Indonesian Nationalism

The dislocated, deterritorialized discourse produced by repatriates from formerly European colonies has remained overlooked in academic scholarship. One such group is the Eurasian “Indo” community that has its roots in the former Dutch East Indies, today’s Indonesia. This article focuses on Tjalie Robinson, the intellectual leader of this community from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. The son of a Dutch father and a British-Javanese mother, Robinson became the leading voice of the diasporic Indo community in the Netherlands and later also in the United States. His engagement resulted in the foundation of the Indo magazine Tong Tong and the annual Pasar Malam Besar, what was to become the world’s biggest Eurasian festival. Robinson played an essential role in the cultural awareness and self-pride of the eventually global Indo community through his elaboration of a hybrid and transnational identity concept. By placing his focus “tussen twee werelden” (in-between two worlds) and identifying “mixties-schap” (mestizaje) as the essential characteristic of Indo identity, Robinson anticipated debates on hybridity, transnationalism, and creolism that only much later would draw attention from scholars in the field of postcolonial studies. This article highlights Robinson’s pioneering role in framing a deterritorialized hybrid alternative to nationalist essentialism in the postcolonial era.

Despite its seemingly overwhelming military superiority, the Netherlands never came close to defeating the increasingly effective nationalist insurgency on Java in the late 1940s. This article argues that the desperate state of the Dutch counter-insurgency campaign-which tends to be overlooked for the crucial years 1947-1948-is best demonstrated by focussing on the failure of the colonial power to integrate the civilian and military efforts and on its inability to govern reoccupied territory during the 'pacification phase'.

De Sarekat Ambon en de politieke organisatie van de Ambonese bevolkingsgroep in relatie tot de nationalistische beweging in het voormalige Nederlands-Indië tijdens de periode van omstreeks 1900 tot 1942.

The Sarekat Ambon and the political organization of the Ambonese population group in relation to the nationalist movement in the former Dutch East Indies during the period from around 1900 to 1942.

This article tried to analyze political tkinking of the kratons' elites in the twentieth century. The political thinking of Sunan Paku Buwana (PB) X was to restored his power that disappeared by penetration of Dutch colonial. The Sunan's strategy to restored the power was (1) political changed from the traditional perspective to political mass; (2) built schools, markets, bank, hospital, gardens, mosques; and give migrant skills; (3) supported local party that was Sarekat Islam and Boedi Oetomo. But, blunder diplomacy took by PB XI that was surrender to the Japanese troops, and PB XII tried to return to the traditional political paradigm and formed 'swapraja' government in Surakarta. That blunder policy to be opposite of the nasionalist perspective. Kata kunci: politik, tradisional, Paku Buwana, Sarekat Islam, dan Boedi Oetomo.

Di atas panggung internasional, tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa seluruh aktor internasional kini sedang berkompetisi dan bertarung. Indonesia sebagai negara yang hadir dengan kebijakan luar negerinya dengan prinsip bebas aktif, diharapkan dapat menaruh diri dalam menentukan arah dalam pengambilan langkah dan keputusannya. Berangkat dari situ, penulis hendak menempatkan Indonesia apabila diterapkan melalui teori peran (role theory). Lebih sempit lagi, penulis hendak mengkajinya pada masa kepresidenan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, di mana ramainya jargon politik segala arah. Tulisan ini akan dibagi menjadi empat babak: pertama, penjelasan mendasar mengenai teori peran; kedua latar belakang historis dari prinsip bebas aktif tersendiri; ketiga, analisis penulis mengenai keterkaitan teori peran dan prinsip bebas aktif pada era SBY; dan keempat, akan ditutup oleh sebuah kesimpulan.

The present article deals with the political debates about secularism, Islam and Pancasila in Indonesian history. It argues that Pancasila—or Pancasila secularism—constitutes, as Abdurrahman Wahid (2001) has rightly put it, a “mild secularism,” in which relative (not absolute) separation between state and religion is maintained, but allows at the same time the former’s moderate administering of some of the latter’s public affairs, on the one hand, and the latter’s moderate values and norms to inspire the former, on the other hand. If secularism contains three basic theses  (Casanova 1994: 3-6), viz., separation of state and religion, privatization of religion and differentiation between religious and non-religious spheres, they are not fully and strongly implemented, because there has always been some degree of religiousness present, and this could not easily be abandoned. As for the official political debates, they were mostly related to the separation thesis, rather than to privatization and differentiation, but there has also been an association of secularism (also in the sense of separation) with nationalist groups and of anti-secularism with Islamic groups. This study contributes to the knowledge of how secularism has been indigenized creatively as part of Indonesian political culture. This study also shows that secularism and Islam could mix in their milder sense in order to endorse a more democratic form of politics for Muslim society.

"This is just a very small .....and not-in-depth attempt to write an essay out of my curiosity about K-pop's presence in Indonesia. And..as to whether people really like it as much as it is portrayed and hyped. So, I was doing an out-of-curiosity 'research' into how some people express their 'hatred' towards K-Pop seen from the perspective of nationalism and religion (two issues that may uniquely arise in Indonesia (and Malaysia as my essay points out) when it comes to talking about K-pop. Mostly, I look into how they express their so-called 'hatred' through facebook. Other than that, I also point out some news on K-Pop that came up in Indonesian online newspaper and how those online media portrayed the K-pop seen from the nationalism.
"

Right from the start of his banishment to the Netherlands in fall 1913, Soewardi Suryaningrat had been trying to make the Dutch colonial government revoke this decision. For this he approached the social democrats that were actually in the opposition. But to no avail, and Soewardi became disillusioned with the social democrats. Analysing his conflict with the left makes clear in which direction Soewardi’s nationalism was heading. Was he just an “early Javanese-Indonesian nationalist”, or is there more to say about his brand of nationalism?

Richard Wright's The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference has long been a fundamental book in Bandung historiography. As a crucial companion volume to The Color Curtain, Roberts and Foulcher's Indonesian Notebook: A Sourcebook on Richard Wright and The Bandung Conference showcases the previously unknown side of Wright's Bandung narrative, as told from the perspectives of the vibrant group of Indonesian intellectuals and writers who hosted him in Indonesia in 1955. Showcasing Wright’s previously unknown interactions with Indonesian modernists and his previously unknown lecturing activities in Indonesia, this book has major implications for any reading of postcolonial history and culture after the Asian-African Conference of 1955.

At the end of 2016, Islamist organisations proved able to mobilise hundreds of thousands of people for political purposes in Indonesia. In order to explain their success, the role of social media should not be underestimated, as Islamic movements rely heavily on agitation in online media. This article sheds light on the example of the Front Pembela Islam, using one of the or-ganisation's Facebook pages as a case study. Within the algorithmic enclave of a cyber tribe, narratives and symbols are applied in memes. The research examines how narratives and symbols evoke emotions in online memes and offline banners, what narratives are addressed, and how the memes make claims regarding commonly acknowledged signifiers such as the NKRI, Islam and Pluralism. The guiding thesis is that these memes express not simply anti-pluralist or anti-NKRI notions, as opponents of these groups frequently assert, but rather combinations of robust nationalism and their alternative version of pluralism with conservative Islamic approaches. Nonetheless, threats and enemies are inevitably present as a constitutive outside and suggest a highly exclusive version of Indonesianness. Thus similar narratives and symbols applied in online media also emerge within public spaces, blurring the distinction between the online and offline realms.

This chapter discusses the development of MUI, both nationally and locally in the past decades. It argues about the significant shift in the MUI both theologically and politically, seen from the perception of MUI and MUI ulama about the nation-state with all their derivatives, such as state ideology, the system of government, citizenship, tolerance, and the use of violence. Theologically, the MUI developed a moderate religious
understanding of puritans, and politically voiced the aspirations of Muslims and developed religious activism. This article will specifically look at the new direction of the MUI, the emergence of new wings within the MUI, internal contestation, and the influence of this new wing on the discourse and political attitudes of the MUI.

This article discusses the international engagements of the Perhimpoenan Indonesia: the famous Indonesian students organisation in the Netherlands, of which Mohammad Hatta was a member. Among others, the League against Imperialism is discussed, as well as the anticolonial scene in Paris, Berlin and Switzerland.

Right from the start of his banishment to the Netherlands in fall 1913, Soewardi Suryaningrat had been trying to make the Dutch colonial government revoke this decision. For this he approached the social democrats that were actually in the opposition. But to no avail, and Soewardi became disillusioned with the social democrats. Analysing his conflict with the left makes clear in which direction Soewardi’s nationalism was heading. Was he just an “early Javanese-Indonesian nationalist”, or is there more to say about his brand of nationalism?

This is a paper written by a group of students as  an assignment for Asian Cinema course at UNIMAS. We apologize for any false or incorrect information and encourage those who are knowledgeable to correct us for the purpose of education. We thank you for helping us to learn.

Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta Writing in the early 1970s, B.J. Boland said: “As a ‘Pancasila State with a Ministry of Religion’, Indonesia chose a middle way between ‘the way of Turkey’ and the founding of an ‘Islamic State’. A ‘secular State’ would perhaps not suit the Indonesian situation; an ‘Islamic State,’ as attempted elsewhere, would indeed tend ‘to create rather that to solve problems.’ For this reason, the Indonesian experiment deserves positive evaluation.” (Boland 1982 [1971]: 112) Studying Islam in modern Indonesia, Boland concluded that both the secular state and the “way of Turkey” and Islamic states are not suitable for Indonesia. He viewed the Indonesian concept of a “Pancasila State with a Ministry of Religion” proposed by the founding fathers of Indonesia as a solution to this problem. He also suggested that Indonesian experience is a model that deserves consideration and positive evaluation. As a Western scholar, I suppose, he idealized secul...

Salah satu faktor yang mendorong dinamika politik bangsa adalah perluasan pendidikan terhadap anak-anak bangsa. Mereka yang telah mengenyam pendidikan selanjutnya berkontemplasi terhadap eksistensi kolonialis dan imperialis Belanda di Bumi Indonesia. Penyelenggaraan pendidikan kolonial dimulai pada tahun 1850-an, dan hanya dinikmati oleh anak-anak pangreh praja dan aristocrat, atau anak-anak yang mengabdi kepada pangreh praja dan aristokrat yang kemudian disekolahkan. 2 Perjuangan Lantip, anak miskin, untuk menuju strata priyayi baru sebagai guru sekolah dasar telah diabaikan dalam proses pergerakan nasional. Ketika berhasil menjadi guru sekolah dasar simbol loyalitas dan etos keteladanan terhadap bangsa Indonesia adalah bagian dari pekerjaannya. Apa yang dilakukan Lantip merupakan cermin realitas kehidupan untuk mengangkat derajat diri sendiri yang harus dilalui dengan mengabdi di rumah keluarga RM Sastrodarsono, seorang priyayi Jawa. Berpijak pada perjuangan itu tampak ada pembengkokan historiografi yang belum memberi perhatian terhadap para pengabdi yang disekolahkan. Historiografi kita mengeksplorasi gerakan radikal, bahkan pemikiran dan perjuangan kooperatif sering dinafikan, misalnya nasionalisme Jawa. 3 Perluasan pendidikan mempengaruhi ekologi sosial, dan berimplikasi pada kesenjangan. Menurut Savitri Prastiti Scherer diskriminasi dan kesenjangan tidak 1 Disampaikan pada "Workshop Naskah Klasik Nusantara", diselenggarakan oleh Pusat Studi Peradaban, Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengambdian Masyarakat

This article examines the nature of interreligious relations between Protestants of the Bali Church and Hindus as enacted through dramatic forms of Balinese music and dance. Particular attention is paid to the influence of mass tourism as a contributing factor in this process. Since the early twentieth century these arts have formed a central component of a pan-Balinese identity discourse known as" kebalian." The first Balinese converted to Christianity during the 1930s and were subsequently excommunicated from their ancestral villages for refusing to participate in local customary practices (including the ritualistic use of gamelan music). For this reason, Balinese Christians have historically been regarded as “traitors” with no claim to kebalian. Since the 1970s, however, the Bali Church has employed local music and dance in a variety of church-based contexts as one means to “contextualize” congregational life. The adoption of these and other forms of local culture (ex. language, clothing) have reconfigured and challenged the existing parameters of a generally Hindu-centric kebalian. This has led to the formation of a religion(agama)/culture(budaya) dichotomy, which is often used as the intellectual underpinning for the arts as a tool of identity construction. The article concludes with an analysis of the contextualized musical drama, Tarian Perdamaian, to illustrate the practical complications of this dichotomy and suggests the theatrically situated “interreligious gaze” as a lens through which to better understand the parameters of twenty-first century interreligious relations in Bali.

Post-colonialist narratives have tended to reject the idea of nationalism as a totalising discourse and to allow for it to encompass a number of different - even competing - ideologies. In late 1990s Indonesia, however, in the midst of what some saw as the "Balkanisation" of the nation, essentialist nationalism still appeared to occupy a significant space. Take for example the August 1997 editorial of the journal media karya budaya, which asked its readers to consider the difficulty of ... encouraging (our children) to forsake McDonalds or Dunkin Donuts and go back to Nyonya Suharti's fried chicken or Palembang fish cakes. When everything that smacks of being "Indonesian" is marginalised, can we still in all sincerity, in our 17 August ceremonies, give honour to the sacrifice made by our national heroes who died in the battle against colonialism and who returned Indonesia to her people? It is a plea that seeks to privilege an "authentic" form of nationalist sentiment over the vulgar commercialism of globalisation, and to achieve an identity 'uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images'. (During 1988, 114) My paper examines a particular manifestation of this yearning for national wholeness: the concern with what Boehmer (1993, 273) calls 'maternal plenitude'.

This study aims to examine ulama in the urban communities of Banda Aceh, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province, and their perceptions of the concept of nation-states and their derivative issues. The derivative issues are: 1) anti-violence; 2) pro-system; 3) tolerance; and 4) pro-citizenship (citizenship). These issues are used as dimensions to assess ulama’s perceptions of the concept of nation-states. In this research, what is meant by ulama is Islamic religious leaders who are considered as scholars by their community, although by other communities it is not necessarily considered as ulama, especially those affiliated to one or several organizations, majelis taklim, certain religious organizations or movements, who is domiciled in Banda Aceh, or whose center is in Banda Aceh. Therefore, ulama who are outside this category are not included in the scope of this study.
The author argues that the perception of the ulama of
Banda Aceh, and even Aceh in general, about the nation-state, is strongly influenced by government sharia politics in the concept of “nanggroe syari’ah in the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)” which is a long crystallization of negotiations and canalization for the spirit of religious ethnonationalism
of Acehnese ulama . In this context, the author also argues that ulama rejectionism towards the concept of the nation-state, at least until now, is more a phenomenon of decline from high to low, rather than vice versa. However, the concept of “nanggroe syari‘ah in the framework of NKRI” will also treat ideal visions about the application of the Islamic political system, but in the context of the Republic of Indonesia, not in the context of an independent Aceh. This vision has also been, is being,
and will continue to lead to the “kaffah” of the application of Shari’a in Aceh in the future.

The Darul Islam rebellion against the central Indonesian government in the immediate post-independence period was largely dependent on charismatic leaders who came to prominence during the struggle against the Dutch. The charismatic leader of this rebellion in South Sulawesi was Qahhar Mudzakkar (also spelt "Kahar Muzakkar"), whose conflict with the central government and army began in 1950 when he was overlooked as commander of a special Sulawesi brigade and many of the Sulawesi guerrillas who had fought against the Dutch were discarded as the Indonesian Army restructured. Qahhar led the men into the jungle and began a rebellion that would last for 15 years. In 1953, he proclaimed an Islamic state, thus joining the Darul Islam movement. Important factors in the rebellion's genesis and momentum were bitterness at the perceived injustice and rejection of Qahhar and the Sulawesi guerrillas by the central government and army and increasing Javanese hegemony in the region. Other causal factors debated include Islam, various political ideas, and several South Sulawesi cultural concepts. What seems clear is that Qahhar had developed ideas that were seemingly incompatible with "traditional" notions of South Sulawesi culture. He preached a form of "Islamic socialism," aimed to implement strict shari'ah law, eradicate aristocratic titles, pre-Islamic rituals, and Sufi orders. Forty-eight years after his death, Qahhar Mudzakkar continues to divide opinion and inspire new generations. The paper focuses on three main aspects of Qahhar Mudzakkar and his legacy. The first examines traditional leadership in South Sulawesi, including the cultural characteristics expected of leaders and draws comparisons with the 17th century. The second examines memories and perceptions of Qahhar and the rebellion related to me by people who lived through the period. The third looks at how Qahhar is perceived and the role he plays in modern day South Sulawesi, particularly in local politics as many see Preparatory Committee for the Application of Islamic Laws (KPPSI) as a continuation of Qahhar’s struggle.
The head of KPPSI is Abdul Aziz Qahhar Mudzakkar, a son of Qahhar Mudzakkar.

Benarkah nasionalisme meluntur bersama arus deras globalisasi yang mengaburkan batas-batas satuan kebudayaan dalam sebuah Negara-bangsa? Benarkah sentimen nasionalisme tidak lagi relevan dengan konteks modernisasi yang meniscayakan kepentingan individu?Perubahan social telah terjadi, dan sebaiknya disikapi secara tepat. Pelestarian nasionalisme, memerlukan formula tepat pula. Banyak pihak pesimis dan mengkhawatirkan kelanjutan nasionalisme warga negeri Indonesia ini terutama di kalangan generasi muda. Memang perlu dibuktikan dengan parameter jelas, akan tetapi jika dianggap sebagai warning system bagi kelanjutan NKRI, ada baiknya kita menengok kembali kabar nasionalisme dan integritas yang kini agaknya telah menjadi topik yang kurang menarik untuk dibicarakan, kalah populer dengan isu-isu politik praktis, pemilukada, korupsi, kasus hukum, dsb. Topik nasionalisme sama redupnya dengan topik-topik integritas, juga Pancasila. Padahal, isu nasionalisme amat penting bagi kelangsungan hidup negara dan rakyat. Melestarikan ajaran nasionalisme dari masyarakat multikultur dengan sentimen etnisitas dan ikatan primordial yang masih cukup kuat memang tidak mudah. Ditambah isu kedaerahan yang makin menguat bersamaan derasnya gerakan desentralisasi berbalut jargon kemandirian daerah, pemilukada, makin mendekatkan pada isu kelokalan dan menjauhkan pada isu yang dipandang sebagai "urusan nasional". Nasionalisme, mau tidak mau dipandang sebagai isu berlevel nasional, berurusan dengan keutuhan dan ketahanan negara, dan itu domain pemerintah pusat. Orang semakin enggan bicara isu ini ketika mereka pada saat yang sama juga merasakan kekecewaan ketika menyaksikan kasus-kasus hukum yang melibatkan pejabat pemerintah. Dalam pengertian masyarakat umum, para pelaku korupsi, dipandang sebagai orang yang tidak cinta Negara, tidak punya jiwa nasionalisme! Lha kalau pejabat saja tidak berjiwa nasionalis, buat apa rakyat biasa harus berjiwa nasionalis? Asumsi di atas memang perlu dibuktikan, namun ada gejala alienasi (keterasingan) terhadap isu nasionalisme terutama di kalangan generasi muda. Saya tidak yakin jika jiwa nasionalisme telah luntur, hanya terasing dan kurang terstruktur saja, karena perubahan social dan budaya yang terbawa arus globalisasi dan modernisasi.

The 1950s were an extraordinary time of cultural development in Indonesia, in which writers, filmmakers, and painters explored possible "Indonesian" identities in their work, drawing on foreign as well as indigenous sources of inspiration in an atmosphere of freewheeling political debate. My project began in 2007 when I had the good fortune of being invited by Jenny Lindsay and Maya Liem to take part in two workshops on Indonesian culture in the 1950s. A book of essays from these wonderful gatherings will be published by the KITLV later this year under the title "Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian 1950-1965." After the conclusion of the second workshop, which was held in Jakarta in October 2009, I flew to Yogyakarta, met up with Jenny and another old friend, Alan Feinstein, and spent what I can only describe as one of the most pleasurable days of my life visiting art galleries in Yogya, the beautiful art collection at the rural home of the writer Ajip Rosidi (I particularly remember the landscapes by Rusli hung high on the wall [Rusli, 1919-2005]), and finally, late in the afternoon as you can see from the photo taken from Dr. Oei's house of his museum, the amazing collection of modern and contemporary Indonesian painting owned by Dr. Oei Hong Djien (Spanjaard2004). Dr. Oei is an extraordinary figure: heir to a successful tobacco business, anatomical pathologist, violinist, and for thirty years Indonesia's most discerning, if not its foremost, collector of modern and contemporary art. After an all-too-brief visit to this remarkable collection, I knew that I wanted to write something about modern

This is the Indonesian version of my presentation to the staff of the Museum Sejarah Jakarta (Jakarta History Museum) to enable them to act as guides for the newly opened 'Diponegoro Room/Kamar Diponegoro') inaugurated on 1 April 2019. Diponegoro was kept for 26 days in what was then the Batavia Town Hall built during the Dutch East India Company (VOC) period (1602-1799). The west  wing of this building was used to house high-status political prisoners like Diponegoro. The Prince stayed in the private apartment of the head jailer on the second floor (the jailer was obliged to vacate his apartment if a high status prisoner like the Prince was in residence) with three close members of his family (his wife, Raden Ayu Retnoningsih [1810-85], his younger sister, Raden Ayu Dipowiyono, and brother-in-law, Raden Tumenggung Dipowiyono), and 16 followers (including four intimate retainers or panakawan) who stayed in the servants' accommodation at the back. During these 26 days, while the Prince awaited the decision of the Governor-General, Johannes van den Bosch (in office, 1830-34) on the conditions for his lifetime exile in Sulawesi (Celebes) - first in Manado (1830-33) and then in Makassar (1833-55)(Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade no.1, 30 April 1830), he had his portrait painted by his guardian, Adrianus Johannes (Jan) Bik (1790-1872), the magistrate (baljuw) of Batavia, and wrote personal letters to his mother, Raden Ayu Mangkorowati (ca. 1770-1852), and eldest son, Prince Diponegoro the Younger (ca. 1803-post-March 1856), all of which are displayed in the exhibit.

The present article deals with the political debates about secularism, Islam and Pancasila in Indonesian history. It argues that Pancasila—or Pancasila secularism—constitutes, as Abdurrahman Wahid (2001) has rightly put it, a “mild secularism,” in which relative (not absolute) separation between state and religion is maintained, but allows at the same time the former’s moderate administering of some of the latter’s public affairs, on the one hand, and the latter’s moderate values and norms to inspire the former, on the other hand. If secularism contains three basic theses (Casanova 1994: 3-6), viz., separation of state and religion, privatization of religion and differentiation between religious and non-religious spheres, they are not fully and strongly implemented, because there has always been some degree of religiousness present, and this could not easily be abandoned. As for the official political debates, they were mostly related to the separation thesis, rather than to privatization and differentiation, but there has also been an association of secularism (also in the sense of separation) with nationalist groups and of anti-secularism with Islamic groups. This study contributes to the knowledge of how secularism has been indigenized creatively as part of Indonesian political culture. This study also shows that secularism and Islam could mix in their milder sense in order to endorse a more democratic form of politics for Muslim society.

Sukarno’s prime concern was to give Indonesia to the Indonesians by becoming independent from the Dutch Empire. Sukarno was educated in the Dutch education system, and internalized the ideology of the separation of state and religion. Sukarno tried to materialize this by suppressing political movements placing Islam at the center of their political ideology. Islam had been a major factor for decades already before the Indonesian Independence a justification for rebellion and violence against the Dutch colonizer and the Indo-Europeans. This inspired Dr. Kevin Fogg to label the Indonesian revolution an Islamic revolution, but an Islamic evolution seems more plausible. The Indo-Europeans were undoubtedly influenced by negative experiences with Islam. But the thesis of Lizzy Van Leeuwen is only part of a more dialectical history. Indo-European stance towards Islam was influenced by the colonial Dutch-European discourse as well. Dutch experiences in Indonesia reconfirmed their European-Christian preconceptions. Indonesian Islam often went hand in hand with decolonization. The loss of Indo-European hegemony, wealth, and future was seen as taken from them by Muslim revolutionaries after official independence in December 1949. The negative Dutch and Indo-European perceptions of Islam made Islam more attractive for Islamic groups who wanted an independent (Islamic) Indonesia. This is what Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, an influential intellectual advising the Dutch colonial government, tried to prevent by dogmatically supporting a long-standing Dutch political dogma, namely freedom of religion. Snouck warned the Dutch colonial government for the political danger of Islamic groups, mainly those who were influenced by pan-Islamic Arab interpretations that consolidated violent, expansive, and dominant medieval remnants of Islam. Snouck advised to educate the Indonesians to protect the colonial subjects from Islamic aspects that could prevent Indonesia from modernizing. He never professed large-scale Christianization, being sympathetic to Islam himself. These Dutch-Indonesian debates concerning Islam came to the Netherlands in the postcolonial era. The Indo-European experiences of decolonization in relation to Islam are indeed noticeable among contemporary Indo-Europeans in the Netherlands. However, to argue that these memories were solely constitutive for Geert Wilders’ Islam critique downgrades his own experiences with Islam, the complexity of memorizing, and the complex Dutch and Indo-European dialectical discourse construction in relation with experiences.

Abstraks
Diketahui bahwasannya identitas nasional adalah kesatuan yang terikat oleh wilayah dan selalu memiliki wilayah (tanah tumpah darah mereka sendiri), system hukum atau perundang-undangan, kesamaan sejarah, hak dan kewajiban serta pembagian kerja berdasarkan profesi. Diharapkan agar para warga bangsa dapat menerapkan pemahaman tentang identitas nasional dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara. Disarankan agar kita semakin peduli dan mempelajari bangsa Indonesia, sehingga dapat menambah cakrawalah pengetahuan.
Kata Kunci : identitas nasional, bangsa indonesia

Abstract
It is known that national identity is a unit that is bound by territory and always has territory (their homeland), legal system or legislation, historical similarities, rights and obligations and division of labor based on profession. It is hoped that the citizens of the nation can apply the understanding of national identity in the life of society, nation and state. It is recommended that we care more and learn more about the Indonesian people, so that we can increase our knowledge horizons.
Keywords : national identity, Indonesian nation

Despite its seemingly overwhelming military superiority, the Netherlands never came close to defeating the increasingly effective nationalist insurgency on Java in the late 1940s. This article argues that the desperate state of the Dutch counter-insurgency campaign-which tends to be overlooked for the crucial years 1947-1948-is best demonstrated by focussing on the failure of the colonial power to integrate the civilian and military efforts and on its inability to govern reoccupied territory during the 'pacification phase'.

This chapter analyses the position of the Perhimpoenan Indonesia, an Indonesian students’ association in the Netherlands in the interwar era which has been widely recognized as a trailblazing organization within the Indonesian political landscape, in relation to a few concepts from the work of Benedict Anderson. There has been an evolution in the thinking of Anderson, in which he replaced the strictly comparative framework of Imagined Communities with a global conception of nationalism in Under Three Flags, in which travelling ideas and intellectuals were of central importance. In this sense, expatriate communities such as the Indonesian students in the Perhimpoenan Indonesia were repositioned from being eccentric to the Indonesian political landscape to being in the centre of the international stage.

Introduction by Tuong Vu, University of Oregon ..................................................................... 2 Review by Joseph M. Parent, University of Miami ................................................................... 5 Review by Thomas B. Pepinsky, Cornell University .................................................................. 7 Review by Feng Zhang, The Australian National University ................................................... 10 Author’s Response by Ja Ian Chong, National University of Singapore.................................. 14

http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-7-5.pdf

The Darul Islam rebellion against the central Indonesian government in the immediate post-independence period was largely dependent on charismatic leaders who came to prominence during the struggle against the Dutch. The charismatic leader of this rebellion in South Sulawesi was Qahhar Mudzakkar (also spelt "Kahar Muzakkar"), whose conflict with the central government and army began in 1950 when he was overlooked as commander of a special Sulawesi brigade and many of the Sulawesi guerrillas who had fought against the Dutch were discarded as the Indonesian Army restructured. Qahhar led the men into the jungle and began a rebellion that would last for 15 years. In 1953, he proclaimed an Islamic state, thus joining the Darul Islam movement. Important factors in the rebellion's genesis and momentum were bitterness at the perceived injustice and rejection of Qahhar and the Sulawesi guerrillas by the central government and army and increasing Javanese hegemony in the region. Other causal factors debated include Islam, various political ideas, and several South Sulawesi cultural concepts. What seems clear is that Qahhar had developed ideas that were seemingly incompatible with "traditional" notions of South Sulawesi culture. He preached a form of "Islamic socialism," aimed to implement strict shari'ah law, eradicate aristocratic titles, pre-Islamic rituals, and Sufi orders. Forty-eight years after his death, Qahhar Mudzakkar continues to divide opinion and inspire new generations. The paper focuses on three main aspects of Qahhar Mudzakkar and his legacy. The first examines traditional leadership in South Sulawesi, including the cultural characteristics expected of leaders and draws comparisons

Indonesische studenten richtten in 1908 een vereniging op die antikoloniale activiteiten vanuit Nederland zou stimuleren. Zij legden contacten met gelijkgezinden in politieke centra als Parijs en Berlijn, en versterkten ook verzet vanuit Indonesië zelf. Zo stimuleerden ze een internationale antikoloniale samenwerking.

In 1908, Indonesian students in the Netherlands established an association that aimed to stimulate contacts with like-minded activists in political centers such as Paris and Berlin, and reinforce anticolonial resistance in the Netherlands Indies. As such, they stimulated international anticolonial cooperation.

This chapter seeks to discover the value of Literature in reinforcing identity. It discusses the relationship between the absence of Literature courses in school and students’ tendency to adopt a writer’s identity that is essentially foreign. In Indonesia, pupils in local schools have been disadvantaged through lack of grounding in Literature, leaving a vacuum that is being filled with foreign culture that  eventually leads to Euro-/-Americentrism. This chapter uses postcolonial theories to trace the asymmetrical influence of one culture over another, fostered by policies and practices in the Institution of Literature and which have been imposed by the ruling class as far back as colonial times.

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