Judicial independence

In the LM ruling, the Court of Justice developed the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test and indicated it as the one to be applied for the assessment of judicial independence and fair trial guarantees in the context of executing European Arrest Warrants. Although serious threats to the rule of law and judicial independence in some EU countries, like Poland, have been documented over recent years, no warrant has so far been definitely rejected as a consequence of the application of the LM test, although there are cases in which the execution of warrants to Poland has been suspended. This naturally raises questions as to whether the mechanism proposed by the Court responds to the need of protecting the right to a fair trial and

In the Matter of: Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC; DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.; Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp.; Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.; and Asset Backed Securities Corporation Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE AND DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 8A OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECTION 21C OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING FINDINGS, AND
IMPOSING A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

The Realists were ascending during the turbulent 1930s, when the Supreme Court was trying to hold Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats to Lochner era concepts of the role of the state, property, and contracts. Thus, the Realists confronted the debate about popular versus judicial sovereignty head on. Many Realists, including nearly all modem political scientists, argued for some form of popular sovereignty. Most modem political scientists who study the court, though not entirely normative, do take a realist position. That is, they assume that law is policy and that judges are engaged in policy making. Much of the focus of political scientists' research, then, has been to find the source of judicial preferences. One branch, called the attitudinalists, search for judicial preferences in the personal attitudes and characteristics of the judges. These scholars follow Pritchett, Schubert, Nagel and Spaeth, whose pioneering studies developed many of the techniques used to study judges' attitudes. See PRITCHETT, THE

This case about the retirement age of legal officials (judges, prosecutors, and notaries) in Hungary, on the one hand, specifies an important aspect of EU non-discrimination law on the grounds of age and, on the other hand, sheds light on the shortcomings of EU mechanism to combat the rising authoritarianism in this Member State. The annotation first provides a brief outline of the judgement and the view of the Advocate General. It then presents the reflections on the significance of the case against the broader trajectory of political and, subsequently, legal changes in Hungary, especially with regard to the earlier decision of the national Constitutional Court. The analysis goes on to evaluate the consistency of the Court of Justice in its interpretation of non-discrimination provisions in EU secondary law and against the benchmarks of coherence and legal certainty from its previous case law.

Zmiany prawa w zakresie organizacji sądownictwa, a tym samym sposobu sprawowania wymiaru sprawiedliwości, mają przełożenie na rzeczywistą realizację prawa do sprawiedliwego i jawnego rozpatrzenia sprawy w rozsądnym terminie przez niezawisły i bezstronny sąd. Natomiast sposób realizacji prawa do sprawiedliwego sądu wpływa na realizację wszystkich praw podstawowych, których ochrony można dochodzić przed sądem. Poza tym skuteczność prawa Unii Europejskiej w dużej mierze polega właśnie na zapewnieniu skutecznej ochrony sądowej w dziedzinach objętych prawem Unii. Dlatego funkcjonowanie prawa Unii Europejskiej zależy w dużej mierze od istnienia niezależnych sądów w państwach członkowskich. Stąd pogląd o dopuszczalności arbitralnych kierunków zmian prawa krajowego regulującego wymiar sprawiedliwości jest ze wszech miar błędny.

Αντικείμενο της παρούσας μελέτης είναι η παρουσίαση, η ανάλυση και η ανάδειξη των σπουδαιότερων σημείων της απόφασης του Δικαστηρίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΔΕΕ) επί της υπόθεσης Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses . Η υπόθεση αφορά προδικαστικό ερώτημα του Πορτογάλου εθνικού δικαστή προς το ΔΕΕ, με αντικείμενο τη συμβατότητα των διά εθνικής νομοθεσίας περικοπών των αποδοχών Πορτογάλων δικαστών, η οποία έλαβε χώρα για τη διόρθωση του ελλείμματος , με τη δικαστική ανεξαρτησία όπως κατοχυρώνεται στο άρθρο 47 του Χάρτη Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (Χάρτης) και στο άρθρο 19 § 1 εδ. β΄ της Συνθήκης για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΣΕΕ).
Η μελέτη της απόφασης, της οποίας η μεγάλη σημασία προδικάζεται απ’ το γεγονός ότι εξεδόθη από το Τμήμα Μείζονος Συνθέσεως, χωρίζεται σε δύο Μέρη: στο πρώτο παρουσιάζονται τα πραγματικά περιστατικά και το σκεπτικό του ΔΕΕ, και στο δεύτερο αναλύονται και σχολιάζονται τα σημαντικότερα σημεία και οι προεκτάσεις της. Στο τέλος διατυπώνονται τα συμπεράσματα του συγγραφέα.

Pursuant to the same logic that prevailed when Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman reached out to Germany after the end of World War II, and in keeping with the promise made in the Preamble of the founding treaty, the EU reached out to Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and offered integration. In recognition of the difficulties for the EU on the one side of absorbing a large number of countries without jeopardizing the functioning of the institutions, and the difficulties for the Central and Eastern European Countries ("CEECs") on the other side of transforming themselves into modern democracies with rule of law and functioning market economies, a number of pre-conditions for accession and a number of support schemes for the transformation were established. The present Article analyzes those pre-conditions that were supposed to promote the development of Rule of Law, as well as those schemes that were intended to support this development. It concludes tha...

This article analyses how the politico-legal debate has affected institutional reforms of judicial accountability in Italy since the enactment of the Constitution of the Italian Republic in 1948. It discusses the interaction between measures aimed at reshaping the accountability framework and the underlying political motivation for them.
The aim of this article is not to investigate the practice of holding judges
accountable, which is often termed de facto judicial accountability. The real effects of institutional reform are inferred from the existing literature. Instead, this article analyses the rationales and justifications for institutional reform and argues that it is difficult to ensure a proper and stable balance-of-accountability framework in abstracto and ex ante in a general way, due to the ever-changing underlying socio-political conditions. Fixed, one-size-fits-all templates cannot ensure balance.
More specifically, this article demystifies the myth of the Italian
‘self-governing’ Consiglio superiore della magistratura. According to this myth, the Italian judicial council, made up of a majority of judges charged with administering a system free from political interferences (hence ‘self-governing’), is mostly seen as the tool for independence. As we will see, a self-governing judicial body does not, however, necessarily enhance judicial independence, and can even undermine it under certain circumstances. Italian and international scholars share this conclusion,16 yet the myth still prevails when it comes to analysing
judicial reform in Europe. What is often neglected, as the Italian case can teach us, is that judicial councils are flexible tools for achieving a balance in judicial accountability. The structure of this article is as follows. The first section introduces the essential features of the Italian judiciary and the political background of its evolution during the post-war era of the Italian Republic. Subsequently, the Consiglio superiore della magistratura’s functioning with regard to accountability mechanisms is analysed, followed by a discussion of three key areas of reform affecting judicial accountability: the rules regulating the career system, notably evaluation, promotion, and appointment to specific positions; the rules regulating disciplinary responsibility; and those regulating the civil liability of judges. The last section focuses on the broader repercussions of the Italian case study.

This paper sums up the conclusions of a research analyzing the French and the Italian “high councils of justice”. Based on a comparative perspective (both diachronic and synchronic), it correlates the composition and the activity of these two bodies – which are generally considered opposite models – in order to explain some common trends. While part of the Italian legal and constitutional scholarship interprets the progressive enlargement of functions of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura as the result of its undue politicization, this paper shows that politicization is an outcome of a long-term process from oligarchic to constitutional and pluralist democracies and of the democratization of the judiciary. At the same time, it highlights how in its long-term evolution, the French Conseil supérieur de la magistrature shows some typical elements of the Italian Consiglio superiore della magistratura, in relation to both its activity and the characteristics of its members. These elements are somehow related to the evolution of the notion of independence of the judiciary from a corporate one – strictly limited to the judicial staff career administration – to a broader one regarding the manifold influences affecting judges (and prosecutors) in pluralist and complex democracies. This paper provides both a theoretical and an empirical investigation, including the analysis of the professional path of the members of the French Conseil and the Italian Consiglio from 1947 to 2011.

There are three approaches to promoting judicial ethics: the code approach, the guidebook approach and the reflective approach. The code approach uses an enforceable code of judicial conduct. The guidebook approach involves explaining the principles of judicial ethics and advising judges to conduct themselves ethically. The reflective approach involves providing judges with lists of questions that allow them to reflect on issues related to judicial ethics and develop their own answers. Mongolia relies on the code approach, but has never used the other two approaches. This paper analyses the advantages and disadvantages of these three approaches, and argues that the Code of Professional Conduct for Lawyers could make the judiciary in Mongolia more independent, impartial and fair if it were to incorporate elements from the guidebook and the reflective approaches.

This article seeks to give a brief discussion on the entire judicial system in regards to the court structure of Bangladesh. The purpose of this discussion is to visualise mostly every court of the country. It has tried to outline the jurisdiction of the proceedings of the courts. The aim is to show the transformation from the very early period including the British era and the Pakistan era to the concurrent court system of Bangladesh, with reference to the independence of judiciary. In present days, after two landmark decisions by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Secretary, Ministry of Finance vs. Md Masdar Hossain & Ors 52 DLR (AD) 82 and Government of Bangladesh & Ors vs. Advocate Asaduzzaman Siddique & Ors 2017 CLR (SpL), we have reasons to believe that the judiciary is independent, not only in theory but in practice as well

The execution of criminal sentences is the result of the criminal investigation process and the result of all the previous efforts of law enforcement. The criminal justice system at this stage has institutions and actors that are responsible for enforcing various criminal judgments. An examination of the different legal systems shows that there are two general patterns in the structure of enforcement. In many countries, the enforcement of judgments is entrusted to the judiciary, which itself can be a subset of the executive or the judiciary. Execution of sentences. However, the structure and manner of execution of judgments is based on a series of rules and regulations that are derived from the principles of fair trial. One of the most important principles of fair trial is related to the implementation of the principle of judicial independence in the execution of criminal sentences, which has two aspects of structural and personal independence; That is, both the institution and the executive judge must be independent. But this principle faces serious challenges in Iran; Because now, on the one hand, the Deputy for Execution of Criminal Judgments is under the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor's Office, and the Executing Judge acts under the supervision of the Prosecutor, both of whom lack full independence in executing judgments, and on the other hand, the Execution Judge has jurisdiction to change the sentence. It does not use correctional institutions such as parole and suspension of punishment, which is contrary to the principle of judicial independence and...

Abstract (D): Die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des Richteramts steht in der Schweiz in einem Spannungsverhältnis zur richterlichen Unabhängigkeit. Dies trifft auch auf das Bundesrichteramt zu: Bundesrichterinnen und Bundesrichter werden vom Schweizer Parlament nach Massgabe des Parteiproporzes gewählt und müssen sich nach Ablauf ihrer 6-jährigen Amtszeit zur Wiederwahl stellen. Aufgrund dieser Besonderheit sind Kandidierende für das Bundesrichteramt faktisch gezwungen, einer Partei anzugehören, um für die Wahl überhaupt in Frage zu kommen. Die 2019 eingereichte Justiz-Initiative möchte eine Abkehr von diesem System erwirken, indem sie vorschlägt, dass die Mitglieder des Bundesgerichts nach einer ersten, durch eine unabhängige Fachkommission vorgenommenen Vorauswahl per Losverfahren bestimmt werden; ausserdem soll deren Amtszeit erst fünf Jahre nach Erreichen des ordentlichen Rentenalters enden. Eine Abwahl durch das Parlament ist nur in schwerwiegenden Fällen vorgesehen. Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt diese Initiative zum Anlass, um das schweizerische Wahlsystem der Mitglieder des Bundesgerichts kritisch zu beleuchten. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt in diesem Zusammenhang der von Dennis Thompson und Lawrence Lessig entwickelte Begriff der institutionellen Korruption. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass die Justiz-Initiative dazu beitragen kann, diese institutionelle Korruption zu verhindern und die Unabhängigkeit der Bundesrichter(innen) wesentlich zu stärken.

Abstract (E): In Switzerland, the institutional design of the judiciary conflicts with judicial independence. This also applies to the Swiss Federal Tribunal: its judges are elected by the Federal Parliament based on the proportional strength of its political parties, and they must be re-elected after 6 years. Because of this peculiarity, candidates for the federal judicial office are de facto forced to join a political party in order to be elected. The "Justice Initiative", submitted in 2019, seeks to move away from this system by proposing that the members of the Swiss Federal Tribunal be chosen by lot after a pre-screening by an independent commission. Moreover, the initiative proposes that they remain in office until five years after they reach the ordinary retirement age. Recall by the Federal Parliament is only possible in particularly serious cases. The present contribution takes this initiative as an opportunity to critically evaluate the Swiss system of parliamentary elections that applies to Federal Supreme Court judges. In this context, the concept of institutional corruption developed by Dennis Thompson and Lawrence Lessig plays an important role. The article shows that the Justice Initiative can contribute to preventing institutional corruption in the Swiss federal judiciary, and that it can significantly strengthen the independence of Swiss federal judges.

In Indonesia, the Supreme Court justices recruitment have suffered from many influences, giving rise to what has been called political bargaining, associated with a member of Parliament, executive government, the supreme court itself, private lawyers, and many other parties who could count on special treatment by “their judges.” Since the changing of political situation mainly indicated by stepping down of Soeharto by people power in 1998, parliament’s role in judicial recruitment is becoming dominant. In 1999, the Constitution Amendment gave the role to the Judicial Commission in order to minimize political intervention. Even so, there are still many problems which arise during the process. The article try to answer the question as to how the recruitment process of the Supreme Court in Indonesia impacts the independence of the judiciary. The analysis in this essay centers on the institutional position of those in charge of selecting judges. Moreover it explores the extent to which other political institutions can influence the recruitment of judges that will affect independence of the judiciary.

Throughout U.S. history, the two major political parties have switched positions many times on a variety of issues, including whether the United States should intervene more or less in foreign affairs. Are these changes simply the product of historical contingency, or are there structural factors at work that can help explain these developments? To improve our understanding of American party ideologies, this paper applies a historical institutional approach to the question of party ideology development, and shows how party control of government institutions influences the evolution of party ideologies. Specifically, this paper finds that changes in party control of the presidency can help explain changes in party ideologies with respect to foreign policy.

Die EU ging bislang davon aus, dass ihre Mitgliedsstaaten die verfassungsrechtlichen Bedingungen respektieren würden, die ihnen den Beitritt zur Gemeinschaft ermöglichten. Ungarn und Polen stellen diese Grundannahme mit den Attacken auf ihre Justiz gründlich infrage.

In 2018 the populist right-wing authoritarian Fidesz, after eight years of dismantling the rule of law and democracy, won the parliamentary election by two-thirds, in a greatly unfair election. The release from authoritarianism through elections organized by the authoritarian forces is unlikely. Due to the lack of an effective counterbalance for the government, this political situation undoubtedly affects the judiciary, as well as the entire construction of the rule of law from several perspectives. This contribution thoroughly analyses the mechanisms that were instrumental in making the non-rule of law situation, as well as the reasons for this perplexing situation, with particular emphasis on the general peculiarities of the new Hungarian authoritarianism. In its concluding chapter, the article discusses the changes of the judicial structure in Hun-gary, in particular. In this respect, the development in Hungary has been characterized by continuous failure, and periodic setbacks.

Sumário: Introdução; 1. Accountability e sua relação com Estado de Direito e separação dos poderes; 2. Independência judicial e accountability judicial: faces da mesma moeda; 3. Para além do processo jurisdicional accountable no Poder Judiciário; 4. Níveis de accountability sobre o Poder Judiciário; 5 Contribuição do design institucional do Poder Judiciário para accountability e o “ciclo da accountability”; 6. Códigos de conduta: impeachment versus improbidade judicial; 7. Longe de um ponto final: accountability como princípio norteador do desenho dos procedimentos e estrutura dos tribunais. Referências bibliográficas.

Why do authoritarian rulers establish special courts? One view is that they do so to insulate the judiciary from politically oriented cases and allow it continued, albeit limited, independence. In this article I present a contrary case study of an authoritarian regime in Burma that used special courts not to insulate the judiciary but to defeat it. Through comparison to other Asian cases I suggest that the Burmese regime’s composition and character better explain its strategy than does extant judicial authority or formal ideology. The regime consisted of war fighters for whom the courts were enemy territory. But absent popular support, the regime’s leaders could not embark immediately on a radical project for legal change that might compromise their hold on power. Consequently, they used special courts and other strategies to defeat judicial independence incrementally, until they could displace the professional judiciary and bring the courts fully under executive control.

本文透過歷史資料分析二戰前中國於訓政時期推行「黨治」，在「黨化司法」政策下，反對司法獨立，要求司法必須「黨義化」、「黨人化」的各類措施。即便1947年行憲，憲法明文標舉「司法獨立」，黨化的相關措施仍然持續運行。
二戰後的臺灣各級法院，在1947年之後，轉型為以臺灣省以外各省籍人員為主的中國式司法體系，也承續了戰前中國的黨治遺緒。訓政時期的黨化司法經驗，繼續制度性的運作，在1990年代民主化之後，才有根本性的改變。1993年的人民團體法，開始要求國民黨黨部組織退出司法部門，然而，直至2012年的法官法，才完全劃清法官與政黨之間的界線。
過去「黨化司法」的措施，使國民黨能制度性的掌握司法人事，對戰後臺灣司法運作，帶來相當大的影響。尤其是核心司法人事佈局，倚重黨化政策下培訓之黨工、從事調查工作人員，強化了國民黨對司法的實質影響力。

The Politicization of the Judiciary in Post-War Taiwan
The KMT’s Control of Judicial Personnel Administration before 1990 and Its Aftermath

This paper begins with examining the impact of the politicization of the judiciary controlled by the KMT before World War II, when the Republic of China was in its so-called “tutelage period.” In that period, the content of law was aligned with the KMT charter, and judicial personnel were affiliated with KMT organizations. These gimmicks continued even after 1947, when the ROC claimed to be a constitutional republic with an independent judicial system.
When the judicial personnel from mainland China took over judicial institutions left by the Japanese government in Taiwan, they built a mainlander-dominated judiciary in 1947. The legacy of the politicization of the judiciary was thus preserved. Democratization altered this legacy profoundly during the 1990s. The “Civil Association Act” implemented in 1993 eradicated the KMT party organizations within judicial institutions and halted the harmful legacy. However, only after 2012 were judges banned from participation in any political parties under the “Judge Act.”
Before the War, the politicization of the judiciary allowed the KMT to control the personnel administration openly. The impact continued to cripple the judicial operations in Taiwan after the war. Its deleterious legacy persisted at the core of the judicial personnel, where the party agents and national security agents played a heavy role. In this way the KMT reinforced its clout over the judicial system.

Kjo pjesë është shkëputur nga "Komentari elektronik i ligjit për statusin e gjyqtarëve dhe prokurorëve" të realizuar nga Euuralius në vitin 2017. Kjo pjesë e komentarit është ripunuar duke u përditësuar dhe duke pasur parasysh vendimmarrjet e mëvonshme të Gjykatës Kushtetuese përgjatë vitit 2017 dhe ndryshimet ligjore të Korrikut të vitit 2019.
Si një ndër bashkëautorët e këtij komentari, kam punuar mbi pjesën e ligjit ku rregullohet instituti i komandimit te gjyqtarëve dhe prokurorëve.

On 27 November 2020, the Supreme Court rendered its long-awaited judgment on the arbitrator’s apparent bias and disclosure in the case of Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd . The judgment provided important guidance on the arbitrator’s disclosure which was expressly recognised as a legal duty and not simply a good arbitral practice. It held that this duty does not, however, override the arbitrator’s duty of confidentiality. The failure of the arbitrator to disclose relevant facts and circumstances is itself a factor to which the fair-minded and informed observer would have regard in reaching a conclusion as to whether there was a real possibility of bias. The Supreme Court adopted a cautious approach by seeking to accommodate different forms of arbitration and by showing high deference to arbitral practice. Despite its valuable contribution to the law of the arbitrator’s impartiality, the judgment leaves many uncertainties regarding the circumstances to be disclosed. It missed an opportunity to address more critically the practice of multiple appointments of a particular arbitrator by one party. The Supreme Court could also have adopted a more realistic approach as to the roles and duties owed respectively by the party-appointed arbitrators and the chairmen of arbitral tribunals.

Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material into digital or electronic form. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of Wollongong. represent the views of the University of Wollongong.

Although long considered alien to the civil law tradition, the publication of separate dissenting or concurring opinions is now permitted by the majority of European constitutional courts, the only exceptions being the Austrian, Belgian, French, Italian, and Luxembourgish constitutional courts. The decades-long history of dissenting opinions in the practice of several European constitutional courts calls for an analysis.  While there is an extensive literature in the United States regarding the use of dissenting opinions, comprehensive empirical research is still absent in Europe.  American scholars have conducted research from several different points of view. Legal scholars have dealt primarily with the relationship between dissenting opinions and the doctrine of binding precedent, and have tried to solve the problem of the precedential value of plurality decisions, e.g. decisions lacking a reasoning shared by the majority of the judges.  Political scientists, for their part, have studied the policy-making role of judges and strategic opinion-writing.  Scholars of law and economics have analyzed the costs and benefits of writing separately.  Even judges themselves have often expressed their own thoughts in essays or conference speeches on the matter.

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. Using a dataset which breaks down FDI flows into primary, secondary and tertiary sector investments and a GMM dynamic approach to address concerns about endogeneity, the paper analyzes various macroeconomic, developmental, and institutional/qualitative determinants of FDI in a sample of emerging market and developed economies. While FDI flows into the primary sector show little dependence on any of these variables, secondary and tertiary sector investments are affected in different ways by countries' income levels and exchange rate valuation, as well as development indicators such as financial depth and school enrollment, and institutional factors such as judicial independence and labor market flexibility. Finally, we find that the effect of these factors often differs between advanced and emerging economies.

By tracing the historical development of the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and China’s courts, this article finds that in order to subjugate the state as a whole to its superior power, the Party has confined judicial power to a ranking order which it has determined and administered. It follows that courts can compel compliance with the law by non-state actors or state actors of lower rank but not by state actors of equal or higher rank than theirs. These arrangements are essential for the Party to maintain its control over judicial affairs of political significance without preempting the capacity of courts to regulate social and economic activities of low or no immediate interests to the Party. These arrangements also contribute to both the authoritarian and paternalistic roles that the Party has assumed in its relation with courts, which explains the puzzling nearly schizophrenic character that courts have displayed in the course of their activities.

Les concepts d'indépendance de la justice. Une analyse historique et comparée (Angleterre, Allemagne et France), Luxembourg, Université du Luxembourg, soutenue le 8 sept. 2015 (non publié)
La volonté de travailler sur ce sujet est partie du souci de contribuer à un double défi. Le premier était relatif au flou conceptuel entourant le principe de l'indépendance de la justice : il apparaît, en effet, que l'expression « indépendance de la justice » semble si familière que, le plus souvent, les scientifiques du droit ne se posent même pas la question de sa définition, ou se contentent d'une définition superficielle. A ce premier défi théorique s'ajoutait un second problème pratique. Il concernait la question de l'existence d'un dénominateur commun entre les Etats (au moins démocratiques) au sujet de l'indépendance. Assurément, il est assez aisé pour les Etats de se mettre d'accord à l'occasion de la signature d'un traité international sur la formule, sur les mots « judicial independence », « Unabhängigkeit der Justiz » ou « indépendance de la justice ». Toutefois, peut-on en conclure que, ce faisant, les Etats se sont aussi mis d'accord sur le contenu de la formule, donc sur le ou les concepts ?
Pour fournir un premier éclairage des sens de l'indépendance de la justice et afin de proposer un début de réponse à la question d'un dénominateur commun entre les Etats, la thèse a examiné les divers concepts de l'indépendance en Angleterre, en Allemagne et en France. S'inscrivant dans une approche théorique, historique et comparative, son objectif essentiel a été de chercher à identifier, approfondir et suivre les évolutions du principe d'indépendance de la justice dans trois traditions nationales au sein de l'Europe.
Le but de la recherche était, avant tout, de répondre aux questions suivantes : Quels sont les différents sens de l'indépendance de la justice ? A quel moment (sous la plume de quel auteur et/ou dans quel texte) ces sens sont-ils apparus ? Comment et dans quelle mesure ces constructions intellectuelles ont-elles varié dans le temps en Angleterre, en Allemagne et en France ? Quelles ont été dans le passé et quelles sont, à l'heure actuelle, les divergences et les convergences entre ces trois traditions nationales ?  L'auteur peut être contacté à l'adresse email suivante : [email protected].

The first of three parts in this study elaborates on international human rights law and drawing on the most essential international instruments and jurisprudence, the criteria constituting judicial independence are distilled as a framework for assessment. The point of departure is that judicial independence is a necessary guarantee for the enjoyment of human rights rather than a privilege of judges. The criteria necessary for this independence are presented in a chart format, which groups the criteria into three strands: independence, impartiality, and public confidence. Independence is concerned with insulating the judiciary from pressures, while impartiality deals in particular with judges’ unbiased consideration of cases. Public confidence includes aspects such as transparency and representativity that are designed to strengthen public trust in the judiciary and its independence. These charts and strands are the basis for the subsequent assessment of judicial independence in Chin...

In the interests of maintaining the independence of the English judiciary, it is prudent to consider whether the system of judicial recruitment is safeguarded now, when it has previously been so heavily influenced and reliant upon members of the executive. 

The CRA 2005 transformed distortions in the system to better control the authorities dealing with judicial appointments, realigning inequalities to better represent the diversity of the British populace. Recently however, the Act has come under fire for employing obstructive and unnecessary provisions which hinder it from meeting its goals of increased inclusion and fair, transparent assessment.

I. Introduction

Through the centuries the people of common law jurisdictions have debated what is the best way to secure the independence of judges. This debate, which still goes on, ultimately led to the United States adoption of a constitutional system of governance that emphasized separating and dividing the powers of government to protect the liberties and properties of the people being governed. United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568 (2001)(“[T]hese guarantees of . . . [judicial independence] exist, “not to benefit the judges,” but “as a limitation imposed in the public interest.” Id. at 568) See also Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249 (1920) (“The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and justice would be assured by vesting the three great powers, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, in separate departments … .”). See also O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531-34 (1933). Cf. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 219-221 (1980).

Having determined that judicial independence was necessary for the union of states the framers intended to create, they turned to the task of defining its meaning for the people of the United States. Article III, § 1 states:

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Plaintiffs challenge here that senior judicial officer for the Western U.S. District Court of Washington the Honorable John C. Coughenour has resigned that “good behaviour” tenure (hereafter sometimes referred to as “life tenure”) status he once had as an Article III judge, and as a result can no longer exercise the judicial power of an Article III court. See e.g. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989); Commodity Futures Trading Com v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-51, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986). Cf. Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278 (1895).

Independent judiciary is the sin qua non-of a democratic government for ensuring rule of law. Since the beginning of the British colonial rule, the question of separation of judiciary from the executive has been a continuing debate. Even after thirty six years of independence, Bangladesh experiences the separation of judiciary from the executive since November 1, 2007. This paper attempts to explore to what extent the initiatives have been taken and what are the challenges ahead to implement these initiatives in this regard. It also discusses briefly the conceptual issue, theory relating to the study and finally concludes with some recommendations so that policy of separation of judiciary from the executive would be effective and helpful for the policy makers. The paper is prepared based on secondary sources of information.

L’Union européenne fait, à l’heure actuelle, face à une crise majeure et sans précédent dûe au délitement de ses valeurs fondatrices dans certains Etats membres. Cette crise se traduit, notamment, par une mise à mal de l’indépendance de certains systèmes judiciaires nationaux. Le principe de l’indépendance de la Justice, qui est inhérent à l’Etat de droit, constitue pourtant l’une des clés de voute téléologique et fonctionnnelle de l’Union européenne. Celle-ci n’est pourtant pas armée de manière satisfaisante pour faire face à cette crise. En dépit des limites qui brident son intervention en la matière, la Cour de justice a néanmoins trouvé dans l’article 19, §1er, al. 2 du TUE le sésame lui permettant d’ouvrir une porte pour venir à la rescousse des juges nationaux dont l’indépendance est menacée. L’objet de cette contribution est d’analyser l’approche retenue par la Cour de justice quant à cette disposition et, plus fondamentalement, d’en définir la portée et l’efficacité. À la lumière de la jurisprudence récente, il semble que l’article 19, §1er, al. 2 du TUE garantit le contenu essentiel, défini d’un point de vue institutionnel, du principe de protection juridictionnelle effective. En d’autres mots, il s’oppose à ce qu’il soit porté atteinte de manière structurelle à l’organisation des systèmes nationaux de voies de recours, de sorte que ceux-ci ne soient plus en mesure d’assurer l’essence même du droit à un recours effectif et à un procès équitable. Comparativement à l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, il semble ainsi que la protection offerte par l’article 19, §1er, al. 2 du TUE soit plus réduite en termes de contenu, mais qu’elle jouisse d’un champ d’application plus large.

This groundbreaking book challenges the dominant view of ideology held by both political scientists and political commentators. Rather than viewing ideological constructs like liberalism and conservatism as static concepts with fixed and enduring content, Professor Verlan Lewis explains how the very meanings of liberalism and conservatism frequently change along with the ideologies of the two major parties in American politics. Testing a new theory to help explain why party ideologies evolve the way that they do, this book traces the history of American political parties from the Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans of the 1790s to the liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans of today. Ideas of Power shows us how changing party control of government institutions, such as Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court, influences how party ideologies develop.

La lunga storia dell’assetto istituzionale della magistratura, di cui l’ordinamento giudiziario Grandi del 1941 fu l’epilogo, lasciò un’eredità difficile al nuovo Stato democratico nella transizione dal fascismo alla democrazia. La Costituzione italiana è stata, in generale, il frutto della convergenza fra cattolici, comunisti e socialisti, tuttavia per quanto riguarda i temi della giustizia si può parlare di un'importante eccezione. In realtà, in questo campo, fondamentali furono l’apporto di esperti, come Piero Calamandrei con la sua concezione dell’autogoverno elaborata già a partire del 1921, e il ruolo della stessa magistratura al più alto livello che influenzò i lavori della Costituente nelle diverse fasi. Il testo finale riflette il raggiungimento dell’autonomia del corpo giudiziario, pur rinviando al futuro la realizzazione di una piena indipendenza.

Antonella Meniconi, Towards the Judiciary’s independence (1944-1948)
The long history of the judiciary, of which the Grandi law of 1941 was the epilogue, left a difficult legacy to the new democratic state in the transition from fascism to democracy. The Italian Constitution was, in general, the result of the convergence between Catholics, Communists and Socialists, but regarding the themes of justice one can speak of an important exception. Indeed, in this field the contribution of experts, such as Piero Calamandrei with his conception of self-government already elaborated since 1921, and the role of the high judiciary, that influenced in different phases the work of the Constituent Assembly, were decisive. The final text reflected the achievement of the autonomy of the judiciary, while referring to the future the realization of full independence.

In India, the Constitution is regarded as Supreme law of the land. No one is above the Constitution. It provides for three organs of the Government, viz., the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary, each to function independently so that the rule of law in the state could be
upheld in the State. But, due to ineffective legislature and also because of the powers of the executive being in the hands of one person, there has been a series of inaction by the legislature. Henceforth, the Judiciary has involved itself to bridge the gap in the law which the state is lacking by means of establishing new doctrines, expanding the horizons of the law by giving wide interpretations and also by declaring new principles. Thus, the question arouse is that whether in doing so, is Judiciary encroaching the powers of the Legislature?

The rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland revealed the EU’s significant vulnerabilities in the face of the need to uphold the values that the whole system of EU integration presumes are in place. The lessons are revealing: respecting the acquis does not guarantee continuing adherence to Article 2 TEU values; economic success in the Union does not necessarily entrench democracy and the rule of law; the tools available to preserve the rule of law are largely inadequate, as they could go against the key assumptions of the internal market. Consequently, the lack of political will to deal with the values’ crisis is not at all irrational, which makes it even more worrisome. What stands out from the grim picture is the revolutionary case law of the Court of Justice on judicial independence and mutual trust, which bridges the available infringement procedures with the outstanding problems and offers horizontal and vertical empowerment to the EU’s decentralised judiciaries – now able to intervene – while also resolving the competences conundrum through a broad reading of the principle of judicial independence as a key element of the rule of law. However inspiring, recent case law developments are insufficient, we argue, to deal with the sociological legitimacy crisis in tackling illiberal democracies plaguing the EU: autocratic legalism cannot be fought with legalism alone. Designing a long-term systemic approach to a complex re-articulation of EU values is indispensable, as enforcement is not a panacea per se.