International Criminal Court

This article is published by invitation in a special symposium issue of the John Marshall Law Review entitled “International Law in the 21st Century: The Law and Politics of the International Criminal Court.” The article compares the International Military Tribunal (also known as the Nuremberg Tribunal) with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (also known as the Tokyo Tribunal), the two ad hoc international war crimes tribunals the Allies established after World War II to prosecute suspected atrocity perpetrators from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, respectively. The article examines these two tribunals’ similarities and differences, especially as they relate to the tribunals’ designs, staffs, and operations. The article concludes by suggesting that future research should consider whether and, if so, how similarities and differences between the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals affected their results, including their durations and judgments.

The article 12.3 of the International Criminal Court’s Statute allows the States not party of the treaty to make a unilateral declaration accepting the competence of the Court, without expressing their consent to be bound to the Statute. This paper addresses the survey of the provision in the light of the practice arisen from its statutory formulation and the interesting matters that its implementation has brought up regarding aspects such as the entitlement to issue the declaration, the material, temporal, territorial and subjective scope thereof, the procedure after its submission before the Secretary of the ICC and the problems derived from the possibility that a State may withdraw the trust placed in the ICC
in the form of a declaration. The declarations issued until now on behalf of Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Palestine, Ukraine and even Egypt, and the response given by the ICC to the different matters mentioned
above, allow to have a glimpse of a provision full of possibilities, not only for the States that have not ratified the treaty yet, but also for the 124 States that already did.

El artículo 12.3 del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional permite a los Estados no parte en el tratado formular una declaración unilateral de aceptación de la competencia de la Corte, pero sin llegar a manifestar su consentimiento en obligarse por el tratado en su conjunto. El presente trabajo aborda el estudio de la disposición a la luz de la práctica surgida desde su formulación estatutaria y las interesantes cuestiones que su aplicación ha planteado en relación con aspectos tales como la legitimación para emitir la declaración, el alcance material, temporal, territorial y subjetivo de la misma, el procedimiento posterior a su depósito ante el Secretario de la CPI y los problemas derivados de la posibilidad de que un Estado retire la confianza que había depositado en la CPI en forma de declaración. Las declaraciones emitidas hasta el momento en nombre de Costa de Marfil, Uganda, Palestina, Ucrania, e incluso Egipto, y la respuesta ofrecida por la CPI a las distintas cuestiones anteriormente referidas permiten vislumbrar una disposición llena de posibilidades no solo para los Estados que aún no han ratificado el tratado sino también para los 124 Estados que ya lo han hecho.

This book clearly sets out the international criminal law framework. Features throughout the text are used to equip readers with the tools to consider and assess the current status of the law and encourage critical analysis of the latest debates affecting the subject area.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been viewed as the ideal forum to try, decide and dispense punishments for transnational violations of individual and collective human rights as part of a broader transitional justice framework. This paper explores general global issues with transitional justice, as well as whether the concept of justice is inherently Eurocentric, through the lenses of two case studies: Argentina and Uganda. It culminates with some observations on, and provides alternates too, retributive and reconciliation justice models.

India has neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute (‘Statute’) of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). It actively participated in the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of International Criminal Court (‘Prep Com’) and the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (‘Rome Conference’), however, India abstained from the motion to adopt the Statute at the conclusion of the conference.

This policy brief studies the positions taken by India in the Prep Com and the Rome Conference, identifies the primary reasons for India’s abstention, and analyses their context and merit. Further, this brief looks at the developments in India with respect to the ICC and speculates on the stance which India is likely to adopt in the future.

Odpowiedzialność karna na podstawie art. 25 pkt 3 (a) Statutu Rzymskiego a teoretyczne modele sprawczego współdziałania Wprowadzenie W orzecznictwie trybunałów ad hoc oraz Międzynarodowego Trybunału Karnego (dalej: MTK) widać jak w zwierciadle, że im więcej osób współdziała w popełnieniu czynu zabronionego, tym bardziej skomplikowane stają się rozstrzygnięcia w zakresie ich odpowiedzialności karnej. Nihil novi sub sole można by rzec i przejść nad tym spostrzeżeniem do porządku dziennego -zależność ta jest wręcz oczywista. Jednak to, co w ustawodawstwach krajowych jest nieuniknioną konsekwencją tego, że opisy typów są co do zasady nastawione na jednostkowe zachowanie jednego podmiotu 1 , w przypadku czynów zabronionych prawa karnego międzynarodowego jest ich cechą dystynktywną 2 . Czyny te mają tak ukształtowaną stronę przedmiotową, że niemal niemożliwe byłoby jej zrealizowanie przez jedną osobę. Najczęściej zbrodnie prawa międzynarodowego dokonywane są przez grupy i oddziały militarne lub paramilitarne, a ich inspiratorów nie ma wówczas w miejscu ich popełnienia. Może wydawać się zaskakujące, że nie udało się do tej pory w sposób klarowny oddzielić od siebie poszczególnych form przestępnego współdziałania 3 , choć jest ono z prawem karnym międzynarodowym immanentnie związane. Celem niniejszego artykułu nie jest bynajmniej próba dokonania takiego podziału, lecz analiza art. 25 pkt 3 (a) Statutu Rzymskiego 4 (dalej: SMTK) przewidującego odpowiedzialność za tzw. sprawcze formy współdziałania w świetle modelowych rozwiązań dogmatyki prawa karnego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem koncepcji udziału w cudzym przestępstwie (Teilnahme) oraz konstrukcji przyjętych na gruncie polskiego Kodeksu karnego 5 (dalej: k.k.). Z tego względu niniejszy artykuł może odbiegać od innych publikacji, ponieważ problematyka przestępnego współdziałania w 1 P. Kardas, Teoretyczne podstawy odpowiedzialności karnej za przestępne współdziałanie, Kraków 2001, s. 30. 2 H. Olasolo, Joint criminal enterprise and its extended form: a theory of co-perpetration giving rise to principal liability, a notion of accessorial liability, or a form of partnership in crime?, "Criminal Law Forum" 2009, Nr 12, s. 263 i n. 3 B. Burghardt, Modes of Participation and their Role in a General Concept of Crimes Under International Law, w: The Review Conference and the Future of the International Criminal Court, Ch. Burchard, O. Triffterer, J. Vogel, Alphen aan den Rijn 2010, s. 81-82. 4 Rzymski Statut Międzynarodowego Trybunału Karnego sporządzony w Rzymie dn. 17 VII 1998 r. (Dz.U. Nr 78, poz. 708). 5 Ustawa z dn. 6 VI 1997 r. Kodeks karny, Dz.U. 1997, Nr 88, poz. 553. popełnieniu zbrodni prawa międzynarodowego była przedstawiana w literaturze zagranicznej przede wszystkim w oparciu o istniejące rozstrzygnięcia trybunałów ad hoc oraz MTK, a prawnoporównawcza analiza art. 25 pkt 3 SMTK ograniczała się zasadniczo do wskazania, które elementy konstrukcyjne wywodzą się z prawa kontynentalnego, a które wyraźnie nawiązują do common law 6 . Przepis art. 25 pkt 3 (a), który ma dla omawianych zagadnień kluczowe znaczenie, usytuowany został w części trzeciej SMTK zatytułowanej "ogólne zasady prawa karnego". W literaturze wskazuje się, że jest ona w pewnym stopniu niespójna i określa się ją między innymi jako unsystematic conglomeration from a variety of legal traditions 7 . Mogłoby to wskazywać, że wszelkie próby analizy jej przepisów pod kątem wypracowanych w ustawodawstwach krajowych konstrukcji muszą być z góry skazane na niepowodzenie. W odniesieniu do podstaw odpowiedzialności za przestępne współdziałanie, a w szczególności za jego sprawcze postaci byłby to jednak wniosek zbyt pochopny. Należy mieć na uwadze, że interpretując przepisy określające te podstawy przyjmuje się zawsze pewne przednormatywne założenia o charakterze kryminalno-politycznym czy teoretycznym, które rzutują na cały proces wykładni 8 . Pod tym względem wykładnia SMTK nie różni się niczym od ustawodawstw krajowych, a przedstawienie zawartych w nim konstrukcji w świetle tego, co w dogmatyce prawa karnego zostało już dobrze poznane może okazać się pomocnym narzędziem przy rozstrzyganiu niektórych problemów, które pojawiły się w praktyce orzeczniczej MTK. Pojęcie sprawstwa Nie można rozpocząć analizy bez uprzedniej refleksji nad tym, jak na gruncie SMTK rozumiane są pojęcia "sprawca" i sprawstwo". Pojawiają się one po raz pierwszy w preambule, zgodnie z którą: "Państwa-Strony są zdecydowane, by położyć kres bezkarności sprawców tych zbrodni [najpoważniejszych zbrodni wagi międzynarodowej] i w ten sposób przyczynić się do zapobiegania ich popełnianiu". W cytowanym fragmencie pojęcie "sprawcy" zostało użyte w najszerszym możliwym znaczeniu i w oderwaniu od zasad odpowiedzialności karnej przewidzianych w SMTK, co przesądza, że preambuła nie może posłużyć do dalszych rozważań. Jedynie na marginesie można zauważyć, że mogłaby ona 6 B. Burghardt, Modes of Participation…, op.cit.; S. Eldar, Indirect Co-Perpetration,

Resumen
A 15 años de la entrada en vigor del Estatuto de Roma, es mucho lo que se ha debatido sobre la efectividad de la Corte Penal Internacional. En este trabajo examinamos el principio rector del Sistema Penal Internacional y la forma como éste ha funcionado, para bien o para mal, durante los últimos 15 años. Buscamos comprender por qué ciertas opciones para el ejercicio de la Complementariedad, como la noción de complementariedad proactiva, no ejercen la presión esperada sobre los responsables de crímenes de la competencia de la Corte, ni sobre los Estados que los esconden o protegen.

Abstract
Fifteen years after the Rome Statute’s entry into force, there has been much debate about the International Criminal Court’s effectivity. In this article, we examine the International Criminal System’s guiding principle, and how it has worked –for or against the system- in the past 15 years. We attempt to understand why certain options to the enforcement of Complementarity, such as the notion of proactive complementarity, fail to exert the expected pressure upon perpetrators of crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction, or the States which hide or protect them.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, the global human rights movement embarked on a major shift in its agenda and priorities. From the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, human rights groups tended to direct their advocacy in opposition to State criminalization of political activity and abuses within domestic criminal justice systems. The primary tactic was naming and shaming; the principal target was the State. From at least the early 1990s, however, the human rights movement underwent a “criminal turn,” increasingly directing its resources towards the promotion of criminal prosecution as an indispensable requirement for securing justice, peace and truth in the aftermath of mass atrocity situations. Under the banner of “ending impunity,” the primary tactic became the promotion of criminal accountability before domestic and international courts; the principal target was the individual.

Now, almost two decades into the twenty-first century, the correspondence between criminal prosecution and human rights has become so entrenched that to be anti-criminal prosecution is increasingly viewed as anti-human rights.

It is this turn towards an anti-impunity norm that forms the focus of a stimulating new collection co-edited by Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller and D.M. Davis: Anti-Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda. Arriving at a time when the international criminal justice project is increasingly under scrutiny and a surge in divisive and isolationist populism has put many in the human rights community on the defensive, this collection offers a timely problematization of the anti-impunity agenda that has come to dominate human rights thinking over the past two decades.

This article seeks to bring the often-invisible labor of interpreters and language assistants at the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia into sharper focus. I highlight the far-reaching and extensive tasks of language workers, paying particular attention to their efforts to negotiate and mediate witnesses’ accounts of atrocity, including sexualized violence, inside and outside international courtrooms. In doing so, I illustrate how language work is central to the life of an international court and the vision of international criminal accountability. I argue that attention to the dynamics of language work provides opportunities to consider the project of international criminal justice in new and important ways, focusing on its practical work, its social encounters and its complex engagement with relations of difference.

The article examines whether the ICC's jurisprudence on sentencing subverts or adopts a victim-oriented justice and whether the Chambers' discourses are consistent with the Rome Statute's legislative history. It argues that this legislative history is an instructive reflection of the drafters' goals regarding victims' rights and justice. A doctrinal review of the court's Preparatory Works and sentencing jurisprudence reveals a potential for a victim-oriented approach to justice. This article thus advances a theory of justice for victims during the court's sentencing practice. Ultimately, it has implications for our understanding of substantive rights of victims, beyond the procedural notions of international criminal justice.

Barrie Sander continues our symposium on the trial of Dominic Ongwen and the prosecution (or in this case, defence) of former child soldiers. Barrie is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID). His research focuses on conceptions of justice and the construction of historical narratives in international criminal courts. Barrie is also a regular contributor to JiC. You can find his other posts here. This symposium was inspired by Barrie's efforts to start a debate and dialogue on the issues and dilemmas raised by the Ongwen trial.

This article discusses the challenges posed by the scope and volume of the evidential record to fact-finding and the presentation of cases in international criminal trials. To this end, it introduces a modified version of a technique first developed by John Henry Wigmore at the start of the 20th century, which provides a device for mapping complex arguments based on mixed masses of evidence. The potential benefits of the method to both lawyers and judges are illustrated with examples from international criminal trials. This discussion is timely, given a recent debate that has arisen in international criminal law on the analysis of evidence in general, and the standard of proof to be applied to individual facts in particular. The article concludes by offering some observations on that debate and arguing in favour of a method that might be seen as excessively fragmentary to some, but ultimately enables a rigorous analysis of the arguments that support or weaken conclusions on the guilt or innocence of the accused.

While fulfilling their monitoring and adjudicatory functions, international human rights (HR) institutions are increasingly confronted with situations of armed conflict characterized by lack of oversight by domestic authorities. In some instances, fact-finding hearings and on-the-spot investigations conducted by HR mechanisms have made a considerable contribution towards dispelling the factual uncertainties that usually shroud the conduct of military operations, during which violations of the 'Hague law' are allegedly committed. The aim of international HR procedures is not to judge the guilt or innocence of individuals. Accordingly, they adopt standards of proof less rigorous than those used in criminal proceedings, such that their findings cannot be regarded as proof of individual culpability. Notwithstanding, HR investigations can produce a collection of accurate information, which can pave the way for subsequent criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment of responsible individuals.

Affective witnessing in the courtroom does not denote a specific mode of giving testimony. I rather argue that courtroom witnessing is always affective. The use of emotional displays plays an important role in processes of witnessing, but their absence does not indicate the absence of affective dynamics. The performance of emotion is rather one mode among others to shape the affective arrangement of the courtroom. Witnesses, be they human or non-human bodies, have performative power not by the ‘credibility points’ they accumulate as individual entities, but with respect to the relational position they occupy inside an affective arrangement. Actors in the courtroom compete with each other by attempting to introduce bodies as witnesses and to relate and position them in specific ways. The degree to which they are able to manipulate the affective arrangement to their advantage determines their chances to successfully establish a version of the past they desire.

Man möchte es nicht glauben, doch ist all das Schreckliche, was Mächtige dieser Welt im Zeitraum von nur 100 Jahren angerichtet haben, nichts als nackte Realität. Die Autoren der „Gesichter des Bösen“ gelangen zu einem traurigen Schluss: Die Bilanz des 20. Jahrhunderts, das auf vielen Gebieten enormen technischen Fortschritt gebracht hat, ist erschreckend. Die schlimmsten Verbrecher samt ihren Untaten gegen die Menschlichkeit sind in einer „Schandhalle des Bösen“ versammelt und beschrieben: 168 Männer, bekannte und unbekannte, unter ihnen Diktatoren, Regierungschefs, Massenmörder, Staatsverbrecher, Revoluzzer, Großgangster aus der Mafia. Kein genozidaler Vorgang ist übersehen oder aus irgendwelchen Vorurteilen oder Verschiedenheiten weginterpretiert. Zahlreiche Fotos und Texte aus dem Umfeld der Gegner von Völkermord und Kriegsverbrechen dokumentieren den Widerstand gegen Beutegier, Ausrottungsorgien und Terrorismus.
Ist der Mensch fähig, aus der Geschichte zu lernen? Es gibt einen bedeutsamen Anfang, der, wenn auch eher einem Rinnsal als einem mächtigen Strom gleichend, einen Hoffnungsschimmer bereithält. „Es stimmt nicht mehr“, so Heribert Prantl in seinem Geleitwort, „dass Macht, finanzielle und politische Macht, vor Recht geht. Dieses Bewusstsein hilft einem, die bittere und notwendige Lektüre des Buches über die ‚Gesichter des Bösen‘ zu ertragen. Das Buch macht den Leser zu einem glühenden Anhänger der Weltstrafjustiz.“

Il presente lavoro si concentra sulla partecipazione delle vittime nel procedimento di fronte alla International Criminal Court. L'argomento oggi riveste una particolare rilevanza nell'ambito della giustizia internazionale che, già durante il XX secolo, aveva iniziato a manifestare la volontà di condannare gli atroci crimini commessi. È però evidente la marginalizzazione della vittima nelle esperienze dei Tribunali internazionali, basti pensare ai Tribunali di Norimberga e di Tokyo, ed anche ai successivi Tribunali ad hoc. Il riconoscimento dei diritti delle persone, in particolare delle vittime, è oggi considerato incontestabile; differentemente la loro ammissione al procedimento ha riscontrato forti difficoltà ed è trascurato che la tutela dei diritti sostanziali si realizza attraverso la concreta attuazione di quelli processuali. La giustizia internazionale tradizionalmente non ha dato voce ai bisogni delle vittime, limitandosi a perseguire obiettivi punitivi. In questo panorama l'International Criminal Court ha adottato un diverso approccio, riconoscendo loro i diritti di protezione, partecipazione e riparazione 1. La Corte ha reso evidente così il passaggio da una giustizia punitiva ad una victim­ oriented. È evidente infine che l'evoluzione è ancora in corso, la Corte stessa, dalla sua istituzione, è in continua ricerca dell'equilibrio fra i diversi interessi nel procedimento, fra i quali anche quelli delle vittime.

This report was issued Jan. 28, 2016 and contains the first published mapping of mass graves of Yazidis killed in Sinjar, Iraq during the Yazidi Genocide of 2014. The report was written by Matthew Barber (then Executive Director of Yazda Iraq) with research data procured by Yazda's genocide documentation team (led by Andrew Slater and Ali Khalaf). The report was released in conjunction with a statement from Human Rights Watch:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/30/iraq-protect-mass-graves

This essay considers recent debates about an alleged anti-Africa bias at the International Criminal Court and the announced withdrawal of several African states. It looks at international lawyers' responses to these developments, considering some of the common defences against charges of bias, before suggesting that the African-bias debate in fact distracts from more fundamental problems with the ICC.

This chapter seeks to explain why states that are at significant risk of having their nationals commit crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction might nonetheless join the Court. It seeks to craft a theory of joining the ICC as being in the national interest of those states, by focusing on complementarity. Joining the ICC can be seen as part of a process of constitutionalization of certain norms, and the international anchoring of an inter-temporal commitment. The article draws on Jon Elster's paradoxes of rationality, and particularly the reinterpretation of the mythology of Ulysses and the sirens.

Постановка проблеми. Система міжнародного кримінального судочинства характеризується постійним прогресивним розвитком. Виникають нові інституційні органи, серед яких все більш помітними стають адвокатські об'єднання. З числа діючих в наш час міжнародних кримінальних судів та трибуналів найбільш цікавими для аналізу є адвокатські об'єднання у Міжнародному кримінальному суді (далі -МКС). Оскільки суд є єдиним постійно діючим міжнародним кримінальним судовим органом, вимоги до кандидатів у члени його адвокатських об'єднань є найбільш жорсткими, а отже, адвокатські об'єднання МКС мають найбільші шанси в подальшому стати центром міжнародної адвокатури.

The indeterminacy of international law rarely works in favour of the peoples of the global South. Ambiguities and uncertainties are invariably resolved by resort to broader legal principles, policy goals or social contexts that have most often been shaped by colonial views of the world and their supporting conceptual apparatuses. The glimmer of hope presented in the wake of Third World decolonisation by an international law that seemed to offer the prospect of a realignment of the global balance of power and the possibility of a new international economic order has long been extinguished. Despite this, nations that were on the wrong side of imperial history remain unwilling to depart the arena of international law, retaining a belief in its transformative potential and in the ideal of law as a means of constraining, if not subverting, the hegemony of empire. The promise of the International Criminal Court in this regard lies in its global potential. By virtue of its mere existence, the Court alters the dynamics of international relations and sounds a warning signal that no Colonel, Comrade or Commander-in-Chief remains impervious. At the same time, however, the reality is that all international legal institutions are intensely political actors. The International Criminal Court is no different. It can be understood as a site of meta-conflict, where conflict over the nature of a given conflict plays out, and inevitably some particular narrative is endorsed and consolidated at the expense of others. What that narrative will be often depends less on the law than on the socio-political context. The premise that international criminal justice can fully transcend international politics is a false one – it is inherently political. The International Criminal Court in both its constitution (its relationship with the Security Council, for example) and its functioning (the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, for example) essentially serves to implement a form of foreign policy. The Office of the Prosecutor’s decision of April 2012 – to eschew a functional approach to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute and decline jurisdiction over alleged international crimes committed in Palestine – is read in this light. The effect, despite widespread recognition of Palestine and its admission as a member state of UNESCO, is a continuing exclusion of the Palestinians from the mechanisms of international justice.

Allegations of criminal conduct have been made against UN peacekeeping personnel. While only a small number commit criminal offences, these personnel must be held accountable for their actions. Ensuring accountability is difficult due to jurisdictional issues, including in which jurisdiction (host state, sending state, or third state) to prosecute offenders. However, the possibility of the International Criminal Court exercising jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel (civilian or military) has not really been considered. This article will examine the potential applicability of the substantive law of war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute to crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel.

Article 17(1)(d) requires the Court to assess as an admissibility threshold whether a case is of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. What remains uncertain is whether the additional threshold is absolute or relative. The combination of flexibility of criteria and interpretive autonomy to define the concept of gravity enable the Prosecutor to assert a significant degree of discretion in her proprio motu decision-making.
The Court can only exercise a fairly limited review of these decisions, and so the scope of PTC review preserves significant space for the Prosecutor to deploy discretion through the gravity determination

Transnational and international criminal law are bodies of law regulating cooperation between States, as well as between States and various institutions of international criminal justice, in the prevention, prosecution and punishment of individuals for transnational and international crimes. Ever since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the Second World War, both transnational and international criminal law developed into full-scale branches of law dealing with the substantive and procedural aspects of combating such crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other international and transnational crimes. The penalisation of the crime of aggression has been relatively less successful. In 2002, a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was established but it does not yet enjoy universal support, and alternative regional formats such as the Malabo Protocol are contemplated. With due regard to the principle of complementarity, the indirect enforcement of international criminal law and transitional justice mechanisms will remain continually significant.

This article is about a relatively new version of the ‘emerging’ jus post bellum concept. It asks whether the jus post bellum as ‘integrity’ is useful as a normative guide in the interpretation of international criminal law during transitions when the requirements of international criminal law are ambiguous or unclear. It develops the main elements of the jus post bellum as integrity as an analytical framework. It then evaluates the theoretical and practical application of the concept in relation to the task of the International Criminal Court in evaluating the ‘alternative sentences’ regime in Colombia. It argues that a Dworkinian approach to international criminal law must make certain assumptions about the international legal order which are difficult to sustain. The difficulties discussed here are related to the structural conditions needed for a ‘community of principle’ to arise in Dworkin’s theory. The article demonstrates that the jus post bellum as integrity may be useful for identifying the principles of international criminal law that should apply to states in transition from conflict to peace. However, despite its usefulness, the concept is susceptible to the usual arguments against adopting ‘natural law’ constructions in international legal method (and post-conflict law).

This chapter presents a framework for understanding how international courts (ICs) use socialization strategies to influence their performance. ICs can influence both their actual and perceived performance through internal and external socialization strategies. ICs can aim to improve their actual performance by socializing actors into ICs’ norms, rules, and procedures, and essentially clarifying their appropriate roles within international courts’ legal regimes. Internally, ICs improve their actual performance by socializing their judges and administrative officials into ICs’ norms, rules, and procedures. In addition, various dimensions of ICs’ actual performance are contingent on other actors’ behaviour within ICs’ legal regimes. ICs can therefore use external socialization strategies to align these actors’ standards of legitimate, appropriate behaviour with ICs’ norms, rules, and procedures, and thus improve ICs’ actual performance. ICs’ external socialization strategies can also be directed towards influencing actors’ perceptions of IC performance. As perceptions of performance are highly subjective and vary considerably among ICs’ various stakeholders, ICs can influence their perceived performance by disseminating particular normative standards for evaluating their performance. A comparative analysis of all twenty-three permanent, operational ICs reveals the prevalence of and variation in ICs’ internal and external socialization strategies, which influence ICs’ actual and perceived performance. Socialization is thus a key means by which ICs aim to improve various dimensions of their performance, as well as their stakeholders’ perceptions of it.