Legal Philosophy

"Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos opens the book with his latest contribution to his comprehensive project of re-theorising spatial justice with a piece titled ‘Spatial Justice in a World of Violence’. Through a close reading
of the photographic series Fortunes of War, Life Day by artist Eric Lesdema,
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is interested in how these images reveal peripheral
spaces at the edge of violence which impose an ethic of spatial responsibility on the
viewer in the act of turning away and looking elsewhere. While no acts of explicit
violence are shown in the images, we are left with no doubt that violence is ubiquitous
along the spatio-temporal continuum. This continuum of violence between
bodies raises questions of complicity and responsibility. Do we submit to a state
of affairs in which space is saturated with the everyday and immobilised violence
of the ‘engineered atmosphere’ – or is it also possible for bodies to withdraw from
the atmosphere, through ruptures and folds within the continuum? Such a notion
raises the ethical possibility of the ‘emergence of spatial justice’." Chris Butler and Edward Mussawir (eds)

This biographical entry reports, through the reconstruction of the various stages of Alessandro Levi's life, the main theoretical developments of his juridical-philosophical doctrine. Particular attention is paid to his idea of law, evolved from rigorous youth positivism to correct idealism in maturity, as well as to his concept of normative power in the theory of legal relationship.

The article challenges the empirical claim that suggests that the legal skills needed to successfully practice law are not —and cannot be— learned at law schools, and contrasts it with the conceptual claim that indicates that the legal tasks needed for practicing law presuppose a legal theory —or at least requires a link between theory and practice. Hence, the dual claim –empirical and conceptual — is that legal philosophy is an important part of a legal curriculum and necessary to bridge, rather than to deepen, the existing gap between theory and practice.

This is a pre-print of chapter one from AP Simester, Fundamentals of Criminal Law: Responsibility, Culpability, and Wrongdoing (Oxford University Press, 2021)
global.oup.com/academic/product/fundamentals-of-criminal-law-9780198853145

This chapter provides a theoretical overview of criminal law, claiming that it has multiple functions. Among other things, the criminal law operates to prevent certain kinds of wrongs, and to punish them when they occur. Those functions are compatible; but they are often thought to be in tension. Whether preventive, interrogative, or punitive, all parts of the criminal justice system need justification. The chapter then briefly introduces at five foundational principles for criminal law: culpability, legitimate enactment, moral responsibility, wrongdoing, and ascriptive responsibility. Culpability is served by moral responsibility, and it is entwined with wrongdoing: but the latter principles, and the doctrines they govern, are independently significant. The principle of ascriptive responsibility, on the other hand, is related more closely to wrongdoing and legitimate enactment than to culpability per se. Its primary function is to moderate the state’s generic prohibition by identifying those defendants who fall within its scope. As such, it is primarily a criminalization principle.

in "Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del diritto", 2/2021.

ABSTRACT: Definisco “normativismo trascendentale” la concezione per la quale le norme giuridiche non sono oggetto di una conoscenza possibile, ma sono ciò attraverso cui è possibile una conoscenza giuridica. Questa concezione – che è certamente di ispirazione kantiana e, per questo tramite, recupera anche alcuni spunti dal pensiero di Kelsen e di quello di Amedeo Conte – implica che le norme svolgano la funzione trascendentale di rendere possibile l’esperienza di ciò su cui esse vertono.

Since 1976, the VSBO disciplinary board has been only a body oF unauthorized individuals with no judicial authority created by fiat by the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Current research and evidence supports that Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia State Bar Organization routinely commit violations of the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The interests of justice demand an impartial tribunal , but the Court refused to request that the Virginia General Assembly to preside over the appeal of the Appellant’s matters and the appeals of all other misconduct and impairment matters involving attorneys practicing law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

On June 25, 2019, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to ask the Virginia General Assembly appoint an impartial tribunal and dismissed all related Motions for the same.

“Desde mi visión, la obra es en sustancia un abordaje axiológico, una construcción compleja que merece reconocimiento, pues consagra una teoría iusfilosófica de la culpa.

Pero no se debe extraer de ello que la obra ha sido escrita para el regodeo de una élite intelectual. Solemos decir que, para entender la modernidad: los clásicos; pues bien, para resolver las cuestiones prácticas nada mejor que la filosofía.

Las derivaciones prácticas del ensayo son numerosas, intramuros y extramuros de un ordenamiento particular, ya que, con base en el fundamento penal de la responsabilidad, se proyectan soluciones adecuadas, respuestas claras a muchos desvíos propiciados por los esquemas jurídicos formales, los que suelen ser empleados por los tres poderes del Estado como instrumentos funcionales a la recaudación.

En suma, está claro, y no puedo más que adherir a ello que para el Dr. Weffe un derecho sin valores es el revés del derecho, y es por ello que también recomiendo fervientemente la lectura del libro”.

Alberto Tarsitano (Argentina)
Ex Presidente del Instituto Latinoamericano de Derecho Tributario (ILADT)
Profesor de Derecho Tributario, Universidad de Buenos Aires
Profesor de Derecho Tributario, Universidad Católica Argentina
Director de la Maestría en Derecho Tributario, Universidad Católica Argentina

“No es éste un libro de Derecho Penal en el sentido frecuente, con abundancia de citas de autores, escuelas y textos sobre las distintas concepciones jurídico-penales de la culpabilidad. Tampoco es de Derecho Tributario, en el mismo sentido, ni de Derecho Administrativo, según la supradicha premisa. Entonces, ¿qué es y de qué es? ¿Cómo desarrolla su tema, cualquiera que él fuese?

En primer término, esta obra versa sobre la culpabilidad vinculada al Derecho Tributario, lo que de suyo representa continuidad con su tesis doctoral, en un área novedosa en nuestro mundo jurídico, pero –como antes dije– no es una obra sobre la culpabilidad en el Derecho Tributario del modo como se haría desde la perspectiva más frecuente del Derecho Penal, entre otras razones, porque la conexión con una rama que no es penal lo hace posible, sino también –y he ahí lo decisivo– porque los fines perseguidos se orientan desde la Teoría General del Derecho o, si se prefiere, la filosofía del Derecho, como pronto se verá.
Weffe no trata la culpabilidad mediante un simple acercamiento entre el Derecho Penal y el Derecho Tributario, sino que involucra reflexiones filosóficas que incrementan exponencialmente los méritos de su autor, pues son escasas las veces en que los juristas hacen expresamente suyas consideraciones que escapan del terreno dogmático de sus disciplinas, salvo, por supuesto, aquellos que se dedican a los temas teóricos más abstractos y generales, aunque mantienen hacia los horizontes más estrictamente técnicos del saber jurídico, una prudencial distancia, a su vez, pocas veces acortada por las ciencias jurídicas particulares.

El discurso ético-filosófico de la obra desemboca en la esfera de la culpabilidad y la triple función que el autor de ella predica: instrumental de la libertad, la dignidad y la igualdad como contenidos mínimos esenciales de todas las fórmulas jurídicas; ello, como axioma del garantismo y como límite al ejercicio del ius puniendi cada vez que el sujeto ha ejercido de forma desviada su libertad.

Los espíritus proclives a la reflexión filosófica hallarán en esas páginas ocasión para su deleite intelectual, y también para las inquietudes e incertidumbres a las que el ejercicio del pensamiento induce.

En fin, invito al lector a que inicie la aventura intelectual que significa adentrarse en estas páginas, para saciar no sólo inquietudes conceptuales de elevada abstracción, sino también para guiarlo en la interpretación y aplicación de un derecho concreto en un momento histórico específico, en un contexto sociopolítico abiertamente adverso a las propuestas garantistas del Derecho Penal moderno y liberal.

Weffe no cedió ante el desafío, seguramente usted tampoco retrocederá”.

Prof. Dr. Carlos Simón Bello Rengifo
Profesor Asociado de Derecho Penal y Procesal Penal, Universidad Central de Venezuela
Director del Doctorado en Ciencias, Mención Derecho, Universidad Central de Venezuela.

En nuestro medio académico el derecho penal ha sido tratado con pretensión científica por la dogmática penal. La influencia de la dogmática alemana ha tenido una notoria influencia en su desarrollo. Ha sido notable, también, como la dogmática ha desarrollado los fundamentos filosóficos del derecho penal. Ello se debe en parte a que la dogmática penal ha sido ejercida a la vez, en muchas ocasiones, por estudiosos del derecho penal, que además eran filósofos del derecho. Es dable advertir que la dogmática penal alemana se propone ejercer una influencia notoria en el campo de la interpretación del derecho penal y en su aplicación. No me parece exagerado sostener que tiene una profunda vocación prescriptiva. Como sabemos las teorías del derecho pueden dividirse hoy en día en teorías descriptivas y teorías prescriptivas. Las primeras entienden que una teoría del derecho tiene una función descriptiva de las reglas del derecho, el análisis del concepto o significado del derecho, o de otros conceptos como derecho y deberes, etc, como también de la estructura de los sistemas jurídicos. De ahí que, este tipo de teorías descriptivas tengan a su vez una pretensión de ser generales.

"Khusus menyangkut analogi, penafsiran dan hal-hal lain yang terkait, memang ... tidak mudah menemukan bahan-bahan pustaka yang membahas hingga praktiknya. Oleh karena itu, buku ini menjadi penting." - Prof. Dr. Topo Santoso, S.H., M.H.

Sinopsis:
Pandangan dominan dalam ilmu hukum pidana menyatakan bahwa penerapan analogi dilarang dalam hukum pidana, karena melanggar asas legalitas. Di sisi lain, penafsiran ekstensif justru diperbolehkan, padahal keduanya sama-sama memperluas cakupan makna ketentuan pidana dalam undang-undang, sehingga dapat mencakup perbuatan yang sebelumnya tidak termasuk dalam ketentuan pidana tersebut. Dua hal yang menjadi fokus penelitian buku ini adalah: perbedaan dan persamaan antara penerapan analogi dan penafsiran ekstensif dalam hukum pidana; dan penerapan analogi dalam Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia Nomor 786K/Pid/2015 dan 1417K/Pid/1997. Buku ini mengemukakan perspektif alternatif, juga baru, dalam pemahaman terhadap asas legalitas dan metode penemuan hukum, sehingga patut dibaca oleh peminat kajian ilmu hukum pidana, filsafat dan teori hukum, serta pemelajar ilmu hukum secara umum.

Pemesanan dapat dilakukan langsung melalui penulis di email berikut: [email protected].

This Paper explores and summarises the Director's Duties of the UK Companies Act 2006 with emphasis on "the duty to promote the success of the company.

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Some of Law and Economics’ basic claims have come to be criticized as a result of empirical findings that question their viability. Particularly, the premise that agents consistently act rationally and with their self-interest in mind seems problematic. What the consequences of the criticism mean for Law and Economics’ tenability depends largely on the questions whether (1) some elements are unassailable to the alternative’s objections and (2) the alternative is a systematic whole. It is argued that Law and Economics may be salvaged, if it is minimized and its ambitions are tempered. This means focusing on the stable, a priori, elements inherent to it.

У статті з позицій критики традиційних підходів до розуміння структури права запропоновано постструктуралістське її бачення як єдності догми права, суб’єкта, цінностей правової сфери та правової ситуації. Доведено, що правова ситуація виступає в якості динамічної складової структури права. По-новому розглянуто співвідношення між структурою права та правовою системою. Продемонстровано, що правова система є локалізованим (або глобалізованим) варіантом реалізації універсальної структури права. На основі цього запропоновано крім властивості системності виділяти властивість структурності права, що виражається через його універсальність.

Актуальні проблеми політики : зб. наук. праць. – Одеса : Фенікс, 2012. – Вип. 44. – С. 102-112.

This article argues that current iterations of solutions for preventing school segregation are constrained by an overreliance on particular representations of justice, in which the other is perceived as the responsible other. Studying the grounds for a decision to close a suburb school in Sweden, this article engages partly in an analysis on what implicit conception of justice that manifests itself, partly in exploring a conception of justice open towards a multiple and open-ended spatiality. It is argued that in order to imagine and construct such a spatiality, a majoritarian approach to justice must be abandoned in favour of a minoritarian one. Doing so, justice further needs to abandon a distribution of blame and responsibility and instead seek to pluralize forces flowing through different spatialities. A minoritarian approach to justice, I argue, can be envisioned by applying the concept of segmentarity as developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

An advocate must be aware of the mental environment of the judge, particularly the appellate judge.  Their quiet presence has not impeded the use of labels, including judicial attitude as well as a whole subset of ideological labels such as conservative, liberal, activist, restraintist, interpretivist, noninterpretivist, positivist, and with a pejorative ring, biased.

Such bents of mind are the pylons around which the persuasive course must be raced.  After the judge masters the facts and distills the relevant legal principles from a case, something must push him toward a decision.  In the great percentage of cases, the process of assimilating facts and principles points unerringly to one outcome.  However, in a small percentage of cases consensus cannot be readily attained.  In these cases, the holding may be influenced one way or another by the attitude of the judges.  Fortunately, the advocate can acquire the necessary sensitivity to these attitudes through episodic ventures to a court of appeals.

This paper approaches the effectiveness of fundamental social rights, their justiciability, their collision with the principle of the possible reserve, the application of the principle of proportionality, the balancing of the colliding principles, the determination of the prioritary principle, and the determination of the definitive right in the concrete case.

Recently, the question of adolescent culpability has been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration. Neuroscience, adolescent advocates claim, is teaching us that young people cannot be found fully responsible for their actions. The reason: their brains are not fully formed. Here I consider the history of the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom, a number of adolescent murder cases, and the data now emerging from neuroscience, and argue that when it comes to brains, judges, just like the rest of us, are unnecessarily impressed. Ultimately, how we determine culpability should rest on normative and ethical considerations rather than on scientific ones.

В диссертационном исследовании раскрыто понятие юридической догматики и определены функции, выполняемые ею в рамках правовой системы; выявлены социокультурные основания традиции романо-германской юридической догматики; произведена историческая реконструкция генезиса догматической юриспруденции в романо-германском правовом семействе; установлены факторы, способствовавшие ее воспроизводству и развитию; рассмотрено значение романо-германской юридической догматики для общей теории права.

У статті розглядаються елементи теорії наукової картини світу, процеси історичного формування загальної та спеціальнонаукових картин світу. Звертається увага на особливості становлення наукових картин світу в науках про людину в другій половині XVIII – першій третині ХІХ ст. Автор зазначає, що найважливішим проявом порівняльно-правового мислення вчених-юристів, незалежно від його втілення в тій чи іншій науковій дисципліні, стало формування протягом цього періоду на тлі банкрутства універсалістських правових ідеологій неметафізичної наукової картини світу – окремого, особливого і загального в правовому розвитку. Основою цієї наукової картини стала концептуалізація правової карти світу, що формується виключно з національно-державних правопорядків як окремих одиниць, територіальних і тотальних за своїм охопленням. Елементами такої наукової картини світу стали також вчення про іманентний характер загального в правовому розвитку, що існує у формі загальних елементів національних правопорядків (поряд із своєрідними елементами) та процесу діалогу цих правопорядків, про особливе в праві як конкретне загальне, про своєрідність національного права, запозичення в праві, класифікацію правових систем.
Ключові слова: наукова картина світу, загальне в праві, національне право, порівняльно-правові дослідження.

In the article the elements of the theory of scientific picture of the world, the processes of historical formation of general and special scientific pictures of the world are considered. Attention is drawn to the peculiarities of the scientific pitures of the world formation in the human sciences in the second half XVIII – the first third of the XIX century. The author argues that the most important manifestation of comparative legal thinking of legal scholars, regardless of its implementation in a particular scientific discipline, was the formation during this period, against a background of universalist legal ideologies bankruptcy, of non-metaphysics scientific picture of the world – a separate, special and general in the legal development. The basis of this scientific picture became the conceptualization of legal map of the world, formed exclusively of national-state legal orders as separate units, territorial and total in its scope. The elements of such scientific picture of the world were also the teachings on of the immanent nature of a general in the legal development, that exist in the form of general elements of national legal orders (along with the original elements) and dialogue process of these orders, on special in law as a concrete general, the originality of national law, borrowings in law, the classification of legal systems.
Key words: scientific picture of the world, general in legal development, national law, comparative legal studies.

Кресин А.В. Теоретические и исторические аспекты формирования специальнонаучной картины мира на основе сравнительно-правовых исследований
В статье рассматриваются элементы теории научной картины мира, процессы исторического формирования общей и специальнонаучных картин мира. Обращается внимание на особенности становления научных картин мира в науках о человеке во второй половине XVIII – первой трети XIX в. Автор отмечает, что важнейшим проявлением сравнительно-правового мышления ученых-юристов, независимо от его воплощения в той или иной научной дисциплине, стало формирование в течение этого периода на фоне банкротства универсалистских правовых идеологий неметафизической научной картины мира – отдельного, особенного и общего в правовом развитии. Основой этой научной картины стала концептуализация правовой карты мира, которая формируется исключительно из национально-государственных правопорядков как отдельных единиц, территориальных и тотальных по своему охвату. Элементами такой научной картины мира стали также учение об имманентном характере общего в правовом развитии, которое существует в форме общих элементов национальных правопорядков (наряду с своеобразными элементами) и процесса диалога этих правопорядков, об особом в праве как конкретном общем, о своеобразии национального права, заимствовании в праве, классификации правовых систем.
Ключевые слова: научная картина мира, общее в праве, национальное право, сравнительно-правовые исследования.

This paper focuses on a particular exposition of one of Critical Legal Studies’s claims, more commonly associated with Mark Kelman  and less so associated to Kevät Nousiainen.  Kelman, setting his sights on criminal law, highlights the arational choices  in factual construction in which  judges can either use narrow or broad time frames in which to locate a defendant’s act -- thus subsequently  affecting the normative ascription of responsibility. Nousiainen similarly deploys the use of broad or narrow time frames in formulating her triad of ‘text, time and reality construction’  pushing further still by attempting to articulate the theory of time that informs the process of ‘time framing’ in adjudication. Incredibly however, time frames, a tool what  Kelman says is part of the interpretive construction step in criminal law adjudication, ‘goes virtually unexamined’. 

Time frames, I will argue, actually bring together many of the underlying themes of both the American Legal Realism (ALR) and Critical Legal Studies (CLS) attacks on legal formalism. My position will be that time frames necessarily inform both the indeterminacy posited by Karl Llewellyn’s Janus-faced doctrine of precedent  and the central claims of the CLS movement, particularly the contradictions between rules-standards and free-will-determinism that plague  law and adjudication. I will argue therefore, that time frame indeterminacy has chronological priority, in that it makes possible the claims of indeterminacy central to ALR and CLS attacks on formalism. In other words, a judge’s determination of the scope of the period of time of legal relevance has chronological priority over different types of indeterminacy that problematize a legal decision.

In der Ökonomie der Zeit löst sich nach Marx alle Ökonomie auf. Dieser vagen Prämisse folgend, setzen wir uns in folgendem Beitrag mit den Ambivalenzen im Verhältnis von Arbeit und Zeit auseinander. Das neoliberale Spiel mit Freiheit und Zwang, Emanzipation und Unterwerfung steht, neben der sozialkritischen Diagnose einer Entgrenzung, Subjektivierung und Flexibilisierung von Arbeit, im Zentrum unserer Auseinandersetzung. Auf die rezenten rechtlichen, ökonomischen und politischen Implikationen der Genealogie und Transformation der Arbeitszeit – und nicht zuletzt deren Auswirkungen auf die Geschlechterverhältnisse – wollen wir theoretische und empirische Schlaglichter werfen, um aufzuzeigen, dass diese Transformation eine Form der Autonomie ins Werk setzt, die realiter Einschränkung und eine Zurichtung und Disziplinierung von Subjekten entsprechend neoliberalen Postulaten bedeutet.

In Karl Marx's economy of time, the economy itself disintegrates. Following this vague premise, this article discusses the ambivalences relating work and time. In the center of our treatise, we place the neoliberal gamble with freedom and coercion, emancipation and submission as well as the sociocritical diagnose of proliferation, subjectivisation and flexibilisation of work. Furthermore, we will cast a light on the recent legal, economical and political implications of the genealogy and transformation of working time and their effects on gender structures. Providing theoretical and empirical examples, this article will come to the conclusion that this transformation sets up a form of autonomy which leads to a restriction for and disciplining of individuals according to neoliberal postulation.

The emergence of modern societies is an evolutionary puzzle.
Homo sapiens is the only animal species capable of cooperating in
large-scale societies consisting of genetically unrelated individuals.
From a biological point of view, this feature leads to enormous questions. Social scientists typically assume that human life is lived in large-scale societies as a result of cultural, social and institutional history. In this perspective, social institutions such as law, economy and religion, enhance cooperation to higher levels. Gene-culture coevolutionary theories have studied this issue in an integrated framework that accounts for social and biological theories of cooperation. These theoretical approaches have provided an account of the emergence of human institutions with reference to a coevolutionary background in which specific innate psychological features of the human mind enable the evolution of social institutions that impose social pressures requiring the evolution of a complex moral psychology that enables life in a social environment with institutions. However, although gene-culture coevolution theories can explain cooperation in pre-modern societies, they still cannot explain social life in complex societies such as contemporary democracies, in which cooperation occurs even when individuals do not agree about the main values of their society. Acknowledging this fact raises the question as to how it has been possible-from a biological perspective-that people cooperate in large-scale societies with
individuals with whom they are not genetically related and with whom they may not even share values and symbolic structures of mutual self-understanding. Following Edward 0. Wilson, in hoping to achieve consilience between the natural sciences and humanities, this paper argues that the cooperation level required to drive the evolution of complex societies is possible as a result of the emergence of one particular institutional sociocultural framework: constitutionalism. In this sense, this paper is an attempt to integrate sociology, biology and legal theory in its understanding of constitutionalism as an evolutionary adaptation
to specific historical and sociological circumstances that demanded the emergence of institutions to accommodate diversity, pluralism and complexity.

Quoique braquée une vie durant sur des textes arides, l'intelligence de Yan Thomas se répandait en propos volubiles. À chaque séance du séminaire qu'il tenait à l'École des hautes études dans les années 2000 -et que je fréquentais comme étudiant -, ce contraste me frappait. La sécheresse des sources qu'il explorait, l'abstraction des problèmes qu'elles soulevaient, la cruauté des contextes et des intérêts qu'elles mettaient en jeu, à aucun moment n'empêchaient sa pensée de prendre un tour alerte et chatoyant.

Zagadnienie nadużycia kompetencji jest jednym z elementów rozważań nad problemem nadużycia prawa w ogóle1. Wiąże się więc ono z od dawna znanym prawnikom paradoksem, którego doświadczamy, kiedy proceduralnie poprawne działanie uprawnionego podmiotu jest powszechnie uznawane za niewłaściwe czy też niemoralne2. W wypadku nadużycia kompetencji paradoks ten wydaje się jeszcze bardziej jaskrawy niż w wypadku nadużycia prawa w ogólności. Jeżeli bowiem zgodzić się z rozpowszechnionym poglądem, że kompetencja jest rodzajem uprawnienia przysługującym wyłącznie organom państwa3, to sytuacja, w której twórca prawa (ewentualnie ten, kto prawo egzekwuje) wykonuje swe uprawnienie w sposób niewłaściwy, uderza w najbardziej podsta wowe przekonanie o konieczności realizacji zasady legalizmu w działaniach państwa. W niniejszym artykule chcę przedstawić kilka wstępnych tez dotyczących pojęcia nadużycia kompetencji z perspektywy teorii prawa. Perspektywa ta wiąże się nieodłącznie z dwoma założeniami. Po pierwsze, wymaga ona przyjęcia instrumentarium pojęciowego teorii prawa właśnie, nie zaś jakiejkolwiek z dyscyplin szczegółowych (np. nauki prawa administracyjnego). Po drugie, zakłada ona uniwersalne ujęcie zagadnienia, co oznacza, że sformułowane tezy dotyczące nadużycia kompetencji muszą sprawdzić się zarówno na gruncie prawa publicznego, jak i prawa prywatnego. 1 Zob. m.in. referaty prezentowane w czasie Konferencji Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego pt. "Nadużycie prawa", w których wielokrotnie przy okazji rozważań nad nadużyciem prawa poruszono kwestię nadużycia kompetencji. Zob. np. Nadużycie prawa, red. H. Izdebski, A. Stępkowski, Liber, Warszawa 2003, s. 169. 2 Za archetyp nadużycia kompetencji można uznać zachowanie biblijnego króla Dawida wobec Uriasza, męża Batszeby. Chcąc zdobyć Batszebę, Dawid wydał Uriaszowi rozkaz rozpoczęcia walki w miejscu, w którym czekała go pewna śmierć. Dawid skorzystał więc z przysługującej mu kompetencji władcy, choć w innym celu niż ten, dla którego została mu ona przyznana. Za to naraził się na gniew Boga. Zob. 2 Sm 11-12; 1 Kri 1-2. Za wskazanie tego przykładu jestem wdzięczny Oskarowi Lutemu. 3 Przekonanie, że kompetencja przysługuje wyłącznie organom administracji, jest charakterystyczne dla przedstawicieli nauki prawa administracyjnego.

En 1951 von Wright construyó el primer sistema de lógica deóntica, iniciando el estudio riguroso y sistemático de una nueva rama de la lógica: la lógica deóntica. Dicho sistema, a pesar de sus múltiples virtudes, posee una estructura simple basada principalmente en la lógica proposicional y en la lógica modal alética, la cual, no es capaz de dar cuenta del carácter dinámico propio de las acciones que, justamente, constituyen el objeto de las normas. En razón de ello, von Wright refinó su aparato conceptual y desarrolló, en su obra Norm and Action (1963), un nuevo sistema de lógica deóntica más complejo y apto para representar el cambio y el carácter dinámico propio de las acciones. No obstante, tal sistema no está exento de problemas y dificultades conceptuales. El presente trabajo pretendeanalizar la estructura y los principales elementos teóricos del sistema de Norm and Action y mostrar algunos de sus más importantes problemas conceptuales.

RESUMO
O artigo aborda o debate sobre o vínculo conceitual entre direito e moral travado a partir de 1958 entre dois grandes expoentes da teoria do direito no século XX: H. L. A. Hart e Lon Fuller. São focadas principalmente duas controvérsias. De um lado, Fuller defendeu a tese de que alguns princípios de legalidade compõem uma moralidade inerente ao direito, de caráter formal e procedimental. Hart argumentou que se tratava apenas de regras técnicas, sem caráter moral. De outra parte, foi colocada em jogo a teoria hartiana da regra de reconhecimento como uma regra social. Se, para Hart, tratava-se de uma forma de autodefinição do sistema jurídico como uma união de regras primárias e secundárias, para Fuller não há caráter jurídico, de regra, envolvido, por exemplo, no fato político da transição (revolucionária) de um sistema jurídico a outro.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Positivismo jurídico. Moralidade do direito. Legalidade.

ABSTRACT
The paper approaches the debate on the conceptual linkage between law and morals that has taken place since 1958 between two great exponents of jurisprudence in the 20th century: H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. Two controversies are here focused. On the one hand, Fuller defended the thesis that some principles of legality compose a morality inherent to the law, with a formal and procedural nature. Hart argued that these were only technical rules, without moral character. On the other hand, the Hartian theory of the rule of recognition as a social rule has been put into play. If, for Hart, it was a form of self-definition of the legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules, for Fuller there is no legal character, of a rule, involved, for example, in the political fact of the (revolutionary) transition from one legal system to another.
KEYWORDS: Legal positivism. Morality of law. Legality.

To ask the question, “Does evidence law matter?,” is often to assume that some sets or groups of people believe it is important while others are challenging that view.  However, another assumption regarding the nature of this question is possible—that the question is asked because legal academics believe that evidence law both does and does not matter, and that those academics also believe that these are irreconcilable beliefs.  What is of particular interest is how legal academics reached this point and why they believe that evidence law both does and does not matter. 

Consideration of these aspects of evidence law scholarship and study reveals that evidence law can be understood as something both rational, irrational, and non-rational.  It can be perceived as permitting practitioners and scholars to both accommodate paradox and accept the conflict of an abstract rule of law imposed by “concrete” persons.  This stands at odds with progressive reform efforts which attempt to define, codify, and ultimately reconcile the inherently dichotomous nature of evidence law.  In order to achieve real progress in the area of evidentiary reform, the idea of progress will have to be abandoned.

Following the death of 17-year-old Leelah Alcorn, a transgender teen who committed suicide after forced “conversion therapy,” President Barack Obama called for a nationwide ban on psychotherapy aimed at changing sexual orientation or gender identity. The administration argued that because conversion therapy causes substantial psychological harm to minors, it is neither medically nor ethically appropriate. We fully agree with the President and believe that this is a step in the right direction. Of course, in addition to being unsafe as well as ethically unsound, current conversion therapy approaches aren’t actually effective at doing what they claim to do – changing sexual orientation. But we also worry that this may be a short-term legislative solution to what is really a conceptual problem. The question we ought to be asking is “what will happen if and when scientists do end up developing safe and effective technologies that can alter sexual orientation?”

This paper presents a philosophical approach to the semiotics of law in terms of an exercise in symbolic transposition whereby aesthetic categories are brought to bear on jurisprudence, and in particular on two of its foundational questions. These questions, the backdrop against which the analysis unfolds, ask (1) whether law is static or dynamic; and (2) whether law 'constitutes' human beings, in some specific sense, or whether the reverse holds. The notions of universality and necessity and that of utopia are employed together with two opposite art symbols and a model of their antitheses is constructed revealing diverse answers as to how to conceive law in relation to the two questions. One answer is singled out by adopting the principles of Kantian aesthetic (reflective) judgement: to elicit an aesthetic claim, law must be seen as a utopian social order exhibiting purposiveness without, however, presupposing any predetermined substantive normative end. This is effected by a special reading permitting the combination of necessitation (obligation) with free play-this being the common ground shared by both law and aesthetics but only in this limiting utopian moment. This is a unique sense in which legal discourse is formally assimilated to aesthetic non-purposive judgements yet without relinquishing law's distinctive feature as purposive order prescribing, however, prescription alone as a formal end. Leaning on his elbow, in an attitude of profound and solemn meditation, "What a multitude of things there are" (exclaimed the dancing-master Marcel) "in a minuet!"-May we now add?and in a law. Bentham, 'Of the limits of the penal branch of jurisprudence', Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), XVII, ad fin.

This article aims to reconstruct and theorise the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal system by drawing on Hartian legal theory. It comprises four claims. First, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) 'foundational case law' on autonomy-and direct effect and supremacy as its corollaries-is conceptualised as a second-order thesis about the genus to which EU law belongs (the 'autonomy thesis'). Second, the ECJ's reliance on the full effectiveness of EU law as a justification for the autonomy thesis alludes to the deep connection between legality and effectiveness, but this connection cannot rationally explain the normativity of the autonomy thesis as an internal statement of law. Third, in order to provide such an explanation, the autonomy thesis is reconceptualised as an 'internal recognitional statement' by which the ECJ asserts a normative formulation of an autonomous EU rule of recognition. Fourth, within this Hartian analysis of the EU legal system, the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy lack self-standing analytical value. This article finishes with some very preliminary observations on a well-known objection against the autonomy of EU law based on the attitudes and perspectivism of national courts. two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.

Autor ve svém textu pojednává o univerzalitě lidských práv. Soustředí se zejména na analýzu přístupu amerického teoretika Jacka Donnellyho, který hodnotí jako pluralistický. Specifickou pozornost věnuje otázkám vztahu univerzality a legitimity a vzájemných vazeb mezi universalismem a relativismem. Na závěr autor zkoumá i potenciál pragmatického přístupu k univerzalitě a lidským právům.

This is rather the first book with a title "Philosophy of Law in the Arctic" in the literature. This philosophy of law is a very wide and cross-disciplinary area of research: between law, philosophy, anthropology, history, cultural ecology or environmental studies. I have no doubts that we have done such kind of philosophy in the academia so far, not using this term, but keeping up with the concept, the idea.
The book is a result of research conducted by many members of the Sub-group of Philosophy of Law in the Arctic (the University of the Arctic). This team seems a very interdisciplinary academic group. Our cooperation bears fruit.
The aim of the book is to define and systematise Arctic legal philosophy problems. In this book, there are five thematic parts. Each part consists of two-five short articles (we can call them also chapters or papers). These are the sixteen short articles all together. Each article consists of between six and fourteen pages. So going further, what we see in the book then is, in fact, a set of both theoretical and practical papers1. The topics of these papers (chapters) are different as the authors are different while representing a wide-ranging scope of academic disciplines or specialisations. Each paper is followed by a relevant bibliography, which might be helpful for other scholars interested in the field. The seventeen writers come from such countries as Finland (4), Norway (1), Canada (3), Poland (3), Japan (2), Austria (1), Ireland (1), and England (2). Some of them have Arctic indigenous roots (3). In the end
of the book, there is a very original attachment - the map of Arctic Canada.

RBC Law Center, Complaints & Reviews has published an unedited copy of the basic legal document that tells how a testimonial or a testament is being formed. Data Services Co & Us Legal Network are a fraction of all this, as lawyers agree that they cannot intervene if anything different than the contents inside the document occur. This is a legal paper that has the highest standards of respect and it has been ruled a century ago. Even if some modifications have been made, the basic core function hasn't been changed.

This paper outlines a model of argumentation that formulates the processes by which international and comparative human rights law influence the reasoning of domestic judges. I argue that the persuasive influence of such law flows from, and is justifiable by reference to, a distinctive mode of rational argumentation centred around precedent and analogy. If sound, this model helps explain how persuasive influence may be distinguished from political or ideological power (i.e. authority) and how decisions to use such law are constrained by formal and informal institutions of interpretation i.e. are justifiable in jurisprudential terms.

Pojęcie interregnum w symboliczny sposób oddaje istotę zagadnień podjętych w ramach niniejszej monografii. Jej przedmiot stanowi analiza XX-wiecznych transformacji ustrojowych, które dokonały się w kręgu euroatlantyckiej kultury prawnej. Celem badań było uchwycenie najistotniejszych elementów zmiany ustrojowej ujmowanej możliwie szeroko, a zatem obejmującej przekształcanie się reżimów monarchicznych w ustroje o charakterze republikańskim, procesy liberalizacji lub demokratyzacji reżimów autorytarnych czy wreszcie formowanie się całkowicie nowych bytów państwowych. Opisywane metamorfozy ustrojowe zostały uchwycone in statu nascendi, w perspektywie dynamicznej, w okresie kształtowania się nowych form ustrojowych, a zatem ścierania się starego porządku z nowym.

Monografia ma walor nie tylko informacyjny, przejawiający się w opisie biegu zdarzeń składających się na poszczególne procesy zmiany ustrojowej. Podejmuje także uniwersalne problemy związane z napięciem między legalnością a legitymizacją ustroju w warunkach doniosłej zmiany politycznej lub społecznej.