Huawei

One of the foreign policies that can best describe the relationship between two states would be the Huawei Ban. Considering the major impact that this ban might bring to the global economy, it is necessary to discuss the reasons behind the imposed regulation. Thus, this paper will discuss why the Huawei Ban was imposed by US through the lenses of constructivist. Three main points discussed would be the social process that refers to the international norm which urged the US to impose the ban, the role of language through arguing and bargaining to construct the danger of Huawei, and also the cross-level analysis used to view this issue. It can be understood that through the perspective of constructivism, international norms as well as discourse played an important role in the birth of Huawei Ban by the US.

One firm has become emblematic of risk in the deteriorating geopolitical contest between the United States and China. Huawei is a Chinese, and global, leader in next generation telecommunications but is feared by the US and some of its allies as a potential vector of cyber-attacks including espionage and state-directed sabotage, as well as constructing digital standards and infrastructure that will extend Chinese state influence globally. A paradox is that in the absence of trust and international cooperation, firms such as Huawei cannot disprove normative worst-case risk scenarios. The logic of the Huawei paradox threatens decoupling and bifurcation of the world into two rival technological systems, with repercussions for international security, international relations and the international economy. A political risk analysis concludes that the risks originate from geopolitical factors rather than factors specific to the firm and can therefore only be resolved (if there is political will) at the level of global or regional governance with enforceable rules, norms and standards and at the national level with risk avoidance or improved risk management and mitigation measures.

When talking about Chinese corporate culture, it is difficult to ignore the issues that have been brought up over the years by the media, portraying large Chinese corporations as bastions bursting with underpaid and overworked staff, demanding ever increasing work hours and commitment to the company. The most notorious and probably the most well-known case among the public is Foxconn, reaching the sad record of fourteen suicides and dozens more attempted in 2010 (Moore 2010; Pomfret a.o. 2010; Tam 2010). Further articles have been published, often quoting the so-called “wolf culture” of Chinese companies, which seeds out the weakest links within the employees and enforces an idea of constant pressure to keep up and meet demand (CLB 2008). Nevertheless the current success of Chinese companies is unquestionable, as more and more companies start not only producing large quantities, but increasingly also high quality products for highly competitive prices. For my paper, I have chosen to look at two of these highly successful companies, which have been creeping up on markets dominated by Western, Japanese and Korean firms (Osawa 2015; Waldmeir 2012).
To further understand why and how these companies have become so successful, my approach is to look deeper into the corporate culture of these companies and stack them against each other. Should my hypothesis be correct, these companies should feature similar corporate cultures, which, while not necessarily a cause of their success, is definitely a remarkable correlation.

This paper situates Canada–China relations in the context of recent internet developments and debates about information and communication technologies (ICTs) infrastructure. I argue that protest events in Hong Kong surrounding the #occupycentral movement help us understand the tension between internet access, technological innovation and state centric forms of internet governance. By foregrounding the tension between the horizontal exchange of ideas and national surveillance and control, it is possible to identify important similarities between Canadian and Chinese state and the experience of internet users. In the wake of the Hong Kong occupy protests, it is possible to see how the internet promotes the practices of ‘Other Diplomacies’, functional relationships between citizen, market and foreign actors that present challenges for national regulation and traditional diplomatic mechanisms. The paper proposes a revival of the concept of Cyber-Diplomacy to better explain the challenges of state-to-state relations in an era of ICT innovation.

This chapter evaluates the US government's expanding export controls on Huawei.This chapter has four major findings. First, over the next five years even substantial Chinese efforts to replace American capital equipment and EDA tools with homegrown alternatives are very unlikely to succeed. Second, the severity of constraints on Huawei will depend more on the availability of international alternatives to American technology than on the availability of Chinese products. For chip design, the lack of suitable legal alternatives to American EDA tools globally will severely challenge Huawei’s ability to design chips. In contrast, for manufacturing chips, there are alternatives to American capital equipment within a relatively short timeframe so manufacturing firms could relatively quickly produce Huawei’s chips if they chose to eschew American technology to do so. Third, these constraints will most likely knock down Huawei but will not knock Huawei out of the telecommunications industry. Finally, the longer-term costs for American capital equipment and EDA tool vendors could loom large as foreign customers perceive American-made or -designed products as carrying significant political risk and strive to develop alternative sources.

El paradigma hacia el que hoy nos dirigimos es el Internet de Todo, donde los objetos ya prescinden en gran medida de los humanos y se comunican entre sí. El soporte de este nuevo modelo de relaciones es el 5G, la tecnología de telecomunicaciones móviles de Quinta Generación.
El despliegue de la tecnología 5G produce una escalada en la competencia entre actores-proveedores-influencers centrales: los dos cardinales centros de poder de este tiempo, Estados Unidos y China, están disputándose el tablero global de esta nueva tecnología. Avanzan sobre el terreno blandiendo cada uno sus mejores armas para la conquista, ya sea a partir de la persuasión -en el interés de mantener el status quo relacionado con la seguridad internacional- o desde la seducción -de poseer las mejores herramientas para encarar la revolución tecnológica que se avecina-. En un plano subyacente existe la lucha entre la superioridad actual y una preeminencia naciente.
Los desarrollos computacionales, la aeronavegación, la era nuclear, la exploración espacial, y las telecomunicaciones, constituyen evidencias sobre cómo la geopolítica mundial evolucionó y evoluciona sobre capacidades tecnológicas aplicadas, tanto al ámbito civil como a la defensa y conquista militar. Sin estas razones, es imposible entender la revolución del Japón Meiji en el siglo XIX o el afán reformista de China en el siglo XX, la debacle de la ex URSS, la industrialización asiática, la modernidad europea y racional pulso conquistador colonial, o la actual competencia China-Estados Unidos.
En el Campo de Batalla de la Guerra Tecnológica del Siglo se presentan los Campeones y el Retador. Ya están dadas las Reglas del Juego. ¿Cómo se definirá la contienda?

This paper first introduces the architecture of general 3G communication system in both parts; packet switched (PS) and circuit switched (CS) networks and then applies statistical analysis to Key Performance Indicators (KPI) monitored from network entities in PS and CS network  to guide the long term capacity planning and better coverage for the network by introducing a 3G network optimization cycle phases to analysis the problems from the KPIs and propose the suitable solution for these problems, our methodology is applied to a case study of a cellular communications service provider company report for UTRAN performance in a month. This UTRAN consist of two RNCs and 622 NodeBs. This report is proposed as an example of this case study and it's generated according to the proper UTRAN deployment company formulas; which is Huawei in this case.

Machine vision companies command more than a third of China’s huge artificial intelligence market. Products ranging from image recognition platforms to smart city solutions, biometric identification systems and autonomous robots showcase the variety and global competitiveness of the Chinese machine vision industry. Chinese technologies are subjected to increased scrutiny around the globe, but how exactly is machine vision portrayed by Chinese companies, and what kind of imaginaries does the industry embrace for its different audiences? This Screen Walk will bring the audience into a journey through websites, social media pages and user-generated content, delving into the visual tropes, cultural codes, and situated aesthetics of artificial intelligence products.

The third volume of Geopolitical Report titled Coronavirus Pandemics, Huawei 5G Technologies, Artificial Intelligence and Psychological Operations which analyses an example of high-tech psychological warfare, which is the communication control chains (CCCs) created by various actors within the framework of psychological warfare.

The evolution of an existing network to the new structure will require a phased migration strategy aimed at minimising capital expenditure during the transition phase, while reaping the benefits early on. Any action taken during this transition step should simplify the network's evolution to the NGN packet-switched architecture. This paper presents the development of PSTN networks into NGN Optical Fiber, its configuration and implementation of Smart AX MA5600T HUAWEI and C300M ZTE Shelfs MSANs solutions.

One firm has become emblematic of risk in the deteriorating geopolitical contest between the United States and China.  Huawei is a national champion of China’s emerging technology sector but is feared by the US and some of its allies as a potential vector of cyber-attacks including espionage and sabotage.  In a world of connected technology, the paradox is that in the absence of trust and international cooperation, firms such as Huawei cannot disprove worst-case risk scenarios.  The logic of the Huawei paradox threatens decoupling and bifurcation of the world into two rival technological systems, with repercussions for international security, international relations and the international economy.  A political risk analysis and assessment concludes that the risks originate from geopolitical factors rather than factors specific to the firm or country of operations and can therefore only be resolved (if there is political will) at the level of global governance with enforceable rules, norms and standards and at the level of national governance with risk avoidance or risk management and mitigation measures.

Comparing with traditional media, online social media seem to provide more opportunities for people to speak out their ideas. Twitter integrates the whole world users in the platform, so that users from different places can exchange their views in the Internet. These functions own the decentralized feature, which is expected to change the original power structure in international communication. Huawei is an outstanding representative of Chinese company whose texts to some extent illustrate the overseas public 's evaluation of Chinese image. On that basis, this study adopts the theory of Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis and analyzes the ways of Huawei discourse on Twitter. In this way, the current paper tries to investigate the production, distribution and consumption of Huawei discourse on Twitter. Meanwhile, this dissertation also attempts to discuss the situation of the construction and dissolution of the power structure behind social media in the new media era.

buku ini membahas tentang pengetahuan standar yang terdapat di dunia telekomunikasi. Pada bagian 4G RF Planning buku ini membahas secara mendalam mengenai RF Planning baik di sisi Coverage Planning maupun Capacity Planning. Buku ini juga membahas secara mendalam mengenai Physical Channel baik di sisi downlink maupun uplink dimana pengetahuan tersebut sangat diperlukan untuk mengetahui secara riil kapasitas dari sebuah eNodeB. Di bagian akhir bab ada pembahasan mengenai Mobile TV dimana dengan kemajuan teknologi saat ini sudah memungkinkan terjadinya konvergensi antara Telepon Seluler, Internet dan juga televisi.
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--The current debates revolving around 5G, Huawei, and how they are resolved, are highly visible indicators of the technology based shifts in the global order which are setting the tone for the 21st century. Currently, it seems that many in the US and the PRC are using Cold War and Thucydides Trap paradigms, with a zero-sum mentality. At least in the case of 5G technology, the UK seems to have taken a more nuanced approach.

--This article comes as the UK prepares its new National Cyber Security Strategy, reviewing the 5G and cyber security debates surrounding Huawei in a highly interdisciplinary manner, and directing readers to a rich variety of resources. In addition to its analysis of issues and solutions often absent from the discourse, this article's feature contribution is the argument that the UK can be more than an example of a middle way. Specifically, if the UK scales up and internationalizes its Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Center, perhaps by creating an International Cyber Security Evaluation Center, it can lead its allies and the world in 5G, 6G, cybersecurity, and international relations, filling a vital leadership vacuum.

Estados Unidos lleva más de 10 años detrás de Huawei, finalmente al no poder darle caza desde lo comercial, decide golpearlo por los riesgos a la seguridad nacional, que en definitiva da como epítome, un efecto comercial.
Es importante tener claro que no existen pruebas técnicas contundentes que puedan confirmar que los dispositivos de la empresa, se usen para espionaje, tampoco que posean algún componente que le permita al Gobierno chino, tomar control sobre ellos. Sin embargo si es verdad que China tiene un prontuario que no ayuda a suponer que Huawei no esté siendo o vaya a ser utilizada para esta actividad. En 2016 la empresa contratista de seguridad de los EEUU, Kryptowire , descubrieron software preinstalado en algunos teléfonos Android que monitorean a dónde van los usuarios, con quién hablan y lo que escriben en los mensajes de texto. Todo lo cual era enviado a China.

Ticaret savaşı gündeminin yanında teknoloji rekabeti konusunda da
Çin, ABD’nin hedefi konumundadır. Hatta ABD ile Çin arasındaki mücadele
teknolojik soğuk savaş şeklinde de yorumlanmaktadır. Bu çalışma Huawei’nin
ABD için bir tehdit olup olmadığını incelemektedir. ABD yönetimi, dünyada
Çin ürünlerinin Amerikan ürünlerinden daha fazla tercih edilmesinden dolayı
rahatsız olmaktadır. ABD’yi rahatsız eden noktalardan biri de Amerikalı şirketlerin fikri mülkiyetlerinin Çin tarafından çalındığı şeklindeki iddialardır.
ABD, Huawei’yi ulusal güvenliği için tehdit olarak kabul etmektedir. ABD,
başta Avrupalı müttefikleri olmak üzere diğer ülkeleri Çinli Huawei ile çalışmaması konusunda uyarmaktadır. Buna karşın Avrupalı ülkelerin çoğu
ABD’nin tüm baskılarına rağmen Huawei ile çalışmaya devam etmektedirler

This policy paper provides an assessment of convergent security concerns and interests between the Philippines and Australia within the framework of the Philippine-Australia Comprehensive Partnership. The insights presented in this paper reflect the views and analyses of experts who participated in the Philippine-Australia Dialogue: Security Dimensions of the Comprehensive Partnership held in Manila last June 2018. Key areas of discussions focused on regional security architecture, maritime security and cooperation, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity. The overall findings conclude that continuous dialogue between Australia and the Philippines is essential. Moving forward, track 1.5 and track 2 interactions offer opportunities for Australia and the Philippines to continuously collaborate in the formulation and evaluation of policies to address common challenges and achieve shared goals and interests.
The Philippines and Australia must enhance their maritime security cooperation through regular sharing of strategic assessments and information-sharing. As a critical party in the emerging power dynamics in the South China Sea, the Philippines’ geostrategic location situated between the Pacific and Indian ocean is a viable site for launching deterrence and offensive moves should potential conflict ensue. Australia can offer assistance to enhance the Philippines’s territorial defense capabilities, such as air defense and anti-submarine warfare.
During the Marawi siege, Australia extended assistance by providing reconnaissance, and intelligence support, training assistance and joint maritime patrols. There must be increased public discussion to raise awareness and support for Australia’s efforts in Marawi and its history of counterterrorism cooperation with the Philippines. This must not only
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4 Executive Summary
reflect the state of bilateral relations but also the engagement of Australia and ASEAN in fighting terrorism.
In the area of cybersecurity, the Philippines and Australia should work together on capacity-building and training opportunities. A dedicated Track 1.5 track dialogue may be conducted to boost the collaborative relationship on cyber issues that involve not only the government but also civil society groups. Also, the Philippines could participate in regional cyber security simulations. Australia has been working with Singapore in this area. Timely information sharing is also a key area of collaboration. Such shared information will be useful given the prominence of common actors involved in persistent cyber-attacks and espionage in the Indo Pacific region.
With the immense challenges that the international rules-based order is currently facing, the Philippine-Australia security dialogue is critical. Both countries are pivotal actors in protecting and promoting the set of norms and values that underpin the rules-based order, given the longstanding history of people-to-people relationships, institutional partnerships, and their common commitment to the rule of law and democracy. These common interests and shared values are further solidified in the Comprehensive Partnership signed by both states. The Comprehensive Partnership serves as a platform to explore research collaboration and continuous dialogue in addressing converging issues and interests. The success of liberating Marawi City from the ISIS-affiliated Maute group demonstrated the value of such partnership in streamlining technical and intelligence-gathering cooperation in counterterrorism.
Aside from counterterrorism, Australia and the Philippines must focus on the growing security threats in cyber space, maritime cooperation, natural disasters, and climate change. It is therefore crucial for both U.S. allies to include these issues in their succeeding Track 1.5 dialogue engagement. Furthermore, it is also worthwhile for both states to elevate their bilateral cooperation to a strategic level. Through strategic partnership, both states could become more flexible and agile in formulating common strategies and responding to converging security threats.

V4 states are increasingly wary of Chinese intelligence, notably the threats they can pose to the region, which is reflected by reports from intelligence agencies of the Visegrad Group countries. In the EU and some V4 nations, China has a scare cultural potential yet it is capable of lobbying for
any law that suits its interests. The future of the 17+1 platform, or the 16+1 now, is shaky. As there is no progress in cooperation while the access to the market is patchy, some of its countries voice growing dissatisfaction.

Akhir-akhir ini kita sering mendengar tentang kasus pencurian data ataupun kasus jual beli data yang melibatkan beberapa perusahaan start up terkenal. Pencurian ataupun jual beli data tersebut menyebabkan menurunnya kepercayaan masyarakat terhadap penggunaan internet sebagai media, hiburan ataupun transaksi melalui online. Dalam hal ini huawei yang mendapat tuduhan dari militer Amerika serikat bahwa perusahaan mereka sedang mengawasi militer amerika serikat melalui perangkat/produk yang dibuat oleh mereka dan digunakan oleh prajurit tentara amerika serikat ataupun instansi pemerintahan terkait. Oleh karena itu komunikasi keamanan ini sangat penting dan perlu diterapkan oleh segala instansi di tiap negara agar tidak kecolongan data ataupun meminimalisir tuduhan-tuduhan yang melibatkan perusahaan teknologi sekalipun.

Jelen elemzés nem tükrözi sem az amerikai, sem a kínai, sem a magyar hivatalos álláspontot az USA-Kína kereskedelmi háború, a Huawei-ügy és a kialakuló új világrend kapcsán. Szakértői elemzés, amelyik a realitásokat helyezi előtérbe. Nem cél „politikailag korrekt” álláspont kialakítása.

Zebrane dane mają przedstawić jak prezentują się perspektywy firmy Huawei na udział w tworzeniu sieci 5G w Europie oraz wyszczególnić które kraje – lub firmy w nich działające –są skłonne do współpracy z chińskim gigantem telekomunikacyjnym. Poniższa analiza nie ma na celu szczegółowego przedstawienia problemu, lecz zarysowanie nastawienia i narracji  wiodących graczy. Przydatnym źródłem informacji było zestawienie przygotowane przez Brookings Institution. Do analizy dodano też państwa niebędące członkami UE, czyli Wielką Brytanię, Norwegię, Islandię i Szwajcarię które stanowią jednak część szeroko rozumianego Zachodu. Na zbadanych 31 państw, 3 są zdecydowanie przeciwko, 17 raczej nie przyjmie Huawei, 6 ma neutralne stanowisko, a 5 raczej może przyjąć usługi chińskiego giganta w procesie rozwoju sieci 5G. Autor podczas analizy danych zauważył, że stanowiska państw wcześniej neutralnych, przesuwają się coraz bardziej w stronę niekorzystną dla Huawei, co przedstawiono poniżej. Należy przypuszczać, że kolejne tygodnie i miesiące mogą przynieść większe lub mniejsze zmiany i stale obserwować rozwój zdarzeń.

Kovrig János 1932-ben a véletlennek köszönhetően lett haditudósító a kínai-japán fronton, ahonnan kizárólag ő és a New York Times újságírója jelenthettek a nyugati külvilágnak. A véres konfliktusról küldött fényképes anyagait nemcsak budapesti lapja közölte, hanem külföldi hírügynökségek is. Unokája, a kanadai születésű Michael Kovrig 2018-ban a Huawei-botrány miatt kémkedés vádjával került kínai börtönbe, ahonnan még ma sem látszik a szabadulása. A kanadai-magyar kettős állampolgár Michael ügye két tűz közé szorítja a külhoni magyarok érdekvédelmét és a jó pekingi viszonyt egyaránt fontosnak tartó magyar diplomáciát. Csak remélni lehet, hogy a '90-es években budapesti punkbandában éneklő Michael sorsa happy end lesz. Kovrig János életének puzzle-ját Mervay Mátyás, a New York-i Egyetem doktorjelöltje rakta ki és írta meg először a Toronto Star című rangos kanadai lapban. A Válasz Online olvasóinak írt cikkében most magyarul is elérhetővé teszi az idősebb Kovrig lebilincselő történetét.

Huawei anunció que su sistema operativo HarmonyOS estará disponible para teléfonos inteligentes a partir de 2021. Un mensaje de fuerte contenido geopolítico en el marco de la carrera tecnológica por la llamada “revolución 4.0”. ¿Cuáles son las implicancias de este mensaje?

Abstract: Along with the Serbian government’s statements emphasizing the importance of digitalisation and the need for innovation, China is starting to penetrate sensitive domains in Serbia in terms of national security. This intensifying cooperation also extends to critical assets in the ICT sector, such as digital education, e-governance, biometric mass surveillance, and the 5G network, raising concerns from Western powers. The aim of this analysis is to provide an overview of the projects involved in the cooperation and reflect on the sensitive issues that could lead to disagreements between Serbia and its great power allies in the future.

En el presente trabajo buscaremos describir, como en medio del escenario de tensión entre Estados Unidos y China, el vínculo entre la Unión Africana y la compañía china Huawei, un actor de la escena internacional de gran peso no sólo económico, sino también político, da cuenta de un hecho importante para el continente. Esta relevancia tiene que ver, no sólo con la carencia que poseen los países africanos de tecnologías de la información y la comunicación, sino también con las decisiones de estrechar lazos políticos en medio de esta disputa existente entre dos grandes hegemones tanto por colocar sus productos en los mercados como por conquista el ciberespacio africano.

A police raid on a Kazakh group documenting the plight of Kazakhs and Uyghurs caught in a brutal crackdown in China’s north-western province of Xinjiang is about more than a government seeking to please Beijing in the hope that it improves the lot of its ethnic kin while preserving diplomatic and economic relations.

Inauguramos el proyecto formativo Aula Transversal analizando el futuro de la IA dentro de la narrativa artística.

Enmarcado en el programa formativo Aula Transversal, profesionales de diferentes disciplinas aúnan sus conocimientos para ofrecer un formato docente único, donde fotografía, inteligencia artificial y lenguajes de programación de código abierto van de la mano.

En un mundo regido por esferas de conocimiento autónomas y endogámicas, Aula Transversal plantea la mezcla como factor de cambio, el diálogo transdisciplinar como metodología docente y la sinergia como el camino a recorrer entre distintos referentes de la cultura y tecnología audiovisual. Durante los próximos meses se impartirán diversas sesiones en las principales escuelas de fotografía de Madrid.