Logical Determinism

We can reasonably conclude that, contrary to the teachings of libertarian philosophers, there is no contradiction between determinism, causality and the concepts of freedom, free will and responsibility in the common sense. But the extension of the denial of free will in the philosophical sense to itself leads to paradox and should be avoided. You, dear reader, who are reading me, have no free will in the philosophical sense of the word, because you are a material system, your mind a mere product of your brain function. But I, who am speaking to you, have a free mind, guided by my own thoughts. (Of course, you can say the same of me.) If the physicalist position of compatibilism on free will applies to itself, then this position eliminates the concept of truth by reducing the mind to physical functioning.
By this reduction, it also eliminates truth itself. I say what I say and I believe what I believe because it follows from the functioning of my brain, it follows from the functioning of a very complex physical system, but there is no guarantee that this belief of mine is true. There is no evolutionary advantage to the correct philosophy.
We are in a paradoxical situation: if I am right in the materialistic conception of the mind, then there is no truth, there is only physical functioning. Let’s face it, a mind independent of brain function, and free will in the philosophical sense, is a necessary working hypothesis with logical reasons, not metaphysical ones. It is as useful an assumption as the belief in the existence of numbers in mathematics.
False, but a useful myth.

In a series of writings from 1918 to 1946, Jan Lukasiewicz provided arguments for logical determinism, that is, the idea that every future event would be determined in advance (as subsistent or nonsubsistent) by the truth or falsity of the proposition expressing it: this fact would a priori limit our ability to influence the course of future events through our free choices. The rejection of  'logical coercion' and the desire to guarantee a scope for our free actions constitute the philosophical motivations that led Lukasiewicz to get rid of the principle of bivalence and introduce a third logical value (the 'possible' or 'indeterminate'), inaugurating the field of polyvalent logics.
The kind of argument Lukasiewicz advanced in support of the nexus between bivalence and determinism has a very long history, which Lukasiewicz knew well as he was also an (eminent) historian of logic. The seminal text for logical determinism is the well-known Chapter 9 of Aristotle's “De interpretatione” in which the author suggests that an unrestricted application of the principle of bivalence to contingent sentences expressing future facts would entail a limitation of our freedom.
The purpose of this paper is not to offer a historical reconstruction of the problem, rather to show how the use of certain conceptual tools developed within the 'analytic' tradition enable us to dissolve the problem. If my argument turns out to be correct, this will be an example of how a pseudo-problem can be debated in the history of philosophy for over two thousand years just because the meaning of the terms in which it is posed is not sufficiently defined.
The main thesis I intend to support is that there is no entailment between classical logic and a deterministic worldview - contrary to Lukasiewicz's claim. In other words, an unrestricted acceptance of bivalence has no bearing on our ability to affect the course of future events through our free choices. In order to argue for this, certain premises are necessary. Primarily, that truth consists in some form of correspondence to reality. A shift from the semantic dimension to the ontological dimension is essential for the determinist argument. I will try to show how within a coherentist, deflationist or pragmatist conception of truth the problem of logical determinism cannot even be formulated.
Moreover, I will argue that the problem of logical determinism can be posed only after a clear choice has been made regarding possible truth-bearers, essentially: propositions, sentence-types and assertions. In the first two cases, the temporal dimension is absent: this makes the very formulation of the determinist thesis impossible (as it relies on expressions such as “A is true at time t”). Assertions, on the other hand, are intrinsically linked to a speaker uttering them in a spatial-temporal context. In this case, they are inadequate to fully express the generality logical determinism. Following some reflections offered by Gilbert Ryle (1966) I will show that the so-called problem of logical determinism hides at its core a conceptual confusion between causality and logical consequence: a truth can imply another truth but it cannot be the cause of any event.

In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.

In the contemporary philosophical debate about probability, one of the main problems concerns the relation between objective probability and determinism. Is it possible for objective probability and determinism to co‑exist? This is one of the questions this dispute tries to answer. The scope of discussion is conducted between advocates of a positive answer (compatibilist) and co‑existence opponents (incompatibilist). In the early twentieth century, many logicians also developed topics regarding probability and determinism. One of them was the outstanding Polish logician and philosopher - Jan Łukasiewicz. The general purpose of this paper is to analyse and implement Łukasiewicz’s views regarding determinism and probability in the contemporary field of this problem. I will try to show the relation between his interpretations of these concepts and in consequence his attempt to confront them. As a result of the above analysis, I present some different positions (located in the fields of...

In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to de-marcating its various forms. KEYWORDS: Determinism – fatalism – logical determinism – scientific determinism – logical fatalism. Determinism is a basic philosophical concept. It is usually assumed that both the term " determinism " and determinism as a philosophical conception or theory are clear and obvious. In the literature, however, the precise contours of determinism are not explicitly defined – an obscurity that often leads to inconsistencies and misunderstandings. In this article, I put to the side questions concerning the soundness or adequacy of the philosophical views I shall consider. Instead, I am interested only in the basic conceptual contours of different kinds of determin-ism and whether it is possible to sort them into some kind of interrelated order for the purposes of better demarcating varieties of determinism. My

В статье рассматривается оценочные аспекты транзитивности периодов развития исторических событий. Представляется, что необходима определенная темпоральная структура, которая позволит адекватно представить те фазы, которые происходили не просто в конкретном историческом событии, но и которые воспроизводили бы универсальность подобного представления. Показывается, что в исследовании непосредственно сопоставляется философия истории и философия времени.

Автор статьи пытается прояснить прагматический подход к метафизике свободы воли и детерминизма, сосредоточившись на работах Уильяма Джеймса и Мортона Уайта. Статья начинается с общего обзора отношений прагматизма и аналитической философии. Автор объясняет причины, почему нам не стоит следовать решению Питера Стросона, несмотря на то, что оно очень похоже на прагматическое. Далее автор разбирает теорию Джеймса и после анализа его главных аргументов выявляет наиболее существенные проблемные места, присущие этому взгляду. Затем автор пытается устранить эти проблемы из прагматического истолкования проблемы свободы воли. Для этого используются идеи Мортона Уайта. Автор старается показать как основные идеи Уайта в этой области, так и некоторые частности, такие как критика концепций Джорджа Эдварда Мура, Питера ван Инвагена и случаев Франкфурта. Автор подчеркивает, что так называемый корпоративизм дает нам только формальное решение проблемы, ограничиваться которым не следует. Автор предлагает два аргумента, основанных на фанероскопии, наблюдении и теории причинности Юма. Первый может быть назван спекулятивным, второй — эмпирическим. Первый опирается на особую трактовку понятия тождества, второй — на инверсию юмовской критики причинности. На основании этих доводов автор приходит к выводу, что свобода связана с нашей верой в существование отдельных событий, а вера в единство опыта поддерживает детерминизм.

In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to de-marcating its various forms. KEYWORDS: Determinism – fatalism – logical determinism – scientific determinism – logical fatalism. Determinism is a basic philosophical concept. It is usually assumed that both the term " determinism " and determinism as a philosophical conception or theory are clear and obvious. In the literature, however, the precise contours of determinism are not explicitly defined – an obscurity that often leads to inconsistencies and misunderstandings. In this article, I put to the side questions concerning the soundness or adequacy of the philosophical views I shall consider. Instead, I am interested only in the basic conceptual contours of different kinds of determin-ism and whether it is possible to sort them into some kind of interrelated order for the purposes of better demarcating varieties of determinism. My

Even though fatalism has been an intermittent topic of philosophy since Greek antiquity, this paper argues that fate ought to be of little concern to metaphysicians. Fatalism is neither an interesting metaphysical thesis in its own right, nor can it be identified with theses that are, such as realism about the future or determinism.

Аннотация. Автор размышляет о метаморфозах исторического события во французской историографии последних десятилетий. Являясь стержнем историописания, событие – это главное, с чем имеет дело историк. Однако история, оформляясь в социальную науку, конституировала свою научность против события. Тем не менее, событие всегда возвращалось. Новый виток интереса к событию, порожденный изменением режима историчности и потребностью понять современный мир, заставил историков переосмыслить содержание исторического времени, что позволило прояснить соотношение события со структурой и системой. В изучении события все большее место стала занимать неопределенность вовлеченного в действие исторического актора. Анализ такого действия позволяет лучше описать соотношение этой неопределенности и возможностей, скрытых в неизбывной загадочности событийности. Кроме того, анализ события помогает показать сложное переплетение времен и миров действия.

Ключевые слова: историческое событие, рефлексивный поворот, режим историчности, эпистемологически ориентированная историография, нарратив, время события.

This article tries to clarify the various senses of
the term “Bahala na” in Filipino usage. It attempts
to show that the term has many senses but the primary
one is to leave one’s life—or anything—in the care of
God. The paper explores the various types of
determinism and points out the types which entail the
"Bahala na" fatalistic attitude. Finally, the work
shows that “Bahala na” as a cultural value is
ambivalent in that it can be applied in various situations
responsibly or irresponsibly. The author contends that
it is best for Philippine society if Filipinos themselves
can avoid using “Bahala na” irresponsibly.