International Alliances

The paper intends to explain the Saudi alignment choices, either with US, or China, by utilising the literature on the alliance management. The paper assumes that the multipolar moment provided Saudi Arabia with the ability to choose, whether to align itself with US through a defence pact, or to continue the current strategic partnership with China. The paper shall differentiate between alliance and strategic partnership, and then utilise the theoretical framework presented by Goh and Sahshi to analyse alliance management. In addition, Saudi relations with both US and China is going to be assessed critically, referring to the most recent issues impacting the bilateral arrangements. Finally, the paper will attempt to pinpoint the factors that might push Riyadh to align with either of these two countries.

PurposeThe digitalization of an organization implies centralizing the data collected. Nevertheless, the management of customer data in franchise networks is a delicate, complicated and little studied issue. The purpose of this paper is to investigate its challenges and the keys to success, by developing a conceptual framework resulting from a qualitative study and a literature review.Design/methodology/approachA qualitative study was carried out with around 30 franchisors, franchisees and franchise experts in the light of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The results of the qualitative study helped to clarify our theoretical framework and to position ourselves on the side of the founding theories of relationship marketing. A research model was then defined and tested using a quantitative survey administered to a total sample of 192 franchisors and franchisees.FindingsThe results of the various studies show that relationship quality, through inter-organizational commitme...

Bu calismada; G.W. Bush doneminin 2002, 2006, Obama doneminin 2010 tarihli ABD Ulusal Guvenlik Stratejisi belgelerinin baskan imzali “Beyaz Saray” baslikli bolumlerinin soylemleri, Soguk Savas sonrasi gelisen guvenlik kavrami ve ulusotesi-transnasyonel tehditler baglaminda, Walt’un ittifak teorisi cercevesinde analiz edilmeye calisilmaktadir. 2002 ABD Ulusal Guvenlik Stratejisi’ndeki tehdit algisinin terorizm temelli oldugu, tek tarafli ABD mudahaleleriyle dengelenebilecegi, soz konusu tehdit algisi ile ABD’nin dunya capinda buyuk bir hareket serbestisi elde edecegi ve uluslararasi toplumun bunu mesru gormesi gerektigine dayanan bir soylem uzerine kuruldugu tespit edilmistir. Bu soylem Buzan’in guvenligin “guc kullanilmasini mesrulastirma”da

Истраживач приправник, Институт за политичке студије, Београд ** Рад је настао у оквиру научног пројекта "Демократски и национални капа цитети политичких институција Србије у процесу међународних интегра ција", бр. 179009, који финансира Министарство просвете, науке и техно лошког развоја Републике Србије. Младен Лишанин * МЕЂУНАРОДНИ СИСТЕМ, САВЕЗИ И ИЗБИЈАЊЕ ПРВОГ СВЕТСКОГ РАТА **

The historiography of both Romania and Belgium has insuciently examined the
economic relations between the two countries during the post-war period. This article
aims to provide an analysis of the eorts undertaken by Romania and Belgium to
establish new economic treaties, despite facing signicant political and social challenges.
Ocial visits by ministers and various secondary political gures, including senators
and mayors from both nations, played a crucial role in enhancing bilateral trade
exchanges. The economic policies of the Benelux Union—comprising Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg—tended to favor a trade balance that was advantageous to
Belgium, placing the Socialist Republic of Romania at a consistent disadvantage.
Nonetheless, Romania's strategic and economic interests compelled it to maintain and
pursue economic relations with the Kingdom of Belgium.

Although social interactions and exchanges between partners are emphasized as imperative for alliance success, comprehensive examination of how social exchanges facilitate learning and knowledge transfer in strategic alliances is lacking. Drawing on social exchange theory, we examined the effects of social exchange processes between alliance partners on the extent of learning and knowledge transfer in a strategic alliance. An empirical examination of data collected from alliance managers of 144 strategic alliances revealed that social exchanges such as reciprocal commitment, trust, and mutual influence between partners are positively related to learning and knowledge transfer in strategic alliances.

Following the collapse of the old communist regimes, 28 post-communist
countries chose from among three main foreign security arrangements:
commonwealth of independent states (CIS)/collective security treaty
organization (CSTO) membership, north atlantic treaty organization
(NATO) membership, or neutrality. What explains these choices? We are
most interested theoretically in the role played by regime type. The alliances literature typically uses a narrow institutional theory of the effects of regime type, which implies that more democratic regimes are more attractive alliance partners than more authoritarian regimes. Post-communist area specialists will be aware that this institutional theory fails to explain the apparent tendency of more authoritarian post-communist regimes to join the CIS/CSTO. We develop a broader ideological theory of how regime type affects alliances, in which political institutions are complemented by substantive ideological and policy goals. Applying the ideological approach to the post-communist world, we define and measure two main ideological regime types – liberal nationalist regimes and neo-communist authoritarian regimes. Multinomial logit regressions indicate that more democratic, liberal nationalist regimes are more likely to affiliate with NATO, whereas more authoritarian, neocommunist regimes are more likely to join the CIS/CSTO. Moreover, the desire of neo-communist authoritarianism regimes to affiliate with the CIS/CSTO is as strong or stronger than that of neo-liberal democracies to affiliate with NATO – largely because NATO is more reluctant than Russia to accept aspirants. We conclude that the ideological approach to regime type may offer significant explanatory value as a refinement of the institutional approach.

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon

The extremely tense Romanian-Soviet relations after April 1964 would deteriorate even more during Mikhail S. Gorbachev‘s mandate. The leaders of Kremlin criticised Nicolae Ceaușescu and, at the same time, could not forgive him for his ambition and his demonstrative flirting with the West. Speaking about Nicolae Ceaușescu, Mikhail S. Gorbachev stated that after August 21, 1968, he began to distance himself from the Soviet Union and to emphasize his demand for Romania's independence and sovereignty to be respected in every way possible, so that this basic demand in itself, repeated on every occasion and even without reason, turned into a kind of incantation that brought with it doubled dividends. Nicolae Ceaușescu and socialist Romania proved to be the stumbling block in the process of reforming and restructuring the strategic glacis of the USSR, reforming socialism and trying to bestow a new perspective on an ideology that proved to be failing.

Abstract
Although social interactions and exchanges between partners are emphasized as imperative for alliance success, comprehensive examination of how social exchanges facilitate learning and knowledge transfer in strategic alliances is lacking. Drawing on social exchange theory, we examined the effects of social exchange processes between alliance partners on the extent of learning and knowledge transfer in a strategic alliance. An empirical examination of data collected from alliance managers of 144 strategic alliances revealed that social exchanges such as reciprocal commitment, trust, and mutual influence between partners are positively related to learning and knowledge transfer in strategic alliances.

This article argues that NATO's current burden-sharing regime, which I term the proportional model of NATO burden-sharing and which obligates each NATO member to allocate at least 2 percent of its GDP to defence, is deeply flawed from a purely ethical standpoint. This is because the proportional model omits from its approach to distributing the burdens of collective defence two morally relevant ally-level characteristics: namely, individual level of economic development and individual level of external threat. The model therefore treats unfairly both those allies characterised by especially low levels of economic development and those allies characterised by especially high levels of external threat, relative in each case to the alliance-wide average. The article argues that the proportional model should be replaced by that I term the prioritarian model of NATO burden-sharing, which is grounded in the normative theory of prioritarianism from the distributive justice literature. The prioritarian model would morally improve upon the proportional model by incorporating the aforementioned two ally-level characteristics (level of economic development and level of external threat) into its burden-sharing system in the form of two action-guiding prescriptions. The prioritarian model is therefore the fairer of the two models and consequently should be adopted by NATO.

After a period of relative overperformance due to the focus on output indicators in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) burden-sharing debate, we ask whether the shift back to input indicators prior to the Ukraine War meant that the smaller NATO allies have returned to their fringe position as NATO underperformers. According to the deterrence model, smaller allies are induced to free ride to a higher degree than mid-sized allies. Utilizing insights from public choice theory, our analysis demonstrates, first, that there is no support to the claim that the size of NATO member state GDP determines the percentage of GDP spent on defence. Second, selective incentives tend to reduce the incentive for small allies to free ride. The relationship between GDP and the percentage of GDP spent on defence capabilities is therefore conditional upon the net gain of the individual member state. Defence capabilities that are characterized as a public good when we control for exposed borde...

Decision making about the structure of strategic alliances, beside the decision about goal and scope of alliance and decision about partner selection, is one of the three fundamental questions that should be addressed to form successful strategic alliances. It is believed successful alliances must accomplish two goals which both of them are related to alliance structure: coordinate the optimal combination of productive resources across parties and mitigate the risks of opportunistic behavior. Literature review reveals scattered and sometimes contradictory findings about structural framework of strategic alliances. Hence, current research is tried to provide a concluding remark of effecting factors on choosing between contractual-based and trust-based structural frameworks of strategic alliances with meta-analytics method. After reviewing and filtering of 516 scholarly papers which published in reputed scholarly international journal in a 15-year period (2002-2017), thirty-eight papers were put in meta-analytics process and twenty-four factors were identified. Findings from these meta-analytics showed that optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms in an alliance is contingent, and contractual-based and trust-based frameworks are complementary governance. It also showed that legal safeguard, legal system, trust, formal control and opportunism have the most effect and shared governance mechanisms has the least effect on decision about choosing between the structural frameworks of strategic alliances, among others.

After a period of relative overperformance due to the focus on output indicators in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) burden-sharing debate, we ask whether the shift back to input indicators prior to the Ukraine War meant that the smaller NATO allies have returned to their fringe position as NATO underperformers. According to the deterrence model, smaller allies are induced to free ride to a higher degree than mid-sized allies. Utilizing insights from public choice theory, our analysis demonstrates, first, that there is no support to the claim that the size of NATO member state GDP determines the percentage of GDP spent on defence. Second, selective incentives tend to reduce the incentive for small allies to free ride. The relationship between GDP and the percentage of GDP spent on defence capabilities is therefore conditional upon the net gain of the individual member state. Defence capabilities that are characterized as a public good when we control for exposed borde...

Imagining war scenarios between south American nations is a complex exercise. The war was never, in this continent, "politics by others means", as Clausewitz claimed. However, in the past ten years, the attitude of south American countries towards defense and security invites to reflect on priorities just at a time when south America seeks more autonomy and undertakes new processes of regional integration. The tensions between countries like Colombia and venezuela are an example of the existing fragility in intercontinental relations. Democracy is not the only condition to guarantee peace, and regional actors have an important role in the diplomatic stage to advance towards the elimination of war as an alternative for conflict-resolution and to make possible the reduction of defense budgets, with savings redirected to other sectors.

India has adopted the Indo-Pacific concept with uncharacteristic speed. This article examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, which evolved out of its earlier ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’ policies but is much more focused on strategic concerns than on trade or connectivity. As such, the strategy is subset of its China policy, and includes contradictory elements of balancing China by building partnerships with the United States as well as with regional powers, while simultaneously pursuing a reassurance strategy to convince Beijing that India is not really balancing China. The combination of these contradictory elements is characterized as evasive balancing, which is a more useful concept than either pure balancing or hedging for understanding the policies of India and of many other countries in the region that are trying to manage China's rise. However, reassurance strategies rarely work and the combination of balancing and reassurance is even less likely to be viable.

Over the past decade, India's focus on the Indo-Pacific has increased dramatically. New Delhi has built or upgraded existing strategic partnerships with a number of key actors in the region, and has embraced the new 'Indo-Pacific' concept with uncharacteristic speed. At the same time, India's objectives and strategy have been left unclarified. While the original 'Look East' policy, launched in 1991, appeared to be focused on the pursuit of economic growth by slipstreaming behind the dynamic economies in southeast Asia, strategic concerns occasioned by China's rise eventually became an important consideration. India's Indo-Pacific strategy has now become, in the main, a subset of its China policy, with other elements fading into the background. But contradictions also abound. The Indian government is loath to admit that China is the main driver of its Indo-Pacific policy, and indeed actively discourages any such idea-even while its actions and words, especially its increasingly close strategic relationships with the United States and its allies, such as Japan, suggest that very interpretation. 1 As Rajesh Basrur points out, India's 'relationships with the US and Japan are clearly a response to the rise of China, though policy-makers are predictably chary of saying as much'. 2 Equally, India also periodically seeks accommodation with China, further clouding the logic of its policy. It is not just India, of course, that is attempting to fashion a complicated mix of policies to deal with China's rise and its consequences for the region, and finding the process fraught with contradiction. 3 Most of China's other neighbours are also engaged in similar efforts. There is little consensus in the theoretical literature about how to characterize these policies, many scholars describing them as 'hedging' while others insist that most states are actually balancing. 4 I argue that * This article is part of the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs on 'Unpacking the strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific', guest-edited by Kai He and Mingjiang Li.

Este trabajo aporta algunas reflexiones sobre la Defensa en el marco del CDS y la Unasur. El Consejo busca el fortalecimiento de la unidad latinoamericana y su consolidación como región de paz, para lo cual se ha propuesto construir una visión estratégica común, algo impensable hasta hace unos pocos años, cuando el dominio de EEUU en cuestiones militares era absoluto, con la excepción de Cuba. El advenimiento de gobiernos populares posibilitó la construcción de estos espacios institucionales interestatales. Sin embargo, el estancamiento o retroceso de algunos gobiernos, ha dado lugar a cierto empate catastrófico con las fuerzas sociales y políticas neoliberales, que abre un escenario de fuertes disputas al interior de estas herramientas creadas para la integración latinoamericana y para construir estrategias de defensa basadas en la soberanía política, económica y social.

The theory of alliances allows us to understand the nature and the functioning of alliances, particularly NATO and its recent evolution. However, NATO remains a unique and specific example and the studies applying the numerous hypotheses and conclusions of alliance theory to other organizations are rare. Consequently, this article tries to compare the characteristics of three organizations (ECOWAS, SADC and ASEAN) with NATO. These three organizations are not explicitly military alliances and their statutes and missions are less precise and less defined than those of NATO. Indeed, they can pursue economic objectives, as for example, economic development. An analysis of data from these four organizations allows us to compare the similarities and the differences between these organizations according to their fundamental objectives and purposes.

Many commentators refer to the U.S. overseas network of military installations as an “empire,” yet very few have examined the theoretical and practical significance of such an analogy. This article explores the similarities and differences between the basing network and imperial systems. We argue that American basing practices and relations combine elements of liberal multilateralism with “neo-imperial” hegemony. Much, but far from all, of the network shares with ideal-typical empires a hub-and-spoke system of unequal relations among the United States and its base-host country “peripheries.” But Washington rarely exercises rule over host-country leaders and their constituents. Historical examples suggest that this combination of imperial and non-imperial elements has rendered the United States vulnerable to political cross-pressures, intermediary exits, and periodic bargaining failures when dealing with overseas base hosts. Moreover, globalizing processes, especially increasing info...

The importance of the development of the necessary technology to achieve the production of vaccines from a “synthetic biology”
perspective is analyzed, as well as the essential articulation and financing through international cooperation to combat COVID-19,
all the information on this topic is from the bibliographical research on topics focused on the development, cooperation, and international
regulations involved in the synthesis of COVID-19 vaccines. A comprehensive vision on the recent development strategies on
health and bioeconomy issues is proposed to face future eventualities and thus promote better health-oriented developments with the
possibilities of immediate action.

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The theory of alliances allows us to understand the nature and the functioning of alliances, particularly NATO and its recent evolution. However, NATO remains a unique and specific example and the studies applying the numerous hypotheses and conclusions of alliance theory to other organizations are rare. Consequently, this article tries to compare the characteristics of three organizations (ECOWAS, SADC and ASEAN) with NATO. These three organizations are not explicitly military alliances and their statutes and missions are less precise and less defined than those of NATO. Indeed, they can pursue economic objectives, as for example, economic development. An analysis of data from these four organizations allows us to compare the similarities and the differences between these organizations according to their fundamental objectives and purposes.

Nicaragua presenta altos niveles de inseguridad alimentaria y nutricional. Predomina la deficiencia proteico-energética y la carencia de nutrientes específicos y al mismo tiempo presenta la superposición epidemiológica-nutricional y la doble carga de riesgos para la salud. Faltan conocimientos para optimizar los escasos recursos para adquirir productos de mayor valor nutricional. El objetivo fue contribuir a reducir el hambre y la desnutrición y mejorar la alimentación y el estado nutricional de la población del municipio nicaragüense de Somotillo, a través de estrategias educativas difundidas por el medio radiofónico. Se ejecutó el programa “Por una mejor nutrición” en la radio (1 junio al 29 de julio, 2016) y se abordaron cuatro temas: conocimientos sobre alimentación saludable, higiene alimentaria, enfermedades asociadas a la malnutrición y alimentación del escolar y se acompañaron de tres cápsulas informativas cada uno, transmitidas 1v/s y 5v/s (8v/día), respectivamente, más una...

Dados Internacionais de Catalogação na Publicação (CIP) ___________________________________________________________________________ C395 Cenários contemporâneos no âmbito da governança global: políticas nacionais e internacionais de enfrentamento da crise em perspectiva comparada. Gabriel Rached, Rafaela Mello Rodrigues de Sá-organizadores. São Paulo: Pimenta Cultural, 2022. 445p..

The theory of alliances allows us to understand the nature and the functioning of alliances, particularly NATO and its recent evolution. However, NATO remains a unique and specific example and the studies applying the numerous hypotheses and conclusions of alliance theory to other organizations are rare. Consequently, this article tries to compare the characteristics of three organizations (ECOWAS, SADC and ASEAN) with NATO. These three organizations are not explicitly military alliances and their statutes and missions are less precise and less defined than those of NATO. Indeed, they can pursue economic objectives, as for example, economic development. An analysis of data from these four organizations allows us to compare the similarities and the differences between these organizations according to their fundamental objectives and purposes.

The theory of alliances allows us to understand the nature and the functioning of alliances, particularly NATO and its recent evolution. However, NATO remains a unique and specific example and the studies applying the numerous hypotheses and conclusions of alliance theory to other organizations are rare. Consequently, this article tries to compare the characteristics of three organizations (ECOWAS, SADC and ASEAN) with NATO. These three organizations are not explicitly military alliances and their statutes and missions are less precise and less defined than those of NATO. Indeed, they can pursue economic objectives, as for example, economic development. An analysis of data from these four organizations allows us to compare the similarities and the differences between these organizations according to their fundamental objectives and purposes.

The move towards a common European defence policy raises a multitude of multidimensional and complex issues. As pointed out in a recent paper (Hartley, 2003), among then is that of its economics aspects ranging from the role of the European defence industrial base to the ...

El Consejo ha establecido como objetivos centrales el fortalecimiento de la unidad latinoamericana y su consolidación como región de paz, para lo cual se ha propuesto construir una visión estratégica común, algo impensable hasta hace unos pocos años, cuando el dominio que Estados Unidos ejercía en las cuestiones militares de este continente era absoluto, con la excepción de Cuba. El advenimiento de gobiernos populares en buena parte de nuestra región en las últimas décadas, posibilitó la construcción de estos espacios institucionales interestatales. Sin embargo el estancamiento o retroceso de algunos de esos gobiernos, ha dado lugar a cierto empate catastrófico-para utilizar palabras de Álvaro García Linera-con las fuerzas sociales y políticas neoliberales, que abre un escenario de fuertes disputas al interior de estas herramientas creadas para la integración latinoamericana y para construir estrategias de defensa basadas en la soberanía política, económica y social.

Palabras previas Desde el año 2008, cuando se fundan las bases del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS) de la UNASUR, han surgido en la región un sinnúmero de interrogantes acerca de sus perspectivas futuras y en algunos sectores ha despertado diversos grados de entusiasmo. Esto ocurre debido a que en Latinoamérica no existe un referente eficaz que se aboque a los temas de la defensa y seguridad, los cuales indudablemente han ido alcanzando creciente relevancia en los últimos tiempos. Sin lugar a dudas, fundar las bases de una futura "OTAN latinoamericana" es un anhelo por parte de quienes ven en la región la capacidad de tener independencia, autonomía y la posibilidad de ocupar en el mundo un lugar superior al actual. 1 Como podemos comprobar, se han creado y dado forma institucional a muchas iniciativas destinadas a reunir países, ya sea por zonas geográficas o intereses afines. Esta actitud no es otra cosa que la más clara demostración de la insatisfacción que se percibe con las organizaciones formales ya existentes. De lo contrario, los países no buscarían estas múltiples formas para reunirse en paralelo con las estructuras institucionalizadas. Por de pronto, si este CDS se constituye en una iniciativa para tener una nueva plataforma política para entenderse y conversar ya es positivo y no hay nada más que alabarlo y felicitarlo. Por el contrario, si se espera que de aquí emerja una institución ESTUDIOS 193 * Profesor en el Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos de Defensa en Washington DC. Se hace presente que las opiniones vertidas en este artículo son absolutamente personales y no representan necesariamente a ningún organismo o país donde yo ejerza mi actividad profesional. 1 El CDS es un organismo solo consultivo, de cooperación y coordinación en temas de defensa según lo estipulan claramente sus estatutos. Se hace presente que Brasil ha señalado en diversas oportunidades que no es la idea organizar una alianza militar regional, tipo OTAN.

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon

This paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances. The first view, associated with Olson and Zeckhauser, argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members, which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members. A second view argues that NATO defense activities produce a mix of outputs, some of which are not purely public, and some of which may be complementary across nations. Furthermore, the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies. The test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of NATO members and their population and relative wealth shares. A simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data. The empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships th...

El término era de las transiciones, acuñado por Newt Gingrich en 2000, denota en su sentido original la revolución tecnológica que conduce a la fusión y convergencia de los mundos biofísico, humano y tecnológico. Este artículo retoma y amplía el concepto a fin de proponer que la actual era, la cual se manifiesta como una transición geopolítica, un cambio sistémico y una crisis civilizacional, va acercándose gradualmente a una real y efectiva confrontación hegemónica. Sus actores geoestratégicos principales son Estados Unidos y China por gozar de mayores capacidades, voluntad política y dinamismo. Al analizar la interacción entre ambos, guiados por sus respectivos imperativos geopolíticos en términos de competencia geoestratégica —en especial, por la inteligencia artificial y los recursos naturales estratégicos—, este artículo expone cómo dicha competencia ha ido dando forma a una nueva estructura internacional enmarcada en las dos megatendencias globales de nuestro tiempo: la cuarta revolución industrial y la crisis ecológica. Aunque el concepto de Gingrich no incluye este último factor, este texto considera que la crisis ecológica es el signo definitorio de nuestra era que revela las vulnerabilidades de ambas potencias en cuanto a sus biocapacidades. Partiendo del entorno geoestratégico que se describe y desde la perspectiva de un neorrealismo ecológico, este artículo busca responder la pregunta ¿qué debe hacer Colombia para lograr un mejor posicionamiento en el sistema internacional en el transcurso de la próxima década? Finalmente, desde la perspectiva anunciada y en torno a las biocapacidades de Colombia, se proponen tres geoestrategias para ser implementadas en la presente transición. Esta es la contribución del presente artículo.

The burden-sharing debate has been a main issue for NATO since its creation. Even during the Cold War, the United States repeatedly demanded a more equal burden-sharing formula within NATO, although it never carried out its threats to disengage from the Alliance. Scholars have developed alliance models and collective-action theories to address the issue. Nonetheless, there are few dialogues between security and political economy perspectives. This article advances such discussion by proposing the incorporation of a bargaining conceptual framework since members of an alliance have to make decisions taking into account historical and geographic contingencies. Hence, it addresses the organization’s decision-making process and common budget as well NATO’s burden-sharing historical experience. Finally, it draws conclusions and raises problems concerning defense-burden in NATO and the future prospects of this debate within a changing geopolitical scenario.

“Hace poco hablé con las autoridades de Estados Unidos y les dije claramente que vamos a hacer lo que le interesa a Suramérica. No hay ninguna posibilidad de participación de EE.UU. porque el Consejo es suramericano y EE.UU. no está en Suramérica. No tenemos que pedir licencia a EE.UU.”

Nelson Jobim, ministro de Defensa de la República Federativa del Brasil.

La reconfiguración de la seguridad hemisférica tras el fin de la Guerra Fría y la caída del Muro de Berlín ha sido un proceso inestable. El período de un mundo bipolar Capitalismo vs. Comunismo dejó como resultado un concepto restrictivo de la seguridad, encaminado a la vigilancia y cuidado de un expansionismo ideológico comunista. En este contexto, los Estados suramericanos adoptaron como propias las políticas norteamericanas y lucharon internamente con los brotes comunistas que se manifestaban por medio de partidos políticos y grupos alzados en armas. Actualmente el giro a la izquierda de América Latina está avivado por discursos populistas que han creado nuevas dinámicas en la reconfiguración de la seguridad. La transición de una seguridad hemisférica que se limitaba a las políticas adoptadas por Washington pasó a proyectos para la articulación de ejércitos y fuerzas militares de la región. Hoy se ve una América Latina que se divide entre el Socialismo del siglo XXI y la lucha contra el terrorismo, lo que ha promovido la creación de un nuevo escenario, el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano.

This short commentary asks if Turkey and Qatar can become 'complementary nations' - a concept that was originally developed in Israeli policy circles in the 1950s vis-a-vis Turkey. Complementary nations make up for one another's qualitative and quantitative shortcomings. Are small and wealthy Qatar and sizeable Turkey with a particularly fragile economy indeed complementary nations?

Making credible commitments is a formidable problem for states in the anarchic international system.  There is a long-standing view that holds that this will be particularly true for democratic states in which changeable public preferences make it difficult for leaders to sustain commitments over time.  There are, however, a number of important elements in the values and institutions that have characterized the liberal democratic states that should enhance their ability to sustain international commitments.  The importance of these elements is confirmed if we examine the durability of international military alliances.  Alliances between democratic states have proven more durable than either alliances between non-democracies or between democracies and non-democracies.

This illustrated paper (in French) discusses the various functions of oath-taking during the late medieval and early modern periods. It deals with the need of any power to be legitimized by – reciprocal but vertically asymmetric – oaths of obedience, the very common form to organize protest and rebellion through – horizontal and equal – oaths of conspiracy and the very inversion of the oath by the alleged witches’ devilish pact. For the Swiss case, oath-taking gets a state-founding importance, as the Confederacy is not based on a divinely legitimated monarchical dynasty, but on the mutually sworn treaties of alliance.

Why do some bilateral relationships have the ability to become strong, stable and amicable but others do not even when they have incentive to develop higher resilience? This article proposes that perceived relational identity differences between two states, or otherness, shapes and limits resilience in their relationship. Drawing on the existing IR identity literature, the article develops a conceptual and operational definition of otherness and proposes a useful and replicable framework that can be used to capture the complexity of bilateral ties. The article illustrates this framework with two types of cases. First, two historical “least-likely” cases (Germany–Israel, 1949–1973; India–USSR, 1947–1970) of higher resilience, in which one would not expect the resilient relationships that developed. Second, a most likely contemporary mini-case (India–Israel 1992–2012), which uncovers lower than expected resilience. The article then concludes with the implications of this framework for further academic research and policy analysis.

This research considers why the U.S.A.’s promotion of democracy was successful in Georgia in 2003, but not in Azerbaijan. It looks at democracy promotion within the context of U.S. foreign policy priorities towards the region and each country – helping them become viable states, developing Caspian basin oil and gas, constructing export pipelines to bypass Russia and Iran, and, after 9/11, cooperating on security. The U.S. provided substantial democracy promotion assistance to Georgia, but was restricted in its aid to Azerbaijan until early 2002, a result of pressure from the Armenian lobby. Through comparative analysis the research identifies key similarities and differences in the political situation in Azerbaijan and Georgia before, during and after the respective elections in autumn 2003, and considers the significance of the U.S. role in supporting democracy to the election outcomes. It concludes that in Georgia U.S. diplomatic pressure and support for democracy, especially for free media and capacity building, were very influential, but perhaps not decisive, factors in the Rose Revolution. A weak government and president, a united opposition with a charismatic leader, and Russian neutrality were all crucial factors there. In Azerbaijan, the U.S.A.’s muted response to the election fraud may well have encouraged the regime in its crackdown on opposition and civil society. The “resource curse” theory helps to
shed light on the situation in both countries and the U.S. role. Oil revenues and the promise of vastly increased income in the near future were a powerful incentive for the Azerbaijani regime to unite behind the president’s son as successor and keep their grip on power. Pipeline and security interests, especially the prospect of a military base in Azerbaijan, meant the U.S. was keen to see stability in both countries – the best guarantor of that in Georgia was Mikheil Saakashvili, who went on to be democratically elected in 2004, while in Azerbaijan it was the dynastic regime of Ilham Aliyev.

Este artículo analiza las relaciones de China y Rusia con Venezuela. Si bien ambas potencias eurasiáticas muestran similitudes generales en los objetivos que las han llevado a cooperar con la Revolución Bolivariana, mantienen diferencias específicas en sus motivaciones. Ambos poderes juegan al viejo rol de equilibrador externo (offshore balancer) en la perferia de un rival común, Estados Unidos.

While the efforts of great powers to export their regimes to small states is well studied in the literature, the role of mass opinion in small states where great powers compete for influence remains under-theorized as a factor that can shape small state preferences over foreign alliances and policies. This paper investigates the causes of individual-level variation in foreign policy preferences toward major powers in small states with big neighbors. Using recent public opinion data from Georgia, we propose a conceptual framework based on three factors-political paternalism, economic status, and religiosity-to explain why some individuals in small states prefer closer ties with different major powers. We find support for all three factors influencing foreign policy attitudes toward Russia, but not America. As great powers continue to pursue policies that encourage their preferred political orders in small states, the analysis of foreign policy preferences in such states will become increasingly vital to our understanding of world politics. Russia's resurgence, including its ongoing intervention in Ukraine and its previous actions in Georgia and Moldova, sent a clear signal to all former Soviet Union member states that there will be deadly consequences, in addition to energy and economic sanctions, for turning away from Russia and pursuing closer ties with the West. The tepid US response to these crises has also made it obvious that the United States is unwilling to use military force against Russia to defend its interests in non-NATO countries, particularly those on Russia's periphery. Some have even called into question NATO's resolve to respond militarily in the event of a Russian invasion into NATO countries, chiefly the Baltics, which has recently engaged in a series of war games in anticipation of a potential Russian invasion.