Harry S. Truman

Between 1947 and 1949, Harry Truman had all the markings of
an isolated president. He was unelected, faced a Congress
controlled by opposition Republicans, and was opposed by
major segments of his own party. Yet unlike other presidents in
similar isolated positions, Truman managed to overcome these
institutional obstacles and was successfully elected to his own
term in office and pulled the Democrats into majorities in both
houses of Congress. This article examines the conditions that
allowed Truman to escape his political and institutional isolation,
arguing not only that Truman gives us a clear view of the
strong constitutional basis of presidential power in the modern
era, but also that extraconstitutional developments enabled
Truman to do what no other isolated president was able to
accomplish.

The first “hot” war of the Cold War helped shape political developments worldwide for decades. The Korean War is a central factor in the ongoing issue of North Korean nuclear weapons. Through eleven questions, the author introduces the reader to the history, course, and effects of this still unresolved and complex conflict, including Swiss involvement, in easy-to-understand, thoroughly researched, and richly illustrated short texts.

Marshall and the Korean War On July 24, 1950, George Catlett Marshall dashed off a note to his goddaughter and confidante, Rose Page Wilson. "I have been trembling on the edge of being called again into public service in this crisis," wrote the general, "but I hope I get by unmolested, but when the President motors down and sits under our oaks and tells me of his difficulties, he has me at a disadvantage." 1 Twenty days earlier, on Independence Day, President Harry Truman had indeed motored to Marshall's home in Leesburg, Virginia, to discuss the crisis in Korea, which had begun when the Korean People's Army (KPA) of Communist North Korea violated the thirty-eighth parallel and invaded South Korea on June 25. Truman and his advisers incorrectly assumed that the Soviet Union had instigated the attack. 2 South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea (ROK), was led by President Syngman Rhee; though corrupt, it was at least partially democratic and recognized by the United Nations. 3 "I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall communist leaders would be emboldened to override 189 192 CHAl'fER 8 EXTENSION OF THE DRAFT ACT "Extension of the Draft Act." Cartoon by James T. Berryman in the Washington Evening Star depicting ChiefJustice Fred M. Vinson (right) swearing in George C. Marshall (center) as secretary of defense in front of President Harry S. Truman (leji). Circa 1950. Courtesy Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. Marshall before commanding the VII Corps in Europe. A third JCS member was the air force chief of staff, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, who had worked wit It Marshall in the War Department at the beginning of World War II. 14 One man who could not in any meaningful way be considered a Mar• shall protege, however, was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the newly appointed commander-in-chief of UN forces in Korea. MacArthur-a Medal of Honor recipient, the loser and subsequent liberator of the Philippine Islands during World War II, and the democratizer of Japan-had already enjoyed one of the most storied careers in American military history. His recent appointment as UN commander was in addition to his roles as head of the Far East Command and supreme commander for the Allied Powers in J apan. 15

Postponing the Taiwan Campaign, June 1950 By Xiao }ingguang 1 On June 30, 1950, the fifth day after the Korean War broke out. Premier Zbou Enlai met me in his office. He told me about the position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Comminee and the Chinese government on the current development of the Korean War. Zbou said that this change in the world situation made our liberation of Taiwan lOugber because the United States now protected Taiwan across the straits. This change, however, might also have a positive result since we were not well prepared yet. At present, our government's attitude was to denounce the American imperialists' invasion of Taiwan and their intervention in China's internal affairs. For the army, our plans were to continue the demobilization of the land force, strengthen the construction of the naval and air forces, and postpone the campaign against Taiwan. 1 Xiao Jingguang was commander of China's newly established navy. This section is translated from Xiao Jingguang, Xiao Jingguang huiyilu

akon napada Nemačke na SSSR, 22. juna 1941, pred sovjetsku diplomatiju postavili su se brojni, hitni i vrlo složeni zadaci. Ona je, pored ostalog, morala da: 1) u međunarodnim okvirima širi pozitivne vesti i procene o perspektivama borbe protiv agresora; 2) zaštiti i stavi pod nadzor strane diplomatske misije u SSSR-u; 3) spreči da se na strani Nemačke u rat protiv SSSR-a uključe druge države, posebno Japan; 4) uspostavi i pravnim dokumentima precizira savezničke odnose sa zapadnim silama. U radu se govori o načinu na koji se sa ovim problemima suočavala sovjetska diplomatija. Posebno je ukazano da je u jednom periodu Kujbišev (danas: Samara) postao rezervni glavni grad, a po mnogo čemu čak i diplomatska prestonica SSSR-a. U njega su evakuisani MIP, kao i strane diplomatske misije koje su tu ostale sve do 1943. godine. Mada su događaji na bojnom polju bili presudni, snažna diplomatska aktivnost Sovjetskog Saveza, koja se odvijala na mnogim poljima i raznim sredstvima, znatno je doprinela da se prebrodi kritična situacija u jesen i zimu 1941, da se Japan odvrati od mogućeg napada i da se uspostave stabilni saveznički odnosi sa vodećim zapadnim silama, formiranjem antihitlerovske koalicije, što je vodilo pobedi u ratu.

Forgetting Speech Frederick Douglass's account of his first ''invited'' speech in ''My Bondage and My Freedom'' includes a snippet of rhetorical criticism, auto-criticism if you will. After writing about his being sought out by the abolitionist William C. Coffin at a summer 1841 anti-slavery convention in Nantucket, Douglass recounts how he was ''induced to speak out the feelings inspired by the occasion,'' to offer ''fresh recollection'' of what he had endured as a slave. His account, remarkably, begins with what he can't in fact recall: ''My speech on this occasion is about the only one I ever made,'' begins the auto-criticism, ''of which I do not remember a single connected sentence.'' He continues: It was with the utmost difficulty that I could stand erect, or that I could command and articulate two words without hesitation and stammering. I trembled in every limb. I am not sure that my embarrassment was not the most effective part of my speech, if speech it could be called. At any rate, this is about the only part of my performance that I now distinctly remember. But excited and convulsed as I was, the audience, though remarkably quiet before, became as much excited as myself. 1

Archival evidence sheds new light on the Truman administration's 1951 investigation into the "China Lobby" and its links to McCarthyism. Truman's advisors suspected connections among illicit funding streams generated by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime in Formosa, illegal lobbying by unregistered agents, and a barrage of anti-Communist propaganda from activists connected to McCarthy and the "China Lobby." The White House worried that by flooding America's public discourse with charges of treason, the alleged conspirators were destabilizing the nation's ability to engage in reasoned deliberation about foreign policy. However, the White House could not persuade any congressional committees to manage an investigation, so it instead ran an executive operation that produced tantalizing clues but no prosecutable conclusions. Rather than proving its suspicions, the investigation created confusion and sowed doubts about Truman's judgment. Analyzing the administration's investigation provides new insights into the confusions and contradictions besetting America's grappling with the early Cold War and offers lessons on how not to defend democracy in a time of crisis.

Getting to the Affordable Care Act Congress finished with the Affordable Care Act late at night on March 21, 2010. Weary White House staffers watched the proceedings. When things concluded, President Obama invited some fifteen or twenty of them back to the White House for an impromptu celebration. They assembled after midnight in the White House residence, and the president served champagne and hors d' oeuvres on the Truman balcony. "No matter what you do, " the president said, "this will be the hallmark of the rest of your careers. " As one participant noted, "Everyone was humbled that we were part of this effort that had previously failed. " 1 The formal signing ceremony for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act occurred on March 23. It was the usual elaborate ceremony, celebrating a legislative triumph for the president and his party. The bill, according to the president, "set in motion reforms that generations of Americans have fought for and marched for and hungered to see. " The Affordable Care Act (ACA), then, marked the end of a long process that stretched back at least as far as President Truman. 2 In explaining a modern event like the passage of the Affordable Care Act, historians need to understand the technical complexity of modern public This article originated as a talk given at the Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, and Aging Research on October 8, 2015, at Rutgers University. I am grateful to Professor David Mechanic for arranging the event. I also wish to make clear that the essay was written, peer reviewed, and rewritten while Barack Obama was still president and before it became evident that Donald Trump and the Republican Party would win the 2016 election. I would contend that, despite the change in the political landscape, the points made in the article remain relevant to the history of health-care policy, although that is up to the reader to decide.

La tesis doctoral aborda la politica exterior del administracion Truman entre 1945 y 1948 analizando los inicios de la guerra fria. La tesis analiza la presunciones y percepciones de la administracion estadounidense respecto a la energia y al arma atomica, sobre la URSS y sus intenciones, sobre la situacion en Europa, la actividad comunista percibida y los propios Estados Unidos. En un segundo nivel analiza la narrativa de la administracion sobre la situacion internacional entendida como el discurso oficial que analiza la realidad y plantea un proyecto de futuro. En un tercer nivel la tesis analiza someramente los principales procesos internacionales que tuvieron lugar. En dichos analisis se han tomado como momentos de referencia divertos hitos de la guerra fria intentando encontrar pautas de evolucion tanto en las percepciones como en la narrativa. Del analisis conjunto de las percepciones, narrativas y politica norteamericana se concluye que la administracion Truman uso la retoric...

It has never been more important to understand China than now; in the sixth volume of the China Studies Review, our unified analysis of China as a global force gives us the capacity to do so. Understanding China as a major power means having a clear grasp of the dynamics that have shaped the country, to better comprehend the prism through which Chinese policymakers see the international sphere. To this end, we hope to shed light upon China as a global actor through multiple lenses: qualitative evaluation and quantitative analysis play a vital part in our interpretation of China’s key actions abroad, as do articles focused on the distant past and the present day. Hope Parker’s “Two Paths to the Arctic” begins our volume with a comparative study of China and Japan in the Artic Ocean. The divergent approaches taken by these countries in both multilateral forums and direct interactions with Arctic nations show striking differences, deeply influencing China and Japan’s reception within t...

uposlen je u Ministarstvu obrane Republike Hrvatske. Polaznik je poslijediplomskog međusveučilišnog znanstvenog doktorskog studijasmjer Vojno pomorski sustavi na Pomorskom fakultetu u Rijeci. Stajališta iznesena u radu osobni su stavovi autora i nemaju veze s institucijom u kojoj je uposlen.

's choice for the American delegation, took part in the first assembly of the United Nations in London. In appointing the former First Lady, Truman recognised that Eleanor Roosevelt, more than others, embodied the ideals that were to underpin that new statement of international order; above all she stood for the values, aims and hopes of a part of American civil society which wished to take part in the administration's decisions and contribute to building a democratic peaceseeking international order. The new administration saw it as crucial to the success of that project that civic associations and non-governmental organizations be a party to it, as most recent works have pointed out i. Eleanor rose to this challenge, though the urge and desire to voice civil society's opinion was to come up against a hard-nosed realpolitik that turned the United Nations into a prime duelling ground between the two superpowers emerging victorious from the Second World War. What I wish to show, in a nutshell, is how Eleanor Roosevelt's ambition to do "diplomacy from below"-voicing the claims of civic associations and the ordinary citizen-soon merged with American public diplomacy and to some extent came to share its values, albeit critically. 2 The definition "diplomacy from below" or bottom-up diplomacy is intended to highlight the citizens' wish to contribute to creating international relations by active participation, cooperating with the traditional diplomatic channels. At times this concept has been confused with "public diplomacy" which is seen as an American innovation. Nicholas J. Cull's definition for this last is "the process by which international actors seek to accomplish the goals of their foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics." This is based on the hardly revolutionary operations of "listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting." ii So while the concept of public Eleanor Roosevelt at the United Nations: "Diplomacy from Below" and the Searc... European journal of American studies, 12-1 | 2017 5 Eleanor did not there and then accept: her son would recall how she felt she lacked the diplomatic qualities needed for Truman's mission. Truman's proposal came at a delicate moment in Eleanor's life, a point fraught with uncertainty: how to rearrange her life after years of active political engagement; what new course to give her political passions that had by no means subsided with the end of her long stint as First Lady; how above all to carry on the political vision of Franklin Delano Roosevelt which she by and

This research examines Latin American countries’ roles during and after the Korean War from 1950 to 1957. This conflict was the first global struggle between communism and capitalism, and therefore, became the main stage that reshaped the new geopolitical environment of the early Cold War. Since all independent Latin American countries had been part of the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, they were able to use it as a framework to participate in the conflict in three different instances. At first, when the U.S. government pleaded that all states join its efforts with the UN in the Korean War, Latin American countries renegotiated and set boundaries in their relationship with the United States by committing to the war effort through means that suited their own national interests. When the war reached a stalemate and the discussions turned into how to find a middle ground for an armistice, once again Latin American countries used their power as neutral but U.S-friendly nations to play a substantial role in the writing of the final armistice, by proposing resolutions that substantially impacted the final result. And at last, in 1955, when ex-POWs from the Korean War saw themselves stranded in India in search of a country that would accept them, it was Latin American countries who negotiated with the UN and offered to receive sixty-nine of these men as their new citizens. These three different examples reveal that the Korean War had a large impact on Latin America, and that Latin American countries played key roles in resolving several major issues of the Korean War. The progenies of this relationship were the 69 Korean and Chinese POWs who ended up in Latin America and their lives forever changed because of this relationship.

The New \'ork Times eulogized him as a "decisive pl'esident." 1 The compliment was well-deserved. Harry Truman made more than his share of major decisions while presiding over the nation as its 33rd president. The atomic bomb, the Soviet intervention in the affairs of Greece and Turkey, and the communist invasion of South Korea were only a few of the developments that required pr'ompt decisions with far-reaching consequences. Sometimes Truman embroiled himself in controversy unnecessarily. He did not have to dismiss Gene"'ll MacArthur or seize the steel mills. But he never hesitated to make these decisions and others like them when he felt they were necessary. Handling so many decisions is an accomplishment in itself. The seven and a half years of Truman's administration were anything but uneventful; the President faced one problem aftel' another in rapid succession. Two of his decisions, the bomb and the Marshall Plan, literally meant the difference between life and death for thousands of people. Many men would have broken under the strain. nut Truman did not b.•eak, nor did he push his problems aside. He faced them with courage and determination, aged very little while in office, and lived longer (to age 88) than any other president who served more than four years.2 It is no accident that Harry Tl"Uman bOI'e the burden of the presidency so well. His psychological 8 ,/anIHIl•y 1973, p. 17.

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Joan Miró returned to Franco's Spain in 1940, fleeing from Nazi troops in France. How did the anti-fascist artist survive in a dictatorship and in the years of the cultural cold war? The investigation into unpublished archives reveals how the artist was able to keep unnoticed during the years of the Second World War and after the defeat of Hitler, how he was able to circumvent the pressures of the dictatorship to use his art in a laundering operation of the regime, such as the United States and the Vatican demanded. Washington for the installation of military bases in Spain and Rome for the signing of the Concordat. The research uncovers the link between Nazis or collaborators with Nazism refugees in Spain (Mathias Goeritz, Karl Buchholz, Erich Gäbelt, Abel Bonnard...) in the promotion of avant-garde art in Spain.

The police sought to restrict automobiles and their drivers. Engineers sought to facilitate them. It was only after great propaganda efforts that the new force, ''motordom,'' succeeded in reframing the perceptions of the public street. Streets became progressively less public; ultimately they were given over almost completely to the automobile. The regimentation that resulted infuses both Norton's and Seiler's books. Each examines and attempts to offer explanations. Neither deals substantially with concerted attacks on electrified transportation in general, or on rail traffic in particular, although Norton does demonstrate that the public was not hostile to streetcars, as is often assumed; rather their numerous riders were unorganized and thus unable to present their views forcefully until the automobile became overwhelming. Norton's theme is a clear clash of interests, and he explores carefully the dramatic changes that have resulted from unprecedented technological forces. For Seiler, change is less a motivation; he seems to have searched for continuities and sees the new technology as merely a modern manifestation of preexisting themes. In searching for hidden meanings, he appears to believe that he has discovered them. Although he deals with Frederick Taylor in a rather vague way (his point is unclear, but he largely dismisses Taylorism), his villain is always ''liberalism,'' never industrialism, commercialism, managerialism, technology, or even conservatism. It would seem that, for Seiler, if a military-industrial complex exists, it is only a manifestation of Emersonian individualism. Evidently, he has convinced others as well. Some readers of Republic of Drivers may be among the convinced. Others assuredly will not be.

This inquiry focuses on the role of expert knowledge in the Korean War armistice negotiations. Beginning in July , and over a period of two years, the warring sides exchanged verbal barrages while fierce battles raged on. As far as the United States was concerned, this phase of the Korean War was tragic and fraught with existential dangers. Approximately  percent of all American Korean War casualties occurred during the negotiations.  Thousands of prisoners of war (POW) endured mental and physical hardship as the antagonistic negotiators sought to salvage a symbolic victory out of a military stalemate. The perceived futility of the talks brought the United States to the brink of unleashing its unconventional arsenal, induced rifts within the Western alliance, and contributed to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.  In contrast to early analyses of the negotiations-mostly accounts of allegedly duplicitous Communist bargaining tactics-recent scholarship has privileged global events and Washington epicenters rather than the enemy camp or the truce tents. While acknowledging the still-uncharted area of enemy motivation and goals, most contemporary inquiries assign the slow and often confusing bargaining strategies to crosscurrents between and within the U.S. political and military establishment. Armistice scholars agree that a powerful domestic political agenda dictated the talks' tortured developments. Throughout the duration of the negotiations U.S. leaders produced harsh ultimatums rather than workable bargaining positions, thereby presumably obviating any

In contrast to early analyses of the negotiations – mostly accounts of alleg-edly duplicitous Communist bargaining tactics – recent scholarship has privi-leged global events and Washington epicenters rather than the enemy camp or the truce tents. While acknowledging the still-uncharted ...

El 26 de julio de 1945 Harry Truman, Winston Churchill y Chiang Kai-shek emiten una declaración para definir los términos de la rendición del Japón. El gobierno japonés rechazó esta iniciativa. En agosto el presidente Harry Truman decide lanzar dos bombas atómicas sobre territorio japonés.

This thesis examines the bilateral relationship of the United States to Iran in the years 1940 to 1953. It looks at the US foreign policy toward Iran that led to the coup d'état against the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, and further investigates how US officials perceived and evaluated the Iranian political situation during this period. The thesis relies on a broad range of secondary sources on the political and economic situation of Iran and US foreign policy in period, as well as official US governmental documents released in 2017 as part of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.

The analysis does not attempt to give a complete answer as to why the US decided to carry out the coup but aims to demonstrate the lack of understanding among US officials for the Iranian political situation which was characterized by a rising nationalist movement at the time. The coup operation is not reviewed per se. The thesis rather deals with the change and continuity in the US foreign policy toward Iran, and particularly examines why the coup was possible and appeared beneficial to US interests.

I argue that US officials neglected the strength of Mossadegh and the nationalist movement which caused the US to lose control and influence in Iran. Therefore, a coup appeared beneficial to the US as it was an emergency measure to reestablish its influence in Iran. In this way, the thesis argues that the coup was not a well calculated or planned effort. I build this argument by first showing how the US established political and economic cooperation with the Shah during the Second World War and the first post-war years. This started an era of cooperation with the Shah which was an essential part of the backdrop of the coup. Second, I explain the rise of the nationalist movement and how the US neglected its significance. US officials did not grasp the support for the nationalists among Iranians which caused US policy to be subject to rapid changes and failure. Finally, I explain how Mossadegh and the nationalists had by 1953 managed to significantly limit the power of the Iranian monarchy, the main bulwark of US influence, before Mossadegh was overthrown.

Pre toga prvi svetski rat, Japan dobija Šandong, netrpeljivost postaje još veća. 1927. godine japanski general Tanaka postaje premijer i govori o obezbeđivanju vlasti nad Mandžurijom i Mongolijom kako bi Japan mogao da prodre i u ostale delove Kine pa preko Kine osvoji celu Aziju, a onda Evropu i na kraju ceo svet. Falili su im resursi, (falio im je mozak) falilo im je da se osećaju moćno i da budu moćni jer su mali i kopirali su Kinu u svemu pa su hteli da je se reše (setimo se profesorovog govora o kopiranju ideala pa gajenju mržnje prema njima). 1928. godine Zhang Xueliang postavlja zastave nacionalističke Kine i time ujedinjuje Kinu. Za vreme ekspedicije na sever (Northern expedition) japanske trupe bile su u Tianjinu, a kako se kineska vojska približavala Jinanu japanci su odlučili da prebace svoje trupe u Jinan (po naređenju generala Fukude, navodno Hirohito nije to odobrio). Kineskoj vojci je naređeno da na ulazi u grad, međutim ona nija poslušala i ušla je, trećeg dana njihovog boravka u Jinanu desio se Jinan incident (1928) u kojem je poginulo 12-oro Japanaca, civila, jer su se kineske i japanske trupe sukobile blizu kuće japanske porodice. Ubrzo je potpisano primirje. Iste godine desio se još jedan incident-Japanci su postavili eksploziv na prugu kojom je trebalo da prođe voz u kojem se nalazio Zhang Zuolin, tadašnji vladar rata u Mandžuriji. Hteli su da ga svrgnu kako bi postavili nekoga na koga mogu više da utiču. Zhang Zuolin je poginuo, ali nasledio ga je sin Zhang Xueliang, na zaprepašćenje Japanaca. On je pregovarao sa Chiang Kai Shekom. Sledeći korak Japanci su napravili 18. septembra 1931. Godine kada su opet postavili eksploziv blizu pruge, ovog puta, ne s namerom da nekoga ubiju već da optuže Kineze za postavljanje ekploziva, kako bi imali razlog da uzvrate udarac. U " samoodbrani " su uništili garnizon kineske vojske i do kraja dana okupirali Mukden, potom su nastavili sa okupacijo, za 5 meseci japanska vojska je kontrolisala Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang. Kinezi nisu zadovoljni Chiangovim nedostatkom reakcija na ponašanje Japanaca. KMT je prvo želeo da se otarasi KPK-a, a onda pozabavi spoljnim pitanjima. Zbog nezadovoljstva naroda Chiang 15. Decembra 1931 daje otkaz na mesto predstavnika KMT-a i biva zamenjen sinom Sun Yat Sen-a, Sun Fo-om. Sun Fo ubrzo biva zamenjen Wang Jinwei-em jer je dok je on bio predstavnik Japan okupirao još jedan grad. 1932, 7. Januara SAD ne priznaje Japance u Mandžuriji, ne priznaje njihovu vladu. U martu Japanci ipak postavljaju Pu Yi-a za cara države marionete-ManChuKuo. Lytton report-Japanski napad na kineski garnizon nije bio u cilju samoodbrane. Liga naroda ne priznaje ManChuKuo, Japan odlazi iz Lige nadora marta 1933. 28 Januara 1932 Japan bombarduje Šangaj, Chiang KaiShek privremeno premešta prestonicu iz nanjing-a u LuoYing (zbog blizine Nanjinga i Šangaja). 4 marta Liga naroda naređuje prestanak vatre, 6 marta Kinezi se smiruju, Japanci ne pristaju na primirje sve do 5 Maja. Potpisan je Šangajski dogovor o prestanku vatre. Ovim dogovorom Šangaj postaje demilitariozovana zona Kine, pokoja japanska jedinica je mogla da bude u ovoj zoni.

Od proljeća 1945. intenzivirale su se japanske diplomatske aktivnosti za prekid rata, vojne pripreme za odlučujuću bitku; američke za brzo i pobjedonosno okončanje sukoba bezuvjetnom kapitulacijom neprijatelja te sovjetske za što brži i uspješniji ulazak u dalekoistočni rat. Cilj ovoga preglednog članka jest razmotriti utjecaj atomskih bomba, odnosno sovjetske invazije Mandžurije, na japansku odluku o prihvaćanju bezuvjetne kapitulacije u kontekstu spomenutih procesa. Pritisnut ratnom i ekonomskom realnošću, Japan je u proljeće 1945. bio zreo za kapitulaciju, no njegova militaristička vrhuška tvrdoglavo je odbijala položiti oružje, pripremajući posljednju veliku bitku. Istovremeno,
japanska diplomacija pokušavala je navesti SSSR na ulogu medijatora između Japana i Saveznika, a objema je stranama najmanji zajednički nazivnik bio očuvanje sovjetske neutralnosti, formalno zajamčene Sovjetsko-japanskim sporazumom o nenapadanju.
SSSR je sa svoje strane nastojao Japance zavlačiti diplomatskim procedurama što duže bude moguće, kako bi se jedinice Crvene armije mogle što bolje pripremiti za napad na Mandžuriju. Amerikanci su u veljači 1945. bili uvjereni kako za uspješan pohod protiv Japana treba suradnja s SSSR-om, napadom na Kvantunšku armiju u Mandžuriji
pa su je i dogovorili tijekom konferencije u Jalti. Do Potsdamske konferencije situacija se promijenila i sovjetsko sudjelovanje više nije bilo nužno te su Amerikaci napravili sve što su mogli kako bi usporili i odgodili sovjetsko priključenje ratu. Jedna od poduzetih akcija bilo je i atomsko bombardiranje Hirošime i Nagasakija, koje nije previše impresioniralo
japansku vrhušku jer to su bila samo dva od više od šezdeset gradova uništenih od proljeća 1945. godine. Konačno, ulaskom SSSR-a u rat, japanski militaristi su napokon shvatili i prihvatili beznadnost situacije i potpomognuti „svetom odlukom“ cara Hirohita, napokon pristali na mir.

Examination of Western coverage of the Japanese seizure of Korea in 1905.  Analysis of the reporting of such correspondents as George Kennan, Stephen Palmer, Jack London, W. E. Griffis, William Jennings Bryan, Frederick McKenzie and others.  Each of these writers had a strong bias for and against what the Japanese were doing in Korea.  There was certainly a strong imbalance in the reporting of each of these correspondents.

Fifteen short articles in James I. Matray, ed., East Asia and the United States: An Encyclopedia of Relations Since 1784, 2 vols. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002). 

[“Bruce, David K. E. (1898-1977),” 1:55-56; “Constructive Engagement,” 1:111-112; “Davis, Norman H. (1878-1944),” 1:119-120; “Ford, Gerald R. (1913-),” 1:167-169; “Harriman, W. Averell (1891-1986),” 1:215-216; “Hilsman, Roger (1919-),” 1:225-226; “Hong Kong,” 1:234-236; “Kennan, George F. (1904-),” 1:296-297; “Kissinger, Henry A. (1923-),” 314-315; “Lee Kuan Yew (1923-),” 1:343-344; “Luce, Henry R. (1898-1967),” 361-362; “McCoy, Frank R. (1874-1954),” 374-375; “Peace Corps,” 2:467-468; “Rusk, Dean (1909-1994),” 2:525-526; “Taylor, Maxwell D. (1901-1987),” 2:609-610.]

In a series of in-depth essays, this book describes the United States' response to diplomatic, economic, military, political, and cultural developments in East Asia. While focusing particularly on China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, the encyclopedia also provides solid coverage of Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan. Written by distinguished scholars from nine countries, the entries cover all of the significant people, controversies, conflicts, and agreements of the past two centuries.


Individual entries, many of which were written by the acknowledged authority on the subject, reflect the most current thinking and up-to-date research, and include sources of additional information. The book includes:

·A chronology

·17 maps

·A list of acronyms

·A personnel summary

·A selected bibliography

This encyclopedia will be useful to Asian specialists and students, as well as scholars in the broader fields of international history and foreign relations, making it an excellent resource for public and academic libraries.

At the end of World War II, many Americans were looking to resume the social progress achieved during the era of the New Deal.  Abruptly elevated President Harry S Truman believed it was time to take the next step toward social security by enacting a program of compulsory national health insurance. Though over 75% of Americans supported it, no such program was enacted until twenty years later when Lyndon B. Johnson obtained health insurance for the elderly as part of his Great Society.  This study examines the reasons why national health
insurance passed during an era of great social tumult yet was unable to be achieved during a previous era of relative domestic calm and prosperity when it had substantial support.
Using the previous works of social and political scientists, traditional historical accounts, materials of the Truman and Johnson Libraries, the contemporaneous literature of interested parties and journalists as well as transcripts of speeches and press conferences, this paper analyzes the political and sociological forces at work in the nation during these periods. In addition to the traditional account of Johnson’s political effectiveness, this research finds four other changes in the United States which help to account for the success of a national health insurance program in the 1960s. These include the increasing mobilization of interest groups representing senior citizens, the declining effectiveness of appeals by the American Medical Association that such a program was “socialized medicine,” the changes in the philosophy of
labor unions in the ensuing period, and the influence of civil rights movement upon health insurance efforts.  Taken together with the “honeymoon” period boost given Johnson after the Kennedy assassination, ex-president Harry S Truman was able to witness his dream of national health insurance become a reality when Medicare was signed into law in his presence in 1965.

This article advances a rhetorical theory of deixis, a theoretical and methodological orientation that infuses the linguistic concept of deixis with rhetorical understandings of ethos, place, and time. Deixis reveals the rhetorical dynamics within the fabric of spoken discourse, dynamics that often refer to what is outside the text to make sense of what is within it. Ultimately, I argue that identifying the deictic indicators within a speech text enables the critic to pinpoint where, how, and why a speaker activates the physical elements of the speech situation as a material means of persuasion. After outlining the theoretical tenets of this approach, I analyze Harry S. Truman's Address to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, to show how a rhetorical theory of deixis orients the critic to the bodies, places, and temporalities implied in and displayed through speech.

Complex social systems require knowledge specialists who provide information that political actors rely onto
solve policy challenges. Successful advice is unproblematic; more significant is assigning institutional blame in the
aftermath of advice considered wrong or harmful, undercutting state security. How do experts, operating within
epistemic communities, preserve their reputation in the face of charges of incompetence or malice? Attacks on
experts and their sponsors can be an effective form of contentious politics, a wedge to denounce other institutional
players. To examine the politics of expertise we analyze the debate in the early 1950s over “Who Lost China?,”
the congressional attempt to assign responsibility for the fall of the Nationalist regime to the Communists. Using a
“strong case,” we examine political battles over the motives of Professor Owen Lattimore. For epistemic authority
an expert must be defined as qualified (having appropriate credentials), influential (providing consequential
information), and innocent (demonstrating epistemic neutrality). We focus on two forms of attack: smears (an
oppositional presentation of a set of linked claims) and degradation ceremonies (the institutional awarding of
stigma). We differentiate these by the critic’s links to systems of power. Smears appear when reputational rivals
lack power to make their claims stick, while degradation ceremonies operate through dominance within an institutional setting. Policy experts are awarded provisional credibility, but this access to an autonomous realm of knowledge can be countered by opponents with alternate sources of power. Ultimately expertise involves not only knowledge, but also the presentation of a validated self.

In 1894 Japan went to war with Russia over the latter’s expansion into East Asia. However, in February 1904 Japan attacked Russian forces at Port Arthur and Inchon. Japan at that time was an ally of Britain, and the US was willing to allow Japan to have control over Korea in exchange for Japan acknowledging US control over the Philippines. In 1905 Japan established a protectorate over Korea, and in 1910 Japan annexed Korea.
    In August 1945 the USSR declared war on Japan and entered the northeastern section of Korea that borders on the Soviet Union. US troops didn’t arrive in Korea until September 8th. Two young State Department officers were assigned to define the American zone of occupation. They decided that an “administrative” line be established along 38th parallel. Korean Communists immediately began forming so-called People’s Committees friendly to the Soviet Union in preparation for Korean independence.
    In December 1945 the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow to discuss post-war issues in Europe and the Far East. It was agreed that the U.S. and Soviet military commands in Korea would establish a Joint Commission to make recommendations for a single, free government in Korea. The Americans favored a united Korean government under Syngman Rhee. Rhee opposed the U.S.-Soviet Cooperation Committee that was created and refused to negotiate with the Communists. In September the US decided to refer the matter to the UN General Assembly. In November the UN General Assembly established a UN Temporary Commission on Korea to oversee elections scheduled for May 1948. The Communists did not participate in the election, newly elected National Assembly elected Rhee as president in July, 1948. In February 1946 a provisional government named the Provisional People’s Committee was formed under Kim Il-sung.
    On New Year’s Day 1949 Moscow announced that it would withdrew all Soviet troops from North Korea, and in June the last American troops left Pusan. In a speech on January 1950 at the National Press Club, Secretary of State Dean Acheson implied that both South Korea and Taiwan were outside the American “defensive perimeter.” In April Kim Il-sung visited Stalin in Moscow and asked his support for a forcible reunification of Korea. Stalin gave his support, but warned that North Korea should not expect Soviet military support for the invasion. In June the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. Truman then ordered American air and naval forces to support South Korea.
    By the end of June the North Koreans had taken control of the South Korean capital of Seoul. In an emergency meeting the Security Council passed a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council, because earlier in the year the Security Council had refused to replace Nationalist China with the Communist China in the United Nations. Truman appointed the hero of the War in the Pacific and former military governor of Japan, Douglas MacArthur as Commander of the United Nations Forces. American ground troops were quickly redeployed from Japan to South Korea to assist the Army of the Republic of Korea resist the North Korean People’s Army. But outnumbered three to one, they were forced to retreat to the port of Pusan. MacArthur came up with a plan to launch an amphibious assault on the rear of North Korean forces at the port of Inchon on the western coast of the Korean peninsula.
    The Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai broadcast a warning that Peking would not tolerate a crossing of the 38th parallel. In early October the Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel near Kaeson. But a South Korean force approaching the Yalu River was almost wiped out by Chinese troops. MacArthur then requested permission under the international law rule of “hot pursuit” to chase attacking aircraft for three minutes across the Manchurian border. MacArthur also requested additional forces, including Chinese Nationalists from Formosa, a naval blockade of China, and permission to bomb the Chinese mainland. Truman ordered all commands and embassies abroad not to make any speeches or issue press releases until they were cleared by the departments of State or Defense.
    In March MacArthur decided to defy the President’s gag order by calling a press conference in which he predicted if he did not receive major additions to his army, there would be a military stalemate followed by a “savage slaughter” by the enemy. This was interpreted as an attempt to torpedo a diplomatic initiative made by the United States to negotiate a truce of which he had been privately informed. After a series of meetings with his advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Truman decided to relieve MacArthur of his command.
    The reaction to the dismissal of MacArthur was intense. Truman’s popularity was at an all-time low, and he decided not to run for re-election in the 1952 Presidential election. The Republican nominated former general Dwight David Eisenhower, and the Democrats Adelai Stevenson. Eisenhower chose as his running mate was Richard Nixon. In a speech on October 24, 1952, Eisenhower promised to end the war, and go to Korea if he were elected. After winning the election in November, but before his inauguration as President in January, Eisenhower went to Korea in December 1952. Two weeks after his inauguration, Eisenhower in February 1953 announced that he was withdrawing the Seventh Fleet from protecting China from a possible invasion from Taiwan. Then in March Josef Stalin died after a brief illness. He was replaced by a troika. On 15 March the Kremlin moved dramatically away from the style of Soviet foreign policy of Stalin’s last years. Soon after, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai sent a cablegram proposing the resumption of negotiations at Panmunjom.
      It is informative to contrast the outcome of the Vietnam Conflict, after which the United States permitted the country to be reunited under the Communist regime in the North, to the outcome of the Korean Police Action, in which the country remained divided between the Communist North and the non-Communist South. With assistance from the Soviet Union, China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb in 1967. In 1964 North Korea asked the Soviet Union for assistance in its nuclear program, but the Soviet Union refused.  Instead, Kim Il-sung approached Pakistan for help. Pakistan began its nuclear program in response to India’s nuclear program. India tested its first nuclear device in 1974, using a reactor it obtained from Canada under the so-called “Atoms for Peace” program of the Eisenhower administration. It is alleged that Pakistan obtained technical advice from China. Kim Il-sung died in 1994, and he was succeeded by his son Kim Jong-Il, who is more autocratic and erratic than his father. In May 1998 North Korea tested five nuclear devices. Thus, one of the legacies of the Cold War was the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
    In conclusion, the Korean police action demonstrates the transition from an American foreign policy based on the principle of self-determination under Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the anti-Communist ideology of the Cold War under Harry Truman. This was done under pressure of lobbyists and politicians who accused those who disagreed with them of treason. For the next 40 years (from 1950 to 1990) United States foreign policy under both Republican and Democratic administrations has been premised on the containment of the spread of Communism, not only in Asia, but Europe, Africa, and South America. This fight against an ideology and the support for those regimes, however, corrupt or dictatorial, that oppose Communism has pre-empted one of the principles on which this nation was founded—that is, self-determination. It is sad that rather from learning from this history, our foreign policy is again putting a fight against the ideology of Islamism before the underlying reasons why certain people are attracted to radicalism, namely, that they have not been allowed to change a status quo under which they have been divided and forced to live in countries not of their own making.

In questo mio breve elaborato scritto ho cercato di analizzare il concetto di "sviluppo" nella sua evoluzione dalla fine dell'Ottocento fino  al secondo dopoguerra, focalizzandomi in particolare sul famoso "punto IV", enunciato il 20 gennaio 1949 dal presidente statunitense Harry S. Truman nel "Discorso dei quattro punti". Il "punto IV" ha realmente cambiato il modo di concepire lo "sviluppo"? Ha concretamente portato un cambiamento epocale nei rapporti tra le superpotenze e i Paesi considerati "sottosviluppati"? Si possono identificare cause politiche alla base dell'apertura di Truman verso questi Paesi? Questi sono solamente alcuni dei quesiti ai quali ho cercato di rispondere, attraverso una ripresa critica della riflessione proposta da Rist nella sua opera intitolata "Lo sviluppo. Storia di una credenza occidentale".

Scholars in rhetoric are increasingly attentive to the power of places and spaces to shape rhetorical performance. This article takes up the connection between ethos and location identified by several recent scholars, arguing that affiliation with and representation of material environments plays a crucial role in ethos. Ethos strategies are further shaped by genres, which are theorized as locations and environments in order to capture a fundamental dynamic between strategy and social norm. To demonstrate the strengths of understanding ethos in relation to both geographical and genre location, I analyze the ethos-maneuvers of Mary Austin, prominent early twentieth-century feminist, activist, and nature writer whose thirty-year public career merits attention from rhetorical scholars. In articulating how genre shapes Austin's efforts to develop her location in the deserts of the American West into a persuasive public ethos, I argue that ethos emerges in genre-specific formations.

Jack London came to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 looking for excitement. Having just been hired by the vast Hearst newspaper chain to cover the Russo-Japanese War as its chief correspondent, London eagerly accepted the assignment. He longed to be in the thick of battle, dodging bullets and risking mortality. He wished to hear the sounds of rifles and guns, the bursting of shell and shrapnel, and to hear the voices of competing soldiers as they fought to the death. He wished to witness hand-to-hand fighting between Japanese samurai and Russian Cossacks, to view wave after wave of Japanese troops charging Russian fortifications and see the horrible death and destruction that so characterized this first of the deadly wars of the twentieth century.