John Maynard Keynes

The objective of this undergraduate thesis is to study in historical perspective, through a theoretical analysis, how the neoclassical synthesis was formed by investigating the hypothesis that there would have been a macroeconomic consensus. Macroeconomics has always been characterized as a field in intense ideological dispute, however it is possible that a consensus was brought about in the 1950s-1960s in respect to some core propositions characteristics of a research program that emerged after the Keynesian Revolution, but conserved influences of the classical microeconomic framework. This study also conducted a survey, using articles of the time, on the definition of neoclassical synthesis, aiming to determine whether it was given only a posteriori, which would allow to state that the leading economists of the period of the so-called "neoclassical synthesis" shared a theoretical core, nevertheless they did not invariably worked with the same issues and with the same goals.

Μετά τον Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, μία από τις σημαντικότερες και χαρακτηριστικότερες δραστηριότητες του κράτους στην Δυτική Ευρώπη ήταν ο εκτεταμένος κρατικός παρεμβατισμός στην οικονομία και η εμβάθυνση του κράτους κοινωνικής πρόνοιας. Αναδείξτε, χρησιμοποιώντας παραδείγματα, τις σχετικές πολιτικές οικονομικής ανάπτυξης και εισοδηματικής αναδιανομής που ακολουθήθηκαν μεταπολεμικά και τα βασικότερα χαρακτηριστικά της κεϋνσιανής-φορντικής οικονομίας.

Uncertainty and information are ideas that have a central role in contemporary economics in the domain of decision theory. The expected utility hypothesis is a powerful instruments widely used in theoretical and empirical analysis. Contemporary economics considers the theme of uncertainty as a branch of decision theory. This is not a necessary result of a linear history, rather of an intellectual path that was not easily foreseable at the end of Nineteenth Century. The leading role in this story is not played by utility, as is usual in the traditional reconstructions of historians of economic thought, but by probability. Uncertainty is in fact a multifaceted concept. It refers to a subjective condition or a mental status of an agent not knowing for certain the consequences of a present or a future event (subjective uncertainty). It refers also to an objective status of things that may results in different outcomes (frequency of occurences), or are knowable only through careful measurements subjected to errors (objective uncertainty). Because the modern developments could happen, two conditions were required: both objective and subjective uncertainty needed to be treated with the device of probability. Both these recognitions slowly emerged between 17th and 20th century.

Esta monografia tem como tema central, a abordagem da evolução do sistema financeiro internacional de meados do séc. XIX até os dias atuais, evidenciando seus principais dilemas e aspectos mais relevantes que permitiram aos anos do padrão ouro, serem a época mais prospera da história econômica mundial. Entretanto, esse sucesso foi cíclico, com fases de apogeu e crises se intercalando, além de rodízio de países como “capitães“ do sistema. A ênfase maior do estudo se concentra na estrutura criada na Conferência de Bretton Woods e no papel dos EUA como nação hegemônica. Assim, o objetivo do estudo é desvendar a dinâmica por trás da engenharia financeira que conhecemos hoje e os rumos seguidos para chegar em tal patamar de complexidade, sempre dando importância aos fatos que influenciaram essa “jornada econômica“. Exatamente por isso, foi detectada uma certa dificuldade em se obter a verdade sobre a complexidade dos
fatos, e chegar em uma conclusão imparcial no estudo, o que nos faz sentir-se mais seduzido pelo contexto apresentado em Tratado de Bretton Woods: A Diplomacia Econômica e os novos rumos da Política Monetária Internacional.

There were three celebrations of the 100 year centenary  held for Keynes’s 1921 A Treatise on Probability in 2021.They were ,first,the Keynes’ Treatise on Probability and Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit After 100 Years at the Cambridge Journal of Economics (Editors: Phil Faulkner, Alberto Feduzi, C.R. McCann, Jr, Jochen Runde).Second, Uncertainty and Risk :A workshop to commemorate the centenary of publication of Frank Knight’s "Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit" and John Maynard Keynes’ “A Treatise on Probability” at the Alan Turing Institute(Organizers: Sam Cohen, Lars Hansen, Tomasz R. Bielecki, Igor Cialenco, Mike Tehranchi and Haoyang Cao),and third, Robert Dimand’s  “Keynes, Knight, and Fundamental Uncertainty: A Double Centenary 1921–2021”, in the journal ,Review of Political Economy(editor: Steve Pressman).
All three centenaries are complete failures because of their  general  reliance on Ramsey’s two reviews of 1922 and 1926 ,which are gobbledygook at best .The most basic aspects of Keynes’s logical approach to decision making ,which requires using both of  his logical theories ,that  of probability and  of weight, are not covered in any of the articles written for any of the three Keynes centenaries.
Currently, there is no academician ,who has written on Keynes in the 20th or 21st centuries, who realizes that Keynes’s approach depends on two logical relations, not one. Ramsey himself never realized this basic fact.
The reader should note that in urn cases like those  considered by Keynes on pp.75-76 of the A treatise on probability ,w<1 ,but the probabilities will be numerical since the existing evidence is positive and perfectly symmetrical for all alternatives(Keynes,1921,p.160)

Hirsch's 2021 CJE article is fatally flawed because he bases his assessment of Keynesian uncertainty, not on Keynes's analysis as contained in A Treatise on Probability and General Theory, where Keynes defined uncertainty to be an inverse function of weight on p.148 of the General Theory ,but on a claim made by an extraordinary and severely mathematical ignorant economist ,Joan Robinson, whose Interpretations of the General Theory Keynes completely rejected in his November 9 th ,1936 letter to her ,in which he characterized her work on his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest as "nonsense" .Joan Robinson's gobbledygook, which was later developed by G L S Shackle, asserted that on p.213 of the 1937 QJE article, Keynes had changed his definition of uncertainty when he stated that, with reference to the far and distant future, "We simply do not know.” Of course, this is identical to Keynes’s analysis of a decision maker’s ignorance of the far and distant future that Keynes presented on pp.309-312 of the A Treatise on Probability.
Robinson claimed that Keynes had introduced a new topic, fundamental uncertainty, which had not been covered in the General Theory. This so-called new analysis by Keynes is also called irreducible uncertainty, radical uncertainty, deep uncertainty, real uncertainty, true uncertainty, genuine uncertainty ,etc. by all heterodox economists. The fundamental problem is that all heterodox economists have confused fundamental uncertainty with ignorance. Keynes’s concept of uncertainty, like Knights’, is one of partial knowledge and partial ignorance. The fallacy of equivocation is involved here. It is easily demonstrated by Shackle’s argument that certainty is a state of certain knowledge and uncertainty is a state of unknowledge ,so, given that  “un” means no ,uncertainty must  mean  no knowledge .This argument is simply nonsense as Keynes defined uncertainty as a range .It has nothing to do with Shackle’s binary dual definition ,where only two states are ever present-certainty and uncertainty .Keynes’s analysis involves certainty, where risk can be calculated , uncertainty  and ignorance.
Keynes always used the following three terms in all publications where he was dealing with decision making-risk, uncertainty and ignorance. At no time in anything published by Keynes in his life did he ever refer to fundamental uncertainty, irreducible uncertainty, radical uncertainty, deep uncertainty, real uncertainty, true uncertainty, or genuine uncertainty. These terms come from Joan Robinson, G L S Shackle and their heterodox supporters that are heavily concentrated in the economics department at Cambridge University.

The book presents a framework for defining the natural evolution of economic systems based on the application of the value system framework. Borrowing from the extensive works of Dr. Clare W. Graves and the theory of Spiral Dynamics, the author builds upon his in-depth knowledge of macroeconomics, financial and real estate markets, and his decade-long experience with Graves’ successor, Dr. Don E. Beck (who wrote the forward for the book), to devise a comprehensive macro-memetic-economic model through which he reframes the United States economy through historical, present and future value systems cycles.

Joan Robinson took an anti-scientific approach to methodology and philosophy of science .Her belief was that Keynes's models (which she misrepresented as being R. Kahn's models) were TRUE models while the classical and neoclassical models were FALSE models. This showed up again in the early 1950's in the useless and sterile controversy about the neoclassical aggregate production function model. Joan Robinson believed that this was a FALSE model. Apparently, her opponents believed it was a TRUE model. The only relevant question, from a scientific point of view, is the question "Is this model useful or not in helping to explain the phenomenon under investigation?" Asking this question would have put an end to this so called "debate" before it surfaced and ended up being published in economics journals. Of course, Keynes NEVER believed that models are either true or false. Models are useful, but they are, at best, only approximations to reality. Therefore, a model can't be true or false; it can be better or worse than other models or an improved, better version of an existing model. The goal in economic science is to continually come up with useful models that were better than previous models or improved versions of older models, so that more of reality could be more accurately explained, as demonstrated by Keynes's IS-LM model on pp.298-299 of the General Theory.

El estado de bienestar nació en la Alemania del Conde Otto Von Bismarck . Durante 1880 se considera peligroso la activa militancia de la clase Obrera Industrial con las ideas revolucionarias que provenían de Marx. Por este temor a la Revolución se adoptaron leyes que otorgaban una protección elemental bajo la forma de seguros en previsión de accidentes, enfermedades, ancianidad e invalidez. De esta forma la clase Obrera podría vivir mejor, hoy en día se consideran obligatorios por ley estos derechos.

The decision by Gay Meeks to skip the teaching of chapter V  of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability to undergraduate and graduate students ,who would later in some cases  go on to obtain Masters and Doctorate Degrees in Economics and Philosophy at Cambridge University, is  an extraordinary  error .It is equivalent to the incomprehensible error made by Donald Moggridge to place an editorial foreword ,written by a rabid,partisan  advocate of Frank Ramsey’s subjectivist theory of probability,at the front of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes’s 1973 Volume 8 edition of the A Treatise on Probability.It is this edition that Gay Meeks uses in her classes at Cambridge University to teach from.
Chapter V is important for what Keynes says in it about Part II and chapter 15.Keynes makes it clear that Chapter V is the beginning of a discussion that will end in Part II and in chapter 15.The final word on measurement is contained in Part II and chapter 15,not in Part I and chapter III
It is in chapter 15 that Keynes makes it clear that(a) decision makers generally make  use of  a concept of interval valued probability in applications in the real world,not ordinal probability and that (b) a mathematically and logically advanced theoretical foundation supporting  this assessment and conclusion can be provided by using Boole’s original interval valued probability to provide a justification for the use of inexact measurement and approximation, as opposed to exact and precise measurement .
All heterodox schools of economics are thus still in the dark, teaching their  students that Keynes’s theory was an ordinal one as claimed by R Skidelsky and all other Post Keynesian economists,who look to F. Ramsey for direction ,not Keynes in his A Treatise on Probability.This conclusion was totally and completely rejected by Keynes explicitly in Part II and in chapters 15,17,20,22,26,29 and 30 of his A Treatise on Probability.
Gay Meeks taught her students,based on her belief that Ramsey had put great pressure on Keynes's logical theory of probability,that Keynes's theory was an ordinal theory .Her teachings were passed on to Anna Carabelli ,R.O'Donnell,and Jochen Runde,who then passed the ordinal theory myth on to their students.Meeks,ODonnell,Carabelli and Runde were all brought up on the 1973CWJMK edition of the TP,with the intellectually perverse editorial foreword by R B Braithwaite.They all accepted Braithwaite's claims about the alleged existence of serious logical errors in Part II of the TP.This provided them with a reason to skip Part II of the TP.

This paper gives an account of the debate between F.A. Hayek and J.M. Keynes in the 1930’s written for the general public. The purpose for this is twofold. First to provide the general reader with a narrative of what happened, and pointers to further reading that are accessible to the non-specialist. Second, to discuss how academics can fruitfully bridge the gap between their specialist work and the public without reducing complex themes into one-dimensional narratives. I use the Keynes vs. Hayek debate as a case study on how this may be achieved.

This paper intervenes in the longstanding debate over modernism’s relationship to the market by taking the publication of Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway and Marcel Mauss’s landmark essay, The Gift, in 1925 as a prompt to remap the historical and conceptual intersections between Anglo-American modernist literature, economic discourse, and twentieth-century theories of gift exchange. Drawing a crucial distinction between a modernist fascination with the gift and a modernist fascination with the primitive, I argue that Mauss uniquely conceived what John Maynard Keynes called the “end of laissez-faire’’ in terms of a shift in our collective thinking about gifts and exchanges. Via her sympathetic and critical characterization of Clarissa Dalloway, Woolf then figures this shift in terms of the emergence of a feminine ethos of hospitality. In furthermore establishing literature’s centrality to fostering this ethos, she also anticipates, while historicizing and gendering, the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, one of Mauss’s primary heirs.

This paper presents a survey of major economic systems, both contemporary and history, evaluated in light of Catholic Social Thought. The conclusion offers a suggestion as to which system best correlates with the official teaching of the Catholic Church. Submitted in as senior undergraduate thesis in the Division of Theology and Philosophy at Quincy University.

The complete failure of all heterodox economists (orthodox economists are no better) to recognize , grasp ,and apply Bertrand Russell’s July ,1922  refutation  of the 1922 Ramsey critique of

Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability ,as presented in Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability,in the Mathematical Gazette in his * footnote on p.120, resulted in the integration of Ramsey’s farcical and laughable gobbledygook attack of Keynes’s theory into all Heterodox attempts at explaining Keynes’s General Theory.
All heterodox economists have accepted Ramsey’s incomprehensible and ludicrous claim that Keynes’s nonnumerical probabilities  could only “…preserve the relations of greater and less.”(Ramsey,1926;In Kyburg and Smokler ,1980,2nd ed.,p.27).
Nowhere in anything published  in Keynes’s  CWJMK  will anyone ever find such a preposterous piece  of intellectual garbage and  rubbish.

The integration of Ramsey’s rubbish into the foundations of heterodox(orthodox )economics has resulted in the acceptance, to one degree or another by all heterodox economists, of the Ramsey Myth ,which was that an 18 year old ,teenage, boy genius  walked onto the Cambridge ,England campus in 1921  and convinced Keynes that he was all wrong. This eventually led Keynes to capitulate to Ramsey’s critique ,as presented in  a worthless 3 page review published in the Jan.,1922 issue of Vol. 11 of Cambridge Magazine ,in 1931.Further ,it is claimed by Bateman and many others  that  Keynes not only  explicitly repudiated his own  theory in 1931, but that he  fully accepted Ramsey’s subjective theory of probability or created a so called intersubjective theory of probability to replace his failed logical theory of probability.None of these claims  are  ever recognized , mentioned or discussed by Keynes  in(a) the Keynes-Townshend exchanges over the connections between the A Treatise on Probability and the General Theory in 1937-38,(b)Keynes’s 1937 QJE reply to his critics ,(c)  in his 1938-1940 exchanges with Tinbergen over Tinbergen’s precise,frequentist approach to statistics, or(d)in his Feb., 1937 Eugenics Review article ,which contains Keynes's most scathing rejection of precise probability and the concept of mathematical expectations .

Cinquanta anni dopo, il racconto dietro le quinte attraverso i verbali delle riunioni in Banca d'Italia - Guido Carli governatore - per la predisposizione del primo grande modello econometrico italiano con personaggi che sono poi diventati protagonisti della storia italiana (Ciampi, Fazio, Sarcinelli) raccolti e commentati da Paolo Peluffo e Guido Mario Rey

The discipline of modern economics has been categorized as based in mathematics and thus dealing only with facts. Religion, on the other hand, is considered one of the primary institutions in society that engenders different values. The stark separation between these two fields is typical of the modern fact-value distinction. The goal of this project is to provide, relying heavily upon Peter L. Berger, a detailed analysis of the value-laden social functions of religion and consider whether economics, specifically capitalism, also carries out these functions. The thesis blurs the lines between economics and religion by showing that capitalism engages in one of the primary social functions of religion, namely the promulgation of a theology. The research has revealed that capitalism, though it eschews any role in producing value-laden beliefs, actually manufactures its own unarticulated theology, establishing certain values through doctrine. This theology of capitalism is displayed by evaluating economic literature produced by three different schools of capitalism. Comparing this economic literature to three standard doctrines of Christian theology has uncovered pieces of capitalism’s own theology heavily involved in shaping specific values. By shedding light on capitalism’s theology, this thesis has revealed that economics carries out the same social functions as religion and consequently problematizes the modern fact-value distinction.

The paper examines the evolution of the Asian regional security architecture in the past three decades, evaluating relations between China and its neighbors, and considering various approaches in International Relations theory. First, the paper examines the assumptions of liberal institutionalism in the context of "econophoria," assessing its merits in East Asia. Second, the paper addresses China and its relations with the East Asian neighborhood in the latter decades of the 20th century. Third, the paper examines growing territorial tensions between China and its neighbors in the past decade --and how this undermines regional security and regional integration. Lastly, the paper evaluates the contributions of alternative IR theories such as realism and constructivism in providing a better understanding of China's new assertiveness.

This paper discusses Japanese motor vehicle manufacturing investment and state intervention measures in the Australian market. Australia’s auto industry is an extension of global motor vehicle manufacturers with a small number of domestic manufacturing firms that form a part of the global supply chain.  Toyota Motor Corporation, Mitsubishi Motor Corporation, General Motors Corporation and Ford Motor Company all have had extensive investments in the Australian market.  In the past, the Australian market was also a host to investments from Volkswagen AG, Chrysler LLC, Nissan Motor Company Limited and British Leyland Motor Corporation.  The size of the industry has shrunk recently with the March 2008 shut down of manufacturing by Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited (MMAL), not long after the company’s emergence from a long and significant restructuring.  Still, the auto industry remains the largest single manufacturing sector in Australia both in terms of investment levels and the number of people employed.  Thus, Japanese auto manufacturing investment in Australia require an evaluation, now that the federal government has completed the 2008 ‘Review of Australia’s Automotive Industry’.  The paper focuses on Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (TMC Australia) in Victoria and (the recently shut down) MMAL in South Australia.

As the title suggests, this extended essay is a critique of mainstream economic theory (neoclassical and neo-Keynesian), which serves the function of a theology for the Capitalist religion -- a rationalization and legitimization of capitalist accumulation. The economics faculty constitute a secular priesthood with its own arcane form of self-referential theological discourse. The essay examines the discursive and institutional practices which systematically distort genuine understanding of the economic system in a way that rationalizes capitalist production.

We hope to model financial fragility and money in a way that captures much of what is crucial in Hyman Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis. This approach to modeling Minsky may be unique in the formal Minskyan literature. Namely, we adopt a model in which a psychological variable we call financial prudence (P) declines over time following a financial crash, driving a cyclical buildup of leverage in household balance sheets. High leverage or a low safe-asset ratio in turn induces high financial fragility (FF). In turn, the pathways of FF and capacity utilization (u) determine the probabilistic risk of a crash in any time interval. When they occur, these crashes entail discrete downward jumps in stock prices and financial sector assets and liabilities. To the endogenous government liabilities in Hannsgen (2014), we add common stock and bank loans and deposits. In two alternative versions of the wage-price module in the model (wage–Phillips curve and chartalist, respectively), the rate of wage inflation depends on either unemployment or the wage-setting policies of the government sector. At any given time t, goods prices also depend on endogenous markup and labor productivity variables. Goods inflation affects aggregate demand through its impact on the value of assets and debts. Bank rates depend on an endogenous markup of their own. Furthermore, in light of the limited carbon budget of humankind over a 50-year horizon, goods production in this model consumes fossil fuels and generates greenhouse gases. 

The government produces at a rate given by a reaction function that pulls government activity toward levels prescribed by a fiscal policy rule. Subcategories of government spending affect the pace of technical progress and prudence in lending practices. The intended ultimate purpose of the model is to examine the effects of fiscal policy reaction functions, including one with dual unemployment rate and public production targets, testing their effects on numerically computed solution pathways. Analytical results in the penultimate section show that (1) the model has no equilibrium (steady state) for reasons related to Minsky’s argument that modern capitalist economies possess a property that he called “the instability of stability,” and (2) solution pathways exist and are unique, given vectors of initial conditions and parameter values and realizations of the Poisson model of financial crises.

Las ganancias son el objetivo central de la producción y el motor de la acumulación. Es el criterio último que utiliza el capitalista en la selección de nuevas técnicas de producción, y por ende una de las variables clave que condicionan el nivel y ritmo de acumulación y crecimiento. Sin embargo, no existe una única definición de ganancias y las diversas teorías económicas suelen asignarle un disímil grado de importancia. El propósito del presente trabajo es analizar, revisar y comparar las posturas teóricas neoclásicas, keynesianas, postkeynesianas y marxistas en relación a la naturaleza de las ganancias, su rol y principales determinantes así como examinar las implicancias que tiene el abordar esta temática de modo diferente. Abstract Profits are the main goal of production and the engine of capitalist accumulation. It is the ultimate criterion used by capitalists in the selection of new production techniques, and thus one of the key variables that conditions the level and rate of accumulation and growth. However, there is no single definition of profit nor the different economic theories assign equal importance. The aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the neoclassical, Keynesian, Post Keynesian and Marxist theoretical frameworks regarding the nature of profits, their determinants and role in accumulation, as well as to examine the implications of approaching this issue differently.

Die Lobredner der Arbeit. -Bei der Verherrlichung der ‚Arbeit', bei dem unermüdlichen Reden vom ‚Segen der Arbeit' sehe ich denselben Hintergedanken, wie bei dem Lobe der gemeinnützigen unpersönlichen Handlungen: den der Furcht vor dem Individuellen. Im Grunde fühlt man jetzt, beim Anblick der Arbeit -man meint immer dabei jene harte Arbeit von früh bis spät -, dass eine solche Arbeit die beste Polizei ist, dass sie Jeden im Zaume hält und die Entwicklung der Vernunft, der Begehrlichkeit, des Unabhängigkeitsgelüstes kräftig zu hindern versteht. [...] So wird eine Gesellschaft, in welcher fortwährend hart gearbeitet wird, mehr Sicherheit haben: und die Sicherheit betet man jetzt als oberste Gottheit an. -Und nun! Entsetzen! Gerade der ‚Arbeiter' ist g e f ä h r l i c h geworden! Es wimmelt von ‚gefährlichen Individuen'! Und hinter ihnen die Gefahr der Gefahren -d a s individuum!" 1 Friedrich Nietzsche -1881 "Die Arbeit zum Oberbegriff menschlicher Betätigung zu machen, ist eine asketische Ideologie […]" 2 Max Horkheimer -1934 Die erste Fassung dieses Textes erschien unter gleichem Titel in: Bernd Gehrke/ Wolfgang Rüddenklau (Hrsg.): Das war doch nicht unsere Alternative. Verlag Westfälisches Dampfboot, Münster, 1999, ISBN 3-89691-466-9, S. 362-383. Vorliegende Textfassung steht seit Anfang 2001 im Internet unter: http://www.otium-bremen.de/texte/kloss.pdf. Für die Aufnahme in die Autorenliste zwischen Kleist und Knigge danke ich dem Bremer Verein Otium e. V. -Initiative zur Rehabilitierung von Muße und Müßiggang. Einerseits hat der Text eine erfreuliche Resonanz erfahren, andererseits hat die politische Gefährdung des Kapitalismus durch die Konter-Reformen und deren weitere Entwertung von Arbeit zugenommen.

Is Artificial Intelligence qualitatively different from other means of economizing the use of labor? Are we on the edge of a jobless society? If yes, are we ready for it? These are a few of the questions discussed in this collection of academic works. This book traces a brief history of the concept of technological unemployment; proposes a short-term scenario analysis concerning the relations between automation, education, and unemployment; analyzes the most recent literature on social robotics; examines the possible futures generated by the development of intelligent machines; shows the relation between automation and unemployment in an Italian case study; considers the impact if machines become effective pursuers of knowledge or even conscious; and addresses the role of serendipity in the development of science and technology.

ABSTRACT:  The task of creating a public will is daunting in any political system, but a democracy dedicated to the principles of participation and public deliberation faces specific challenges, including overcoming organized opposition that may not accept democratic tenets.  In the sphere of eduction (and social reproduction more generally), business influenced movements to reform public education question many of the established goals and norms of democratic education and thus may be the vanguard of such opposition.  In order to interpret and explore these movements, this article enlists Amy Gutmann's work as a heuristic device.  In so doing, it looks at both the task of instituting a unified public school system and organized opposition to this task within the context of a democratic polity and its deliberative processes.
Since the 1980s education policy in the US has been increasingly influenced by business interests and ideologies.  Examples include accountability regimes based on standardized tests, public asset privatization (such as Charter Schools), performance pay (sometimes referred to as merit pay), the importation of business 'best practices,' changes in labor relations, changing systems of evaluation, an advocacy of administrative autonomy (as opposed to teacher autonomy) and a more away from civics education, physical education, arts education and music education.1  These are intertwined and for the most part have a common political lineage; they are based on market emulation models which promote hierarchical authority structures, lessen professional teacher autonomy and at the same time also provide opportunities for private entities to make profits in the public education sector.
What is striking is that, since the 1980s, the form that influence takes, the positions that business takes and the authority that business wields, can plausibly be interpreted as a direct response to Amy Gutmann's Democratic Education (1987), perhaps as an attempt to refute its premises and principles.  Rather than a discourse on the problematic of education in a democratic society, however, there is an emphasis on evaluation systems devised by outside experts, concepts of merit and the promotion of administrative autonomy vis-a-vis teachers. 
Specifically, significant aspects of the pro-market education reform movement seem to closely and negatively correlate to the arguments she makes in favor of deliberative democracy and egalitarian social goals.  Moreover, two principles that Gutmann says must not be abandoned --non-repression and non-discrimination-- are no longer reasons for revamping the system, but are addressed, if at all, not by core changes, but by programs appendant and appurtenant to the main. Finally –and potentially both more important and most intriguing--, there is an effort to recast the three sources of authority which Gutmann holds are foundational in education:  parents, the state and professionals. 
Gutmann's analysis of parents, the State, and professional educators as the three sources of authority in education, seems to provide a playbook for political action.  This program consists of coopting parents via school choice, narrowing the State's mission, attacking and marginalizing educators; in addition, the profession is divided hierarchically, as tasks such as curriculum development fall to outside educational experts and exclude class room teachers.  Accordingly, the article is an exploratory piece, a heuristic exercise that examines this lineage by tracing what might be regarded as an attempt to negate and counter the influence of Gutmann's work. 
Thus, what I suggest, half as a conceit, half as a description –and only speculatively as an explanation of how ideological justifications are produced--, is that business influence manifests itself in contemporary education reform as a point by point rejection of Gutmann's central goals and seems determined to be systematic in their rejection of Gutmann's conclusions. One could call identifying this 'seeming' a hunch, but it is a hunch supported by evidence that points to such a pattern.  There are different types of decision making.  Consumers make decisions which are somewhat different in kind from the decisions a business makes and much different from the process of  deliberative decision making in a democracy. A chief example is the set of business logics focused upon marketing products to different population segments; these have to do with the discovery of individual preferences and associated 'profit pools,' including behavioral triggers to get people to buy, not with collective decision making.  This runs counter to the ideal of 'conscious social reproduction' in Gutmann and may reveal and clarify a diametric opposition between market based education and democratic education. 
Overall, outcomes are based on the aggregation of individual projects.  The motivations of business and the interests of investor classes cohere is such a manner as to advance policies that allow for the greatest freedom of action for owners, model the labor market so as to align with business needs and are, as a result, antithetical to liberal Democratic concerns.

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says that the “most fruitful ideas” of the book are due to the stimulus of Sraffa’s criticism, but does not mention him nowhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. I solve the puzzle by explaining Sraffa’s role in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development. Due to Sraffa’s stimulating criticism, Wittgenstein definitely parted away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), introduced the “anthropological approach”, and structured the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations.

Keynes’ attack on the classical articulation of capitalist economy and his rethinking of the fundamental concepts and dynamics of the whole system and the individuals in it, stand as a great contribution to economic theory after more than seventy five years. Even though his critique of the labor market and consumption function are remarkable, it has been argued that Keynes’ theory of capital investment is central to his General Theory.
Keynes’ assumption that the future is inherently unknowable, therefore the eventual outcomes of the investment decisions, which are made today, are fundamentally uncertain, makes his theory of capital investment quite revolutionary. It refuses the classical assumption that the future outcomes can be assigned numerical probabilities, and that these probabilities present certainty, as if almost they were the truth. Inclusion of the fundamental uncertainty allows for the decision making based on expectations, which in turn dependent on conventions.
A more important contribution of Keynes can be found in the way that he deals with this concept of fundamental uncertainty. Contrary to what some classical economists may claim (Lucas, 1983), Keynes eliminates the potentiality for chaos and perpetual instability that appears to be inherent in the assumption of uncertainty, by introducing his theory of conventional decision making. Yet Keynes still acknowledges the fragility of social conventions and their subjectivity to sudden and violent changes, which in turn provides an explanation to the tendency of the system to endogenously produce instability.
This paper attempts to assess whether the Keynesian theory of capital investment provide a complete and satisfactory explanation of either the cyclical or secular instability of investment. Section two provides a restatement of the tenets and workings of Keynes’ theory of capital investment. Section three provides a discussion of Keynes’ analysis of the management of the nonfinancial firm in investment decisions, as well as the influence of financial markets on investment, and the role of competition in affecting the investment process. Section four discusses the extent to which Keynes’ theory of capital investment can provide an adequate explanation of either the cyclical or secular instability of investment.

scale, using a common, homogeneous unit of measure. These situations are within the domain of radical uncertainty, a concept that is relevant to Keynes's thinking in general, but which came to dominate his mature economic writings, and in particular the 1936 General Theory (henceforth GT) and his 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics article. 1 Also behind Keynes's uncertainty as incommensurability is his notion of partial similarity or likeness (partial analogy arising from shared features of similarity) and partial dissimilarity (partial negative analogy arising from shared features of dissimilarity), which he uses in his approach to generalisation from instances by inductive arguments. There are cases in which it is impossible to draw comparison between two (three or more) complex objects or situations. In the Treatise on Probability (henceforth TP), Keynes refers to the difficulties of comparing complex objects. He takes the example of comparing three books (TP, 39), recalling, as we will see, the GT passage on comparison of the two queens, Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth (GT, 40). There is obviously a problem of complexity, or of degrees of complexity, because complexity is not readily grasped by the mind in its entirety. For Keynes, it is possible to have «quite different laws for wholes of different degrees of complexity, and laws of connection between complexes which could not be stated in terms of laws connecting individual parts» (TP, 277). Dealing with complexity raises the issue of temporary removal of superfluous resemblances to attempt comparison or generalisation from the relevant features of similarity. However, this is not always possible, as Keynes notes. In induction, the selection of features showing similarity between instances is central to any (total or partial) generalisation by inductive argument. In induction, comparison between situations already experienced and situations newly encountered forms the basis for judgements about the latter. We try to identify principles of regularity under conditions of incomplete knowledge of what things are or may be. This is how we face the future, trying to escape from the Humean habit or way of thinking that the future is simply recurrent past. Keynes's approach might help us, as well as economic agents, not to suffer the fate of Bertrand Russell's turkey on Christmas Eve, blindly applying the law of the uniformity of nature. 2 This is a fundamental step in forming inductive generalisation which Keynes also discusses in Chapter 12 of the GT in relation to long-term expectations (Carabelli and Cedrini 2013). Judgements of relevance for knowledge-Keynes's causa cognoscendi (cause for knowledge)are fundamental to select the material (Carabelli 1985, 1988, 2021). In induction, individual instances, like the above-mentioned comparisons of books and queens, are n-dimensional objects and this turns comparison and similarity judgements into complex operations subject to alternative outcomes depending, as Scazzieri 2021 writes, «on the choice of the cognitive agent who identifies similarity features, and

El turbulento período de entreguerras a principios del siglo XX cambió el rumbo del saber y hacer Economía Política a nivel planetario. Buenos Aires fue una de las primeras ciudades en América Latina en desarrollar dicha disciplina y reconfigurar su discurso desde el Estado, tanto en el poder ejecutivo como en la educación superior. En este trabajo se evalúa la influencia de la obra de John Maynard Keynes en Buenos Aires. Para ello se compila y examina la recepción, estudio, crítica y despliegue de sus obras tanto en los ámbitos de formación superior como en la política pública. Se realiza un inventario que permite clarificar los cambios en las formas de pensar y hacer economía provocados efectivamente por el diálogo de los economistas y funcionarios locales con la obra de Keynes.

El presente trabajo tiene la pretensión de vincular aspectos centrales de la producción, distribución, cambio y consumo, al mismo tiempo que busca poner énfasis en dos aspectos que aparecen antagónicos como son las actividades y las necesidades. Intentaremos descubrir las relaciones propuestas en Marx, Marshall y Keynes, tres autores centrales en la historia del pensamiento económico con la intensión de dar significado al rol del trabajo en la producción de lo social. Para ello haremos equilibrio sobre sus textos originales y daremos una breve introducción a sus categorías para que el abordaje de las conclusiones evite confundir lo esencial de lo accesorio por el uso de lenguajes y métodos diversos.

Un'introduzione alla teoria post-keynesiana, per delineare in sintesi i principi e le peculiarità di una vasta tradizione di ricerca che si sviluppa inizialmente nella Cambridge di John Maynard Keynes per arricchirsi negli anni dei contributi di numerosi studiosi di tutto il mondo. Questa breve guida introduttiva è stata pubblicata nella forma di quattro diversi articoli sul sito di Rethinking Economics Italia con il titolo "Cos'è la teoria post-keynesiana: princìpi e politica economica".

In trying to assess the content and significance of Keynes's attempted revolution in economic methodology, historians have almost exclusively focused on the "General Theory". By highlighting the legacy of the "Treatise on Probability" for Keynes's economic writings, this paper provides evidence of strong methodological continuity between the "Tract on Monetary Reform", the "Treatise on Money" and the "General Theory", despite radical differences in the theories. We argue that the novelty of Keynes's approach lies in offering a method of analysis requiring cooperation on the part of the reader, in the effort to tackle the complexity of the economic material.

The paper looks at aesthetics in the the urban context of London as an alibi for varying theories of economics. Starting from John Maynard Keynes' theory of money and his thoughts on urbanism in the 1940s, the paper looks at the development of an "icon"-laden South Bank in London as indicative of the history of the changing monetary wherewithal of the state.

L’attività di sostegno alle arti che John Maynard Keynes ha svolto e teorizzato nel corso della sua vita dipende in modo pregnante, anche se non esclusivo, dal recepimento della concezione filosofica di Moore, così come dalla condivisione delle idee e dell’esperienza di Bloomsbury. L’originalità del pensiero di Keynes consiste, in particolare, da un lato nell’inquadrare le arti all’interno di quell’enjoyment of life cui potrà finalmente dedicarsi l’uomo liberato dall’ossessione della scarsità e dal “problema economico”; dall’altro per la soluzione offerta ai complessi rapporti tra arte, stato e mercato, preservando il carattere di libertà e le potenzialità di coesione sociale che qualificano le arti, e delineando con sufficiente chiarezza i ruoli dell’autorità pubblica e della libera iniziativa privata nel sostegno a queste ultime. Ne discende, per la società dell’avvenire e per quella del presente, una concezione non esclusivamente materialistica del welfare state. Il movimento verso la risoluzione del problema economico giustifica le attività intraprese dallo stato per realizzare le precondizioni del vero benessere, dunque non solo di quello materiale. Lo stato potrà abbandonare i criteri di spesa utilitaristici e sostenere le most public arts. Inoltre, attraverso il suo esempio e l’aiuto a istituzioni semipubbliche di promozione delle arti, sosterrà lo sforzo dei cittadini nel favorire forme di enjoyment of life altrimenti sacrificate alla considerazione dell’economia come problema permanente dell’umanità. Il “paradiso ritrovato” di Keynes è qui prospettato come possibile alternativa al modello di welfare state materialistico del secondo dopoguerra: giudicato fallimentare dal punto di vista dell’efficienza economica, e tuttavia sconfitto in primo luogo dalla sua incapacità di attrazione culturale, la società del “paradiso perduto” non contemplerà il sostegno alle arti tra le sue responsabilità.