Kant and Religion

Il saggio confronta la dottrina di Kant sul «male radicale» (e la relativa interpretazione
kantiana di Gen 3) con la dottrina e l’interpretazione dello stesso tema di Paul
Ricoeur. Il suo scopo è quello di mostrare fino a che punto un’ermeneutica simbolica
e riflessiva della Scrittura e dei dogmi possa risultare più feconda per gli scopi di una
filosofia della religione che intenda superare le sue origini illuministe.

The essay compares Kant’s doctrine on «radical evil» (and the Kantian interpretation
of Genesis 3) with the doctrine and interpretation of the same theme from Paul
Ricoeur. Its purpose is to show the extent to which symbolic and reflective hermeneutics
of Scripture and dogma may be more fruitful for the purposes of a philosophy of
religion that intends to overcome its Enlightenment origins.

Ibn Rushd, llamado Averroes entre los latinos. Esta obra es conocida como Epítome de la Metafísica y consistiendo, según el mismo nombre indica, en una explicación compendiada de dicho escrito aristotélico, no debe ser confundida con el Gran Comentario a la Metafísica. Aparece en la serie arábiga del proyecto Averrois Opera dirigido por G. Endreß. Arnzen pone entre nuestras manos la primera traducción inglesa completa de la obra. El lector de lengua castellana, quien cuenta desde hace casi un siglo con una traducción en su propio idioma-C. QUIRÓS RODRÍGUEZ, ed., Compendio de Metafísica (Imprenta de Estanislao Maestre, Madrid, 1919) reimpreso por la Universidad de Córdoba en 1998-, no debe ignorar esta nueva traslación por varias razones que tratamos a continuación de presentar. Aunque por desgracia el libro no trae impresa la versión árabe, el traductor ha llevado a cabo un trabajo crítico intenso, consultando la mayoría de los manuscritos. Asimismo, los ha contrastado con las ediciones que reflejan aquellos a los que no ha podido tener acceso, razón por la cual se ha visto impedida la fijación definitiva del texto árabe. Este esfuerzo

Kant’s conception of the highest good poses several challenges for scholars. Recent research has primarily focused on the object of obligation that Kant associates with the highest good. Some scholars have attempted to reconcile Kant’s seemingly contradictory statements by hypothesizing a development in his thought. They suggest that Kant replaced his metaphysical conception with an inner-worldly one due to the insurmountable difficulties posed by the obligation to create a world in which happiness is distributed in proportion to moral worth. According to this secular conception, individuals need only strive for the best possible state of the world. However, this hypothesis of a shift in Kant’s conception is not only weak in its textual foundation but also contradicts a key distinction that Kant consistently maintained throughout his critical philosophy: the distinction between God as the original highest good and the world as the derived highest good. In this paper, I argue that the systematic difficulties in determining the object of human obligation with respect to the highest good can be resolved by more precisely distinguishing the elements within the highest good and by seriously considering God as the foundation that unites these two aspects in the ideal of the original highest good.

La filosofía de Immanuel Kant ha ejercido una influencia profunda y duradera en prácticamente todas las dimensiones del pensamiento humano: sea en el ámbito del conocimiento o en el de la acción, en el de la reflexión sobre el ordenamiento jurídico y político de las sociedades modernas lo mismo que en el del esclarecimiento del enjuiciamiento estético, o bien en el de la interrogación acerca de la fe religiosa y del decurso histórico de la humanidad en su conjunto. Todas estas dimensiones han sido incorporadas en el libro que ahora presentamos al lector. En él se recogen una serie de aportaciones de los investigadores y estudiosos más destacados del pensamiento de Kant en lengua española que fueron presentadas inicialmente a discusión en el marco del III Congreso de la Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española (SEKLE) celebrado en septiembre del 2016 en México. Los trabajos fueron sometidos a un muy cuidadoso proceso de reelaboración conceptual y argumentativa que dio como resultado este libro.

A fin de ofrecer una visión más clara tanto del pensamiento de Kant como de la estructura de este libro, éste ha sido dividido en seis secciones, a saber: Filosofía Teórica, Filosofía Moral, Filosofía Política y del Derecho, Filosofía de la Religión, Filosofía de la Historia y, finalmente, Estética.

In this paper I focus on how the meritorious dimension (or latitude, Spielraum) involved in the promotion of the highest good is closely related to the constitution of an ethical community as a free, open and progressive moral society. I argue that since moral perfection and moral belief/faith as the grounding elements for the promotion of the highest good (synthesis of virtue and happiness) are not objective duties that must be promoted to a definite extent but involve a certain latitude in their employment, the ethical community that emerges out of the pursuit of the highest good does not prove to be a uniform society in terms of the degrees of the pursuit of moral perfection and moral commitment of its citizens. Rather, I point out that the latitude involved in the pursuit of moral perfection and the adoption of moral belief leads to the establishment of an ethical community that emerges as an open and free society entered by its citizens freely and willfully as part of their inner self-constraint. I thus hold that in such an ethical society agents can pursue and promote the highest good not in a strictly prescribed and uniform manner but in various forms and degrees as long as they constantly progress towards a higher form of moral perfection and purer form of religious (or rational) belief/faith.

En el “Prólogo” a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la Razón Pura, Kant afirma: “Debí, por tanto, suprimir el saber, para obtener lugar para la fe”. (Bxxx) En el presente trabajo tomaré como punto de partida este famoso pasaje para mostrar por qué Kant rechaza cualquier concepción metafísica del ateísmo, al mismo tiempo que desplaza la discusión del plano metafísico al psicológico. De igual forma señalaré que, aunque este desplazamiento esté aparentemente justificado por la razón práctica, la apuesta kantiana por una especie de teísmo psicológico-práctico encierra diversos problemas para su sistema filosófico.

“Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden.” 
“Therefore, must return to Kant.”
Titles in English of Kant’s writings for this index (pages 1 to 7321). 

Anthropology, History, and Education  [Starts on page 1 Correspondence  [Starts on page 313 Critique of Pure Reason  [Starts page 971 Critique of the Power of Judgment  [Starts on page 1771 Lectures on Logic  [Starts on page 2247 Lectures on Metaphysics  [Starts on page 2991 Notes and Fragments  [Starts on page 3670 Opus Postumum  [Starts on page 4374 4 Practical Philosophy  [Starts on page 4741 Religion and Rational Theology  [Starts on page 5446 Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 [Starts on page 5990 Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770  [Starts on page 6541 Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or An Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Entire Structure of the Universe Based on Newtonian Principles  [Starts on page 7162

The focus of this paper is on the concepts of practical and transcendental freedom, their relation to each other, and their role in Kant’s (moral) philosophy. It is argued that there is in this regard neither an inconsistency or contradiction between the Dialectic and the Canon of the first Critique nor a break between the first and the second Critique. The Canon’s claim that we cognize practical freedom through experience must by no means be understood as implying that Kant held a “naturalized” concept of freedom. The paper also reveals the preparatory role of the first Critique with respect to the moral philosophy that Kant, beginning in the Groundwork, presented in the following years.

This article undertakes a crucial examination of Kant's depiction of the interconnectedness between human reason and the divine. The argument posits that Kant conceptualizes reason as inherently founded on a divine basis. The primary objective of this article is not to delve into whether Kant endorses or dismisses specific Christian doctrines, or if his portrayal of reason aligns with a particular strand of Christian thought. Instead, the aim is to chart an interpretive middle path-one that embraces the profound philosophical underpinnings embedded in Kant's rationalist legacy while recognizing the inherent limitations he imposes on human reason. The conclusion drawn is that Kant's account of reason tends towards the divine, though the precise nature of this interconnectedness remains shrouded in mystery.

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that rational beings should want to have no inclin ations. But in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, he asserts that the inclin ations are good in themselves. While many commentators hold that Kant simply wrote hyperbolically in the Groundwork and the second Critique, I argue Kant was sincere, and changed his mind about the worth of the inclinations between the second Critique and the Religion. This is because he changed his mind about the source of immorality: whereas in the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason Kant took our inclinations to be tempters, starting in "Miscarriage of All Phil osophical Trials in Theodicy" and concluding in the Religion, he posited a selfim posed propensity to evil as the source of immorality. Kant's reason for changing his mind about the source of immorality was partly theological: if our inclin ations were to blame for immorality, then God would also be to blame for creating us with them. The only way God could not be to blame is if our immorality were selfimposed. But Kant also concluded that looking for theoretical explanations of our immorality-whether theological or naturalistic-was itself problematic: such explanations ended up exonerating us for our immorality. Because they had this effect, I contend that Kant saw the offering of such exculpating theoret ical explanations as itself motivated by immorality. This understanding of Kant makes sense of the approaches he takes in both "Miscarriage" and Religion.

Este volumen colectivo reúne trabajos de distintas áreas de la filosofía. Es un regalo que algunos colegas ofrecen al profesor Jaime Nubiola con motivo de su jubilación, como símbolo de agradecimiento por su amistad y magisterio. Las veintiséis contribuciones, agrupadas en cuatro bloques temáticos, abarcan autores, temas, corrientes filosóficas y momentos históricos muy variados, pero están en todos los casos conectadas con la vida intelectual que Jaime ha ido cultivando a su alrededor.
I. “El profesor universitario”. Junto con unas semblanzas que presentan a Jaime Nubiola como maestro y como amigo, esta primera parte contiene también dos capítulos de investigación propiamente dicha, en los que las nociones de “interdisciplinariedad” y “persona” ayudan a comprender la unidad de dimensiones complementarias (distintas pero interrelacionadas) que debe tener lugar, de modo privilegiado en la enseñanza universitaria, y en general en toda vida propiamente humana.
II. “Pensar, escribir, dialogar: hacer el mundo más razonable”. El hilo conductor de esta segunda parte es el lenguaje (o, más ampliamente, los signos compartidos) y el tema de fondo es la búsqueda de sentido, que se lleva a cabo en comunidad. Las nociones de “juegos de lenguaje”, “abstracción”, “narración”, “formas de vida”, “razonabilidad”, “amor personal” y “juego”, por nombrar solamente las más centrales, son herramientas para comprender realidades tan presentes en nuestras vidas como el crecimiento de nuestros hijos, la necesidad de saber quiénes somos, la transmisión de la fe, la orientación de las acciones de acuerdo con fines, la importancia de la amistad o las peculiaridades de la investigación científica.
III. “Filosofía para el siglo XXI”. En la tercera parte se trata de mostrar la conexión real de la filosofía académica con algunas de las grandes cuestiones del mundo contemporáneo: el debilitamiento moderno de las antiguas convicciones compartidas sobre el mundo y la vida, el eclipse de la verdad en el discurso público, la relación del ser humano con la naturaleza, la lucha de las mujeres por la superación de barreras, el papel de las emociones en la vida política, la presencia de lo sagrado en la cultura laica y la posibilidad de la ética en la sociedad neoliberal. Las nociones filosóficas con las que se trata de comprender estas cuestiones son: “sospecha” y “confianza”, “verdad” y “posverdad”, “naturaleza” y “finalidad”, “autonomía” y “simpatía”, “reconocimiento” e “identidad”, “inspiración” y “fiesta”, “poder” y “amabilidad”.
IV. “La comprensión histórica de la filosofía”. La última parte quiere reflejar el modo de hacer filosofía que Jaime practicó y enseñó durante toda su carrera. Por una parte, el diálogo con los filósofos Nicolás de Cusa, Tomás de Aquino, Saul Kripke, Michel Foucault y Friedrich Nietzsche; por otra parte, la mirada al contexto en el que se desarrollan el arte de Manuel de Falla, la epistemología empirista y la comunidad pragmatista mediterránea; en conjunto, estos capítulos nos ayudan a profundizar en cuestiones como las siguientes: ¿qué son la mente y el conocimiento?, ¿qué es eso que llamamos Dios?, ¿qué se esconde en un nombre?, ¿cómo encontrar la verdad sobre nosotros mismos?, ¿cómo enfrentarnos a nuestra fragilidad?, ¿qué relación tiene el arte con la vida?, ¿son las matemáticas algo más que lógica? y, finalmente, ¿qué es una comunidad de pensamiento?

We have seen in recent decades a series of books about divine command theory in analytic philosophy. Notable among them are Philip Quinn's Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (1978), Robert M. Adams's Finite and Infinite Goods (1999) and C. Stephen Evans's God and Moral Obligation (2013), all from Oxford University Press. In God's Command, John E. Hare, the Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale Divinity School, manifests a version of divine command theory as part of this series. However, this book is also one in a trilogy in which Hare presents an ethical theory based on the Trinity. The Moral Gap (Oxford University Press, 1996), which argued for the implications for ethical theory of the doctrine of the second person of the Trinity, in particular those of atonement and justification, was the first volume. God's Command, which is about the work of the first person of the Trinity, is the second. In his God and Morality (Blackwell, 2007), Hare announced that the third volume would be about the work of the Holy Spirit in sanctification. God's Command has eight chapters along with an impressive summary at the end. Although their main shared topic is divine command, the chapters are formed independently of each other. The questions of why we should be moral people and what is the foundation of our moral truths are the most significant drivers of this book. Hare basically defends the thesis that what makes something morally obligatory is that God commands it and what makes something morally wrong is that God prohibits it. In his view, moral law cannot be deduced from our nature, but it fits our nature exceedingly well. In the first chapter, Hare explains various kinds of relationship of morality's dependence upon religion and offers three arguments about this dependence, to do with providence, grace and justification. The argument from providence holds that if we don't doubt that we are under moral law, we are entitled to believe in the existence of a ruler of the world who makes the evil in the world subordinate to the good. The argument from grace maintains that there is a gap between moral demand and human capacity. For Hare, the key solution to the problem of the moral gap is to accept that, even if 'ought' implies 'can', 'ought' does not imply 'can by our own faculties' (p. 13). It is possible to be moral agents but only with assistance from outside. The argument from justification is about how the moral demand can be justified. Hare indicates that loving God is not simply to repeat God's will in our will, because there are things God wills that God does not will for us to will. The main concern of the second chapter is how divine command should be understood as associated with the obligatory. Hare holds that God has both objective and subjective authority. Objectively, when God commands a person to do something, this brings about a reason for acting in accordance with the command, even if the person subjectively does not acknowledge this reason. Only God's commands make obligatory the good things that God prescribes, all of which take us to our proper end by the path

El propósito de este trabajo es bosquejar los principios de una antropología del silencio en la obra de Edith Stein con base en las siguientes indagaciones preliminares. En la distinción XXIII de su Ordinatio I, Duns Escoto retoma la siguiente definición de persona dada por
Ricardo de San Víctor en su De Trinitate: «La existencia incomunicable de la naturaleza intelectual». El estudio de Duns Escoto a este respecto señalará que una entidad singular (haecceitas) es condición de posibilidad de la persona, pero no la persona misma porque esta es incomunicable ya que no la encontramos dentro del orden óntico. Es decir, la individualidad de la persona presenta una unicidad de orden cualitativo que no puede ser
expresada por ciencia alguna. De esta opinión es Mariano Crespo quien, con todo, nos marca el camino para comprender en qué consiste dicha
individualidad personal en Ser finito y ser eternoen tanto: «…yo, por medio de mi libre actividad, me decido por esta o aquella posibilidad de actuación, me conformo a mí mismo, me construyo como la persona
individual que soy.»

The purpose of my work is to outline the basis of one anthropology of silence in the work of Edith Stein based on the following preliminary inquiries. In distinction XXIII of his Ordinatio I, Duns Scotus takes up the following definition of the person given by Ricardo de San Víctor in his De Trinitate: «The incommunicable existence of intellectual nature». Duns Escoto's study in this regard will point out that a singular entity (haecceitas) is a condition of possibility of the person, but not the person
himself because he is incommunicable since we do not find him within the ontic order. That is to say, the individuality of the person presents a uniqueness of qualitative order that cannot be expressed by any science. Of this opinion is Mariano Crespo, however, shows us the way to understand what this personal individuality consists of Being Finite and Being Eternal insofar as: «... I, through my free activity, decide on this or that possibility of acting, I conform to me, I build myself as the
person that I am.»

Worin besteht das Band, das uns mit unseren Handlungen verknüpft? Wenn wir es mit Kant auf Gesetzen beruhen lassen, sehen wir uns bald folgendem Dilemma gegenüber: Entweder es beruht auf Naturgesetzen, dann können wir den Handelnden nicht für das loben oder tadeln, was er getan hat; denn er konnte ja nicht anders - oder es beruht auf dem Sittengesetz, dann müssen wir ihn loben; denn in diesem Fall muss sein Tun trivialerweise moralisch gewesen sein. Für ein moralisch verfehltes Tun scheint in Kants Konzeption kein Platz. Doch er kennt noch eine weitere Art von Gesetzen, den sog. Charakter. Indem ich diesen Ansatz aufgreife und variiere, versuche ich das geschilderte Dilemma zu überwinden und dem moralisch verfehlten Tun einen Platz zu geben..

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant postulates the immortality of the soul as a necessary condition for the realization of the highest good. Most important is the notion of infinite progress toward perfect conformity of the Gesinnung to the moral law. But how can a soul separated from the body make any progress toward moral perfection? And what does 'progress' mean if time, as a precondition of change, is conceived as a sensible form of intuition? Both questions are controversially discussed in current research. Most problematic is that both moral perfection and progress understood as continuous change toward the good seem to presuppose sensibility. In this paper I will argue that neither the testing of virtue nor the infinite progress toward holiness require a sensible nature. I will show that this interpretation is supported by two later Kantian texts: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and On the End of All Things.

This paper is a review to introduce the readers to Professor María Luisa Pro Velasco's work, with the same title. This book is a complete explanation about Robert Spaemann's ethics and bioethics, making a dialoge with the
bioethical basis of Peter Singer Derek Parfit and Daniel Denett .

Kant holds that whenever we fail to act from duty, we are driven by self-love. In this paper, we argue that there are a variety of different ways in which people go wrong, and we show why it is unsatisfying to reduce all of these to self-love. In doing so, we present Kant with five cases of wrongdoing that are difficult to account for in terms of self-love. We end by suggesting a possible fix for Kant, arguing that he should either accept a pluralistic account of self-love, or move beyond the duty/self-love dichotomy entirely.

The aim of this paper is to resolve the tension between Kant's doctrine of the highest good and his entire philosophical system. The concept of the highest good is the first major ambiguity of the doctrine. There are three pairs of ambiguities: immanent-transcendent; justice-perfection; and individual-community. They are able to form eight combinations. Corresponding to the various combinations and conceptions of the highest good, interpreters also conceive different reasons for the necessity of the doctrine as well as various conditions of its applicability. For example, some emphasize its religious dimension, whereas others understand it in the political sense. In this paper, I adopt a different approach in understanding the highest good's systematic meaning as the moral confirmation, and suggest that only a transcendent, perfect and communal concept of the highest good can provide the most consistent doctrine. Additionally, it explains the importance of the different branches (such as philosophies of religion and of politics) of Kant's system.

This paper explains a way of understanding Kant’s proof of God’s existence in the Critique of Practical Reason that has hitherto gone unnoticed and argues that this interpretation possesses several advantages over its rivals. By first looking at examples where Kant indicates the role that faith plays in moral life and then reconstructing the proof of the second Critique with this in view, I argue that, for Kant, we must adopt a certain conception of the highest good, and so also must choose to believe in the kind of God that can make it possible, because this is essentially a way of actively striving for virtue. One advantage of this interpretation, I argue, is that it is able to make sense of the strong link Kant draws between morality and religion.

In Dostoevsky's book "The Brothers Karamazov", the Grand Inquisitor clearly explained by what laws civilizations develop. Why, in some cases, situations arise when these laws are violated? How the idol of ideology could become its first enemy. What should be added to the questions of the "wise and dread spirit"?

Absicht des vorliegenden Essays ist es, die Funktion der Zeit innerhalb einiger teleologischer Strukturen der praktischen Philosophie Kants hervorzuheben, um zu der Deutung der Entfaltung der Vernunftzwecke und zu der Kontextualisierung der antischen Frage nach der Geschichte beizutragen. Aus den Analysen der zweifachen Bedeutung des höchsten Guts als vollständig zu verwirklichen und partiell zu befördern, wird eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit auf die Konzeption der Glückseligkeit als komplexes zweckmäßiges System (als zweiter Teil des höchsten Guts) gelenkt (1). Das Verhältnis zwischen diesen zwei Bedeutungen der Idee des höchsten Guts wird dann mit dem Verhältnis zwischen dem letzten Zweck der Natur und dem Endzweck der Schöpfung, sowie in derKU formuliert wird, verglichen (2). Als gesamter Bereich der teleologischen praktischen Leistungen spielt die Kultur in diesem Zusammenhang eine wichtige Rolle, um besser zu erläutern, wie konkret die Suche nach jener systematischen Glückseligkeit in der Welt sich gliedern kann (3). Angesichts des Verhältnisses beider Normativitätsebenen der Vernunft wird dann mit der in der Religionsschrift dargelegten Anlagentheorie das zentrale Ergebnis der Untersuchung Kants betrachtet, um die These des menschlichen Fortschritts zum Besseren zu begründen (4).

A intenção do presente ensaio é destacar a função do tempo dentro de algumas estruturas teleológicas da filosofia prática de Kant, a fim de contribuir para a interpretação do desenvolvimento dos fins da razão e para a contextualização da questão kantiana da história. Das análises do duplo significado do bem supremo como plenamente realizável e parcialmente a promover, atenta-se em especial para a concepção da felicidade como um sistema complexo e conforme a um fim (como segunda parte do bem supremo) (1). A relação entre estes dois significados da ideia do bem supremo é então comparada com a relação entre o fim último da natureza e o fim último da criação, como formulado na KU (2). Como âmbito geral das realizações teleológicas práticas, a cultura desempenha um papel importante neste contexto, a fim de melhor explicar como pode ser estruturada concretamente a busca daquela felicidade sistemática no mundo (3). Por meio da relação entre ambos os níveis de normatividade da razão e com a teoria das disposições apresentada na Religionsschrift, é então considerado o resultado central da investigação de Kant, a fim de fundamentar a tese do progresso humano para o melhor (4)

espanolSegun enfoques recientes, cuyos antecedentes se remontan a Ockham, la religion es el fundamento mas adecuado -o acaso el unico posible- para la moral. De esta teoria hay tres versiones. La primera reduce la moral a la religion identificandolas, con lo que no es un genuino modo de fundamentar la moral. La segunda, debida a R. Adams, defiende que la religion, o mejor los mandatos divinos, son condicion necesaria -pero no suficiente-de la moral. Pero entonces, si hace falta algo mas para que surja la moral, ya no es una germina fundamentacion de la moral en la religion. La tercera, debida a P. Quinn, afirma que la religion es solo condicion suficiente para la moral. Pero al no ser necesaria, la moral podria fundarse independientemente, con lo que los mandatos divinos parecen redundantes. En suma, tales fundamentaciones, o no son genuinamente teologicas, o son muy poco plausibles. EnglishAccording to recent approaches, which go back to Ockham, religion is the most adequate ground...

This paper examines the growing importance of the unpublished writings of thinkers for research in philosophy. This new orientation of the study of philosophy raises at least two questions: What is the philosophical interest of the posthumous legacy of a thinker? And specifically, why do Heidegger's lessons and notes awaken as much enthusi- asm among researchers as the books and es- says published in his lifetime?

How to interpret autonomy plays a crucial role that leads to different readings in Kant’s moral metaphysics, philosophy of religion and moral psychology. In this paper I argue for a two-layered conception of autonomy with varying degrees of justification for each: autonomy as a capacity and autonomy as a paragon-like paradigm. I argue that all healthy rational humans possess the inalienable capacity of autonomy, i. e. share the universal ground for the communicability of objective basic moral principles. This initial understanding stands for autonomy as a capacity about which we can talk of universal validity and justification. Nevertheless, the way a person fully actualizes herself, her freedom, namely autonomy, is shaped by her initial conception of autonomy and moral view of the world. Autonomy as an organic experience of real moral agents, which means an ongoing, non-static, irreducible and inexplicable judgmental process concerning one’s actualization of oneself gives way to consider autonomy as a godlike state of the soul even though one cannot provide objective validity for this.

In what sense, if any, does Kant's moral theory "belong in a religious setting?"] The question continues to command attention not only because scholars take seriously the Kantian approach to ethics, but because of Kant's own conviction that belief in God plays an important role in his theory. Kant often reasons as follows. As moral agents, we have a duty to promote the highest good, that state of nature in which happiness is had in proportion to virtue. Since we cannot intend to do what we know or believe to be impossible, and since unaided nature yields us no hope of success, we must postulate the existence of an omnipotent, moral being-a God who could transform nature in the required way.2 Recent debate over the place of theism in Kant's ethics has centered around the question whether the non-theist can act (in Kant's sense) morally well. Answering in the affirmative, Stephan Korner says "a person could without self-contradiction recognize the categorical imperative and yet believe that it is not his duty to try to bring about the highest good, since this duty would imply the existence of God which he denies." Lewis White Beck points out that the highest good cannot command us to do any thing that the moral law has not already commanded. Ralph Walker writes, "one can perfectly well be a serious moral agent while remaining altogether pessimistic about whether virtuous acts achieve anything or will ever be rewarded." And Thomas Auxter has argued that "Kant's own explanation of how a moral ideal is constructed and of how practical judgments are made precludes an appeal to the highest good as a standard for conduct."3 The view that Kant's ethics cannot do without belief in God has also found able, if fewer defenders. Thus, for John Silber, the highest good brings a material content to what would otherwise be a merely formal principle; for only the highest good obliges us to "strive for the realization of happiness in proportion to virtue in the lives of all men." And according to Allen Wood, someone who abandons pursuit of the highest good must "at the same time cease to act purposively in obedience to the moral law. Pursuit of the highest good could not be

In what sense, if any, does Kant's moral theory "belong in a religious setting?"] The question continues to command attention not only because scholars take seriously the Kantian approach to ethics, but because of Kant's own conviction that belief in God plays an important role in his theory. Kant often reasons as follows. As moral agents, we have a duty to promote the highest good, that state of nature in which happiness is had in proportion to virtue. Since we cannot intend to do what we know or believe to be impossible, and since unaided nature yields us no hope of success, we must postulate the existence of an omnipotent, moral being-a God who could transform nature in the required way.2 Recent debate over the place of theism in Kant's ethics has centered around the question whether the non-theist can act (in Kant's sense) morally well. Answering in the affirmative, Stephan Korner says "a person could without self-contradiction recognize the categorical imperative and yet believe that it is not his duty to try to bring about the highest good, since this duty would imply the existence of God which he denies." Lewis White Beck points out that the highest good cannot command us to do any thing that the moral law has not already commanded. Ralph Walker writes, "one can perfectly well be a serious moral agent while remaining altogether pessimistic about whether virtuous acts achieve anything or will ever be rewarded." And Thomas Auxter has argued that "Kant's own explanation of how a moral ideal is constructed and of how practical judgments are made precludes an appeal to the highest good as a standard for conduct."3 The view that Kant's ethics cannot do without belief in God has also found able, if fewer defenders. Thus, for John Silber, the highest good brings a material content to what would otherwise be a merely formal principle; for only the highest good obliges us to "strive for the realization of happiness in proportion to virtue in the lives of all men." And according to Allen Wood, someone who abandons pursuit of the highest good must "at the same time cease to act purposively in obedience to the moral law. Pursuit of the highest good could not be

In what sense, if any, does Kant's moral theory "belong in a religious setting?"] The question continues to command attention not only because scholars take seriously the Kantian approach to ethics, but because of Kant's own conviction that belief in God plays an important role in his theory. Kant often reasons as follows. As moral agents, we have a duty to promote the highest good, that state of nature in which happiness is had in proportion to virtue. Since we cannot intend to do what we know or believe to be impossible, and since unaided nature yields us no hope of success, we must postulate the existence of an omnipotent, moral being-a God who could transform nature in the required way.2 Recent debate over the place of theism in Kant's ethics has centered around the question whether the non-theist can act (in Kant's sense) morally well. Answering in the affirmative, Stephan Korner says "a person could without self-contradiction recognize the categorical imperative and yet believe that it is not his duty to try to bring about the highest good, since this duty would imply the existence of God which he denies." Lewis White Beck points out that the highest good cannot command us to do any thing that the moral law has not already commanded. Ralph Walker writes, "one can perfectly well be a serious moral agent while remaining altogether pessimistic about whether virtuous acts achieve anything or will ever be rewarded." And Thomas Auxter has argued that "Kant's own explanation of how a moral ideal is constructed and of how practical judgments are made precludes an appeal to the highest good as a standard for conduct."3 The view that Kant's ethics cannot do without belief in God has also found able, if fewer defenders. Thus, for John Silber, the highest good brings a material content to what would otherwise be a merely formal principle; for only the highest good obliges us to "strive for the realization of happiness in proportion to virtue in the lives of all men." And according to Allen Wood, someone who abandons pursuit of the highest good must "at the same time cease to act purposively in obedience to the moral law. Pursuit of the highest good could not be

Resumen: En contra de ciertas posturas actualistas que consideran a las personas como meros Aaglomerados@ de actos, hay evidencias más que suficientes para mostrar que éstos muestran un Aaire de familia@ que va más allá de un simple parecido externo. Es precisamente ...

In this essay I begin by examining Kant’s criteria for “proper science” as presented in the Preface to his Metaphysical Foundations of Science, and then ask whether Kantian anthropology can possibly qualify as a proper science according to these demanding criteria. I defend a qualified ‘yes’ answer to this question, while also drawing attention to several less tidy aspects of his anthropology project that are difficult to fit onto the Procrustean bed of science.

Maxims play a crucial role in Kant's ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their strengths and their weaknesses. In Part II: New Approaches, I look at three more recent views in somewhat greater detail than I do the five treatments canvassed in 'Recent Works on Kantian Maxims I: Established Approaches'. First, there is Richard McCarty's Interpretation, which holds that Kant's understanding of maxims can be illuminated by placing them in the context of the Wollfian tradition, according to which maxims are the major premises of practical syllogisms. The next subject Maria Schwartz, holds that careful attention to Kant's distinction between rules and maxims, as well as Kant's concept of happiness, allows us to make sense of almost all of Kant's remarks on maxims. It may be, however, that on Schwartz's view agents turn out to perform actions as opposed to thoughtlessly habitual behaviors much less often than is plausible. This leads to the final approach, exemplified by Jens Timmermann, which is that Kant understands maxims equivocally. I claim that something like Timmermann's approach is the only way to make sense of all of what Kant has to say on maxims.

I have said that practical reason shares the 'fate' of theoretical reason insofar as it, too, is driven to 'seek the unconditioned.' In an important sense, however, the fate of practical reason is different from that of theoretical reason; this is one of the most central tenets of Kant's philosophy. (Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends) Most of [the interpreters of Kant] do not mean, by the practical postulate of the existence of God, the demand to realize practically the moral implication of the idea of God. They mean merely the demand to assume the existence of God theoretically, [ostensibly] for the sake of moral progress and therefore in a mere practical intention.

This paper deals with the central questions concerning the motivation in Kant's moral philosophy trying to establish some general guidelines for approaching the respective theme. Our analysis will be divided into five parts. Firstly, we present (I) the problem such as it appears in the pre-critical period in terms of a "gap" between the judgment and the execution of the action, showing that Kant was not sure about the "intentionality" of the act of judging and that the motive could have the drives (elateres). The following sections (II and III) explore the relation between the objective grounds and the subjective grounds (motive) of determination of the will, characterizing the concept of motive. Finally, the sections (IV and V) deal with the connection between the "motive' and the "desire".

In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in a future world. In his other writings, however, he suggests that the highest good is attainable through mere human agency in this world. Based on the apparent incoherence between these texts, Andrews Reath, among others, argues that Kant’s texts reveal two competing conceptions of the highest good, namely a secular and a theological conception. In this paper, I argue that Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of the individual humans and the domain of the human species.

In this article, I critically examine the religious argument for the existence of God, which Palmquist formulated from Kant’s  Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason . After showing the structure of the argument, I point the problematic point of the argument and focus on the concept of Gesinnung. The privateness of Gesinnung is problematized in the analysis of it, and I briefly suggest that an alternative account of the Gesinnung is possible. Yet I emphasize the advantage that this argument has compared to other competing arguments.

Wrong on a very high level Silber is for me a highly esteemed author to whom in my opinion the Anglosaxon Kant research owes the first comprehensive information about Kant's doctrine of the highest good. I agree without reservation with what a reader of the book once wrote in a review: "A lucid, beautifully written, and highly readable presentation of Kant's ethics and moral philosophy. This book is the product of 50 years of philosophical reflection on Kant-the nodal point in modern philosophy, and ranks with the very best works on Kant-avoiding the jargon and formalism of so many commentaries. Serious readers will not be disappointed." Silber also had the clear judgement that Lewis White Beck's interpretation isn't tenable. But unfortunately, his own interpretation, too, is not tenable. For Beck, the Dialectic part of the Critique of Practical Reason (CprR) is in principle completely superfluous; one can ignore it. The second Critique is concluded with the Analytic.

This article submits a new version of internalism with respect to our reasons to act. The argument has three stages: an enlargement of the orthodox moral psychology that takes into account the authority of love in human agency (H. Frankfurt); the statement that our loving interpersonal relationships are the fi rst analogate of love; and, fi nally, a non-reductive account of love and the recognition of the actual hierarchy
of the loves of human agents, which is in tension with an adequate hierarchy of loves.

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third-man regress. Siding with those who think that the midway posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyze a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.

For Kant, 'wish' is a technical term denoting a strange species of desire. It is an instance in which someone wills something that she simultaneously knows she cannot bring about. As a result, it is, in one sense, antithetical to morality, which deals with 'ought implies can'. I will argue that Kant re-evaluated wishing as (to some extent) causally efficacious and, further, of moral relevance. This re-evaluation has not been discussed in the literature, yet has been lurking in plain sight in a subtle shift in two versions of a footnote from the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*.