Mexican Drug Cartels

This paper aims to fill some of the glaring gaps in the history of Mexico’s pre-cartel drug trade by viewing it as part of an international system connecting European and Latin suppliers with North American organized crime syndicates. It opens with a brief review of Mexico’s early development as a supplier of both narcotics and alcohol following the passage of prohibition laws in the United States. It examines the role of major U.S. organized figures, and their prominent “legitimate” business partners in businesses such as racing, gambling, and the cross-border narcotics trade. After World War II, U.S. crime organizations shifted their source of supply from Mexico to Europe, where more advanced chemists converted Turkish opium and morphine base into prized white heroin. However, almost from the start, French Corsican and Sicilian traffickers used Mexico as a transit country to evade U.S. Customs and narcotics agents at East Coast ports and the Canadian border. Mexico thus became deeply integrated into a global drug supply chain, at the same time “modernizing” leaders such as President Alemán were opening Mexico up to international trade and capital. Ultimately, as we will see, Miguel Félix Gallardo and the "Guadalajara cartel" inherited the priceless business and political connections of this international network, allowing them to enjoy a meteoric rise with protection from the Mexican state.

Mexico's cartels are significant social, political, and economic actors. The extent of their socioeconomic and political influence is the subject of great debate yet, as their recent response to natural disaster demonstrates, they are influencing the populace in new and diverse ways. In the aftermath of recent hurricanes (i.e., Hurricanes Manuel and Ingrid) in Mexico cartels provided " humanitarian " aid to the victims of the storms. As a result they positioned themselves in a positive light in the communities they assisted. This strategic note documents and assesses this cartel foray into the provision of social goods—specifically " humanitarian aid. " Cartel Disaster Relief On 22 September 2013, Proceso reported that the Gulf Cartel (Cártel del Golfo/CDG) dispensed tons of supplies to persons impacted by Hurricane Ingrid in Tamaulipas. In this report, it was noted that the CDG posted a video on YouTube claiming that " they help because they have a heart " (" Si ayuden es por que tienen corazon ").[1] The video—punctuated by a " rap style corrido " voice over—shows pickup trucks loaded with supplies: food, water, rice, masa, milk, that are then dispensed to the affected community.[2] The ability for the cartel to mobilize and distribute groceries and aid without government interdiction raises questions about state capacity in the contested disaster zone. Questions about state capacity and cartel intentions were raised on social media in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Tweets became the common method of sharing disaster situation reports. Social media also became a way for the CDG to publicize its relief efforts. As one report noted: The most interesting twist came Sunday when an Internet video claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel began circulating through social media. The video shows several pickup trucks filled with food items being driven across the state and through dirt roads where the food was delivered to the communities. In the video, a written message claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel says that the organization is from Tamaulipas and cares for the people of the state.[3] The aid to the town of Aldama provided by the CDG was publicized on social media and widely reported

Ioan Grillo's new work, Blood Gun Money, is a cutting-edge expose that chronicles the flow of firearms from the United States into Mexico for use by the gangs and cartels (and within the U.S. itself and even into Honduras and Colombia to criminals/non-state actors as a lesser theme). It is more investigative reportage than academic research with the tradeoff being readability (and enjoyability) vs methodological rigor, though his extensive use of field interviews more than satisfy academia’s ‘primary source material’ criteria of scholarship. Just as the US and Mexico enjoy formal economy trade and manufacturing relationships alongside demographic migrations (typically northward) and remittance flows (southward), crossover (from formal to illicit) and purely illicit relationships also exist with regard to drugs, guns, cash, and other commodities. In his work, Grillo delves into these crossover and illicit economy relationships from a firearms trafficking perspective.

The US Consulate in Guadalajara, Jalisco was attacked with two grenades in the hours before Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (ALMO) was sworn in as Mexico’s new president. The attack, which occurred around 2300 hours on Friday, 30 November 2018, involved two grenades thrown at the consulate. While the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)—has been mentioned as a possible suspect group in the attack—which yielded no injuries the CJNG denies involvement.

This paper assesses the impact that drug cartels and their associated violence have had on development in Mexico.  For this purpose, we monitor official and media reports to identify where cartels have operated with and without drug related homicides. Using the difference-in-difference kernel matching method, we find that on the one hand, inequality declined to a large extent in areas where cartels were active without incidents of drug related homicides. On the other, poverty increased in areas that had both the lowest and the highest rates of drug related homicides. Two reasons could explain this increase in poverty. In the most violent areas the number of employers and remunerations declined in key industries, such as manufacturing. In the least violent areas poverty increased possibly due to  people migrating from the more violent places.

statunitensi. Queste compagini sono formate prevalentemente da individui di nascita o origine messicana. Gli accordi con le gang americane, opportunistici e mutevoli, consentono poi ai cartelli di minimizzare il rischio e garantire lo spaccio al dettaglio nelle maggiori città americane 330 .

It was springtime in Mexico City, and the boulevards were sweet on Jesus. Under the pink bloom of the jacaranda trees, amidst the Sunday throngs at Plaza Hidalgo; along the newsstands and across the racks of bootleg DVDs dividing the stalls of the tianguis, the image of Jesus-Jesus by way of James Caviezel-had flourished in the warming landscape. His shadows thriving under the imperious sun. His sorrows circling like the farewell notes of "Cielito Lindo" over the bust of a morose organ grinder.

This curated collection "Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs" documents the evolution of drone usage by criminal cartels, gangs, and criminal armed groups (CAGs) in Mexico and beyond. Cartel Drone Evolution demonstrates the development spread of drone technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) among criminal actors while also pointing toward future potentials.

Adaptation and innovation is a core component of successful organization competition among states and their militaries, businesses and corporations-and as argued here, organized crime groups-especially transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). In order to gain supremacy organizations often introduce new technologies to foster this innovation, yet not all innovation is technological. Indeed, non-state actors are often incubators of novel practices and non-technological innovation to further their goals and often to survive. This brief assessment looks at non-technological innovation potentials among Mexican TCOs (criminal cartels and gangs).

As violence has continued to rise in Mexico year after year, criminal groups have adopted an increasingly militarized approach to their tactics, weaponry and training.

InSight Crime sat down with Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, founders of Small Wars Journal-El Centro and editors of a new book, "Illicit Tactical Progress: Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes 2013-2020," which dives deep into how this evolution has taken place.

Either on or immediately before Tuesday 12 April 2022, Guardia Nacional (GN) forces in Jamay, Jalisco seized an improvised armor fighting vehicle (IAFV), a narco tank (narco tanque), belonging to the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). These vehicles have been utilized by the Mexican cartels for over a decade, increasingly integrated into their operational units (commandos), and have proliferated over time. The circumstances of this IAVF seizure, related to its being discovered in the back of a semi-tractor-trailer, are of great interest because they provide a glimpse into the mechanisms behind the logistical supply of CJNG operational units.

This chapter focuses on the role of the Caballeros Templarios cartel in
local governance from 2011 to 2013. I conducted thirteen months of fieldwork in Michoacán, spread out over five visits between 2013 and 2017. My hypothesis is that drug cartels in Michoacán transformed patronage relations and brokerage practices by displacing, replacing, or mirroring brokers that lie at the center of political and social mediation. In so doing,
they were able to impose a new moral and political economy in the territories they socially and geographically control.
This territorial control is not merely an occupation of land. It lies at the base
of their ability to transform social relationships and hierarchies, to impose
alternative social orders, and to build governance models that extract resources from the drug trade, as well as the public and private sectors.

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent,” a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

This publication attempts to create a better understanding of the nature, origins, and evolution of organized crime in Central America by examining the dynamics of organized crime in the three countries of the so-called Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—as well as the broader regional context that links these case studies. The authors investigate the challenge organized crime poses to the state, its institutions, and governability in general.  This publication is part of a series on the sub-regional dynamics  of organized crime, focusing especially on the linkages between Central America, Mexico, and the Andean region as well as the growing insertion of Latin America in global transnational crime networks.

Depuis son introduction au milieu des années 2000, la guerre hybride est devenue un concept en vogue au sein de la communauté stratégique occidentale. Faute de définition claire, son usage risque pourtant de mener à des incompréhensions, voire à de dangereux quiproquos. Au niveau politique et stratégique, le concept d’hybridité reflète la porosité entre la guerre régulière et la guerre irrégulière. Au niveau opératif, il renvoie à certaines manœuvres sophistiquées combinant dispersion et concentration des forces. Enfin, au niveau tactique et capacitaire, il décrit l’association d’équipements conventionnels modernes, normalement réservés aux formations régulières, et le recours à des tactiques non-linéaires, typiques de la guerre irrégulière. Ce mode de combat innovant a démontré son efficacité sur une grande variété de théâtres et avec des belligérants aussi différents que la Russie en Ukraine, l’Etat islamique en Irak et en Syrie, ou les cartels de la drogue au Mexique. Il importe pourtant de ne pas être aveuglé par une labellisation hybride unique dès lors que seules des stratégies différenciées sauront venir à bout de chacune de ces menaces.

Oswaldo Zavala’s recent book (Zavala 2018) is a collection of essays based on his dissertation. Zavala added an introductory essay and introduced a polemical narrative rooted in the audacious claim that literary and cultural representations of narco-culture demonstrate that Mexican drug cartels DO NOT exist.
This is a critical review that praises his creative essays about literature and media, but strongly refutes his overall argument that Cartels Do Not Exist.

En Anatomías del desastre (2017) se ofrece una visión de las violencias que lastiman a México en los últimos años (narcotráfico, delincuencia organizada, militarismo, represión política), sus raíces, sus consecuencias y también un catálogo de lo que se podría hacer para atenderlas.

De una u otra forma, el Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) siempre ha mostrado su músculo político. Para bien, para mal o para regular, chiquito o grandote, el ITAM, hasta antes de la llegada de Andrés Manuel a la presidencia de la República y desde el sexenio del presidente de la Madrid, ha participado en las grandes decisiones nacionales, principalmente las económicas, pero también las políticas. De todas maneras, la visita de Miguel de la Madrid a la institución académica fue un parteaguas de la relación política entre los altos círculos de poder y la academia.
Y sí, es una experiencia rara y maravillosa leerse a uno mismo después de 34 años de acontecimientos políticos y económicos que en su momento fueron inimaginables. A estas alturas del partido estoy convencido que generación tras generación entre los pueblos, la política es un reciclaje constante de ideas, individuos, intereses e instituciones. Muy, pero muy de vez en cuando hay innovaciones en este terreno y es ahí donde el destino del Estado-nación se echa unas marometas de miedo y con suerte cae parado, mirando hacia el futuro. Y ese no es el caso para México actualmente, si no que le pregunten al crimen organizado y a las autoridades corruptas que lo solapan…

This paper aims to fill some of the glaring gaps in the history of Mexico’s pre-cartel drug trade by viewing it as part of an international system connecting European and Latin suppliers with North American organized crime syndicates. It opens with a brief review of Mexico’s early development as a supplier of both narcotics and alcohol following the passage of prohibition laws in the United States. It examines the role of major U.S. organized figures, and their prominent “legitimate” business partners in businesses such as racing, gambling, and the cross-border narcotics trade. After World War II, U.S. crime organizations shifted their source of supply from Mexico to Europe, where more advanced chemists converted Turkish opium and morphine base into prized white heroin. However, almost from the start, French Corsican and Sicilian traffickers used Mexico as a transit country to evade U.S. Customs and narcotics agents at East Coast ports and the Canadian border. Mexico thus became deeply integrated into a global drug supply chain, at the same time “modernizing” leaders such as President Alemán were opening Mexico up to international trade and capital. Ultimately, Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo and the "Guadalajara cartel" inherited the priceless business and political connections of this international network, allowing them to enjoy a meteoric rise with protection from the Mexican state.

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies, and other resources on the intersections of terrorism and organized crime in Latin America. It includes publications on numerous insurgent groups in Latin America that are relevant to studies on the links between terrorism and organized crime in the region. Well-known examples are groups such as the FARC and ELN in Colombia, the Shining Path of Peru, but also Mexican criminal organizations such as the Cártel de Sinaloa (CDS) or the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Wherever relevant to the terrorism-organized crime nexus, publications on violent gangs and criminal cartels from various other Latin American countries are also included.

In recent years, the Islamic State terror organization has become notorious for its evil brutality. The brutal nature of its propaganda (distributed mostly online) inspires Jihadi sympathizers around the world, encouraging them to use violence against " the enemies of Islam ". This form of violent behavior has also been adopted and imitated by others – including non-Muslim individuals and groups – regardless of their geographic location, worldview, religion, ethnicity, or nationality. Drawing from numerous examples, this article illustrates two processes: first, the " mainstreaming " of beheadings among Jihadists, and second, the imitation of this method (decapitation) by individuals motivated by other kinds of extremism.

Existing within a relatively short time frame (2013-2015), the Michoacán Autodefensas (selfdefense groups) are a particularly fruitful case study for analyzing vigilantism. What we find here is an armed movement that was devoted to (re)creating a local order through the practices of investigation, vigilante justice, and classification of the social world. Beyond what it reveals about vigilantism as a “judicial” procedure, and as a desire to return to intimacy (in this case, that of familial and village interknowledge), the example of the self-defense groups suggests that vigilantes do not necessarily have as their mission the eradication of crime. Rather, they may settle for managing it, in particular by making it more legible locally. As such, they are involved in intense struggles for identification and classification.
Their reordering attempts, however, often bring new disorderly possibilities and opacities, as shown by the aporia of the security model implemented by the self-defense groups.

Analysis Highlights:
• Fragile cities that can fall prey to criminals have come to the forefront of concerns for security and humanitarian planners.
• Criminal enclaves can exist as parallel states, or they can fully supplant the state when it is absent.
• In Latin America, gangs and cartels have directly confronted states and are forging areas of autonomy
enforced by violence.