Human Experience of Time

The purpose of the article is to comprehend the Husserlian model of constituting temporal modes through the ability of intentional "retentional-protentional" consciousness, as well as to clarify the possibility of interpreting its positions in the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time. Theoretical basis. The theoretical framework of the research includes: 1) the interpretation of the phenomenological reflection of "time-consciousness" by E. Husserl in the context of solving the problem of phased-differentiation of this form of temporality; 2) the concept of anthropic time (V. Khanzhy). Originality. For the first time in the research literature, the possibilities of applying the ideas of Husserl to the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time are considered through the interpretation of the phenomenological solution to the problem of temporality, proposed and specified in Husserl's "time-consciousness" concept. Conclusions. According to Husserl, the structure of human time-consciousness is instantiated in three spheres of passivity: prerefleсtive cogito, embodiment, and intersubjectivity. Within the framework of the problem of phase differentiation of phenomenological time, an analysis of the potencies of consciousness in constituting the phases of time-consciousness, namely protentional and retentional potencies, has been proposed. In the context of the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time, several aspects of Husserl's model of time-consciousness have been interpreted, including the paradoxical reconciliation of two quasi-incompatible ideas: the idea of the vagueness of the boundaries between temporal modes and the thesis of the formal capacity of preserving temporal units within their respective temporal phases. The property of multilevel complexity in the system of human temporality accounts for the diversity in the relationship of unique temporal units based on formal and content-related criteria ('temporal matryoshka').

Національний університет «Одеська морська академія» Анотація. В сучасну епоху «нових викликів», все частіше потрібно проводити диференціацію людського від нелюдського, можливо лише для того, щоб зрозуміти щось про саме людське в людині. Тут я спробую використати елементи гуссерлівського феноменологічного аналізу для порівняння людської свідомості і машинної «свідомості». Розглядати ці види свідомостей ми будемо через часовість свідомості, оскільки, з моєї точки зору на точку зору феноменології Гусерля, «жива» людська свідомість структурована темпорально. Тобто можливо, що темпоралізація є найсуттєвішою формальною характеристикою людської свідомості. Фундаментальним для такої інтерпретації феноменологічного аналізу людської свідомості буде поняття «пасивності», тобто дорефлексивності людської свідомості, структури якої (cogito, втіленність, інтерсуб'єктивність), за гіпотезою, реалізуються через тернарну структуру людської часо-свідомості. Разом вони складають специфіку людської свідомості на відмінну від можливої машинної «свідомості».

The Interpretation of Husserl's Time-Consciousness in the Reconstruction of the Concept of Anthropic Time. Part Two The purpose of the article is to comprehend the Husserlian model of constituting temporal modes through the ability of intentional "retentional-protentional" consciousness, as well as to clarify the possibility of interpreting its positions in the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time. Theoretical basis. The theoretical framework of the research includes: 1) the interpretation of the phenomenological reflection of "time-consciousness" by E. Husserl in the context of solving the problem of phased-differentiation of this form of temporality; 2) the concept of anthropic time (V. Khanzhy). Originality. For the first time in the research literature, the possibilities of applying the ideas of Husserl to the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time are considered through the interpretation of the phenomenological solution to the problem of temporality, proposed and specified in Husserl's "time-consciousness" concept. Conclusions. According to Husserl, the structure of human time-consciousness is instantiated in three spheres of passivity: prerefleсtive cogito, embodiment, and intersubjectivity. Within the framework of the problem of phase differentiation of phenomenological time, an analysis of the potencies of consciousness in constituting the phases of time-consciousness, namely protentional and retentional potencies, has been proposed. In the context of the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time, several aspects of Husserl's model of time-consciousness have been interpreted, including the paradoxical reconciliation of two quasi-incompatible ideas: the idea of the vagueness of the boundaries between temporal modes and the thesis of the formal capacity of preserving temporal units within their respective temporal phases. The property of multilevel complexity in the system of human temporality accounts for the diversity in the relationship of unique temporal units based on formal and content-related criteria ('temporal matryoshka').

The purpose of the article is to comprehend the Husserlian model of constituting temporal modes through the ability of intentional "retentional-protentional" consciousness, as well as to clarify the possibility of interpreting its positions in the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time. Theoretical basis. The theoretical framework of the research includes: 1) the interpretation of the phenomenological reflection of "time-consciousness" by E. Husserl in the context of solving the problem of phased-differentiation of this form of temporality; 2) the concept of anthropic time (V. Khanzhy). Originality. For the first time in research literature, the possibilities of applying the ideas of Husserl to the reconstruction of the concept of anthropic time are considered through the interpretation of the phenomenological solution to the problem of temporality, proposed and specified in Husserl's "time-consciousness" concept. Conclusions. The comprehension of the Husserlian model of intentionality of consciousness through the "grasping-from-now" and the constitution of phases of phenomenological time through the component of "exitingfrom-now" showed that solving the problem of phased-differentiation of phenomenological time leads to the observation of the impossibility of isolating the modes of past, present, and future as self-sufficient and unconditional. More accurate indications, based on the constitutive intentionality of consciousness on the "grasping-from-now" phases of time (as conventional), are as follows: a) the abilities of retention and recollection are the foundation for the constitution of the past and its connections to the present; b) the perception establishes the basis for the phase of the present itself; c) the possibilities of protention and anticipation (as forms of imagination) constitute the future and its connections to the present. By the concept of retention, Husserl fixes a certain primary memory (the present "now" of a past interval), which enables retaining the past in the present. The category of recollection or secondary memory is used by the philosopher to refer to the self-sufficient reproduction of past experiences (without being joined to present perception). The fundamental difference between recollection and retention is that the former represents a temporal interval, grasping its content and reproducing it as it was in the past, while in the latter, the perceived duration is presented as a fragment of time that has just passed. According to the German philosopher, the "grasping" of the present phase is performed by perception. Through the constitutive intentionality of consciousness, perception synthesizes the results of primary-actual activity and retentional holding of duration. The second part of the article will present solutions to the following research tasks: 1) analysis of the possibilities of protention and anticipation in constituting the future and its connections with the present; 2) understanding the possibility of using interpreted forms of Husser's ideas in reconstructing the concept of anthropic time.

Ajan luonnetta koskevissa käsityksissä on tyypillistä erottaa kaksi eriävää kantaa: A-teoreettinen presentismi ja B-teoreettinen eternalismi. Edeltävän väitetään tyypillisesti sopivan yhteen inhimillisen ajallisen kokemuksen kanssa ja jälkimmäisen ontologisesti perustavanlaatuisen luonnontieteen kanssa. Ilmikuvamme ajasta sisältää ehdottoman nykyisyyden ja yksisuuntaisen ajan kulun menneestä tulevaan. Tieteellinen kuva ajasta ei sisällä erityistä nykyisyyttä eikä ajan kulun edellyttämää dynaamista aikamuotojen muutosta. Monet ovat pitäneet kokemustamme ajan kulusta illuusiona. Tässä artikkelissa keskitytään A-sarjan mukaisen ajankulun virheteoreettiseen tulkintaan. Tarkastellaan mahdollisuutta, jonka mukaan meillä ei ole kyseistä kokemusta vaan kuvailemme kokemustamme virheellisesti ajan virtaukseen liittyvillä vertauskuvilla. Tätä tukee fysikalistinen argumentti: Jos ajan kulun kokemuksellamme ei ole fysikaalista perustaa, meillä ei voi olla sen mukaista kokemustakaan ajasta.

The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and silently assumes temporal experience is A-ish. I then argue that temporal character is not scale invariant, but rather that temporal experience is A-ish at larger scales (a few hundred milliseconds and above), and B-ish at smaller scales. I then point out that this scale non-invariance opens the possibility of hybrid views. I clarify (or modify, depending on how you want to frame it) my own view (Grush 2005, 2007) as a hybrid view, according to which temporal experience is B-ish at small scales-and at this scale my trajectory estimation model (TEM, a version of retentionalism) applies-but A-ish at larger scales, and at the larger scale my TEM does not apply. I then motivate this hybrid position by first defending it against arguments that have tried to show that the TEM is untenable. Since the hybrid view has TEM as its small-scale component, it must address this objection. I then put pressure on the main alternative account, extentionalism, by showing that its proponents have not adequately dealt with the problem of temporal illusions. The result is a new theory (perhaps characterizable as a refined version of my prior theory) motivated by i) explaining its virtues, ii) showing that objections to it can be met, and iii) showing that objections to its main competitors have not been met. 1 Copyright Rick Grush 2016. This manuscript is the final "published" version. I am purposefully not publishing it in any journal venues, and will not. It may be freely distributed or reproduced for any non-commercial use under the creative commons license provided orignial authorship is clearly indicated. Please cite as: [ Grush, Rick (2016). On the temporal character of temporal experience, its scale non-invariance, and its small scale structure. Manuscript.

Until the eighteenth century, Latin was the uncontested language of academic discourse, including theology. Regardless of their denominational affiliation, scholars all across Europe made use of Latin in both their publications and lectures. Then, due to the influence of various strands of post-Kantian philosophy, a change took place, at least in the German-speaking area. With recourse to classical German philosophy, many Catholic systematic theologians switched to their mother-tounge and adopted the newly coined terms in order to express the same faith. In reaction to this transformative work the neo-scholastic movement came into existence. Its adherents stressed the Church’s tradition and, especially its indebtedness to medieval thought. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, partly supported by the Magisterium, various attempts were made to re-introduce Latin into dogmatics. This project was unsuccessful, however, because of changes to the Catholic world ushered in by the Secon...

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences’ thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.

Resenha do livro do professor de literatura latinoamericana da Universidade do Estado de São Francisco/Eua, Fermín Adrian Rodriguez, intitulado "Un desierto para la nación. La escritura del vacío". O livro didica-se ao estudo da história do Pampa argentino, das gentes e dos espaços das provícias e dos desertos para além de Buenos Aires. Através de um diálogo entre a história, a sociologia, a antropologia e a literatura o autor observa algumas experiências produzidas nos e através dos sujeitos em contato com o deserto.

Action of a hallucinogenic substance, psilocybin, on internal time representation was investigated in two double-blind, placebo-controlled studies: Experiment 1 with 12 subjects and graded doses, and Experiment 2 with 9 subjects and a very low dose. The task consisted in repeated reproductions of time intervals in the range from 1.5 to 5 s. The effects were assessed by parameter κ of the 'dual klepsydra' model of internal time representation, fitted to individual response data and intra-individually normalized with respect to initial values. The estimatesκ were in the same order of magnitude as in earlier studies. In both experiments, κ was significantly increased by psilocybin at 90 min from the drug intake, indicating a higher loss rate of the internal duration representation. These findings are tentatively linked to qualitative alterations of subjective time in altered states of consciousness.

Action of a hallucinogenic substance, psilocybin, on internal time representation was investigated in two double-blind, placebo-controlled studies: Experiment 1 with 12 subjects and graded doses, and Experiment 2 with 9 subjects and a very low dose. The task consisted in repeated reproductions of time intervals in the range from 1.5 to 5 s. The effects were assessed by parameter κ of the 'dual klepsydra' model of internal time representation, fitted to individual response data and intra-individually normalized with respect to initial values. The estimatesκ were in the same order of magnitude as in earlier studies. In both experiments, κ was significantly increased by psilocybin at 90 min from the drug intake, indicating a higher loss rate of the internal duration representation. These findings are tentatively linked to qualitative alterations of subjective time in altered states of consciousness.

Prof. Dr. Herwig Aldenhoven (1933 Wien–2002 Bern) lehrte an der Christkatholisch-Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Bern rund drei Jahrzehnte lang systematische Theologie und Liturgik. Die für diesen Band ausgewählten Arbeiten wurden teils für Fachgremien, teils für mitdenkende Glieder der Kirche geschrieben. Sie alle beruhen auf einem altkirchlichen Grundgedanken, auf den der Titel des Buches verweist: Die Liturgie der Kirche steht in einem wechselseitigen Zusammenhang mit der Glaubenslehre. Die akademische Theologie als Beitrag zur Explikation des Glaubens ist in diesem Kontext rational-weltzugewandt, doch sie ist sich zugleich ihrer Grenzen, letztlich ihrer Unmöglichkeit bewusst. In diesem Rahmen berücksichtigt Aldenhoven häufig ostkirchliche Stimmen in der Überzeugung, dass die Orientierung an einer für Ost-und Westkirchen gemeinsamen Tradition auch für ein vertieftes ökumenisches Gespräch unter den Kirchen fruchtbar ist.

Mit diesem Ansatz repräsentiert das Werk Aldenhovens ein Grundanliegen im klassischen Selbstverständnis der Altkatholischen Kirche. Die einzelnen Arbeiten lassen sich drei Themenfeldern zuordnen: Sie handeln von der Struktur des eucharistischen Gebets, vom paradoxen Charakter der Rede vom dreifaltigen Gott und vom Verständnis der Kirche als einer nicht-autoritären verbindlichen Gemeinschaft.

Introduction
François Hartog coined the term “regimes of historicity” in a critical note entitled “Marshall
Sahlins et l´antropologie de l´histoire” (1983) on Marshall Sahlins’s lecture that was published in
the American Anthropological Journal. This notion was born from the encounter between history
and anthropology. Hartog and Gérard Lenclud defined it for the first time in 1993 as “the type of
relation that every society has with its past, the way that it is treated by it and how she treats it to
use it and build this thing that we call history” and subsequently added that the regime of
historicity “refers to the modality of a self-consciousness of a human community” (Hartog and
Lenclud 1993: 26, my translation). In 2003, Hartog developed this concept in his key book on this
topic Régimes d´historicité: Présentisme et experiences du temps, and he defined it as “the ways
in which these universal categories or forms we call ‘the past’, ‘the present’, and ‘the future’ are
articulated,” namely, the ways that societies in different times and in different spaces organize
the past, present, and future.

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences’ thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences' thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences' thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.

O presente trabalho tem por escopo desenvolver uma análise sobre os três conceitos fundacionais do Estado Novo, quais sejam, Democracia, Autoridade e Educação e como estes foram empregados no vocabulário político do jurista mineiro Francisco Campos. A influência de Campos no direcionamento dos caminhos seguidos pelo Estado Novo era tão potente que o mineiro fora escolhido por Vargas para redigir a Carta Constitucional de 1937, fundadora do regime ditatorial. Identifico, ao longo dos discursos, monólogos e escritos de Francisco Campos, uma teoria onde perpassam, necessariamente, três variáveis-Democracia, Autoridade e Educaçãoonde, juntas, formariam, para o intelectual mineiro, os desígnios nacionais, que culminariam na edição de um Novo Estado Brasileiro. A literatura política, via de regra, indica que entre "Democracia" e na "Autoridade" de cunho autoritário desejada por Campos, há um abismo, dada a incompatibilidade entre os conceitos apresentados. Entretanto, percebo que é através do conceito de Educação que o jurista imagina uma 'convivência pacífica' entre as duas construções. Para Campos, a educação seria a ferramenta necessária para a construção de um Novo Brasil. Analiso, neste trabalho, as influências intelectuais de Campos, tais quais, Carl Schmitt e John Dewey, além de teóricos contemporâneos ao jurista mineiro, como Oliveira Vianna, Gustavo Capanema e

Die Universität Salzburg, ursprünglich 1622 gegründet und 1810 aufgelassen, wurde 1962 offiziell wiedererrichtet. Alexander Pinwinkler untersucht in dieser Studie die Biografien, Netzwerke und Karriereverläufe der „Gründergeneration" der Professorinnen und Professoren.
Damit leistet er nicht nur einen Beitrag zur Universitätsgeschichte, sondern auch zur österreichischen Zeitgeschichte von den 1930er- bis zu den 1970er-Jahren. Das politisch-ideologische Profil der Universität Salzburg spiegelte sich wesentlich in den Berufungen von Professorinnen und Professoren und in akademischen Ehrungen und Festakten wider. Warum wurden noch in den frühen 1960er-Jahren häufig katholisch-konservative und ehemals nationalsozialistische Wissenschaftler an die Universität Salzburg berufen bzw. von dieser geehrt? Inwiefern veränderten sich diese Praktiken infolge verstärkten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Wandels?

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences' thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression , mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.

(First paragraphs) — The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time, including that of past, present, and future, and that of the passing of time. This experience and awareness of time raises a number of puzzling questions. How do we experience time? What exactly do we experience when we experience time? Do we actually experience time? Or do we infer time from something in, or some aspect of our experience? And so forth.

These and many related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, answers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that much of the field is still wide open — that is, these illustrations raise more questions than answers.

Our sense of time is altered by our emotions to such an extent that time seems to fly when we are having fun and drags when we are bored. Recent studies using standardized emotional material provide a unique opportunity for understanding the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the effects of emotion on timing and time perception in the milliseconds-to-hours range. We outline how these new findings can be explained within the framework of internal-clock models and describe how emotional arousal and valence interact to produce both increases and decreases in attentional time sharing and clock speed. The study of time and emotion is at a crossroads, and we outline possible examples for future directions.

Action of a hallucinogenic substance, psilocybin, on internal time representation was investigated in two double-blind, placebo-controlled studies: Experiment 1 with 12 subjects and graded doses, and Experiment 2 with 9 subjects and a very low dose. The task consisted in repeated reproductions of time intervals in the range from 1.5 to 5 s. The effects were assessed by parameter κ of the 'dual klepsydra' model of internal time representation, fitted to individual response data and intra-individually normalized with respect to initial values. The estimatesκ were in the same order of magnitude as in earlier studies. In both experiments, κ was significantly increased by psilocybin at 90 min from the drug intake, indicating a higher loss rate of the internal duration representation. These findings are tentatively linked to qualitative alterations of subjective time in altered states of consciousness.

Français [English abstract follows].

« Sur l’horloge de l’histoire », note Adam Rayski, « les aiguilles avançaient plus vite pour les Juifs que pour les autres populations de l’Europe occupée. Le temps des autres n’était pas exactement le nôtre… » [Adam Rayski Nos illusions perdues, Paris, Balland, 1985, p. 91]. Cependant, les Juifs ne peuvent pas faire individuellement l’expérience du temps à un rythme constant. L’expérience du temps n’est en effet jamais uniforme. Concernant celle des Juifs de France pendant l’Occupation, elle n’a guère été vraiment interrogée, tout comme la manière dont leur temporalité est structurée durant ces années. À travers l’exemple rémois, notre propos entend démontrer l’importance de ces questions dans la compréhension de la condition des Juifs de France au cours de cette période. Il mobilise dans ce but de nombreux témoignages, ainsi que des concepts et notions de psychologie en plus des outils de l’historien. Au terme de notre démonstration d’inspiration phénoménologique, une temporalité en majeure partie différente dès 1942 de celle des non-Juifs se dessine, composite, saccadée. Elle traduit une persécution qui s’étend au final jusqu’à l’architecture soutenant la vie des Juifs de France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

* Romain Dupré, « The Lived Time of the Jews of France during the Second World War : the example of Reims ».

« On the clock of history », says Adam Rayski, « the hands advanced faster for Jews than for the other people of Europe that was under occupation. The time of the others was not exactly like ours… » [Adam Rayski Nos illusions perdues, Paris, Balland, 1985, p. 91]. Meanwhile, the Jews cannot individually experience time at a constant rate. Their experience of time is indeed never uniform. For the Jews of France during the Occupation, Time was hardly really questioned, like how their temporality was structured over the years. Using the example of Reims, our purpose intends to show the importance of these issues in the understanding of the status of the Jews of France during this period. For this purpose, he mobilises many testimonies and psychology concepts, in addition to the tools of the historian. At the term of our phenomenologically-inspired demonstration, Temporality contours between Jews and non-Jews show the emergence of major differences from 1942 onwards; Jews’ time being more interrupted, less constant. It reflects a persecution which in  the end extends to the architecture supporting the life of the Jews of France during the Second World War.

The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and silently assumes temporal experience is A-ish. I then argue that temporal character is not scale invariant, but rather that temporal experience is A-ish at larger scales (a few hundred milliseconds and above), and B-ish at smaller scales. I then point out that this scale non-invariance opens the possibility of hybrid views. I clarify (or modify, depending on how you want to frame it) my own view (Grush 2005, 2007) as a hybrid view, according to which temporal experience is B-ish at small scales – and at this scale my trajectory estimation model (TEM, a version of retentionalism) applies – but A-ish at larger scales, and at the larger scale my TEM does not apply.  I then motivate this hybrid position by first defending it against arguments that have tried to show that the TEM is untenable. Since the hybrid view has TEM as its small-scale component, it must address this objection. I then put pressure on the main alternative account, extentionalism, by showing that its proponents have not adequately dealt with the problem of temporal illusions. The result is a new theory (perhaps characterizable as a refined version of my prior theory) motivated by i) explaining its virtues, ii) showing that objections to it can be met, and iii) showing that objections to its main competitors have not been met.

This paper defends the Atomic view I argue for in "Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience" from objections against it that can be found in the literature. I focus in particular on Phillips' objection that Atomism is inconsistent with the correct account of how we are introspectively aware of experience changing over time, and Dainton's objection that Atomism is inconsistent with the felt continuity of experience.

In den Jahren 1968 und 1970 wurden meine Kinder Frank und Birgit geboren. In dieser Zeit war ich noch katholischer Theologiestudent in Tübingen (1966-69), danach Referent für theologische Erwachsenenbildung im Bistum Speyer (1970-71) und Doktorand in Freiburg i.Br. (bis 1974. Es war eine Zeit, in der die Kindertaufe heiß diskutiert wurde. Ich kann mich erinnern, daß in Hans Küngs Vorlesung "Sakramentenlehre" (die leider nie veröffentlicht wurde) auch die Kindertaufe zur Sprache kam. Eine der ersten Akademie-Veranstaltungen, die ich in Speyer leiten durfte, war dem Thema "Kindertaufe" gewidmet. Sowohl der Studentenpfarrer in Tübingen als auch der Bischof von Speyer zeigten Verständnis für die theologischen Gründe, meine Kinder nicht taufen zu lassen, sondern ihnen diese Entscheidung selbst zu überlassen. Bis heute haben sich Frank und Birgit, die beide in der Schulzeit einschließlich Gymnasium am Religionsunterricht teilnahmen, nicht zur Taufe entschlossen. Als ich nach zwei Jahren bei Kurt Aland im Institut für neutestamentliche Textforschung an der Universität Münster

Abstract I examine several aspects of the experience of time in depression and in the experience of different emotions. Both phenomenological and experimental studies show that depressed subjects have a slowed experience of time flow and tend to overestimate time spans. In comparison to patients in control conditions, depressed patients tend to be preoccupied with past events, and less focused on present and future events.

Biographical article (21 pages) about Schloegl, a Cistercian (Heiligenkreuz Abbey) Old Testament scholar put on the index of forbidden books in 1922 because of his German Bible translation. He was a professor at University of Vienna and the novice master for the racial theorist and antisemite Lanz "von Liebenfels" who soon left the order and the priesthood.