Knowledge Of Other Minds

WORLD Collects Constantine Sandis's best works on Wittgenstein's approach to understanding others, offering a fresh exegesis of Wittgenstein's writing while showing his relevance beyond the academy. The book brings together Constantine Sandis's essays on Wittgenstein's approach to understanding others. Sandis sketches a picture of how his anti-scepticism with regard to the philosophical problem of 'other minds' is not only compatible with but also supported by his scepticism concerning the real-life difficulty of understanding others (and being understood by them). While each individual essay focuses on particular issues in Wittgenstein (including philosophical anthropology, interpersonal psychology, and animal concepts), they collectively paint a picture of what he takes the real problem of other minds to be, how to overcome it, and the limitations of our understanding. Sandis not only offers a fresh exegesis of Wittgenstein's public and private writings on these matters, but proceeds to show the relevance of Wittgenstein beyond the academy.

Cet article propose une nouvelle lecture de la 5ème Méditation cartésienne fondée sur une réévaluation de la stratégie argumentative suivie par Husserl dans son traitement de la question d’autrui, et de son articulation à l’égologie phénoménologique des Méditations. Cette relecture s’appuie d’abord sur une distinction entre deux sens irréductibles du solipsisme donnant lieu à l’identification de deux problèmes distincts : le problème métaphysique du solipsisme que Husserl résout et écarte dans la 4ème Méditation, et le problème du solipsisme transcendantal, que ne saurait résoudre l’égologie phénoménologique des quatre premières méditations précédentes dans la mesure où il découle très précisément de la résolution idéaliste du solipsisme métaphysique. L’article montre ensuite que la position de ce problème en ouverture de la 5ème Méditation répond à une difficulté interne à l’égologie husserlienne : celle de l’injustifiabilité du mode de donation en première personne des vécus. Cette difficulté, qui affecte l’ensemble de la phénoménologie husserlienne, ne pouvait pourtant être formulée que dans le cadre d’une analyse du mode de manifestation d’autres egos révélant la possibilité d’une remise en cause de l’égologie. Faire apparaitre cette possibilité sans abandonner pour autant les principes de l’égologie phénoménologique est l’objet de la « réduction à la sphère du propre » accomplie par Husserl dans cette 5ème Méditation, de façon à rendre possible une forme d’échec de la relation à autrui qui garantit le succès de sa description phénoménologique.

El presente artículo propone una nueva lectura de la “Quinta Meditación cartesiana” basada en una reevaluación de la estrategia argumentativa seguida por Husserl en su tratamiento de la cuestión del otro, y su articulación con la egología fenomenológica de las Meditaciones. Esta relectura se basa, en primer lugar, en una distinción entre dos significados  irreductibles  del  solipsismo,  que  da  lugar  a  la  identificación  de  dos problemas distintos: el problema metafísico del solipsismo, que Husserl resuelve y descarta en la “Cuarta Meditación”, y el problema del solipsismo trascendental, que la egología fenomenológica de las cuatro primeras Meditaciones no puede resolver en la medida en que se desprende precisamente de la resolución idealista del solipsismo metafísico. El artículo muestra a continuación que la posición de este problema en la apertura de la “Quinta Meditación” responde a una dificultad interna de la egología husserliana: la de la injustificabilidad del modo de donación en primera persona de las vivencias. Esta dificultad, que afecta a toda la fenomenología husserliana, sólo podía formularse en el contexto de un análisis del modo de manifestación de otros egos, análisis que revela la posibilidad de poner en cuestión la egología. Hacer aparecer esta posibilidad sin abandonar los principios de la egología fenomenológica es el objeto de la “reducción a la esfera de la propiedad” que Husserl lleva a cabo en esta “Quinta Meditación”, de manera que posibilite una forma de fracaso de la relación con el otro que garantice el éxito de su descripción fenomenológica.

Word heeft nu een artificieel intelligente assistent ingebouwd gekregen, en ik heb hem al mijn manuscripten voorgelegd met de vraag om van elk werk een samenvatting te maken. Ook de verzamelwerken en enkele mini-pockets zijn op deze manier geanalyseerd. Bij deze vindt u dus een netjes opgemaakt overzicht van mijn voornaamste ideeën en boodschappen.

Preek 20241224 De tweede laag van ons bestaan Zo hoorde ik onlangs iemand die echt houdt van de maand december iets opmerkelijks zeggen. Ik ken haar als iemand die geniet van de gezelligheid in huis met de kerstboom en een stal waar een lampje in schijnt, lichtjes op straat, muziek in de winkels. Ze merkte op: Ik ben net even met de auto het dorp uit geweest en als ik dan langs de weg,al die lichtjes zie, al die mensen die maar vrolijk denken te moeten zijn, dan denk ik Halloooo, zijn we niet wat schijnheilig bezig, zijn er geen oorlogen aan de gang, bomaanslagen met vuurwerk dat al jaren niet verboden kan worden omdat dat stemmen kost bij de verkiezingen, gaat het dan na half december ineens niet helemaal mis met het klimaat….. maar ja, ik weet het ook niet, ik heb toch ook een kerstboom in huis. Lieve mensen, wees gerust, dit wordt geen ouderwetse preek tegen de kerstcommercie en ook geen pleidooi voor een sobere kerst. Die opmerking zette me aan het denken in een andere richting en ik wil u daar een paar minuten in meenemen.

Il barone rampante uit 1957, in Nederland bekend als De baron in de bomen, is een van de meest iconische werken van Italo Calvino: het boek wordt gelezen van jong tot oud, op scholen en stranden, in 40 talen en 46 landen, tot 2020 in 165 verschillende uitgaven: de meeste van alle boeken van Calvino. 1 Als tweede deel van de allegorische trilogie I nostri antenati (Onze voorouders), waarin de schrijver essentiële waarden van het mens-zijn aan de orde stelt, toont de jonge baron Cosimo Piovasco di Rondò ons ten tijde van de Franse Revolutie een staaltje zelfbeschikking met het besluit in de bomen te klimmen en de wereld voortaan vanaf die hoogte te aanschouwen. 2 Wanneer Cosimo, in hoofdstuk 10, het leven op de grond definitief vaarwel zegt, krijgt zijn natuurlijke opgaan in het bomenrijk gestalte in zijn meticuleuze kennis van en naadloze aanpassing aan dat rijk. Maar daarbij biedt Calvino de lezer ook een meer zintuigelijke ervaring van de harmonisering tussen mens en natuur die zich in deze passage voltrekt, middels klankverbindingen, zinsritmes en intertekstuele associaties. Deze talige harmonie, die de tekstbetekenis ondersteunt en versterkt, mag de lezer van een vertaling natuurlijk niet onthouden worden. Van dit boek van Calvino bestaat tot nog toe één Nederlandse vertaling, uit 1986, door Henny Vlot. 3 Bijna veertig jaar na dato (en bijna zeventig jaar nadat de eerste Italiaanse lezers met Cosimo kennismaakten) is het volgens ons tijd om het boek opnieuw te presenteren aan de hedendaagse lezer. We doen dat met twee korte fragmenten, opnieuw vertaald en met onvermijdelijke verschillen in vertaalstrategie (maar zonder kwaliteitsoordeel) ten opzichte van de eerste vertaling; een strategie die een verrijking en een herijking voor de lezer wil zijn. Elke vertaling werpt immers een ander licht op het origineel. Dit is des te meer van belang bij sleutelwerken die een geprivilegieerde toegang bieden tot het oeuvre van een auteur. Il barone rampante en de daaruit gekozen fragmenten vormen daarvan een bijzonder geschikt voorbeeld. Het boek wordt wel gezien als een stap naar een nieuwe vorm van schrijven en engagement, waarbij Calvino net als Cosimo de juiste afstand neemt tot de wereld, niet om die wereld achter zich te laten maar om haar scherper te kunnen beschouwen. Umberto Eco is een van de kenners en collega's die Calvino met zijn eigen personage heeft vergeleken

Quanti Wittgenstein vi furono? Vi fu davvero una cesura netta fra il Tractatus logico-philosophicus e le Ricerche filosofiche? Tale presunta svolta accomunerebbe il cammino di Wittegnstein al destino di altri filosofi che nel '900 si sono assunti il paradossale compito di divenire i più implacabili critici della propria filosofia (Husserl, Cassirer, Heidegger, Whitehead, Russell). Nel caso di Wittgenstein, la storiografia che lo riguarda si è divisa fra una posizione continuista, una posizione che insiste su una frattura profonda presente nell'iter filosofico del filosofo austriaco e una posizione che rintraccia addirittura l'esistenza di un terzo Wittgenstein. Ma esistono due Wittgenstein, anche in senso geografico: un Wittgenstein austriaco e un Wittgenstein anglosassone. Parole-chiave: Wittgenstein, continuismo, discontinuismo. ABSTRACT. How many Wittgenstein's philosophies were there? Was there really a clear-cut break between the Tractatus logico-philosophicus a...

This chapter centers on the idea that Evans’ notion of transparency, as a mode of knowing a person’s mind by looking outward through their transparent lenses, is not exclusively tied to self-knowledge. On certain occasions, particularly those involving a deep history of second-personal interactions, our knowledge of other people’s minds can be transparent. The argument of this chapter is, thus, a criticism of standard transparent theories of self-knowledge to the extent that transparency is not an exclusive trait of first-personal self-knowledge. However, the chapter also proposes a more constructive understanding of transparency in terms of “epistemic intimacy”, which helps us grasp central features of self-knowledge, as well as of our knowledge of (some) other minds.

human interactions are full of emotions. In fact, even though emotions are often experienced when alone, most of the time emotions are experienced within a social context. Even emotions that are experienced when alone can have an implicit social context in that we imagine an interaction partner or think back to an emotional event involving others (Fridlund, 1991). Importantly, emotion expressions serve as social signals that provide information about the expresser but also about the situation (hess, Kappas, & Banse, 1995) and that help to coordinate and facilitate interpersonal interaction and communication (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005). In the present chapter, we are presenting a model of emotional facial expressions in context (MEEc; hess & hareli, 2016), which proposes a pertinent but not exclusive role for context information in emotion perception by postulating the social appraisal of the expression as the limiting frame for reinterpretation....

Whenever I begin to think about specific experiments that I might do, I am confronted with theoretical problems whose solution does not require experiments but which can be thought through on the basis of the ordinary experience of everyday life. Only when I have cleared up the basic concepts would I feel it proper to proceed to experiments (Heider, 1983, p. 87)

Although many philosophers have, throughout history, regarded themselves as answering the skeptic, the question arises whether answering the skeptic is the thing to do. If not, the question becomes how else to respond to her. Wittgenstein-inspired stances are, in general, therapeutic. In this article I focus on the problem of other minds in order to analyze and compare the different shapes such therapeutic stances may have. I begin by showing how crucial resisting the temptation to answer the skeptic was for John McDowell's early formulations of disjunctivism in the 1980s. In his article "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge" I identify substantial positions such as the rejection of highest common factor views, the diagnosis of the connection between such highest common factor views and an (untenable) conception of appearances, as well as the proposal of a non-Cartesian, or modest, approach to indistinguishability for a subject. Whatever his success in these other enterprises, McDowell continues to regard both the temptation to answer the skeptic and a substitute therapeutic stance as epistemologically motivated. But if skepticism is more than an intellectual conundrum, as maintained by Stanley Cavell, the source of such temptation has to be considered in a completely different light. * Included in N. Venturinha (ed.), Special Section on Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology.

Discr¡ts¿¡s y prácticas en tra consi¡:ucción dc ur¡ te¡-n¡¡rio escolar cn geografía pal !,1írL¡'ítt Vctoria Fe rn,á¡tclez. Clso "'"""""' Una geoS¡'nfia escoiar en carltbto a 1:l Los esccnarios de la innovación ...'. """" Las tensiones enlre finalidacles cducat'ivas y sabert's enscñ;rdos""'

En este artículo defiendo dos tesis: (1) que la asimetría entre primera persona y tercera persona puede ser explicada apelando a las características gramaticales de los conceptos psicológicos implicados y (2) que, dada la heterogeneidad de los conceptos psicológicos involucrados, es natural pensar que no lograremos formular una explicación unificada de la asimetría. Para ello, en § II presento los conceptos psicológicos y muestro cuán heterogéneos son. Luego, en § III, exploro los límites de la explicación expresivista, y en § IV examino el caso de las actitudes proposicionales. La conclusión (§ V) es un alegato a favor del pluralismo.

The article examines Wittgenstein's thought on the language of pain in first and third person. Relevant grammatical differences, according to the typical analytical method of this philosopher, are highlighted not only in relation to the two perspectives, but also regarding the use of cognitive verbs such as 'feeling' and 'knowing'. The exam of many texts suggests some issues concerning the relationship between personal experiences, empathic grasping of other's feelings and their conceptual translation. A brief comparison with some Thomas Aquinas' texts is completed with the proposal of the existence of non intentional knowledge.

The ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mental states is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution. Having an appreciation for the workings of the mind is considered a prerequisite for natural language acquisition (

Wat een titel ! Is dat onderwerp (de houdbaarheid)niet veel te groot om te beschrijven en tot conclusies en opvattingen te komen? Misschien wel,maar ik doe een poging. Een poging die wordt gestut door mijn levens ervaringen,opleidingen,posities,publicaties die ik heb gelezen en hier en daar zelf heb geschreven. Een soort verzameling van lessen die ik heb ondergaan in dit leven en opvattingen die daaruit zijn gedestilleerd. Dit geschrift kent een aantal uitweidingen en opvattingen. Ik begin met een algemene schets gevolgd door een (korte)beschrijving van de Westerse wereld,Nederland en een paar conclusies daarover. Vervolgens tracht ik een drietal lijnen wat nader uit te werken; globaal de maatschappelijke weg naar buiten met veel terugkijken via de opvattingen van de maatschappelijke filosoof Rawls en de sociocraat Endenburg. Daarna de persoonlijke weg naar buiten via onder meer Stirner, Buber, Teilhard, Levinas, Stikker,gevolgd door de persoonlijke weg naar binnen met aandacht voor filosofieën uit het verre oosten(China,India,Japan) en mijn persoonlijke invulling daarvan(Zen,Judo). Waar ik het me herinner geef ik aan wie mijn inspiratiebronnen waren middels citaten uit hun werken. Voor een deel zijn ze gedurende mijn leven deel uit gaan maken van mijn ''eigen''opvattingen. In de bijlage staan,voor zover ik het me herinner hun publicaties. Aan het einde wordt getracht een paar conclusies te trekken over onze mogelijke rol in de houdbaarheid van de beschaving. Om maar direct de zwakte van alles wat komt maar hier reeds aan te geven alvast het slotwoord; Wijzen is een ding,doen een ander!!! Moeilijk,moeilijk!!

In the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl notoriously attempts to dispel the illusion of "transcendental solipsism". Among the many difficulties this text presents, I intend to reconstruct two of them: the vagueness concerning the notion of solipsism, and the ambiguity relating to the thematic epoché and its phenomenological dimension. In analyzing both issues, I strive to offer clarifications which are necessary for any assessment of Husserl’s success in the Fifth Meditation. Following a line of interpretation extant in the secondary literature which I call the Double-Task Interpretation, I maintain there are two different methods going by the name “thematic epoché”, as well as to two different tasks being pursued by Husserl: a static and a genetic one. I proceed as follows: I first (Sect. I) contextualize Husserl’s goal in the Fifth Meditation vis-àvis some classical positions in the secondary literature; I then (Sect. 2) reconstruct the vagueness affecting the notion of solipsism, both within and beyond Husserl; after that (Sect. 3), I present how the thematic epoché, as offered in the Fifth Meditation, is ambiguous, an ambiguity which also relates to the vagueness of the notion of solipsism; analyzing a short textual passage from Intersubjektivität III, I then (Sect. 4) outline the Double-Task Interpretation of the Fifth Meditation, showing its general advantages and challenges; I finally (Sect. 5) conclude by considering the advantages of the Double-Task Interpretation for the assessment of Husserl’s success in the Fifth Meditation.

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Philosophy concerns those necessities we cannot, being human, fail to know. Except that nothing is more human than to deny them. 1 That human (op)positions, contradiction and conflict, permeate our world is obvious; however, if, we (human beings) share a conceptual scheme, common to us all, how then we can agree and disagree, accept and reject, admit or repress, recognize and misrecognize so much in our worlds-between others and ourselves-is not obvious, or needs to be recounted. Notwithstanding, we want to reconsider our shared conceptual scheme-the necessities apart from which we cannot say what we ordinarily say, or even do. To be sure, the (op)positions result from these necessities. It is that sort of necessity, so to say, logic, or "what is common to us all", that "we" want to describe, figure out or find out in ordinary language. To acknowledge a Cavellian insinuation: the necessities, being human, we must affirm and deny at once (i.e. the sense I sketch out from the epigraph above). In this essay, I claim that that is a dialectic inherent in ordinary language (in human forms of life). If we reflect upon, stop to recollect and recognize, what is, and, how it is that we ever agree or disagree about what we ordinarily say, should say about anything, e.g. how we can say that

El capítulo aborda cuatro puntos de la obra de Bolívar Echeverría. El primero trata sobre las peculiaridades del discurso crítico. El segundo punto, intenta ubicar dónde estaría la apertura de la crítica en el discurso de este filósofo. En tercer lugar, se abordan cuáles son las bases un discurso crítico para postular la existencia de un tipo de modernidad diferente que siga siendo ella misma moderna, pero sin su realización capitalista. Finalmente, se vislumbra en dónde acontecería la resistencia en un mundo capitalista plenamente unidimensional. Las conclusiones radican en sostener que el autor ecuatoriano, al cepillar a contrapelo la historia y exhibiendo los lapsus ignorados por el discurso capitalista, no sostiene que estamos dominados por el capitalismo como una fatalidad inmodificable, sino que observa indicios, así como hechos innegables, que abren la necesidad de reasumir las potencialidades de la modernidad para liberarla de su sujeción capitalista y construir un nuevo tipo de politicidad.

This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge.

This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of existence, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of existence in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets-the primacy of existence, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in existence (Tashkīk-i wujūd)-is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of existence holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that existence is fundamental. The writers distinguished between two conceptions of ethics in this regard: one based on existence and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of existence. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic.

Empathy may be understood as a particular topic within the larger discussion of the nature of intersubjectivity, i.e. discussions about how we are to understand the basic communicative relations between subjects and the importance of such interpersonal relations for our way of relating to the world as a whole. We routinely say of other persons such things as: 'she is angry'; 'he failed to understand my point', 'we are both looking for the same thing', 'we share a point of view', 'I feel your pain', 'I was upset to see Mary in pain', 'I can differentiate between what he said and what he meant', and so on. (The Cambridge Behaviour Scale gives a good series of questions that highlight various forms of empathic understanding, see Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004). Our ability to apprehend, cognize or co-experience the experiences of other subjects (both human and animal) has an older label in the history of psychology: it was originally called 'sympathy' in the tradition of David Hume (Hume 1978) and Adam Smith (Smith 2002). Thus Hume writes: No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however, different from, or even contrary to our own. (Hume 1978, pp. 316-17

We interviewed spinal-cord-injured, other handicapped, and nonhandicapped subjects to investigate the relation between the perception of autonomic arousal and experienced emotion. The three groups differed significantly on only one measure of affect intensity, with the spinal-cord-injured subjects more often reporting stronger fear in their lives now compared with the past. In addition, spinal-cord-injured subjects often described intense emotional experiences. Spinal-cord-injured subjects who differed in their level of autonomic feedback differed in intensity on several measures. Subjects with greater autonomic feedback tended to report more intense levels of negative emotions. The findings indicate that the perception of autonomic arousal may not be necessary for emotional experience. There were weak trends in our data, however, suggesting that the perception of arousal may enhance the experience of emotional intensity. The subjective well-being reports of the handicapped groups were comparable to those of nonhandicapped subjects, indicating successful coping with their disability.

Th e paper explores some philosophical consequences of the phenomenological criticisms addressed (indirectly) to logical positivism. It introduces arguments by Husserl and Patočka concerning the duality inherent to the notion of world, as suggested by modern scientism: the real world is alleged to be diff erent from, and hidden behind, the everyday appearance (perception) of the world and things within it. Carnap's project of reconstructing (scientifi c) knowledge in reductionist terms of psychological-atomic sense-data-and, ultimately, physical objects distinguishes him from Husserl: for the latter, meaningful experience originates in primitive encounters with meaningful things. Both, however, share a certain preoccupation with reductionist analyses of scientifi c rigour, while this tendency has been abandoned in Wittgenstein's works. His expanded notion of verifi cation betrays motivations of a phenomenological kind. He tries to show that the relationship between simpler and more complex contents of knowledge is a relationship between contents playing diff erent, but interlinked, roles within our practices of understanding and making ourselves intelligible. Understanding other people and the events in their lives in terms of a soul (and what happens to it) is not a marginal, eccentric, or derivative case: it is the central, primitive form of this understanding. Wittgenstein's working with the notion of 'soul' parallels Husserl's analyses from Ideas II.

Beschouwingen over muziek en hersenen zijn heel actueel, maar zelden wordt stilgestaan bij de vraag waaróm onze hersenen zo 'gevoelig' zijn voor muziek. Vooral deze vraag houdt de hoogleraar muziekcognitie Henkjan Honing bezig. Zijn inzet heeft geleid tot een internationaal multidisciplinair onderzoeksprogramma. De voorlopige resultaten van dit onderzoek zijn samengevat in een recent verschenen overzichtswerk The Origins of Musicality. Het is een doorwrochte verzameling van recent verworven wetenschappelijke inzichten, die uitnodigen tot een interpretatie en voorlopig antwoord op die voor de neurowetenschappen intrigerende vraag. Trefwoorden muziek • biomusicology • cognitieve neurowetenschap • entrainment Inleiding Wat muziek met ons doet, is al even mysterieus als fascinerend. Je kunt er blij en verdrietig tegelijk van zijn en sommige deuntjes houden je zomaar in hun greep. Maar eigenlijk doet muziek dat niet met óns, maar wíj doen dat met 'muziek'. Het is immers niet zo dat muziek als het ware klaar ligt voor gebruik in hemelse sferen, zoals men vroeger dacht [1]. Wat wij horen, is een patroon van klanken en ritmen, waarbij een groot deel van onze hersenen de moeilijke klus moet klaren om dat zelf te interpreteren als 'muziek'. Dat we daar opvallend goed in zijn, maakt ons ook allemaal 'muzikaal' , zoals de Amsterdamse hoogleraar muziekcognitie Henkjan Honing al eerder in een aardig Nederlandstalig boek heeft uitgelegd [2]. Waarom de mens dat vermogen heeft ontwikkeld, is echter raadselachtig. Onze

Schelling's major preoccupations in the 1809 Inquiries into Human Freedom gather around the problem of the finitude of freedom. This is not a new problem for Schelling. Nearly fifteen years earlier he had observed, "What is incomprehensible is not how an absolute ego, but how an empirical ego should possess freedom, not how an intellectual ego could be absolutely free, but how an empirical ego could. .. possess causality through freedom." 1 For Schelling, the freedom of an absolute ego does not present a philosophical puzzle. The puzzle is how freedom, which is absolute, can be attributed to an ego that is finite, and thus not absolute. By 1809 Schelling no longer endorses the Fichtean talk of an absolute ego; he has in the meantime established that the absolute, as the identity of identity and difference, outstrips the distinction between subject and object, ego and non-ego, ideal and real. Accordingly, while in the 1790s Schelling has seen transcendental freedom as equivalent to the unconditioned self-positing of an absolute ego, in 1809 Schelling dissociates absolute freedom, as decision, from the absolute. Freedom begins its complex career not as absolute identity but as absolute difference, a difference or divorce from the absolute that is not compromised in also being a difference or divorce within the absolute. 2 Schelling's discovery in 1 809 is clear. Divorce or separation, Scheidung, is the condition of all performance and activity, thus the condition of freedom. Yet divorce is not original; it, too, must be performed. Separation from the absolute is thus, paradoxically, both the condition of freedom and a free act. As Jean-Francois Marquet puts it, freedom must "declare itself, decide itself," in a free deed. 3

The article examines Wittgenstein’s thought on the language of pain in first and third person. Relevant grammatical differences, according to the typical analytical method of this philosopher, are highlighted not only in relation to the two perspectives, but also regarding the use of cognitive verbs such as ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’. The exam of many texts suggests some issues concerning the relationship between personal experiences, empathic grasping of other’s feelings and their conceptual translation. A brief comparison with some Thomas Aquinas’ texts complements the proposal of the existence of non intentional knowledge.

La gramática para términos relativos a 'seres humanos' en Descartes parece interpretar que"yo" debe usarse para designar sólo la mente y no el cuerpo. Esta contribución intenta describir el uso y las observaciones gramaticales que hace Descartes de estos términos en sustextos. Se intenta mostrar aquí que Descartes prescribe ciertas reglas para "yo" y términos afines que, en principio, no están en conflicto con los usos corrientes; las reglas de gramática que Descartes usa y prescribe intentan seguirlos usos establecidos y no proponer otros nuevos.Este proyecto, sin embargo, se ve influenciado por un contexto argumental exterior a la meraprescripción de reglas gramaticales; las'irregularidades' de la gramática cartesiana para palabras sobre 'seres humanos' se derivan del contexto que define sus reglas: la dudametódica

My aim in this article is to flesh out a new distinction between moral responsibility, as it is understood in light of Strawson's Breactive attitudes,^and an institutional form of responsibility-a responsibility that employees bear for their work to their superiors. I show that Strawson's view of responsibility is separate from organizational responsibility, and hence the responsibility of employees to their managers cannot be understood in terms of indignation or resentment, both of which are key Strawsonian concepts. The latter type of responsibility can be understood in terms of objective attitudes, managerial demands, organizational standards, and related expectations. Based on a Cartesian and a Wittgensteinian notions of asymmetry between first-and third-person uses of psychological concepts, Strawson developed a view of responsibility that dissolves the above asymmetry. In contrast with the latter asymmetry, which focuses on those who ascribe psychological concepts to themselves and to others, Strawson's view is centered on the recipients of reactive attitudes. According to his view, resentment and indignation differ because they are aimed at different recipients, something that cannot be applied in cases of organizational responsibility.

On what basis do we attribute phenomenal states to others? One answer, defended by John Stuart Mill, appeals to an analogy between ourselves and the similar bodies and actions of others (1865, p. 208). Despite its intuitive plausibility, this position is often rejected (Arico et al., 2011; Buckwalter & Phelan, 2014; Knobe & Prinz, 2008). In line with Mill's account, we propose that the primary factors used when making phenomenal state ascriptions are the appropriate display of functional and behavioral cues and having bodies with the right kind of physical composition. To test this account, we gave five groups of participants a vignette followed by three to six questions. For four of the groups, the vignette described an alien-human encounter and the participants had to judge the likelihood (on a 7-point scale) that the alien had a non-phenomenal state (a belief) and the likelihood that it could have a phenomenal state (pain). The fifth group, as a control, read a vignette about a similar interaction between two humans. We found that, as appropriate functional and behavioral cues and then humanoid features are added to the alien, people are more willing to attribute a phenomenal state to it. Attributions of the non-phenomenal state are primarily dependent on the appropriate functional and behavioral cues, not on having humanoid features.

This paper has two related aims. The first is to argue that Fichte’s concept of freedom is perfectionist. By ‘perfectionism,’ I mean a moral theory according to which our good, ultimately, is realizing our true nature; Fichte also holds a perfectionist view of freedom, according to which we achieve freedom only to the extent that we succeed in making ourselves good or realizing our true nature. The second aim of this paper is to show how Fichte’s perfectionist concept of freedom solves two problems confronting Kantian autonomy: the “paradox” of Kantian autonomy and the “dilemma” of post-Kantian autonomy. As I contend, Fichte’s perfectionist concept of freedom avoids these two problems by enabling us to view self-determination as a form of self-causation, and by showing that we can be responsible for our immoral actions even if we are not fully free when we perform them.