Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Russia’s progressively evident anti-Western course (traceable to 1999) has turned the
Arctic region into a zone of confrontation – not a region of peace and partnership. Russia’s
relationship with the West is unlikely to improve, too, given Russia’s growing isolationism,
course on militarization, and petrification of the current political architecture, in which the
so-called “siloviki” faction is enjoying a privileged position. Indeed, if Russia achieves its
goals in Ukraine, the model of “Putinism” will outlive President Vladimir Putin and the
current political elite in power. At this juncture, new areas of tension and Russia
engineered local conflicts are likely to emerge. Russia will use conflicts and confrontation
with the West to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals and objectives. 

In addition to the Black and Baltic Sea regions, the Arctic might become an area where
Moscow could try to provoke Western allies. If this materializes, Russia is unlikely to push
for an all-out war that could lead to an open armed conflict with NATO. This said, Russia’s
behaviour will be contingent on the position of the US and, under certain circumstances,
key EU members. As such, Russia will instead pursue a strategy it successfully used in
Ukraine in 2014. Russia is most likely to combine informational confrontation, subversive
actions (spoofing and GPS jamming), provocations against critical infrastructure (cables),
artificially created “migrant crises,” and, in some circumstances, potentially its shadow
formations (members of irregular paramilitary groups) to destabilize the situation. 
From a military point of view, Russia currently dominates the Arctic region. Its post-2014
efforts aimed at achieving quantitative and qualitative superiority over Western countries
in the Arctic have brought success. In certain areas, such as military icebreakers and
military infrastructure, Russia’s capabilities are clearly towering above NATO as a whole,
much less its individual member states. However, post-2022 developments have clearly
weakened Russia, diminishing its economy and armed forces and worsening its already
negative demographic picture. These developments, in addition to Russia’s now reduced
access to Western technologies, could shift that balance of power, provided that the
Western alliance pursues consolidated actions aimed at constraining Russia’s militaristic
effort.Russia’s main concerns over Western efforts to regain initiative in the Arctic are related to
the development of anti-missile/aircraft capabilities, strengthening of cyber- and space
based operational capabilities, accretion of power in the domain of combat aviation, and
development of special forces capable of operating in the Arctic. 
In terms of non-conventional (“hybrid”) confrontation – and should a conflict in the Arctic
take place, it is mostly likely to take this form – Russia has multiple weaknesses. Unlike
in the West, the Arctic plays a key economic role for the Russian state. Furthermore, given
its long history of mistreating the local population (which worsened after 2022), Moscow
does not fully trust the Russian Arctic’s Indigenous population and its loyalty to Russia. If
one is to look for Russia’s weak spots in the Arctic, and in the High North in general, the
domain of “hybrid threats” may be viewed as Russia’s Achilles heel.

The need for autonomous missile defence in the EU in the face of growing ballistic and cruise missile threats is analysed, highlighting Europe's current dependence on the US and NATO, mainly due to the lack of its own satellite-based early-warning system. In this context, Germany is promoting the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), a missile shield relient on US and Israeli systems, sparking tensions with France, which advocates for autonomy and brings its nuclear deterrent into the strategic discussion.
The article details the capabilities needed for a missile defence shield, highlighting the importance of satellite-based early detection. While the US has advanced systems such as SBIRS, which will be enhanced by Next-Generation OPIR, the EU lacks a similar capability and faces financial and technological difficulties in developing a system of its own. Europe's TWISTER and ODIN's EYE II, HYDEF and HYDIS projects, still at an early stage, aim to create an early-warning satellite system and new interceptors, although they are not expected to be operational in the short term.
Financing these developments is a major challenge, with options such as joint debt issuance being considered. The EU must decide how to strengthen its defence and space industries, reduce its dependence on certain allies, and operate within constrained budgetary resources, with space-based early-warning capabilities being essential to achieving strategic autonomy in the defence sphere.

Air Defense Systems contain high-value assets that are expected to fulfill their mission for several years-in many cases, even decades-while operating in a fast-changing, technology-driven environment. Thus, it is paramount that decision-makers can assess how effective an Air Defense System is in the face of new developing threats, as well as to identify the bottlenecks that could jeopardize the security of the airspace of a country. Given the broad extent of activities and the great variety of assets necessary to achieve the strategic objectives, a systems approach was taken in order to delineate the core requirements and the physical architecture of an Air Defense System. Then, value-focused thinking helped in the definition of the measures of effectiveness. Furthermore, analytical methods were applied to create a formal structure that preliminarily assesses such measures. To validate the proposed methodology, a powerful simulation was also used to determine the measures of effectiveness, now in more complex environments that incorporate both uncertainty and multiple interactions of the entities. The results regarding the validity of this methodology suggest that the approach can support decisions aimed at enhancing the capabilities of Air Defense Systems. In conclusion, this paper sheds some light on how consolidated approaches of Systems Engineering and Operations Research can be used as valid techniques for solving problems regarding a complex and yet vital matter.

The rapid advancements in missile technology, particularly hypersonic flight and highly maneuverable ballistic systems, have exposed critical vulnerabilities in traditional missile defense frameworks. These evolving threats—characterized by extreme speed, unpredictable trajectories, and evasive maneuvers—outpace current defense systems that rely on linear predictive models. To address this critical gap, the Convergent Algorithm is introduced as a groundbreaking solution that redefines missile defense and offense paradigms. This system integrates advanced artificial intelligence (AI), multi-layered defense architectures, and dynamic, real-time predictive algorithms, particularly focused on terminal defense operations.

Unlike legacy systems such as Patriot and THAAD, which operate within set parameters designed to intercept ballistic trajectories, the Convergent Algorithm offers an adaptive, fully integrated response mechanism. This capability becomes crucial when confronting hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and other advanced re-entry vehicles, whose flight paths and evasive capabilities challenge even the most sophisticated intercept systems. The Convergent Algorithm is not simply an enhancement of existing technology—it represents a paradigm shift, fundamentally altering how missile defense and offensive countermeasures are managed.

The core of the Convergent Algorithm lies in the convergence of multiple data streams from ground, air, and space sensors to form a unified, real-time threat environment map. This map allows the system to constantly update predictions on missile speed, trajectory, and behavior, adapting responses to evolving situations. Unlike traditional systems with centralized command structures prone to disruption, the Convergent Algorithm operates in a decentralized manner. This architecture ensures that each defensive layer can function autonomously, offering resilience in contested environments where communication networks may be disrupted or jammed by electronic warfare (EW).

One of the key innovations is the Pre-Terminal State Engagement concept, which involves engaging threats before they enter their terminal phase of descent. This proactive strategy is facilitated by Smart Reusable Hybrid Terminal Vehicles (SRHTVs), a novel component introduced by the Convergent Algorithm. These vehicles form a multilayered defensive mesh that can engage and neutralize highly maneuverable hypersonic threats, extending the defensive window significantly beyond traditional terminal interception capabilities. The introduction of these SRHTVs enables engagement at earlier stages of the threat’s trajectory, increasing the probability of a successful interception.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are integral to the operational functionality of the Convergent Algorithm. While many modern missile defense systems incorporate basic levels of automation, the Convergent Algorithm goes further by employing a self-learning mechanism. This system refines its predictive models based on real-time data, previous engagements, and simulations. For instance, when a missile employs evasive maneuvers or advanced decoys, the algorithm learns from this behavior and dynamically adjusts its response for future engagements. This self-learning capacity ensures that the system remains effective even as adversaries develop more sophisticated offensive capabilities.

The strategic and operational implications of the Convergent Algorithm are profound. By decentralizing command and control, it provides the ability to continue operating autonomously in highly contested environments where communications may be compromised. Furthermore, its multi-layered, autonomous architecture enhances operational resilience, allowing it to counter saturation attack strategies—where adversaries attempt to overwhelm defense systems with a barrage of threats. By providing decentralized layers of engagement, the Convergent Algorithm ensures that no single point of failure can compromise the overall defense structure.

From an operational perspective, the Convergent Algorithm seamlessly integrates into existing missile defense systems such as THAAD, Aegis, and Patriot, augmenting their capabilities rather than replacing them. This interoperability allows the Convergent Algorithm to act as a force multiplier within current missile defense architectures, enhancing performance across all phases of engagement, particularly during terminal defense. Its ability to predict and adapt to hypersonic threats makes it a critical tool for maintaining defense superiority.

In addition to its defensive applications, the Convergent Algorithm introduces a new offensive dimension through its Counter-Counter Predictive Defense (CCPD) capability. By anticipating the unpredictable behaviors of hypersonic and maneuverable ballistic threats, it provides a multi-dimensional solution, enabling it to conduct offensive countermeasures alongside its primary defensive role. This offensive capability, which is deeply integrated with its real-time learning mechanism, represents a leap forward in how missile systems are addressed on the modern battlefield.

The introduction of SRHTVs also transforms the system’s ability to counter hypersonic threats, particularly during their most vulnerable phases. SRHTVs operate in a layered defensive mesh, ensuring that the Convergent Algorithm can engage multiple targets simultaneously, using dynamic engagement strategies to neutralize threats before they reach critical assets. This mesh network also enhances the system’s ability to defend against threats that utilize stealth technologies or decoy deployment, which are designed to confuse traditional missile defense systems.

Saturation attacks, designed to overwhelm defense systems with numerous simultaneous threats, present another challenge to traditional missile defense systems. The Convergent Algorithm, with its decentralized structure and autonomous layers of engagement, offers a solution to this problem by handling multiple threats independently. In scenarios where adversaries employ advanced electronic warfare tactics or launch large-scale saturation attacks, the Convergent Algorithm’s ability to autonomously manage each layer of defense ensures that no single system is overwhelmed or incapacitated.

As hypersonic missile technology continues to evolve, combining high speeds, unpredictable trajectories, and advanced evasion capabilities, the Convergent Algorithm stands at the forefront of missile defense innovation. By incorporating real-time, adaptive AI-driven responses into its multi-layered architecture, it addresses the most pressing challenges posed by these next-generation threats. Its decentralized approach, combined with its ability to engage in both defense and offense, ensures that the Convergent Algorithm remains a critical asset in maintaining missile defense superiority.

In conclusion, the Convergent Algorithm offers a revolutionary solution to the limitations of traditional missile defense systems. By integrating advanced AI, predictive algorithms, and decentralized architectures, it provides a future-proof response mechanism capable of addressing the most advanced missile threats, including hypersonic weapons. Its capacity to engage threats in the pre-terminal phase, combined with its multi-layered defense capabilities, ensures that the Convergent Algorithm is well-positioned to dominate the missile defense landscape in the coming decades. This system not only redefines how missile defense is approached but also paves the way for a new era of strategic and operational superiority.

Türkiye'nin hava savunmaya yönelik bugüne kadar hayata geçirdiği tüm projeleri kapsayacak olan Çelik Kubbe, Türkiye'nin katmanlı hava savunma sistemlerinin entegre bir şekilde tüm algılayıcı ve silahların ortak bir ağ yapısı altında çalışmasını sağlaması açısından önemli bir eşiği temsil ediyor. Böylece hava sahasında, tam hakimiyet sağlanırken oluşabilecek tehditlere karşı daha etkili ve hızlı bir şekilde karşılık verilebilecek.

Günümüz güvenlik ortamında sürekli dönüşen tehditlere karşın etkin çözümlere sahip olmak tüm modern orduların temel gereksinimi durumundadır. Türk güvenlik güçlerinin özgün nitelikte yerli çözümlerle donatılmasına yönelik iradenin sergilendiği Savunma Sanayii İcra Komitesi (SSİK) son toplantısından da bu yönde çok önemli bir karar çıktı. Türkiye'nin hava sahasının korunmasında "Çelik Kubbe" projesi ile yeni bir döneme girildi. Böylelikle hava savunmaya yönelik Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu kabiliyetler aynı amaca hizmet edecek bir ağ yapısında birleştirilecek. Sürekli yerli ve milli çözümlerle güncellenecek, yeni kabiliyetler kazandırılacak olan Çelik Kubbe ülke hava sahasındaki egemenliğin, etkinliğin kilidi olacaktır.

The paper discusses the methodology of forming an air defense plan to counteract a group of drones based on multiagent modeling. It is shown that the application of traditional planning methods does not take into account the peculiarities of the defense of objects against large groups of air targets in case of their simultaneous application. The use of a multiagent paradigm for modeling is considered, which considers the defense process as an interaction of two groups of agents: attack and defense. The air situation model is based on the application of agents with simple control methods and the use of cohesive and repulsive functions. The air defense model includes adequate air defense agents' response to air targets. The conclusion about the possibility of multi-agent air defense planning was confirmed by modeling of an infrastructure object defense from attack of a group of drones.

330 pages with 120+ figures and 200+ references Index: 950+ entries, including 150+individuals More than 50 years ago, pioneering scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union and the United States searched for a technical means of defense against ballistic missiles. This book tells the little-known story of the earliest breakthroughs which paved the way for the emergence of a powerful missile defense complex in the Soviet Union, a major factor in the Cold War.

This edited volume focuses on the changing regional security dynamics of Southeast Asia within the context of the U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, China’s growing influence and assertive behavior in the South China Sea and the Archipelago region are the main concerns of these countries. On the other hand, Southeast Asian countries are skeptical—if not hesitant—with the formation of new mini-lateral frameworks and emerging institutional cooperation such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and AUKUS. In this highly competitive strategic environment, these countries prefer to position themselves in a flexible mode of sometimes leaning toward the United States or China based on a nuanced balance of maintaining both strategic autonomy and opportunities that manifest in the region. In line with this flexible mode of engagement, Southeast Asian countries prefer to eschew an explicitly pro-position vis-à-vis the United States or China, cognizant of the turbulence ahead due to the deepening of U.S.–China strategic competition—this, despite the fact that freedom of navigation and a rule-based international order is much desired by Southeast Asian countries to establish and maintain peace and stability in the region.

The strategic value of Southeast Asia has much significance to the deepening U.S.–China strategic competition. In this book, chapters examine the behavior, perspectives, and strategy of Southeast Asian countries toward the U.S.–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Dağlarda veya soğuk hava koşullarında askeri operasyonlar icra eden komutanlar ve askerlerin çevre ve karşılarındaki düşman unsurları olmak üzere iki düşmanı vardır ve askerî harekât planları iki düşmanı da hesaba katmalıdır. Dağ ve soğuk havanın yarattığı bütün zorluklara rağmen, geçmişte ve günümüzde, dağlarda ve soğuk ortamlarda büyük çaplı ve uzun süreli operasyonları başarıyla yürüten ordular mevcuttur.

This study addressed the issue of allocating the air defense missiles to incoming air targets to maximize the air defense effectiveness of land-based air defense systems. A constraint based nonlinear goal programming (multi-objective) model for weapon assignment problem to minimize survival probability was developed. The model not only gave optimum assignment but also resulted in engagement times and defense success for multi-defense sites. The model utilized parameters belonging to defense systems such as engagement duration, setup duration between engagements, command and control structures, fire doctrines, and defense strategies and parameters belonging to target such as probability of kill values, position, orientation, weapon load, target type, and course of actions inferred by current detection information. The simulation model has two-way usages. In the first usage, it obtains solution for the parameters given above under limited number of missiles. In the second usage, the model shows the amount of missile to be used to achieve the possible highest success with the parameters given above. To be able to use the optimization model in a simulation environment, a simulation model as an optimizer agent is developed and located in air defense simulation scenarios. The model collects input data, optimize assignments, calculates fire times, and schedules fire orders. This solution is exemplified by a land-based air defense example.

: Since 2002, MDA has spent approximately $105 billion, and it plans to spend about $38 billion more by 2019, to defend against enemy ballistic missiles. MDA is developing a BMDS comprised of a command and control system, sensors that identify incoming threats, and intercepting missiles. For over a decade, GAO has reported on MDA s progress and challenges in developing and fielding the BMDS. GAO is mandated by law to assess the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives, as reported through its acquisition baselines, and to report on other acquisition issues as appropriate. This, GAO s 12th annual report, examines progress and challenges in fiscal year 2014 associated with MDA s: (1) individual element testing and asset delivery goals, (2) efforts to reduce acquisition risks, and (3) reporting on the BMDS integrated capability. GAO examined MDA s acquisition reports and assessed them against GAO s acquisition best practices, analyzed baselines reported to ...

Cumhuriyetimizin 100. yılına girerken Türk savunma sanayiinin oldukça hareketli ve coşkulu zamanlardan geçiyor. Sektör Bayraktar TB2'den ANKA'ya, AKINCI'dan AKSUNGUR'a yüksek teknoloji çözümleriyle dünyada adından söz ettirirken jet motorlu platformlar büyük yankı uyandırdı. Otuzdan fazla ülkeye yapılan milyonlarca dolarlık ihracat ile dünya SİHA pazarını domine etme yolunda ilerleyen Türk firmalar yeni çözümler geliştiriyor. T.C. Savunma Sanayii Başkanı Prof. Dr. İsmail Demir yakın zaman önce Baykar'ın yanı sıra TUSAŞ'ın da jet motorlu platform üzerinde çalıştığını açıklamıştı. TUSAŞ'ın jet motorlu insansız uçak projesinin adının ANKA-3 MİUS olduğu yakın zaman önce açıklandı.

Recently, the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) has become vital for the defense system as the military defense system is vital for national security. Placing Integrated Air Defense System batteries among locations to protect locations assets is a crucial problem because optimal solutions are needed for interceptor missiles to intercept attacker missiles for maximizing protection of assets across locations or places. In this research, the procedures of using network algorithms along with developing several network algorithms are going to be demonstrated to develop a model for sequential development of seven network securing strategies of placing Surface to Air Missile (SAM) batteries to maximize the protection of assets across locations (based on given asset values) by generating optimal solutions through computation to destroy maximum attacker missiles by using minimum interceptor missiles with given intercept probability. This network securing strategies can be implemented not ...

This document focuses on Nike Site SF-88, but is based on the firm foundation already established by others. In particular, the authors of this study wish to draw attention to the invaluable assistance received from the editor and authors of Last Line of Defense: Nike Missile Sites in Illinois, Christine Whitacre, Christina M. Carlson and Robert Lyon, who generously allowed us to use verbatim large portions of their study that describe the development, deployment and operations of the Nike system in general. Although the text "borrowed" from their work has been, with their permission, integrated into the text for the sake of readability, we have attempted to footnote it as thoroughly as possible and wish to draw special attention to their substantial contribution to this work. In the introduction to his recent book, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, Stephen E. Ambrose wrote, "Long ago my mentors...taught me to let my characters speak for themselves by quoting liberally. They were there. I wasn't. They saw with their own eyes, they put their own lives on the line. I didn't. They speak with an authenticity no one else can match. Their phrases, their word choices, their slang are unique-naturally enough, as their experiences are unique." i For much the same reasons, we have chosen to make extensive use of quotations from oral histories representing officers, warrant officer technicians, and enlisted personnel who served at Nike site SF-88. The authors of this study owe them a debt of thanks for the information they freely shared, and for the service they gave to their fellow soldiers and fellow citizens.

In this paper we present an overview on the operational environment of the
air defence. Basing on the fundamentals of futurology we try to sum up the trends that air defence will have to face with. We consider the asymmetric spectrum of air threats and we present a wide picture about the offensive air assets as one of the main determinants of the future operational environment of air defence.

Recently, the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) has become vital for the defense system as the military defense system is vital for national security. Placing Integrated Air Defense System batteries among locations to protect locations assets is a crucial problem because optimal solutions are needed for interceptor missiles to intercept attacker missiles for maximizing protection of assets across locations or places. In this research, the procedures of using network algorithms along with developing several network algorithms are going to be demonstrated to develop a model for sequential development of seven network securing strategies of placing Surface to Air Missile (SAM) batteries to maximize the protection of assets across locations (based on given asset values) by generating optimal solutions through computation to destroy maximum attacker missiles by using minimum interceptor missiles with given intercept probability. This network securing strategies can be implemented not only for Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) planning but also Counter Air (CA) planning as Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) is conducted with defensive counter air supported by attack operations in offensive counter air.

A study sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Within the context of Europe, the US Army must develop a force posture that best navigates the tensions between deterring or defeating armed conflict at an acceptable cost, successfully competing below armed conflict, and maintaining global responsiveness and institutional flexibility through the global operating model and dynamic force employment. While Russia’s economy, and consequently military capability will likely shrink over the next 10 years, which can make them more dangerous as the Kremlin continues to try to punch above its weight. The ideal force posture needs to accomplish a range of on-going and contingency missions and also be adaptive enough to remain viable despite any number of potential swings in resources, military balance, or the domestic politics of allies. This study recommends five possible strategic approaches and specifies what conditions and priorities optimize each.

The principal investigators recommend investing in a multidomain alliance. This strategic approach enables the joint force and multinational partners to get the most of their capabilities and makes the best use of the Army’s top modernization priorities, such as long-range fires in a way that alters the strategic balance of a theater to avert a potentially catastrophic, albeit low probability, scenario of armed conflict. More importantly, this strategic approach is far more stable in a crisis, as it does not place policymakers in having to rush this critical, escalatory capability into theater at a moment of high tension. Moreover, invest in a multidomain alliance has the flexibility to allow a later build-up of heavy forces if conditions still warrant.

In its ongoing global realignment of U.S. forces and installations, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to reduce the number of troops permanently stationed overseas, consolidate overseas bases, and establish a network of smaller forward locations with limited personnel. Realigning the U.S. overseas posture involves closing obsolete and redundant bases, constructing new facilities costing billions of dollars, and ensuring that other needed infrastructure is in place to support realigned forces and missions. These significant changes to force structure both in the United States and overseas are being implemented to enhance operational efficiencies and ensure access during future contingency operations. DOD requests for overseas military construction projects extend around the world including Europe, the Pacific, Southwest Asia, and Central America. For fiscal year 2010, DOD requested approximately $1.5 billion, or 7 percent, of the regular military construction request for overseas military construction. The Congress has supported the DOD's efforts to reassess and realign its overseas posture to better respond to emerging security challenges, but the Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concerns about the department's ability to effectively manage and accomplish such an ambitious program as well as the fidelity of the global basing plan given the rapidly changing global security environment. GAO-09-706R Global Defense Posture Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

Future regional conflicts will almost certainly involve politically less stable nations or other regional actors using theater ballistic missiles armed with either nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. The United States Air Force is attempting to deal with this threat by developing the Airborne Laser (ABL) with the goal of shooting down missiles while they are still under power and before they can release submunitions possibly containing highly toxic biological agents. This paper presents the results of an analysis of this system. It is based solely on information found in the open literature and using the basic physics and engineering involved in transmitting intense laser beams through the atmosphere. The ABL's potential capabilities and possible theaters of operation are discussed at a non-technical level.

Distillation columns are the most units used in oil refineries, and chemical factories. This is a very difficult process and non-linear. Therefore, the development of intelligent control systems for the columns of the distillation is very difficult. In this paper, an intelligent control strategy using Mamdani type Interval Type-2 PI Like Fuzzy Logic Controller (IT2FLC) is used. The controller consists of PD-Like FLC with integrated output. Kernek Mendel (KM) algorithm is used as the type reduction method for the IT2FLC. This controller is applied to control a continuous binary trays distillation column. The controller has three tunable gains to reach minimum overshoot, minimum error and minimum settling time at least variables can be controlled. The controller is a variable of the molar fraction of distillate and the reflex ratio is the manipulated variable. Integral Time Absolute Error (ITAE) is employed as an objective function to measure the improvement in time response where the error is between desired and output product composition. The performance of IT2FLC is compared with Type-1 PI Like FLC (T1FLC). The results of the simulations have shown that the project of IT2FLC works efficiently to no-disturbance and the effects of disturbance. Improve average is of 85% for a constant set-point without a disturbance and 80% with a disturbance. Furthermore, the average improvement for a step set-point is 53% without disturbance and 74% with disturbance. All results of the simulation confirmed the hardiness and control any consistent inaccurate with obvious advantages for the IT2FLC.

: In the early 1990s, sharply reduced military budgets and post-Cold War strategic requirements drove the Air Force to restructure its organization drastically. Recognizing that the active Air Force planned for 1995 would be less than half the size of the Air Force existing in 1990, General Merrill A. McPeak, the Air Force Chief of Staff, aggressively sought to preserve USAF heritage and to increase the historical awareness of USAF personnel. Among other initiatives, he directed the Air Force Historical Research Agency to compile a two-volume series publicizing the lineage and heraldry of the wings and flying squadrons that would remain in the active Air Force. "Active Air Force Wings," the first volume in the heritage series, includes all regular Air Force wings active as of 1 October 1995. Within this volume are the lineages, honors, and heraldry of combat wings created after 1947 and those that originated as combat groups or four-digit organizations. Every wing appears ...

330 pages with 120+ figures and 200+ references Index: 950+ entries, including 150+individuals More than 50 years ago, pioneering scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union and the United States searched for a technical means of defense against ballistic missiles. This book tells the little-known story of the earliest breakthroughs which paved the way for the emergence of a powerful missile defense complex in the Soviet Union, a major factor in the Cold War.

North Korea and the U.S. still remain technically at war. This tense state of affairs is a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean conflict. However, recent evidence suggests that the U.S. and North Korea may be on the verge of another bloody war on the Korean peninsula, this time triggered by a possible U.S. military first strike against the D.P.R.K. The impetus for a second Korean war stems, in part, from events in the early 1990s under the Clinton administration, which have been exacerbated under the current U.S. President, George W. Bush, as discussed herein. Evidence that the U.S. and North Korea may be on the brink of a second Korean war also represented a motivating factor in deciding that the issue discussed in this paper was both urgent and ripe for public discussion. Thus, this paper examines the primary legal justifications for a U.S. military first-strike against North Korea, from both an international law and international relations perspective. To make the relevant analysis, this...

This article discusses the myths surrounding Russia’s A2/AD capabilities and the risks associated with the current counter A2/AD efforts among NATO countries. It offers recommendations for investing in a stronger defense of the Baltic states and Eastern Europe. R to Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities are now standard in assessments of America’s ability to protect its allies and its interests in Europe. Unclassified briefings on European military security now routinely include a slide showing a map of Europe with the reach of advanced Russian interdiction systems extending over a range of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. While awareness of the challenge posed by these capabilities is important, widespread and often unqualified reporting in open sources by both media outlets and nonspecialist think tanks has had unfortunate consequences. Exaggeration and hype suggesting Russia has the ability to interdict its adversaries across large areas of Eur...

So what are the hard facts, and what are the North Koreans really doing? To answer this we must address three key issues: (1) North Korea's nuclear weapons capability; (2) functionality of their missile systems; and most importantly, (3) North Korea's motivation for bellicose war threats. 34 I FrontLine Defence I Issue 3, 2013 I www.frontline-canada.com TIMELINE OF ESCALATING THREATS FROM NORTH KOREA Dec 12, 2012 North Korea successfully launches three-stage rocket and places satellite in orbit. Seoul,Washington and the UN condemn launch as a covert ballistic missile test. 2013 January 22 UN Security Council passes a resolution condemning North Korea's rocket launch and tightens existing sanctions. January 24 North Korea's National Defense Commission says it will proceed with a "high-level nuclear test". January 25 North Korea threatens "physical counter-measures" against rival South Korea. February 12 North Korea conducts a third nuclear test. February 26 North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un oversees a live-fire artillery drill aimed at simulating an "actual war". March 1 South Korea and US launch annual "Foal Eagle" joint military exercise. March 5 North Korea says it will scrap armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War. March 7 North Korea threatens a "pre-emptive" nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea. The United Nations adopts tougher sanctions on Pyongyang over its nuclear test. March 8 North Korea announces the voiding of non-aggression pacts with South Korea and severs a government hotline with Seoul. Kim Jong-Un tours frontline island units and vows "all-out war". March 11 South Korea and US launch annual "Key Resolve" joint military exercise. March 12 Kim Jong-Un threatens to "wipe out" South Korean island of Baengnyeong.

So what are the hard facts, and what are the North Koreans really doing? To answer this we must address three key issues: (1) North Korea's nuclear weapons capability; (2) functionality of their missile systems; and most importantly, (3) North Korea's motivation for bellicose war threats. 34 I FrontLine Defence I Issue 3, 2013 I www.frontline-canada.com TIMELINE OF ESCALATING THREATS FROM NORTH KOREA Dec 12, 2012 North Korea successfully launches three-stage rocket and places satellite in orbit. Seoul,Washington and the UN condemn launch as a covert ballistic missile test. 2013 January 22 UN Security Council passes a resolution condemning North Korea's rocket launch and tightens existing sanctions. January 24 North Korea's National Defense Commission says it will proceed with a "high-level nuclear test". January 25 North Korea threatens "physical counter-measures" against rival South Korea. February 12 North Korea conducts a third nuclear test. February 26 North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un oversees a live-fire artillery drill aimed at simulating an "actual war". March 1 South Korea and US launch annual "Foal Eagle" joint military exercise. March 5 North Korea says it will scrap armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War. March 7 North Korea threatens a "pre-emptive" nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea. The United Nations adopts tougher sanctions on Pyongyang over its nuclear test. March 8 North Korea announces the voiding of non-aggression pacts with South Korea and severs a government hotline with Seoul. Kim Jong-Un tours frontline island units and vows "all-out war". March 11 South Korea and US launch annual "Key Resolve" joint military exercise. March 12 Kim Jong-Un threatens to "wipe out" South Korean island of Baengnyeong.

The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper, but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues.

Mayıs ayı başında Kudüs'teki Şeyh Cerrah bölgesindeki Filistinlilerin evlerinden çıkartılmasıyla ilgili süren bir davanın yarattığı gerilim, aynı günlerde el Aksa camii çevresindeki olaylar ve bunların neden olduğu çatışmalar, kısa süre içinde Gazze Şeridi ile İsrail'in güneyi arasında karşılıklı ateşlenen çok sayıda füzenin başrolünde oynadığı bir çatışmaya dönüştü. Yaklaşık 10 gün süren karşılıklı bombardıman süreci sonunda Mısır'ın ara buluculuğunda varılan ateşkes anlaşması, 21 Mayıs saat 02.00'de başladı. Bu çatışmada, bir tarafta Gazze'den HAMAS ve İslami Cihad'ın salvolar halinde ateşledikleri roketler, diğer tarafta da bunları havada vurmak için Iron Dome hava savunma bataryalarının ateşledikleri Tamir füzeleri ön saftaydı. Iron Dome ile bir diğer unsur olarak Spike NLOS adlı uzun menzilli güdümlü füzenin de yaygın Demir Kubbe ve Sürdürülebilir Asimetri www.siyahgribeyaz.com Sayfa 2 kullanımı dikkat çekti: İsrail ordusu tespit ettiği roket batarya ve mevzilerini, uçuşu sırasında uzaktan kumanda edilebilen Spike NLOS füzeleriyle vurdu. Çatışma boyunca Gazze Şeridi'nden atılan çok sayıda roketin ve onları havada vurmak için Iron Dome (Demir Kubbe) füze savunma sistemlerinden ateşlenen füzelerin gece karanlığındaki köşe kapmaca oyununu tüm dünya anlık olarak televizyon ve sosyal medyadan takip etti. Büyük çoğunluğu gece saatlerinde ateşlenen roketler ve onları kovalayan Tamir'lerin havadaki kıvrak manevraları, uzun pozlama ile çekim yapan kameraların yakaladığı görsel olarak etkileyici ama aynı zamanda düşündürücü fotoğraflarla belgelendi. 1 Bu füze düellosunun bir tarafında teknolojik olarak oldukça ileri bir mekanizma, diğer tarafında ise sınırlı kaynaklara sahip bir yapı bulunuyor. Her biri birkaç yüz dolar maliyet ile üretilebilen çok sayıda roketi vurmak için, roket başına en az iki adet, her biri ortalama $20 ila 50 bin maliyetli Tamir ateşlendi. Öte yandan açık kaynaklara göre bir Iron Dome bataryasının fiyat etiketi $40-50 milyon dolaylarında. Yani ortada sadece teknoloji değil, kabiliyet ve maliyet bakımlarından da büyük bir asimetri var. Öyle görülüyor ki, Iron Dome sisteminin, roketleri havada vurmaya ilaveten en önemli ikinci görevi, bu asimetriyi sürdürmek. İsrail'in Hava ve Füze Savunma Şemsiyesi Iron Dome, İsrail'in hava ve füze savunma şemsiyesinin en alt katmanında yer alıyor. İç içe geçmiş katmanlardan oluşan bu yapını en üstünde de Arrow sistemi bulunuyor. İsrail, balistik füzelere karşı korunma için 1980'lerin ortalarında ABD ile imzalanan bir mutabakat muhtırası ile çalışmaya başladı. Maliyetinin %80'ini ABD'nin üstlendiği bir proje ile ortaya çıkan Arrow 1 füzesavar sistemi, 1,000km'ye kadar menzile sahip balistik füzeleri ve hava soluyan hedefleri (uçak, seyir füzesi vb.) önlemek üzere geliştirilmişti. Bu sistemin erken ihbar ve hedef tespit radarı ise Elta tarafından geliştirilen ELM-2080 Green Pine. İlk test atışı Ağustos 1990'da gerçekleştirilen Arrow 1'in test süreci, 1994'te tamamlandı. Daha sonra başlayan Arrow 2 projesinde de ABD, maliyetlerin %72'sini karşıladı. 2,000kg ağırlığa sahip selefinden 700kg daha hafif olan Arrow 2'nin balistik füze tespit menzili azami 500km, imha menzili ise 50-90km arasında. Green Pine ve diğer radar ve istihbarat sistemlerinden gelen veriler, Citron Tree adlı bir komuta kontrol sistemi tarafından birleştirilerek Arrow 2'ye önleme verisi olarak iletiliyor. 2 Arrow ailesinin en son üyesi olan Arrow 3 ise atmosfer dışında (uzay ortamında) önleme yapan bir hava savunma sistemi. Seleflerinin aksine, Arrow 3'te harp başlığı bulunmuyor: Hedefini, fiziksel olarak vurarak, yüksek hızından kaynaklanan kinetik enerji ile tahrip ediyor. PATRIOT PAC III füzesinde de kullanılan bu tekniğe, "hit-to-kill" adı veriliyor. İki kademeli füzede, öncülleri gibi katı yakıt kullanılıyor. Vurucu başlığı içeren

The proliferation of missiles is commonly viewed as one of the most pressing international security issues and has been a key concern in the arms control and proliferation debates over the past decade. This has occurred at the same time that apprehension about the horizontal spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has risen, and the two issues have become closely related in formulations of potential threats, as well as in existing attempts to regulate the spread of missile technology and parts.

The German Luftwaffen-Feld-Division 11 (t mot). With original photos and the official, and extremely interesting in its variety, order-of-battle at the end of August 1943, right before the Italian Armistice of September 1943. Part four of a series on the orders-of-battle and strengths of the various occupation forces (German, Italian and Bulgarian) in Greece during World War II, 1941-1944.

Review of new technologies being added to ships designs, with a focused look at Western European designs, including the MEKO-200-series, destined as the future ANZAC frigate design.Illustrated and with various charts on the ANZAC design specifications.

The paper discusses the methodology of forming an air defense plan to counteract a group of drones based on multiagent modeling. It is shown that the application of traditional planning methods does not take into account the peculiarities of the defense of objects against large groups of air targets in case of their simultaneous application. The use of a multiagent paradigm for modeling is considered, which considers the defense process as an interaction of two groups of agents: attack and defense. The air situation model is based on the application of agents with simple control methods and the use of cohesive and repulsive functions. The air defense model includes adequate air defense agents' response to air targets. The conclusion about the possibility of multi-agent air defense planning was confirmed by modeling of an infrastructure object defense from attack of a group of drones.

A revisionist Russia is increasing its military capabilities and threatening U.S. allies and partners across Eurasia and the Middle East. In multiple theaters Russia is conducting sophisticated campaigns that combine economic pressure, disinformation, cyberspace activities, and the use of conventional and unconventional military forces to influence neutrals and intimidate U.S. allies and partners. It is likely that a perceived reduction in the United States’ comparative military advantages emboldens Russian actions. To deter Russia and other revisionist powers that may emulate Russian capabilities (e.g. China, North Korea, and Iran), and to ensure effective response to aggression that threatens the security of the United States and its allies, the U.S. Army requires improved capabilities, increased capacity, and revised warfighting doctrine.

Lukas K. Danner’s book, China’s Grand Strategy: Contradictory Foreign Policy?, provides an overarching, uncommon and relatively ingenious theoretical approach to the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over a period of nearly two decades. This has been a period when China has been increasingly portrayed by a largely Western-oriented and sometimes biased media and academia as a country with mixed foreign policy strategies and policy oscillations. The author uses a process-tracing method within case studies to provide an exhaustive study on how the PRC’s foreign policy has been and still is misconstrued by various state actors, particularly by successive US administrations.

On February 11, the head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, Yevgeny Zinichev, stated that a series of Crisis Management Centers were being established in the Artic region in order to “increase the level of security in the Northern Sea Route”

With the shooting down of a US drone by Iran and the more recent killing of a top Iranian Commander in a US drone strike, tension in the region has gone up several notches. One of the key factors that will determine the future course of action, and will influence the outcome of any interplay between US and Iran is the Iranian Air Defence. This paper looks at the capabilities and limitations of Iranian Air Defences.

Technology is developing rapidly, in many cases, faster than the defence industry or NATO can react. For example, many ‘traditional’ countermeasures against small UAS rely on electronic jamming. Many current COTS products are, however, able to navigate autonomously or can be controlled via a GSM network from the operator’s mobile phone. These features make jamming either completely useless, or the frequencies that need to be jammed are often off-limits, as they are used by the public. A sole focus on the low, slow, and small end of the C-UAS spectrum covers only a fraction of current UAS technology and excludes most military applications.

The paper briefly describes a spectrum of C-UAS considerations and why the current focus on the low, slow, and small end, although imminent and essential, is not sufficient to cover all aspects of defence against potential adversary UAS engagements.

This article discusses the myths surrounding Russia's A2/AD capabilities and the risks associated with the current counter A2/AD efforts among NATO countries. It offers recommendations for investing in a stronger defense of the Baltic states and Eastern Europe.