2 This limited viewpoint, Lawrence argues, was unable properly to grasp the roots of the crises of the twentieth century. Lawrence

The Thing-in-Itself has been contentious issue within Kantian philosophy. Initially, it seems like an unfortunate side-effect of Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena. This article deals with this issue in a different manner, attempting to re-situate the Thing-in-Itself within Kantian philosophy, albeit from an anthropological rather than a critical angle. The anthropological works of Kant fully recognize that subjectivity and lived experience, as well as a thoroughgoing cognitive gradualism are necessary to "orient ourselves in thinking". By reading the importance of the Thing-in-Itself from the anthropological viewpoint of Otto Friedrich Bollnow and the Kyoto School philosophy of Ueda Shizuteru, I argue that in all its negativity, the Thing-in-Itself constitutes the outer expanse of thought. Connecting this exposition with contemporary thinking on actancy and ecology, and following the Romantic tradition represented by Schopenhauer and Schelling, I argue that the Thing-in-Itself can be grasped indirectly and non-conceptually. As such, it constitutes the ground of thought. This insight makes Kant's initially problematic concept directly relevant for our current ecological predicament, through which we realize the necessity for epistemic humility and embracing the unknown or the noumenal dimension that we cannot conceptually represent.

Stop! Look! Listen! These are important imperatives both for crossing streets and doing philosophy after modernity. Robert Gibbs's Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities places these imperatives in front of us to signal the sea-change which philosophy has gone through in its transition from the lead provided by the rational autonomous subject to the "Other" whose face interrupts our thinking and whose signs and words provide our first guides. Gibbs's book presents neither a philosophical system nor a treatise or exposition. Rather, it is a map and performance of the variety of difficult thought crossings we must make to live up to the promises of philosophy and the challenges of thinking in and through the postmodern condition. This book is unique. It is simply unlike any book that you have read. On the left margin one finds long quotations, usually from philosophers. These Gibbs calls his "pretexts" and about 140 of them provide the launching points for the book's discussions. The texts come from a surprising variety of figures which start with Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida but go on to include the likes of Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Charles

This paper aims to show a strong connection between Tertullian’s Pre-Nicean Trinitarian framework and the Pneumatology of Gregory of Nazianzen. This will be done by examining Tertullian’s polemical work Against Praxeas and drawing a comparison to the Pneumatologogical thought process of Gregory of Nazianzen. One of Tertullian’s later works, Against Praxeas, will be our primary place to study Tertullian’s Trinitarian theology as he wrote it to counter Monarchianism or Patripassianism being propagated by the teaching of Praxeas. The Cappadocian fathers were vigorously active voices in affirming the deity of the Spirit and formulating a more nuanced and robust Pneumatology for the church; through their writings, we were given a more precise orthodox vocabulary for our theological statements on who the Spirit is. For Gregory, we will primarily focus on Oration 31, where we find some of his most concise and rich Pneumatology. While all three of the Cappadocian fathers played a role in orthodox Pneumatology that is still used in the church today, it would be beyond this essay's scope to attempt to synthesize the writings of all three of them. I felt this essay would be more effective to succinctly examine primarily Gregory of Nazianzen and his pneumatological thoughts.