Japan-China relations

Objectives: Study the similarities and differences of small states of the Caribbean, joined in the Caribbean Community, and South Pacific states, in pursuing their common problems, deriving from their smallness and in most cases, their insular character, as well as geographical remoteness and economic vulnerability, with regards to diplomatic initiatives and action regarding the issue of recognition of either China or Taiwan. Theoretical Framework: A comparison of small island developing states (SIDS), a specific group of states, was done, with regards to China-Taiwan recognition issue. Our research falls into the category of exploration of challenges and opportunities in achieving social equity and justice within the SDG framework, and is particularly connected with SDGs 16 and 17. Method: Explore the various foreign policy strategies of small island states of the Caribbean and the South Pacific region, respectively, by consulting scientific papers, conference papers, press releases, foreign policy documents etc., all covering the problematics of China-Taiwan battle for recognition among the afore-mentioned states. Results and Discussion: Taiwan's strategy is comprised of providing developmental aid and thereby trying to avoid complete diplomatic isolation, with only 12 states recognizing it at present day, while in 2007 there were still 23. Research Implications: Study of the changes in these issues in the last two decades, particularly connected with the rising of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the economic pressure of China, which provokes the response in developmental help of Taiwan. Value: The paper gives a contemporary insight into the China-Taiwan diplomatic struggle for recognition, as a zero-sum game, in the two regions of the world where it is most present.

The purpose of this paper is to decipher the visual codes embedded in the illustrations of the Orchid Pavilion Gathering theme as examples of Tokugawa-era (1603-1868) visual culture, based on the approach of treating the image as a pictorial language that conveys specific messages. In so doing, I will consider the function of these images to construct a new collective identity for some intellectual and cultural groups in Tokugawa society.

Japanese ODA dates back to the period of war reparation, which started in 1954 under the agreement of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the end of the 1980s, Japan took the place of the United Stated as the worldʼs largest donor country. After the Cold Warʼs demise, Japanʼs record in Official Development Assistance (based on net expenditure) was at the top in the world for 10 consecutive years from 1991 through 2000. Despite its tremendous amount of aid to developing countries, Japanese ODA was criticized for only aiming at its own economics interest. However, after the end of the Cold War, globalization has brought about numerous problems, such as drugs, inequality, terrorism, and so on, which affect directly individualsʼ lives or human well being. The globalization has forced international community to get concerned with those problems. Then, the paradigm of international development assistance shifted in a big scale in the 1990s when the World Summit for Social Development called for social development assistance; instead of economy oriented assistance. Since then Japanʼs ODA has a new direction emphasizing assistance related to human-centered social development, so emergence of the concept of human security seems to be the cornerstone of Japanʼs foreign aid in pursuit of economic and social development. However, what is "human security"? The development of human security concept emerged through two different streams -Theoretical contributions from a group of scholars including Mahbub UI Haq and Amartya Sen and institutional efforts from United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Canadian government. First of all, it is necessary to explain the role of all these elements in conceptualizing human security. Beginning with the term of "human security, it could be considered as a concept for future vision and agenda for action and was first mentioned in the 1994 UNDPs Human Development Report. This idea was closely associated with the human security concept initiated by Mahbub UI

Since its inception in late 2016, Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision has
continued to adapt to a shifting global order associated with an intensification of the US- China strategic competition, technological innovation, competition for influence in the so- called Global South, and global challenges such as climate change. The FOIP includes wide-ranging initiatives. These include economic partnerships such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), energy cooperation in the form of Asia Zero Emission Community, and security and defense cooperation throughthrough the annual Indo-Pacific Deployment. Japan’s political will and vision to uphold　a free and open, rules-based international order has obtained buy-in from lcooperation through in the region and beyond. The term “Indo-Pacific” has effectively replaced　the previously common “Asia-Pacific” and it is now understood as a geographical and strategic frame of reference for the region. This is puzzling as Japan did not have a policy document stipulating the ways and the means of achieving a FOIP region until Prime Minister Kishida’s speech in New Delhi in March 2023 and his announcement of the FOIP Vision update. How has Japan achieved this success in the adoption of the Indo-Pacific framing? How do we make sense of Japan’s FOIP vis-à-vis its relations with China and Taiwan? By employing the pyramid principle, this paper seeks to unpack and examine the construct of Japan’s FOIP in the context of Japan’s national interests. The research reveals that the recent FOIP update signifies strategic continuity rather than a reboot, with tactical adjustments in place. While it shows that FOIP has not been an effective mechanism for cooperation with Japan’s closest neighbors such as China, Taiwan is implicitly integrated
as an essential partner in Japan’s FOIP version 3.0.

This paper applies the theoretical perspective of Jacques Ellul, as set out in Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes (1965/1962), to examine why the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), despite years of effort, has had little success in shifting public opinion regarding constitutional reform, particularly in regards to changes to the Article 9 provisions. Ellul argues that propaganda is the use of media to transmit an ideological position and transform this ideology into a societal myth. Ellul rejects association of myth with falsehood and, instead, considers the term closer to the Greek origin as denoting narrative. Ellul's theoretical model provides a way to understand why the efforts of subsequent LDP governments have made scant progress in swaying public opinion.

Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP) has moved to the forefront of Japan’s foreign policy since 2017. Nonetheless, it re-
mains elusive as a tangible strategy as activities that fall under FOIP continue to evolve. This chapter investigates critical junc-
tures in FOIP’s evolution between 2005 to today as it marks a de-
marcation point for articulating the use of the term Indo-Pacific.
Key lines of enquiry include: 1) What and why have critical junc-
tures pushed FOIP to evolve?; and 2) Are these changes being insti-
tutionalised? Findings suggest that Japan’s FOIP vision evolution
cannot solely be explained through neorealism or liberal institu-
tionalism, rather, Japan’s maritime strategy and its FOIP are sensi-
tive to power distribution changes associated with China’s re-emer-
gence as the dominant power in the region and the relative decline
of the U.S. and that it adapts to these changes through a hybrid ap-
proach. This approach includes: 1) a selective accommodation of
China’s rise; 2) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politi-
co-economy and rules-making process; 3) tightening the Japan-U.S.
alliance and cementing the U.S. into the region; and 4) diversifying
and deepening its strategic partnerships.

The economic structures of African nations are markedly underdeveloped and operate on a lesser scale relative to the economies of their peers within the wider BRICS Plus alliance. This inherent discrepancy in economic development and operational scale may lead to a pronounced disparity in the economic benefits and opportunities accessible to the members of the coalition (Hopewell, 2017; Arapova & Lissovolik,

The U.S.-China strategic competition is intensifying and has the potential to spill over into a kinetic conflict. For allies of the U.S., such as Japan, a military conflict between its ally, Washington and its biggest trading partner, Beijing, is unacceptable.  As a result, using the free and open Indo-Pacific framework, Tokyo is attempting to moderate the negative consequences of U.S.-China strategic competition by enhancing deterrence, building resilience in its economy, and pursuing engagement with China.

As extra regional powers look to the Indo-Pacific and formulate their strategic approaches to the region, a Japan-China lens is a useful tool to understand that Tokyo and other regional capitals have nuanced and often contradictory approaches to their most important economic partner, which is also a source of great geopolitical anxiety.

Раздел 3 КУЛЬТУРА И КУЛЬТУРНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА Языковая политика В современном Китае с его обширной территорией, населением 1,4 млрд человек, десятками языков малых народов и далеко отстоящими друг от друга китайскими диалектами основной языковой задачей внутри страны по-прежнему остается распространение единого устного и письменного средства общения. О необходимости распространять «общеупотребительные в государстве язык и письменность», иначе говоря, основанный прежде всего на пекинском диалекте официальный путунхуа и стандартное иероглифическое письмо, говорил Си Цзиньпин в своем докладе на ХХ съезде КПК,

This thesis encompasses South Asia as an area of interest mainly focusing on the Indo-Pak conflict and its impact on the regional as well as global arena. Furthermore, a non-experimental research design is used while using neo-realism and power transition theory as a theoretical framework. The thesis focuses mainly on China's policies and the United States' abrupt inward turn which are both the consequence of factors represented in the variables. The critical independent variable is patriotism, which, in combination with China's and the United States' power trajectories, defines how their relationship will unfold in the next years. Hence, there is an ample reason to expect a soft landing as the world evolves from unipolarity to multipolarity. It has been about a few years since the United States and China saw their relationship deteriorate due to an increase in hostilities and a decrease in collaboration. Increased disagreement and strain in US-China security relations may be unavoidable. The United States and China are in the midst of a power transition that has significant ramifications for the balance of power in South and East Asia and for their respective national security objectives. As the power transfer progresses, it is likely that a great power struggle will increase emerging as a new cold war.

On the basis of a wide range of critically assessed and triangulated secondary and primary sources, including elite interviews and official documentation often in the original language, this article suggests that Japan’s domestic politics, and also its foreign and security policies, displayed a remarkable degree of continuity with the path set by the late Abe Shinzō, and thus carry his imprint. Notable exceptions are Kishida’s initiatives in the energy, economic, and fiscal realms. Amid major scandals and internal readjustments in the majority party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s domestic politics appear to be dominated by a single party maintaining its edge over possible adversaries in a fundamentally non-competitive democratic system. This trend has been further reinforced by growing political disaffection. Public trust in the government in 2023 was at a minimum, while surveys show that more than 40% of the Japanese electorate did not support any specific political party. Against this backdrop, however, the Kishida administration was successful in ending a long-lasting period of deflation in the Japanese economy and coming to terms with the legacy of former PM Abe Shinzō. In fact, the lasting influence of Abe lives on in the LDP’s factional balance, influencing Kishida’s policy stance.
Especially in the realm of Japan’s security policy and international relations, 2023 testified to Abe’s legacy. Japan’s changes in its military doctrine and its force posture, together with its strategic outreaches to its east Asian neighbours and European and Pacific players, mirror US grand strategy. In fact, Japan also worked in lockstep with US-led minilateral diplomacy aimed at purposeful multi-layered security ententes, often on an ad hoc basis, to balance China militarily, counter the expansion of its regional diplomatic and economic influence and maintain the status quo along the first island chain. The seeds sown by the second Abe administration bore fruit in Japan’s security embrace of Taiwan, an embrace which capitalised on Abe’s poorly understood 2015 legislative and strategic revolutions.
With a focus on the geopolitics of the first island chain, the article then looks at Japan’s burgeoning security cooperation with South Korea and European states. It does so to argue that while Kishida’s Japan is seemingly reactive to US grand strategy, it acts in broad continuity of the course set by the two Abe administrations. After all, under Abe, Japan expanded its strategic partnerships to include European players and NATO. Moreover, while Kishida is not a revisionist nationalist, unlike Abe, Japan’s reset of its relations with Seoul is a by-product of the new Yoon administration’s ability to compromise rather than a result of the Japanese government’s concessions.
After analysing the burgeoning Japan-NATO relations, the article concludes with a discussion of Japan’s successful G7 presidency, the apex of minilateral diplomacy in 2023.

Груз исторической памяти, связанной с японской агрессией в Китае в 1930-e-1940-е годы, отчётливо проявляется в японо-китайских отношениях на современном этапе. В связи с этим важно понять, в чём заключается причина разногласий: почему китайская общественность считает, что японская сторона недостаточно осознала трагичность событий военного периода, в то время как японцы недовольны постоянными напоминаниями о прошлом со стороны своего соседа. В статье сделана попытка хотя бы частично разобраться в этом противоречии и понять, имеет ли место чувство вины в послевоенной Японии и как оно проявляется. В статье чувство вины за японскую агрессию анализируется с двух основных ракурсов: с точки зрения проблемы компенсации морального и материального ущерба, которая подразумевает рассмотрение вопроса с позиции государства и его субъектов (первая часть), и с точки зрения осознания японским народом трагедии произошедшего и вытекающего из этого чувства вины (вторая часть). В первой части статьи после обобщения обстоятельств капитуляции Японии на основе известных исторических фактов и анализа материалов, отражающих разные точки зрения на проблему, объясняется, почему извинения японской стороны за агрессию и компенсация материального ущерба пострадавшим странам (в частности, Китаю) считаются слишком поздними и недостаточными. Во второй части рассмотрена эволюция исторической памяти в японском обществе в послевоенный период и показано, что японский народ воспринимает историческое прошлое с определённого угла зрения, и представление о войне не является целостным и всеобъемлющим. В заключении сделан вывод о том, что формирование отношения к войне в Японии происходило под воздействием политических факторов и в условиях послевоенной травмы, трансформировавшей общественное сознание. Особо отмечена роль храма Ясукуни как символа японской агрессии и милитаризма для Китая и воплощения торжества мира над войной и боли об ушедших близких для простых японцев.

The influence of historical memory about Japanese aggression in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937−1945) on contemporary Japan-China relations is still very noticeable. Therefore, it is important to look into fundamental reasons for the long-lasting disagreement between the countries on the events of the war. The key here is to understand why Chinese society still believes that the Japanese side has not fully realized the tragedy of the events and has not sufficiently apologized for its military actions, while Japanese people are displeased with constant reminders from China about the past. The article seeks to address this controversy and to clarify whether the feeling of guilt could be seen in post-war Japan and how and whether it was expressed on different levels, from the Emperor to common Japanese people. The article is divided into two main sections. The first section is focused on the problems of moral and material compensation to China after the war: the process of settling these issues is described, while putting an emphasis on the circumstances which led to major problems in mutual understanding and acceptance of Japan’s apologies by China. In the second section, the development of historical memory in Japan in the post-war decades is investigated. After analyzing Chinese and Japanese sources, the author comes to the conclusion that, in addition to the mentioned issues with apologies and reparations, gradual fading away of historical memory in Japan after the war (partially caused by the post-war social trauma) also contributed to the understanding that the feeling of guilt in Japanese society was not sufficient. At the same time, visiting Yasukuni Shrine to commemorate the souls of those who died for the Emperor does not necessarily mean that Japanese people do not feel guilty for the aggression.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

This article examines Zhang Wojun (1902–1955) and the memory of his ‘collaboration’ with Japan during the Second World War. A Taiwanese-born writer and educator who lived in Beijing for 25 years, his drifting identity was full of ambiguities. Although he was one of the key intellectuals behind Taiwan’s New-Old Literatures Debate and responsible for introducing many May Fourth ideas to Taiwan, he also played an important role in bringing Japanese literature and thought into Chinese discourse during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. During the war, he continued to teach in Beijing and travelled to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia Writers’ conferences. Some of his works from this period call for the Chinese people to support the empire and eradicate Western culture and literature from Asia, but many of his writings also indicate a strong sense of Chinese nationalism.

This article considers the memories of Zhang, his various intellectual contributions, and his oeuvre, arguing that his collaboration must be understood and contextualized within his intellectual landscape through a research methodology that examines continuities and change across decades of his life and work.

THE SYMBOLIC DIMENSION OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISMA great majority of Taiwanese people declare themselves to be Taiwanese only (61% in 2022) or Taiwanese and also Chinese (additional 31%), which gives an impression of ethnic and national unity. However, the divisive factors of (sub) ethnic grouping, language diversity and historical consciousness are still present. Taiwanese nationalism, which in its civilian form is organized around present state of Republic of China (ROC) as opposed to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, ROC, although de facto an independent state is not de iure a Taiwanese state, as can be seen in its national symbolism. The paper analyses this enthosymbolical dimension of Taiwanese national identity, discussing four main symbolical spheres: the memory of the 2-28 Incident; memory and idealization of the Japanese colonial period; strong presence of local languages, used alongside the official northern mandarin standard; and finally, the presence of the Ab...

This article deals with problems of word formation in the contemporary Chinese language, particularly the formation of technical loanwords. A review of the works on types of loanwords is presented in the article. Theoretical aspects of word formation in the contemporary Chinese language in the works of Russian and Chinese sinologists are reviewed. A detailed description of word-formation models based on the structural and semantic approach is given.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has increased demand for medicines and hygienic personal care products. The increase in demand for medicinal products should increase the turnover of pharmacies. It was therefore hypothesised that the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic caused shocks to the pharmacy market in Poland. The aim was to identify and determine the nature of the shocks to the pharmacy market in Poland and compare them to the period before the pandemic. The subject of the study was the value of sales in open pharmacies in Poland in the years 2010-2021. To identify shocks and verify the hypothesis, an automatic TRAMO-SEATS procedure was used. The results obtained unequivocally confirmed the hypothesis, with the changes being more visible when analysing the value of total sales in open pharmacies expressed in current prices rather than in constant prices. The shocks were the result of increased demand for medicines and hygienic personal care products resulting from panic in the face of an unprecedented threat such as SARS-CoV-2.

The Raisina Chronicles is not just a compilation of contributions from eminent leaders to mark a decade of dialoguing at Raisina Hill; it is also a report card of a decade of world affairs. The original Essays and selected Addresses delivered at the Dialogue in this publication collectively offer some crucial insights. First, that a dialogue out of India matters, because it brings a unique capability and commitment to the imperative of discussions and deliberations. Second, Raisina’s journey is a reflection of Bharat’s emergence. And as its engagement with the world evolves, we at the Dialogue will have to continue to innovate and upgrade. Finally, now that the Dialogue is a global good in the assessment of many, it will have to enter the second decade of its existence more aware of its wider responsibility.

Resolving the Senkaku Islands dispute is a complex challenge with no easy or guaranteed solutions. However, several potential paths towards peaceful resolution and coexistence can be explored based on the provided information and considering both realistic and theoretical possibilities.

The Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu Islands in China, are a tiny cluster of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea. Despite their small size, they hold immense strategic and symbolic value for both China and Japan, making them a potent flashpoint in their already complicated relationship. critical thinking and evaluation of diverse viewpoints are key to comprehending this complex issue. We should not hesitate to ask questions, challenge assumptions, and continue our research to deepen our understanding of the Senkaku Islands dispute.

O artigo analisa a posicao do Japao no contexto de seguranca da Asia Oriental, tendo em conta as mudancas no equilibrio de poder na regiao e a crescente assimetria entre uma China poderosa e “musculada” e um Japao mais vulneravel que se debate com uma economia estagnada, uma popu‐ lacao em rapido envelhecimento e uma imagem ambigua e problematica na regiao. A disputa te‐ rritorial sobre as ilhas Senkaku/Diaoyu e uma manifestacao da reorganizacao do poder na ordem regional na medida em que acentua a vulnerabi‐ lidade do Japao e foi usada pela China como um mecanismo para enfraquecer a alianca EUA‐Japao e opor‐se ao plano de expansao do soft power ame‐ ricano na regiao atraves do processo do TPP. Estas mudancas desencadearam uma alteracao funda‐ mental na estrategia de seguranca do Japao no sen‐ tido da sua remilitarizacao e reconstrucao do hard power, por forma a compensar o declinio no seu soft power, atualmente em fase de implementacao pelo Governo de inspiracao nacionalista lidera...

This paper applies the theoretical perspective of Jacques Ellul, as set out in Propaganda: The Formation of Men＇s Attitudes (1965/1962), to examine why the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), despite years of effort, has had little success in shifting public opinion regarding constitutional reform, particularly in regards to changes to the Article 9 provisions. Ellul argues that propaganda is the use of media to transmit an ideological position and transform this ideology into a societal myth. Ellul rejects association of myth with falsehood and, instead, considers the term closer to the Greek origin as denoting narrative. Ellul＇s theoretical model provides a way to understand why the efforts of subsequent LDP governments have made scant progress in swaying public opinion.

This article argues that offensive realism is applicable to explain China's strategic behavior. Contrary to constructivist and liberal arguments, ideational and domestic factors are not the primary causes of China's strategic behavior. Instead, structural and material factors such as anarchy and the distribution of relative power significantly shape how China behaves in the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, they have a larger impact relative to nonmaterial/unit-level variables on China's policymaking. Available evidence strongly indicates that China's strategic behavior is driven by power maximizing calculation. China's grand strategy, its maritime ambition as well as naval modernization, and rapid growth rate of military expenditure all confirm the hypotheses of offensive realism.

Conflicts are driven by various factors, but over time, conflicts have evolved in nature and complexity. In addition to traditional factors, the emergence of technology has played a significant role in shaping conflicts. Technological advancements also have been a driving force in shaping societies and economies, and impacting various sectors and aspects of life. Our research uses Structural Equation Model (SEM) analysis. We will analyze the direct and indirect impacts of digital connectivity, technology trade, military expenditure and personnel, and socio-economic welfare on conflicts and tensions in Indonesia and Japan. The findings of our study suggest that technology variables such as digital connectivity and technology trade have a positive effect on socio-economic welfare in Indonesia with coefficients 0.311 and 0.457. A similar thing also happened in Japan with coefficients 1.312 and 0.310. However, technology trade can increase conflicts and tensions in Indonesia with coeffi...

De la visite d’État du Président sud-coréen Yoon Seok-Yeol aux États-Unis fin avril 2023, à celle du Premier ministre Japonais Fumio Kishida en Corée du Sud début mai, sans oublier celle du Chef d’État-major de la marine japonaise, l’Amiral Ryo Sakai, en Australie ou encore l’annonce de l’ouverture prochaine d’un bureau de liaison de l’OTAN au Japon, de nombreux signaux indiquent que les États- Unis accélèrent dans la consolidation de leurs réseaux d’alliances et de partenariats en Asie du Nord- Est et au-delà.

History of Chiang Ching-kuo's first official visit to Japan in 1967. Introduces documents related to the visit from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives translated and posted to the Wilson Center's Digital Archive.
Link: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/getting-know-ching-kuo-chiang-ching-kuos-1967-visit-japan-and-cold-war-japan-taiwan

is now virtually alone at the top of the field of Chinese military studies. A political scientist, Dreyer, employs the research methodology of a classic historiographer, i.e., she identifies key facts and places them in their precise historical contexts. In Middle Kingdom, the author relies on leading standard works and news articles, as well as interviews with scores of experts and writers who know the Asia landscape very well. She has taken on an immense task-to provide a complete, foundational history of the rise of modern China and how it faces a completely modernized Japan today. In writing this book, Dreyer has left no stone unturned. She has produced a thoroughly convincing history of Sino-Japanese relations, emphasizing the cultural and historical motives that drive their suspicions of each other today. Although she does not emphasize realist theory, Prof. Dreyer offers the most complete historical explanation of the two countries' animosities that stem mainly from factors of geography, proximity, and differences in cultural perspectives. Prof. Dreyer begins by discussing the origins of China-Japan relations going back to 200 BC. She argues that the two countries' rivalry began from the moment that they first acknowledged each other and that rivalry intensified up to the 7th century. This period was marked by Japan's importation of Chinesestyle culture, language, political institutions, and government structures. Japan's government, just like China's, became heavily influenced by its military. Although China could have chosen to be proud of its contribution to Japanese government, the former quickly recognized that these adoptions strengthened a previously weak power and began to view Japan as a threat to China's dominance in Asia. Despite this suspicion, China-Japan relations remained largely inactive but strained. Dreyer pinpoints the intrusion of Western, principally American, power in the 1850s as the external trigger that quickly ratcheted up the heretofore latent rivalry between China and Japan. At that time, China was at the beginning of what would be more than a century of decline while Japan was organizing itself as a modern, Western-style state. The waning of Chinese power was a boon to major Western powers which carved up the country into spheres of influence in order profit from the lucrative Chinese market. Dreyer lucidly explains all the forces and events, including the two countries' rivalry to control Korea and Taiwan, which led to Japan's attack on China and Asia. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was designed to dissuade America from entering World War II, but it backfired and precipitated America's entry into the war.