Ijtihad

Penulisan penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh Pandemi Covid-19 yang melanda hampir di seluruh negara di dunia, salah satunya yaitu Indonesia. Pandemi Covid-19 membawa berbagai dampak yang dialami oleh penduduk dunia, tak terkecuali penduduk Indoneesia yang mayoritas beragama Islam. Beragam dampak yang ditimbulkan tentunya mempengaruhi gaya hidup serta keseharian yang dilakukan, salah satunya adalah ibadah sholat dan lain-lain. Peneelitian ini mengkaji mengenai kontribusi Ijtihad sebagai salah satu sumber hukum Islam yang digunakan sebagai pedoman dalam kehidupan beragama maupun bernegara. Ijtihad yang dilakukan oleh para mujtahid memberikan solusi dari permasalahan yang timbul akibat Pandemi Covid-19. selain itu, bentuk kontribusi dari Ijtihad di masa Pandemi Covid-19 juga dapat dijumpai melalui pengimplementasiannya. Tujuan dari penelitian ini yaitu untuk mengetahui peran serta manfaat dari eksistensi Ijtihad di masa Pandemi Covid-19 sebagai penyelamat jiwa (hifdzu an-nafsi) terutama dalam aspek beribadah.

In this book I offer a critical, comparative and empirically-informed defense of Islamic schools in the West. To do so I elaborate an idealized philosophy of Islamic education, against which I evaluate the very different empirical situation in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United States. I examine in detail notions of cultural identity and cultural coherence, the scope of parental authority v. a child's interests, as well as the state's hypothetical role in regulating religious schools.

Towards a Fiqh for Minorities is an important subject and a much-needed contribution to an area of ‎Fiqh that has become essential for the wellbeing and development of Muslim communities living in the ‎West. The author stresses that the problems of Muslim minorities can only be tackled with a fresh ‎juristic vision based on the principles, objectives and higher values of the Qur’an in conjunction with ‎the ultimate aims and intents (maqasid) of the Shariah. In essence Dr. Al-Alwani’s paper is a call for ‎Muslim minorities to have a sense of themselves as citizens and develop a positive, confident view of ‎their place and value in society, moving away from notions of immigrant status and governed by a ‎humanistic vision focusing on the betterment of society.‎

In this paper I will analyse Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī’s (1703-1762) characterisation of the early divide in Islamic jurisprudence between the aṣḥāb al-raʾy, commonly translated as rationalists, and the ahl al-ḥadīth, the traditionalists who refused to engage in the sophisticated legal reasoning which the former had become famous for, instead vindicating the limitation of law to the evident implication of the scripture. For the sake of brevity, I will confine my analysis to the chapter “Causes of the disagreement between the ahl al-ḥadīth and the aṣḥāb al-raʾy” in al-Dihlawī’s “al-Inṣāf fī bayān asbāb al-ikhtilāf” (Fair Elucidation of the Causes of Disagreement)1. I will compare his portrayal of the conflict with present Islamicist research, examining harmony and variation. Specifically, the legal hermeneutics of both parties will be considered alongside underlying conceptions of the historical environment and course of development. As the chapter at hand further gives many clues about al-Dihlawī’s personal stance on the matter, I will review respective passages as part of the studies on the confluence and later legacy of these two parties. Considering that he is the principal figure of the traditionalist revival in 18th century India, his remarks are important to understand the link between modern Salafi literalism and the early traditionalists of the formation period. To which degree does Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī’s characterisation of the divide differ from the results of present Islamicist research, and how does his particular framing of the conflict relate to his revivalist thought?  / Term paper in "Hadith", B.A. Islamic Studies course by Olly Ackermann at FUB in winter 2019. Grade: 1,0.

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Şah Veliyyullah ed-Dihlevi'nin erken dönem ehli rey ve ehli hadis tartışmalarını değerlendirişi.

وصف شاه ولي الله الدهلوي للنزاع التاريخي بين مدرستي الرأي والحديث

يقارب الدكتور سعيد شبرا النقاش حول قضية الاجتهاد والتجديد من بابه الواسع في كتابه الاجتهاد والتجديد  ويطرح قراءة متجددة للاشكاليات والأدبيات الفلسفية والعقائدية التي رافقت حركة التجديد و أسقطت على معاني الاجتهاد مفاضلات متعددة في الفكر الاسلامي المعاصر.
وعلى الرغم من أن الشبار يقول أن الأصل في تبيان مواضع الاختلاف في تعريفات الأصوليين وبعض التعديلات الموجهة إليها ليس الخلوص إلى ترجيح تعريف معين أو استخلاص تعريف جديد منها، لكن الإشكال من زاوية نظر تعالج مسألة تخلف الأمة وتعطل حركة العقل والفكر فيها، والاجتهاد على رأسها، هو اختزال مفهوم الاجتهاد الذي كان فعلاً حركة عقل ومجتمع في إطار أصول دينية واضحة، وجعله آلة خاصة بمجال التداول الفقهي الذي كان بدوره المغذي الأكبر لهذه الحركة. لكنه لما أتى على هذا المجال زمان من الجمود والانكماش، قضى على تلك الحركة أن تتوقف، وعلى العقل أن يستقيل، وعلى الاجتهاد أن «يغلق» بابه، وعلى الأمة بالتالي أن تنسحب من موقع القيادة.
ونقرأ للدكتور إسماعيل راجي الفاروقي، وهو يفسر – في عبارات بليغة ومختصرة لما تقدم – انحسار الاجتهاد «على يد السلف في عملية استنباط الأحكام من أدلتها الشرعية أو مصادرها الأصولية» وأخذ إما فهم المعاصرين للخلاف بين مفهومي التجديد والإخماد فهو لم يؤلف وجوباً بحسب الشبار عن إلغاء الأصول فهم أوردوا رسموا دائرة خلقة أخرى حول هذا المفهوم بين «الترجيحي انتقائي» يقوم على «اختيار أحد الآراء المنقولة في تراثنا الفقهي العريض للفتوى أو القضاء به، ترجيحاً له على غيره من الآراء والأقوال الأخرى» و«إبداعي إنشائي» يقوم على «استنباط حكم جديد في مسألة من المسائل، لم يقل به أحد من السابقين، سواء كانت المسألة قديمة أو جديدة»( ).

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Husein Đozo je jedan od najuticajnijih naših savremenih muslimanskih mislilaca. Istovremeno, on je izuzetno značajan predstavnik islamskog reformizma kod nas. Mi ćemo u ovom radu pokušati da analiziramo osnovne spoznajne principe njegovog reformističkog razumevanja islama i Kur’ana. Služeći se metodom detaljne analize najvažnijih spisa Huseina Đoze, uočićemo da se on znatno udaljava od tradicionalnog spoznajnog stadijuma islama u različitim sferama svojih ontoloških, antropoloških i epistemoloških razmišljanja. Njegova definicija odnosa između nauke i objave potpuno je zasnovana na empirističkim metodološkim principima. Zbog toga, Đozo će na temeljima empirizma i istoricizma tumačiti pojam idžtihad a i značaj predanja Verovesnika islama. U njegovim stavovima, na tom polju, jasno se prepoznaju glavne orijentacije neoselefizma i uticaj slavnih predstavnika škole al-Manar.

Ključne reči: Husein Đozo, islamski reformizam, empirizam, škola al-Manar, moderna nauka, objava, idžtihad, neoselefizam

Dari segi bahasa, Ijtihad berasal dari kata ijtihada, yang berarti bersungguh-sungguh, rajin, giat atau mencurahkan segala kemampuan (jahada). Jadi, menurut bahasa ijtihad ialah mengerjakan sesuatu dengan segala kesungguhan. Perkataan ijtihad tidak digunakan kecuali untuk perbuatan yang harus dilakukan dengan susah payah.

Islamic Feminism has emerged around the 1920s as a concept and developed  rapidly as a global phenomenon in the mid‐1990s. While conservatives claim that  gender asymmetries are divinely ordained, Islamic feminists hold the contrary and  are working for complete equality between men and women. The purpose of this  research is to investigate the status of women in Islam according to the Quran and  the Sunnah to see whether Islamic feminism’s claims are founded.   This study reveals that although there are commonalities between Islamic feminism  and Islam itself, oftentimes Islamic feminism is fighting against practices that  emanate directly from the Quran and the Sunnah, such as polygamy, hijab, the  Islamic inheritance laws, the concept of male guardianship, etc. At the core of the  differences that exist between Muslim scholars and Islamic feminists are the  methodologies they use to investigate the sacred texts. 
Keywords: Islamic  feminism,  gender  equality,  gender  equity,  ijtihad,  social  justice, gender asymmetries, science of hadeeth 

Le féminisme islamique a vu le jour aux alentours des années 1920. Il a connu une  avancée fulgurante au milieu des années 1990, et est devenu depuis lors un  phénomène mondial. Alors que les conservateurs affirment que les inégalités qui  existent entre les genres sont un commandement divin, les féministes islamiques  soutiennent le contraire et revendiquent donc une égalité complète entre homme  et femme. Le but de cette recherche est d’enquêter sur le statut de la femme en  Islam en prenant appui sur le Coran et la Sunnah pour voir si les revendications du  féminisme islamique sont fondées ou pas.  Cette étude révèle que bien qu’il existe des points communs entre le féminisme  islamique et l’Islam en tant que tel, force est de constater que trop souvent le  féminisme islamique se dresse contre des pratiques qui émanent directement du  Coran et de la Sunnah telles que la polygamie, le hijab, les lois qui régissent  l’héritage en islam, la tutelle, etc. Au cœur des divergences qui existent entre les savants musulmans et les féministes islamiques se trouvent les méthodologies  qu’ils utilisent pour analyser les textes sacrés.   
Mots-clés: Féminisme islamique, égalité des genres, équité des genres, ijtihad,  justice sociale, asymétrie du genre, science du hadith 

Preface
This volume originated from the proceedings of the three-day international seminar “Islamic Ethics and the Genome Question”, organized by the Research Center for Islamic Legislation & Ethics (CILE) in Doha, Qatar, between 3rd and 5th April 2017.  This seminar makes part of the CILE series of interdisciplinary seminars which solicit contributions from researchers, scholars and experts in various fields in order to address key ethical questions from an Islamic perspective. Like other seminars in the series, this seminar was preceded by a Call-For-Papers (CFP), espoused with a background paper explaining its main themes and key questions.  All submissions were reviewed by an internal committee and a limited number of the submissions was selected. Besides the submissions coming from the CFP, direct invitations were sent to some participants, whose published research shows their ability to cover topics that were not addressed by the CFP submissions. Throughout the three days of the seminar, the two groups, coming from the CFP and direct invitations, presented their papers and feedback on each other’s papers and exchanged ideas and insights on many issues related to the main themes of the seminar. Benefiting from the intensive discussions during the seminar, the authors worked on revising their papers. Finally, a few new papers were written after the seminar in order to cover some lacunas revealed by the discussions during the seminar. A post-seminar internal review was made inside CILE then the selected material went through the peer-review process managed by Brill. The papers which successfully went through these various layers of review are included in this volume.
Throughout the long journey, which started by mere proposals of rough ideas about the seminar up until this publication, I have received invaluable help and support from a great number of people whose list is too long to be included here. Every researcher is well aware that working on refining the language and unifying the referencing style of pieces written by different authors is time-consuming and laborious. Most of this work was accomplished by two of our brilliant students of “Islamic Thought and Applied Ethics” specialization in the College of Islamic Studies, namely Mariam Taher and Reem Al-Sahlawi. Furthermore, a splendid job was achieved by the two competent and hardworking Research Assistants, Noha Abdel Ghany and Shaimaa Moustafa, who assisted me in my current two research projects funded by the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF). Additionally, all colleagues working in CILE were very supportive throughout all the elevations and depressions of this extensive journey.  Finally, my due thanks go to Dr. P.S. Van Koningsveld, who worked temporarily as the Managing Editor of this series. His advice and wisdom were crucial for bringing this publication to light.
I keep the last word here for my dear family, to whom I remain indebted my whole life. My wife, Karima, has always been far and beyond the ideal woman I could have ever imagined in my dreams. Personally, my children, the twin Maryam and Khadija, Mustapha, Aisha and Hamza have practically demonstrated that “pure innocence” exists and I hope they will be up to the challenges ahead in their life, while keeping their precious innocence intact. My mother, Fawiza, is an example of the simple villager whose strength lies in her ability to selflessly give without waiting for a reward in return. My late father, Mustafa, is the great personality in my life whom I miss dearly. I say to these great figures in my life: “I am related to you all not only through a shared genome, but also through unbated love and mutual care”.
Mohammed Ghaly
Doha, Qatar
August 2018

Syari’ah tidaklah dikatakan syari’ah jika tidak mempunyai tujuan dari implementasinya, yang hadir sebagai respon solutif terhadap problematika aktual zaman. Adanya maqasid syari’ah adalah sebagai tanda dan petanda adanya dialektika antara teks (nash) dengan realitas.Pengetahuan mengenai maqasid syari’ah bertujuan memahami teks dengan memahami tujuan dari teks mengeluarkan dalalah-nya, karena pengetahuan tentang syari’ah melahirkan pengetahuan tentang maqasid. Kajian mengenai maqasid syari’ah membawa kita kepada pemahaman tentang hakikat at-tasyri’, khususnya dalam ayat-ayat hukum. more click http://ejournal.kopertais4.or.id/index.php/elhikam/article/view/1386

Puji syukur saya panjatkan kehadirat Allah SWT, atas segala limpahan rahmat, taufik, hidayah dan inayah-Nya, sehingga saya dapat menyelesaikan penyusunan makalah yang berjudul "Ijtihad dan Tanggung Jawab Hakim" dengan hadirnya makalah ini dapat memberikan informasi bagi para pembaca tentang Ijtihad dan tanggung jawab hakim yang berkaitan dengan Hadits Ahkam Keluarga.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Sat, 02 May 2015 20:53:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Int. J. Middle East Stud. 16 (1984), 3-41 Printed in the United States of America Wael B. Hallaq WAS THE GATE OF IJTIHAD CLOSED? INTRODUCTION

‫ـــــــ‬ ‫الثامن‬ ‫العدد‬ ‫ـــــــ‬ ‫ّة‬ ‫اإلسالمي‬ ‫ّراسات‬ ‫الد‬ ‫جملة‬ ‫جانفي‬ 7102 ‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬ ‫ــــــ‬ ‫ـــ‬ ‫ــــــــ‬ ‫ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ‬ 011 ‫قاعدة‬ " ‫ال‬ ‫اليص‬ ‫مع‬ ‫اجتَاد‬ " ‫ىقدية‬ ‫حتليلية‬ ‫دزاضة‬ ‫المتقي‬ ‫العالي‬ ‫عبد‬ ‫زهر‬ ‫ابن‬ ‫جامعة‬ ‫الشريعة‬ ‫كلية‬ ‫أكادير‬-‫المغرب‬ Abstract: This study discusses the precept "no ijtihad is allowed when the text is presented", by revealing its core nature, defining its terminology, and by exploring its different research trends. The study distinguishes between the overall trend and the specialized one, while separately presenting the premises of every trend. Throughout this study, the researcher uses a critical, analytical method; and he does so by examining the significance of the concepts "text" and "Ijtihad" (exegesis) in Islamic jurisprudence, and also by revealing the existing differences between various Muslim jurisprudents. Additionally, the study examines deeply each researcher's perspective regarding the issue under study. The study's findings could are as follows:-First, the precept "No Ijtihad is allowed when the text is presented" is an Islamic juristic rule.-Second, the study of a rule or precept necessitates the study of its terminology.-Third, difference between various researchers is attributable to differences in defining the meaning of its terminology.-Fourth, the function of "Ijtihad" is not limited to understanding and deduction, but goes beyond that to real critical application.-Fifth, the lack of interest-by some researchers-in explaining the precepts' terminology has a negative impact on the nature of their commentaries.-Sixth, the problematic relating to the precept, "There is no Ijtihad/exegesis in the presence of the text" has to do with its terminology.

Imam Ibn taymiyyah being one of the greatest scholar who was a mujtahid,muwahid as well as muhaddis. There is no aspect of Islam which is not touched by Ibn taymiyyah. So, as for the concept of Ijtihad and taqleed. Ibn taymiyyah raised the importance of ijtihad and true menaing of both taqleed and ijtihad in an era when people were loosing its value which was danger for the coming generations as ijtihad and taqleed are essential concepts in Islam which allow the scholars to take decision in the light of Quran and sunnah for new contemporary issues of the society.

While the studies on al-Ghazālī’s thought are abundant, its unusual approach to the issue of khatm al-nubuwwa has not received the attention of researchers. Yet, in his Iqtiṣād, he seeks to answer this tricky issue: Is it possible to consider as an infidel a Muslim who does not believe in the sealing of prophethood? In this article, we will analyze al-Ghazālī’s response. Our aim will be to put his response into its historical context, taking into account the philosophical and religious attitude of the author. To this end, we will analyse, firstly, the context in which he tackles this issue in his Iqtiṣād. Secondly, we will examine how his opinion differs from the commonly accepted doctrine and then analyse how it provides a solid refutation of the idea that ijmā‘ and tawātur can be used as a conclusive proofs of a doctrine.

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Si les études sur la pensée d’al-Ghazālī sont abondantes, son approche singulière de la question du khatm al-nubuwwa n’a pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. Or dans son Iqtiṣād, il s’attache à répondre à cette question épineuse : peut-on qualifier d’infidèle un musulman qui ne croit pas en la clôture de la prophétie ? Dans le présent article, nous analyserons la réponse d’al-Ghazālī. Notre objectif sera de replacer celle-ci dans son contexte historique, en tenant compte de l’attitude philosophico-religieuse de l’auteur. Pour ce faire, nous analyserons, en premier lieu, le contexte dans lequel il traite cette question dans son Iqtiṣād. En second lieu, nous examinerons comment son opinion diffère de la doctrine communément admise et, ensuite, en quoi celle-ci constitue une réfutation solide de l’idée que l’ijmā‘ et le tawātur puissent servir de preuves décisives en matière de doctrine.

Depuis l’émergence de la discipline uṣūl al-fiqh, il existe une tension entre le taqlīd et l’ijtihād plus ou moins affirmée selon les auteurs et les époques. Cette tension a trouvé avec l’apparition du wahhabisme une expression renouvelée. L’objet de cet article est de rendre compte de la controverse entre deux penseurs musulmans contemporains et de montrer comment derrière le vif débat qu’ils conduisirent à propos de l’ijtihād et du taqlīd se trouve en jeu la définition de l’orthodoxie sunnite.

Nopiyanti. 2014. Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar.
Ijtihad adalah istilah para fuqaha, yaitu berfikir dengan menggunakan seluruh ilmu yang dimiliki oleh ilmuan syari’at islam untuk menentukan/menetapkan sesuatu hukum syari’at islam dalam hal-hal yang ternyata belum ditegaskan hukumnya oleh Al-qur’an dan Sunnah. Ijtihad dapat dijadikan sebagai sumber hukum Islam yang ketiga.

Un des points centraux de la pensée islamique contemporaine tourne autour de l’idée qu’il faudrait « rouvrir les portes de l’ijtihâd » (effort de réflexion) progressivement fermées par l’establishment religieux. Partout dans le monde, y compris en France, savants et intellectuels musulmans appellent à mettre fin à la sclérose intellectuelle dont souffrirait l’Islam depuis plusieurs siècles. Cependant, par bien des aspects, les notions de « fermeture des portes de l’ijtihâd » et de déclin intellectuel sont en réalité des légendes – au sens étymologique – nées dans les cercles orientalistes et salafis, comme plus de trois décennies de recherches historiques et islamologiques le montrent

My thesis attempts to establish whether sainthood (wilaya) in Islam has been correctly defined according to the Glorious Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna. It, therefore, focuses on the commentary of the hadith of the wali by the independent mujtahid and Yemeni scholar Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Shawkani. I have translated the first chapter of his work, Qatrul wali ‘ala hadith al-wali (The Later Clarification on the Tradition of the Wali) in which Shawkani has endeavored to give a textually based, literalist commentary on the hadith of the wali. His exposition of this hadith finally results in a critique of the widely accepted definition of wilaya held by the Sufis.

Traduction, introduite et annotée, d'Ibn Taymiyya, « Minhâj al-sunnat al-nabawiyya », édition M. R. SÂLIM, t. VI, p. 382-442, section (faṣl) dans laquelle l'auteur entend réfuter la thèse de la nécessité d'un imâm infaillible avancée par al-Ḥillî dans son « Minhâj al-karâma ».

Islamic legal tradition is discursive; it developed through discourses at two levels, one between jurists and society, and the other between jurists and state. The part played by differences of opinion (Ikhtilaf) and juristic reasoning (Ijtihad) cannot be overstressed. It provided strong basis for legal pluralism and accommodation of social practices,
especially in the area of marriage and divorce. State efforts to centralize law did not meet the approval of the jurists. Since  state had no direct role in the development of fiqh, the
systematization of Fiqh and Law Schools was achieved through consensus. Looking back at the history of Islamic law, we find that local practices in various cities like Medina and
Kufa generated diverse legal doctrines and gradually produced more than nineteen schools of law (madhhab); about seven are still in practice today. The distinct mark of the development of fiqh in this period is the diversity of views among the jurists on almost
each and every doctrine. This diversity was welcomed by Islamic legal theory as a valid
manifestation of Ijtihad. It is typically usual in the Fiqh texts to mention more than one view on almost every point. This is evident even in Fiqh texts like Fatawa Alamgiri, which were designed as a guide book for the qadis. Instead of giving just one doctrine of law, these texts refer to different opinions. It looks strange, but the underlying concept seems to be that it was not for the jurist, to choose between these varying opinions.

The employment of the judicial organ of the state for the incremental reform and modernisation of family laws distinguishes Pakistan’s experience from that of the Middle Eastern Muslim countries where legislative codification is used to achieve the same end. Pakistan inherited a hybrid legal system based on the transplantation of common law tradition in British India. The Pakistani judiciary deviated from the principles of Ḥanafī school that were strictly applied by the colonial judiciary and are still being applied in India. It promoted the rights of women to get a divorce without the husband’s consent under the classical Islamic legal doctrine of khula‘ by making a direct recourse to the primary sources of Islamic Law, the Qur’ān and Sunnah. This form of ‘judicial ijtihād’ continues to play a key role in accommodating the classical Islamic law (fiqh) within the framework of international human rights law in Pakistan. This process was not deterred by the initiation of the process of the Islamisation of laws, introduced in the mid 1970s, rather it unintentionally bolstered judicial ijtihād by empowering the Sharī‘a Courts to have a direct recourse to the Qur’ān and Sunnah. During the colonial period, the judges of the higher courts were discouraged from making a direct recourse to the primary sources of Islamic law by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of appeal in the British Empire.

This article analyses the methods and methodological tools that were used by the judiciary in Pakistan for justifying the extension in the rights of women to get a divorce under Islamic law. The methods went beyond the classical forms of takhrīj, talfīq and takhyyur. Instead the judiciary primarily relied upon the method of judicial ijtihād. Likewise, the methodological tools were not limited to the ones found in the classical uṣūl al-fiqh such as qiyās, istiḥsān, istiṣlāḥ/maṣlaḥa, istidlāl, istiṣḥāb, sadd al-zarī‘a, ḍarūra and maqāsid. Rather new techniques were also employed, such as the principles of equity, justice and fairness and development of new legal categorisation.

This article employs comparative and historical research methodologies for analysing the development of women’s right to get a judicial divorce (khula‘) without the consent of the husband in Pakistan. It makes comparative references to the legal developments regarding this right in other Muslim countries and examines it from a historical perspective by looking into the genesis of legal reforms in classical Islamic law in South Asia during the colonial period.

This paper is the translation and commentary on part  five of the renowned maliki ʿUṣūli manual Taqrīb al-Uṣūl ʿilā ʿIlm al-ʿUṣūl of ʿIbn Juzay al-Kalbī.In the fifth part, which is the part that we have chosen for translation, ʿIbn Juzay provides a legal analysis of the place of fatwā, imitation (taqlīd), ʿijtihād, conflict between the evidences (taʾāruḍ) and preponderance (tarjīḥ) in Islamic Law. ʿIbn Juzay starts this part by first providing a definition of ʿijtihād and the scholarly debate around it. Then he proceeds by setting out the conditions necessary for being a mujtahid and the realms of Islamic faith in which ʿijtihād is applied. After his discussion on ʿijtihād, ʿIbn Juzay delves on the issue of taqlīd (imitation), its definition, condition and the Islamic legal norm regarding it. After this, ʿIbn Juzay analyses the notion of fatwā (legal opinion) and explains the legal discourse on the qualities and conditions of being a mufti or a mustaftī (a person asking for a fatwā). The most important part of the section is that dedicated to the legal explanation of the notion of preponderance and to the various ways in which a mujtahid is supposed to act in the case when a conflict between the legal evidences occur. For ʿIbn Juzay, the legal procedure of preponderance (tarjih) can be applied in regards to different textual sources or analogies. The last section of the text is dedicated to the explanation of the various legal factors that enable that existence of the difference of opinions.

This article argues on the basis of recent case law that the judges of the Pakistan Federal Shariat
Court (FSC) have asserted their right to ijtihād and have indeed engaged in collective ijtihād.
While in some areas, such as freedom of religion, Islamic law has been interpreted rigidly in a
non-human-rights-friendly fashion in Pakistan, in some other areas, the flexibility and
pluralism of Islamic law has been used to improve gender equality, women’s rights and the
right to family life. By using its constitutional powers, with its collective ijtihād, the FSC
has been tackling the traditionally illiberal interpretation and application of Muslim laws in
these areas. Regardless of the methodology and process of this ijtihādic endeavor, the
output shows that the FSC has been either modifying the traditional ijtihāds or coming up
with totally new ijtihāds to answer contemporary questions faced by Islamic law. The
findings of the article once again challenge the views of scholars such as Schacht, Coulson
and Chehata, who have argued that, by the fourth/tenth century, the essentials of Islamic
legal doctrine were already fully formulated and that the doctrine remained fixed.

This long essay examines the roles of the legislature and the Mujtahid with regards to law-making and interpretation processes. The legislative process as obtains under the Nigerian legal system is examined and juxtaposed with the process of Ijtihad under the Sharīʿah. It is found out that while the principles and aims of the two processes are similar, they exhibit some differences in terms of methodology of operation. The principal aim of the two processes, it is found out, is to establish norms that best secure benefit for man. It is also found out that there is much formality in the legislative process compared with the process of Ijtihād and that the qualification requirements of the Mujtahid are more stringent than those of the legislature.  The essay concludes that the formality in the legislative process is to ensure the legislature does not derail from the grund norm while making laws. It recommends that the formality of the legislative process can be adapted for collective Ijtihād and the qualification requirements for members of the legislature can be made a little more stringent, too

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While new and complicated legal issues continuously come to the fore, Islamic sacred texts that deal with legal issues are finite. Ijtihad is an interpretive tool that applies legal reasoning based on sacred texts to derive new legal rules that meet emerging legal problems. This paper will elucidate the nature of Ijtihad and comment on the status of Ijtihad today. The paper will also explain why it is necessary to replace macro-Ijtihad with micro-Ijtihad, and will highlight the importance of the continuance of Ijtihad by Islamic jurists despite Islamic law’s reduced application.

Giriş Fıkıh, içtihat yoluyla şer'î hükümlerin bilinmesini ifade ederken; fıkıh usulü, şer'î hükümlere doğru şekilde ulaşmak için başvurulan delillerin ve içtihat metotlarının bilinmesini ifade etmektedir (Apaydın, 2016, s. 5-11). Teori ve uygulamada tek bir usulden bahsedilemeyeceği için usuldeki farklılık, beraberinde içtihat farklılığını da getirmiştir. Farklı içtihatlar neticesinde ortaya çıkan ihtilaf, temelde şer'i kurallar ile usuli yöntemlerden kaynaklanan meşru bir ihtilaftır. Nasslarda yerilen ve dolayısıyla meşru olmayan ihtilaf ise itikadi konularla ilgili olan ihtilaflardır. Ameli alandaki ihtilafın meşruiyetini iki şekilde gerekçelendirmek mümkündür. Birinci gerekçe, farklı semavi dinlerde itikadi esasların değişmemesine rağmen, ameli uygulamaların değişmesidir. İkinci gerekçe ise hatada birleşmeyeceği belirtilen ümmet (İbn Mace, Fiten, 3950) nazarında, fıkıh mezheplerinin kabul görmesidir (Özdemir, 2014, s. 415). Pratikteki ihtilaflı birtakım meselelerle ilgili Allah'ın hükmünün, fıkıh literatürüne giren farklı içtihatlardan hangisi vasıtasıyla ortaya çıktığı belli değildir. Hepsinin amacı, meselenin çözümünde ilahi hükme isabet etmektir. Bu amaçla farklı içtihatların fukaha tarafından tartışılması ve eleştirilmesi tabiîdir. İçtihatların hata ya da isabetiyle ilgili fukaha arasında musavvibe ve muhattie olmak üzere iki ana temayül öne çıkmıştır. İçtihadî bir meselede Allah katında muayyen bir hükmün olmayacağını ve dolayısıyla birden fazla doğrunun olabileceğini kabul edenlere musavvibe; tek bir doğrunun olduğunu ve geriye kalan görüşlerin hatalı olacağını kabul edenlere ise muhattie denilir. Her iki temayülün kendi içerisinde ittifak ettiği söylenemez. Buna göre musavvibeden olan fakihlerin iki gruba ayrıldığı görülür. Birinci gruba göre birbirinden farklı bütün içtihatlar, Allah katında eşit şekilde doğrudur. Çünkü müçtehidin içtihadından önce Allah katında belirli bir hüküm yoktur. Allah'ın hükmü, müçtehidin içtihadıyla ulaştığı hükümdür. Bu sebeple bütün müçtehitler isabet etmiştir ve doğru, farklı içtihatlarda bulunan müçtehitlerin sayısı kadardır. İkinci gruba göre ise  Arş. Gör., Fırat Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi İslam Hukuku Bilim Dalı,

La richesse et l'évolution complexe des différentes tendances interprétatives qui traversent l'islam depuis ses débuts rendent impossibles les simplifications grossières. Certains analystes, plus ou moins bien intentionnés, reprennent pourtant à leur compte des clichés sur l'islam qui, pour être superficiels, n'en sont pas moins dotés d'une surprenante résilience. C'est le cas de la supposée opposition radicale entre un islam spirituel et mystique, et un islam dit ''juridique et casuistique''. En un mot, l'opposition entre le mufti et le soufi serait irréductible et insurmontable. C'est ainsi qu'un livre récent et intitulé Soufi ou mufti ? Quel avenir pour l'islam ? présente cette opposition comme étant la plus déterminante dans ce que sera l'islam de demain. Cet ouvrage prophétise la victoire inéluctable du juridique sur le spirituel 1 . Pourtant, l'historien des idées en terres d'Islam ne peut ignorer qu'il y a toujours eu des autorités de la Loi qui furent en même temps des maîtres de la Voie. Dès le III e siècle de l'Hégire, Junayd (m. 298/911), considéré comme l'une des autorités les plus importantes du soufisme, déclarait : « Notre science s'enracine dans le Livre et l'enseignement prophétique et quiconque n'est pas de ceux qui ont mémorisé le Coran, transcrit le Hadith et maîtrisé les sciences du fiqh, ne saurait être suivi. » Le célèbre Ghazâlî (m. 505/1111) a réussi une synthèse harmonieuse entre les aspects juridiques et spirituels de l'Islam, entre le fiqh et le soufisme, dans sa fameuse ''somme spirituelle'' intitulée Ihyâ''ulûm al-Dîn 2 . Il a ainsi durablement marqué toute la pensée musulmane. Mais bien avant lui, d'autres mystiques n'ont pas hésité à pratiquer un ijtihâd spirituel, c'est-à-dire à dépasser le cadre de la raison déductive et argumentative par le recours au dévoilement intuitif (kashf) afin d'apporter des réponses à des problèmes non évoqués par le Coran et la Sunna. C'est ainsi que Hallâj (m. 309/922) malgré son caractère extatique pratiquait l'ijtihâd -l'effort d'interprétation -pour réfuter certains points de Droit et de théologie qui lui semblaient trop restrictifs 3 . De la même façon, le grand porte-parole de l'ésotérisme islamique qu'est Ibn 'Arabî (m. 638/1240) fait une large place au fiqh dans son opus magnum, al-Futû-132 1. Anne-Marie Delcambre, éd. Desclée de Brouwer, 2007. Un ouvrage écrit trois ans plus tôt, bien que suivant une tout autre perspective, reconnaît le caractère central du soufisme parmi les alternatives islamiques endogènes aux dérives du littéralisme et de l'extrémisme religieux : Zidane Meriboute, La fracture islamique : demain le soufisme ?, Fayard, Paris, 2004. 2. Il n'existe pas de traduction intégrale de cet ouvrage mais de nombreuses traductions partielles ont paru en français et en anglais. Une analyse détaillée du contenu de chacun des quarante chapitres de cette somme est parue sous la direction de G.-H. Bousquet sous le titre Ihyâ''ouloûm ad-dîn ou vivification des sciences de la foi, Analyse et index, Paris, 1955. 3. Cf. Éric Geoffroy, L'islam sera spirituel ou ne sera plus, éd. Seuil, 2009, p. 108. actualité de l'ijtihâd spirituel: les fatwas soufies du grand-mufti d'égypte, le cheikh 'alî jum'a tayeb chouiref Horizons Maghrébins-le droit à la mémoire, n° 65/2011, 27 e année hât al-makkiyya 4 . Sur de très nombreux points de jurisprudence, il cite l'avis des principales écoles juridiques puis donne son propre ijtihâd, qui se veut à la fois fruit de son inspiration et conforme à la lettre des Écritures 5 . Quelques siècles plus tard, Jalâl al-Dîn al-Suyûtî (m. 911/1505), l'un des auteurs les plus prolixes de la littérature classique musulmane, prononça de nombreuses fatwas sur des sujets relatifs au soufisme dans son recueil intitulé al-Hâwî lil-fatâwî 6 . Il inaugurait ainsi une longue liste de muftis qui furent aussi de grands soufis. Nous nous proposons, dans ce qui suit, d'étudier le travail d'ijtihâd spirituel d'un grand semblés pour la pratique collective du dhikr 48 , et que 'A. J. veut être plus rassembleur que ne le fut 'Abd al-Halîm Mahmûd dans ses fatwas.

In the last few decades, questions about Islam and Shari’a (Islamic Law) have been raised. How does Islamic understanding and law reflect and fit social, cultural, and economic conditions in today’s world? Is Islam able to respond to the global challenges without ijtihad (Independent Reasoning)?

Many scholars and theologians argue these questions and try to find the application of ijtihad in modern era.  Most of the Islamic scholars accept Ijtihad as a main source of Islamic Law after the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the Prophetic Tradition). Ijtihad has a variety of forms such as qiyas (analogical reasoning), istihsan (juristic preference), maslahah mursalah
(public interest) and many more.

This paper consists of three parts. In the first part, I have defined the word “Ijtihad”, its meaning and significance in the Sunni Islamic law. This part includes ijtihad in Islamic Legal Theory. Second part contains the arguments of the contemporary scholars such as M. Hashim Kamali and M. Fethullah Gulen regarding principles and coverage of ijtihad, qualifications of mujtahid. In this part, I explored the discussion
about the historical background of ijtihad. While some scholars, such as Joseph Schacht and Sir James Anderson, have argued that towards the end of the third/ninth century the gate of ijtihad was closed. In addition, H.A.R. Gibb stated that early Islamic scholars commonly accepted that the gate of ijtihad was closed and could never be reopened. Other scholars, such as Wael Hallaq and Imam Suyuti, present more
compelling arguments that the door of ijtihad was never closed.
However, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, a respected Islamic scholar in the 20th century, argued “the door of independent judgments on the law is open, but at the present time there are a number of obstacles it being entered.”2

Finally, I will address the question, “Is the door of ijtihad still open or already closed? And why?” This part also includes the ijtihad committees as a solution to Islamic Law in the global era.

If one wishes to practice iǧtihād in any knowledge discipline, knowledge of the uṣūl of that discipline is required. In facilitating this focus on uṣūl necessary for iǧtihād, Ǧamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (d. 1914) from Damascus was a pivotal figure in the early 20th century. I argue that Qāsimī did not introduce a fundamentally new approach to the fundamentals of fiqh, tafsīr or ḥadīṯ. He merely brought long forgotten concepts and texts back into the limelight. This still both necessitated and facilitated iǧtihād in a wider realm than only fiqh, also including tafsīr, ḥadīṯ, creed, and even linguistics. I first show how Qāsimī revived direct engagement with the Islamic primary sources in his environment by disseminating diverse works on uṣūl. Second, I show how his treatise on the fundamentals of tafsīr necessitated a project of reinterpreting the entire Qur’an according to these fundamentals.