Global Policy

This short paper reflects on the key lessons we can learn from the political debate around and policy experimentation with (emergency) basic income schemes in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the pandemic crisis initially seems to have opened up a policy window for introducing a basic income as a crisis instrument, theoretical arguments and empirical observations strongly suggest the reliance of some basic income advocates on crisis events, such as the pandemic, to push forward their policy ideas involves wishful thinking rather than political reality. A feasible roadmap towards introducing basic income requires the hard work of raising public awareness, constructing broad constituencies, and building robust political coalitions rather than waiting for the next crisis to come around the corner.

The Republic of Haiti heavily relied on foreign aids & reliefs to fund its government. This current tax system relies heavily on indirect taxes, such as a sales tax or value added tax, which generate very limited resources for the government. They also are regressive as time goes with modern technology, such that low-income earners pay a greater share of their income in taxes than high-income earners due to instability of the country's economic health. This in-depth analysis document is to provide an overview on the importance of having a Tax collection system like Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for Haiti to have a functional government for economic independence.

The political strategy of forum shopping is an under-researched but highly relevant concept for understanding the dynamics of global governance. Forum shopping involves actors seeking to realise their policy objectives within preferred policy arenas on the basis of an arena's particular governing characteristics. We examine the forum shopping behaviour of the key states, business and non-governmental groups in regard to three policy issues: labour standards, intellectual property rights, and chemicals regulation. Our preliminary analysis is centred around the questions of why actors forum shop, the circumstances in which forum shopping enables actors to succeed in promoting their interests, and the impact of forum shopping on the effectiveness of global governance. Our cases suggest an arena's membership, issue mandate, decision making procedures and enforcement capacity are the key characteristics that shape actors' arena preferences. Another important implication is that a multi-arena global governance system comprised of duplication and overlap in issue mandate (rather than large multilateral single issue arenas) may be beneficial for advancing actors' policy agendas. The overarching goal of the article is to spark more systematic research into the often practiced but under-theorised phenomenon of forum shopping. • Global governance is achieved through action in multiple arenas, which provide different opportunities for political action. An arena's membership, issue mandate, decision making procedures and enforcement capacity should be taken into account by policymakers in assessing appropriate arenas for advancing their goals. • Entrepreneurial actors take advantage of 'strategic inconsistencies' in the characteristics of international policy arenas in order to progress or block the development of proposals through incremental decisions. • Policymakers must be alert to the likely use of forum shopping by other actors, including business actors and NGOs, which may advance or stymie the development of policy agendas in one arena via action in alternative arenas.

Can Egypt achieve economic and security-related stability without first achieving some sort of political and civil control? While many regional and international actors seem convinced that it can be done, this essay argues that stability in post-revolution Egypt is only possible by empowering civilian and political actors in cooperation with military and security establishments. Based on an analysis of Egyptian civil security relations, it shall be shown that the prioritising of economic and security sector solutions over political reforms has led to a dysfunctional system and a vicious cycle of political violence, economic hardships and security failures. In consideration of ways forward, the essays end with policy recommendations for the EU and other international actors in their approach towards Egypt. • Keep open dialogue and negotiations with Egypt's senior politicians. • Provide more oversight to the Egyptian scene with less political conditionality and no direct interventions. • Strengthen the role of Egyptian civil society -with particular attention focused on civil security relations. • Cooperate with the Egyptian military while prioritising security sector reforms.

Indonesia: Introduced forced local data-storage requirements for Internet-based, over-the-top content providers. Introduced a patent law amendment that undermines pharmaceutical intellectual property and forces local production and technology transfers. • Russia: Introduced forced local data-storage requirements and encryption-key disclosure as part of a new telecommunications data law. Introduced new government procurement rules that ban the purchase of foreign software. It also forced the local production of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. • Turkey: Introduced a new data-protection law with stringent transfer requirements that acts as de facto forced local data storage. • Vietnam: Introduced forced local data-storage requirements for Internet-based, over-the-top content providers. Introduced a new network-security law that forces companies to disclose encryption keys and source code to the government as a condition of market access. Establishing a national payments gateway that discriminates against foreign electronic payment services-favoring a new local firm called "NAPAS"-in direct contravention of its Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) commitment. • India: Introduced local content requirements as part of its National Telecom Machine-to-Machine Roadmap and introduced local content requirements in solar power projects. Introduced new tariffs on telecommunications equipment and implemented. Its Preferential Market Access rules limit government procurement of ICT products to domestically produced products.

The increasing realisation that governance quality is a fundamental element of long-run development has led to its consideration as a desirable development goal in its own right. To contribute to such a process, this paper provides a framework to set, measure and monitor governance goals in the Post 2015 Development Agenda. First, we assess whether existing cross-national measures on governance quality can be exploited to measure and monitor aspects of legal, bureaucratic and administrative quality. Such a "quick fix" approach to measuring governance quality is fraught with challenges. The current practice of measurement is still subject to the short country coverage of most available measures, issues of comparability and legitimacy, as well as methodological shortcomings. Second, we argue that, in the long run, measuring and monitoring governance quality may require reconceptualising "good governance" and designing internationally shared measures that are routinely provided by national statistical offices, (but, international groups should also continue to make their independent measures). Finally, we consider the different approaches to setting governance goals, arguing in favour of a combination of national target setting and minimum standard with continuous improvement.

The slogan 'take back control' was central to Brexit. The conception of democracy this slogan embodies is the traditional Westminster model. It is a model in the sense that it is supposed to provide a simplified characterisation of the operative principles of UK politics and government, although practice in fact diverges from those principles. It is also a model in the sense that the Westminster system is seen by those favouring Brexit as an ideal to which practice needs to be restored. The model can be associated with a corresponding conception of democracies in the international order. However, there are both functional and democratic disadvantages with that account of democracy and the international order, disadvantages that the development of the EU highlights. Two alternative models of democracy beyond the nation state are identified, before concluding that the Westminster model has a past but not a future.

This article examines the ideology and the politics of buen vivir as the government of Rafael Correa in Ecuador has implemented them from 2007 to 2013. The analysis focuses on the implications of this model, which is based on traditional Andean worldview. The article first explores the main components of buen vivir including its focus on strengthening democratic participation and environmental justice. Secondly, the implementation of this ideology is analysed through a review of the new constitution and government policies. Thirdly, key outcomes are assessed through various social and economic indicators. Fourth, a critical approach to the government's interpretation of buen vivir is taken and the many contradictions and inconsistencies in its implementation are unfolded. Nevertheless, the policies of buen vivir have the potential to create innovative and inspiring solutions, especially in the face of the environmental and social challenges brought by the anthropocene.

In debates about democratic backsliding in the new Eastern member states, the EU is pictured as an internally divided weak regional institution, momentarily unable or unwilling to impose elementary norms of democratic governance on deviating member states. In this article I argue that the EU, with its integration strategies, is at least as much part of the problem. It acts as a gigantic machinery of institutional monocropping, imposing uniform policies and institutions on dramatically different economies and societies. In the absence of regional mechanisms that could help European requirements and domestic demands to get in sync, domestic political entrepreneurs are rewarded for experimentation and deviation from European norms. The article highlights the governance problems linked to institutional monocropping by contrasting two major experiences of regional normalization and describes the EU strategies before and after accession. It ends with two alternative scenarios and some of the policy implications of the discussion.

Krueng Aceh is the biggest river that divides Banda Aceh. Krueng Aceh has been contributed to the development of the city. Like many other rivers in Indonesia, the growth of illegal settlements along the riverbank has also been grown rapidly and been contributed to the slum condition in Banda Aceh. Settlements along the banks of Krueng Dhoe, Kerinci Hamlet, Seutui, Banda Aceh are included in the slum category. Therefore the "Kampung Warna" program can be a solution for managing the face of the Krueng Dhoe settlement. This activity uses the Quadruple Helix collaboration concept or known as ABCG elements (Academic, Business, Community and Government), namely Higher Education Institutions in Banda Aceh, the community, PKK Aceh Mobilization Team, Banda Aceh and Gampong City, Banda Aceh City Government, and KOTAKU (City Without Slums). This study aims to investigate the impact of environmental improvement on the quality of life of the community. It is expected that with this program, the impression of slums on the banks of Krueng Dhoe can be changed to become more beautiful, neat, and clean so that this location can become a tourist attraction that can generate income for the local community. This study utilized a qualitative approach with descriptive analysis. In this case, the method is more technical. Data collection techniques used are observation, interviews, and documents. Changes in the environment are becoming a more beautiful, neat, and organized community spirit to maintain the cleanliness of the house, the environment, and the river. The mutual self-help developed during the process of gampong's improvement has been spread around and copied by the nearby neighborhoods.

Modern republicanism must be distinguished sharply from ancient republicanism and modern liberalism. Modern republicanism is strongly restricted in Europe due to the constitutional hegemony of ordo-and neoliberalism. Therefore, Europe is running out of democratic alternatives on both, the national and the transnational level. This is a challenge for the entire Western legal tradition. During a lasting period of multiple crises the new prevalence of private over public law became evident, and as a result democracy became fac ßade democracy. However, at the same time technocratic incrementalism no longer is a solution because it destroys the legitimatory basis of European. But is the legitimation crisis a last chanceor is it already the catastrophe?

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

Solutions to global sustainability challenges are increasingly technology-intensive. Yet, technologies are neither developed nor applied to governance problems in a socio-political vacuum. Despite aspirations to provide novel solutions to current sustainability governance challenges, many technology-centred projects, pilots and plans remain implicated in longer-standing global governance trends shaping the possibilities for success in often under-recognized ways. This article identifies three overlapping contexts within which technology-led efforts to address sustainability challenges are evolving, highlighting the growing roles of: (1) private actors; (2) experimentalism; and (3) informality. The confluence of these interconnected trends illuminates an important yet often under-recognized paradox: that the use of technology in multi-stakeholder initiatives tends to reduce rather than expand the set of actors, enhancing instead of reducing challenges to participation and transparency, and reinforcing rather than transforming existing forms of power relations. Without recognizing and attempting to address these limits, technology-led multi-stakeholder initiatives will remain less effective in addressing the complexity and uncertainty surrounding global sustainability governance. We provide pathways for interrogating the ways that novel technologies are being harnessed to address long-standing global sustainability issues in manners that foreground key ethical, social and political considerations and the contexts in which they are evolving.

Four years on from the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), countries around the world seek methods that provide simple but comprehensive narratives on their progress. Given the complexity of the agenda and its indicator framework, key questions that arise are what is an appropriate method to summarize information? and how to get everyone counted? This paper provides an overview of various existing methodologies for assessing progress towards the SDGs. It provides guidance on how to choose an appropriate method that is fit for the purpose of analysis. The paper also recommends an approach for measuring SDG progress that accounts for progress among the furthest left behind groups in order to fulfil the leave no-one behind ambition of the 2030 agenda. Applying the new approach to data from countries in Asia-Pacific region shows that, when disaggregated statistics are available, the inclusive measurement can significantly change the progress narrative and our understanding of priorities for SDGs implementation. Policy Implications • Given the diversity of practices in measuring progress towards sustainable development and the complexity of the indicator framework provided by the SDGs, policymakers need to make a careful choice among existing approaches. An appropriate approach is one that clearly answers their policy questions. • The 2030 agenda is a people-centred development framework and its measurement should accommodate the inclusion of disaggregated statistics from the furthest behind population groups. SDGs progress assessment should examine if all subpopulation groups are making the required progress to achieve the 2030 targets. • Setting clear and specific national targets are an essential part of measuring progress towards sustainable development. To make progress assessment possible, policymakers should engage with the statistical community to define specific and numeric target values that are aspirational but within reach if existing resources are used efficiently. • The SDGs framework is multidimensional and any progress assessment needs to provide insight on all different dimensions to be useful for national planning and prioritization. Measurement frameworks should ensure that information is aggregated and communicated at various levels in order to capture all dimensions of the SDGs.

The papers in this special issue provide accounts of the politics and knowledge that shaped the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The open and transparent processes in the Open Working Group (OWG) and Post-2015 agenda consultations challenged the MDG paradigm and set more transformative and ambitious goals. But across many goals, there was slippage in ambition when targets and indicators were selected. In some cases, this is due to genuine difficulty in defining a suitable indicator. In other cases, there is clearly a contestation about the agenda, and indicators are used to reorient or pervert the meaning of the goal. The accounts of the negotiations-concerning inequality, sustainable agriculture, access to justice, education, environmentshow how the selection of an indicator is purportedly a technical matter but is highly political, though obscured behind the veil of an objective and technical choice. The papers also highlight how the increasing role of big data and other non-traditional sources of data is altering data production, dissemination and use, and fundamentally altering the epistemology of information and knowledge. This raises questions about 'data for whom and for what'fundamental issues concerning the power of data to shape knowledge, the democratic governance of SDG indicators and of knowledge for development overall. Policy Implications • The research findings show that the SDG experience was an important innovation in more participatory and transparent goal setting, but they also call attention to the pitfalls of 'governance by indicators'. The HLPF and the UN SC should reexamine the most problematic indicators at the 2020 review. • The UN SC should ensure that the IAEG-SDGs is open to comment and proposals for change, while civil society actors and others should continue to invest in scrutinizing the selection of indicators. Criteria for indicator selection should be based more on their accurately reflecting SDG norms and less on data availability. The international community should invest more in developing Tier II and III indicators. • Most national statistical offices (NSOs) cannot implement the SDG indicator framework without adequate resources. National governments and international donors should give higher priority to supporting these needs. • Big data can make a contribution to the SDGs but their development needs to be carefully managed to ensure they promote inclusive and participatory development. To ensure this, UN should play a more proactive role in governing the use of big data, for example through accreditation. • Monitoring the implementation of SDGs should be based on a broad qualitative analysis focused on the goals, not on the indicator framework alone. Keynes (1936, p. 383) once remarked, 'the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else'. But which ideas rule? The development field is replete with competing ideas about the essential objectives of what we mean by 'development', and theories about the best ways to achieve them. Global development agendas are an effort to bridge those divides and find common ground; but there is an intense competition for acceptance of one single set of ideas as the consensus global norm concerning both the ends and means of development. Thus it is not surprising that the formulation of the SDGsan exercise to define a collective vision of development and set out key prioritieswas an intensely contested process. Much public debate about the politics of SDG negotiations has focused on the nature of the open multi-stakeholder process, to explain why they led to a transformative

Global supply chains (GSCs) are organised through complex networks which leave workers vulnerable to exploitation and unprotected against abusive labour practices including modern slavery. However, attention has focused on business responsibilities for the impact of commercial activities on human rights with little focus on the role of states as economic actors and their duties regarding their own supply chain, including through public procurement. This article is the first to analyse the application of the Transparency in Supply Chains provision (TiSCs) of the UK Modern Slavery Act (2015) to the public sector. The TiSCs oblige commercial organisations are obliged to report on efforts to identify, prevent, and mitigate modern slavery in their supply chain. This article finds that whilst most reporting in the first year by public buyers, the bulk of which have been universities, fall short of what is expected of institutions according to Government guidance the exercise of reporting has initiated an important process of awareness. The public sector faces a steep learning curve to develop effective human rights due diligence in their supply chain. However, the TiSCs obligation has proved a catalyst for a wider process of understanding human rights risks and responsibilities in public supply chains. Policy implications:  Box-ticking exercises do not represent the spirit and ultimate aim of the regulation. The Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement (the statement) should be a live document, which should drive policy change, commitments and behaviours to guarantee that purchasing choices do not contribute to the violation of the rights of labourers. Public bodies should have the necessary support and guidance to comply with their obligations.  Through due diligence processes, public buyers should establish systematic ways to access and assess information on their supply chain, and avenues for effective dialogue and engagement with suppliers. Preventing, mitigating and remediating human rights risks in supply chains does not necessarily imply terminating relationship with suppliers. Universities need to develop adequate due diligence processes to satisfy their responsibilities under the MSA and transform the way they think about procurement. They need to devote the necessary resources and human capital to them; public procurement teams alone cannot undertake such responsibilities.  Public buyers have a heightened responsibility to combat human rights violations in their supply chain and as such it should be reflected in the MSA. New obligations to reflect this responsibility and social expectations should be introduced and effective guidance should be developed, as well as sanctions for non-compliance. Public buyers are key actors in bringing positive change and transforming GSCs to minimise and address the impact of modern slavery. Considerations to amend the MSA to include specific provisions for public authorities should be taken seriously in order to guarantee an appropriate role of public buyers in the combat against modern slavery in the GSC.  Several states are considering the development of UK-style modern slavery legislation. They should establish clear obligations for public buyers in these normative developments and provide the necessary guidance to guarantee the fulfilment of the state obligation to protect human rights when acting as an economic agent, beyond the ad hoc inclusion of some public buyers among the reporting organisations, as it has happened in the UK.

Global supply chains (GSCs) are organised through complex networks which leave workers vulnerable to exploitation and unprotected against abusive labour practices including modern slavery. However, attention has focused on business responsibilities for the impact of commercial activities on human rights with little focus on the role of states as economic actors and their duties regarding their own supply chain, including through public procurement. This article is the first to analyse the application of the Transparency in Supply Chains provision (TiSCs) of the UK Modern Slavery Act (2015) to the public sector. The TiSCs oblige commercial organisations are obliged to report on efforts to identify, prevent, and mitigate modern slavery in their supply chain. This article finds that whilst most reporting in the first year by public buyers, the bulk of which have been universities, fall short of what is expected of institutions according to Government guidance the exercise of reporting has initiated an important process of awareness. The public sector faces a steep learning curve to develop effective human rights due diligence in their supply chain. However, the TiSCs obligation has proved a catalyst for a wider process of understanding human rights risks and responsibilities in public supply chains. Policy implications:  Box-ticking exercises do not represent the spirit and ultimate aim of the regulation. The Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement (the statement) should be a live document, which should drive policy change, commitments and behaviours to guarantee that purchasing choices do not contribute to the violation of the rights of labourers. Public bodies should have the necessary support and guidance to comply with their obligations.  Through due diligence processes, public buyers should establish systematic ways to access and assess information on their supply chain, and avenues for effective dialogue and engagement with suppliers. Preventing, mitigating and remediating human rights risks in supply chains does not necessarily imply terminating relationship with suppliers. Universities need to develop adequate due diligence processes to satisfy their responsibilities under the MSA and transform the way they think about procurement. They need to devote the necessary resources and human capital to them; public procurement teams alone cannot undertake such responsibilities.  Public buyers have a heightened responsibility to combat human rights violations in their supply chain and as such it should be reflected in the MSA. New obligations to reflect this responsibility and social expectations should be introduced and effective guidance should be developed, as well as sanctions for non-compliance. Public buyers are key actors in bringing positive change and transforming GSCs to minimise and address the impact of modern slavery. Considerations to amend the MSA to include specific provisions for public authorities should be taken seriously in order to guarantee an appropriate role of public buyers in the combat against modern slavery in the GSC.  Several states are considering the development of UK-style modern slavery legislation. They should establish clear obligations for public buyers in these normative developments and provide the necessary guidance to guarantee the fulfilment of the state obligation to protect human rights when acting as an economic agent, beyond the ad hoc inclusion of some public buyers among the reporting organisations, as it has happened in the UK.

If you were unlucky enough to come accross this paper, please keep in mind that this is a very preliminary version. At this point, we decline any responsability on the consequences of using the implications of our analysis in the real world.

Created to facilitate the transition of economies of Central and Eastern Europe towards democracy and the free market, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is a regional institution in the development finance regime complex. This article examines how the EBRD’s independent accountability mechanism (IAM) emerged and changed to demonstrate how policy norms filter through regime complexes. This is important because new ideas can change behavioural expectations and institutional practices across a complex. Tracing where the idea originated from and how it took hold is therefore central to understanding member state interests, the EBRD’s response considering its organisational preferences, and how the policy norm solidified through inter‐institutional learning. This deepens our understanding of the development finance regime complex in two ways: first, it, shows how ideas can filter through to seemingly independent institutions via member states, bureaucrats, and s...

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub-and non-state involvement in post-2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub-and non-state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low-carbon and climate-resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal-type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event-driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub-and non-state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID-19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for suband non-state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development. Policy Implications • A post-2020 action space within the UNFCCC process remains crucial and might even be more important than before. • A post-2020 Global Climate Action Agenda could exemplify a new avenue of cooperation, featuring effective international cooperation not only between governments, but also with, and between, sub-and non-state actors that provide solutions in a highly interconnected and globalized world. • The transition from the pre-2020 climate action agenda to a post-2020 agenda provides a political opportunity to recalibrate the design of a catalytic framework that effectively responds to the need for successful international cooperation and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement. • A post-2020 agenda should help accelerate implementation at the national level, amplify ambition of subsequent NDC cycles, and inform ambitious 'long term strategies'. • Through collaboration with regional and national processes action, the Global Climate Action Agenda could more effectively encourage the engagement of sub-and non-state climate action at lower levels of governance. • Collaboration between multiple platforms that orchestrate climate and sustainable development action could improve reflexivity and deliberativeness of governance practices. Such could also help generate outcomes that are considered more just when trade-offs occur between different aspects of sustainable development. • By seizing opportunities and expanding the post-2020 Global Climate Action Agenda according to the design principles of a collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic framework, it would not only improve upon previous engagement activities in the context of the UNFCCC, but also make a vital contribution to climate action in challenging times.

The G7 should address new, unprecedented and highly disruptive issues that characterise our complex world, rather than well‐understood international problems that fit into existing categories. We argue that the G7 can do this by playing to its strengths – informality and like‐mindedness in particular – in addressing emerging and transversal issues such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cryptocurrencies.

The world trading system has been remarkably successful in many respects but is now under great strain. The causes are deep-seated and require a strategic response. The future of the system depends critically on reinvigorating the WTO and policy change in the largest trading nations. Important measures are required to sustain the multilateral trading system, and urgent action is needed to avoid a scenario where the system fragments. The worst scenarios will disrupt global trade and see a world which splinters into large trading blocs (most likely centered on China, the European Union and the United States) and where trade relations are based to a large extent on relative power instead of rules. In such a world the smallest players especially those whose trade is least covered by bilateral or regional agreementswill be at the greatest disadvantage. All countries will incur enormous costs only to try and reinvent a system that is already in place today under the WTO. The world economy has never been as closely integrated as it is today. International trade in goods and services as a share of world GDP has increased from around 35 per cent in the mid-1980s to around 60 per cent today, despite a hiatus during the global financial crisis. Trade and investment patterns are changing faster than rules and policies are adapting. The response in multilateral system has been insufficient, and gaps are partly being filled by regional and bilateral initiatives. Despite its evident successes, the world trading system is now confronted by an unprecedented crisis. How this crisis is resolved depends on whether the WTO can be revitalized

The world trading system has been remarkably successful in many respects but is now under great strain. The causes are deep-seated and require a strategic response. The future of the system depends critically on reinvigorating the WTO and policy change in the largest trading nations. Important measures are required to sustain the multilateral trading system, and urgent action is needed to avoid a scenario where the system fragments. The worst scenarios will disrupt global trade and see a world which splinters into large trading blocs (most likely centered on China, the European Union and the United States) and where trade relations are based to a large extent on relative power instead of rules. In such a world the smallest players especially those whose trade is least covered by bilateral or regional agreementswill be at the greatest disadvantage. All countries will incur enormous costs only to try and reinvent a system that is already in place today under the WTO. The world economy has never been as closely integrated as it is today. International trade in goods and services as a share of world GDP has increased from around 35 per cent in the mid-1980s to around 60 per cent today, despite a hiatus during the global financial crisis. Trade and investment patterns are changing faster than rules and policies are adapting. The response in multilateral system has been insufficient, and gaps are partly being filled by regional and bilateral initiatives. Despite its evident successes, the world trading system is now confronted by an unprecedented crisis. How this crisis is resolved depends on whether the WTO can be revitalized

The aim of this paper is to provide a first overview of and some preliminary findings from the Quality of Government Institute Quality of Government Survey, an ongoing web survey of public administration experts from some 50 countries. The general study designhow countries and country experts were selected, as well as how we fare on response rates and country selection thus far-is presented, and the general questionnaire design and some considerations that motivated this design is discussed. Moreover, the basic correlational structure of some core dimensions of public administration is explored, together with some descriptive cross-national comparisons.

The field of international peace mediation has become increasingly complex. Proliferation of actors that are able and willing to mediate has made multiparty mediation a standard format through which conflicts get managed. Due to their ad hoc nature, multiparty mediation efforts require specific mechanisms that will provide sufficient clarity and direction for the mediators involved. This paper departs by differentiating three distinct, yet highly interrelated, fundamental aspects that contribute to the overall success in multiparty mediation: cooperation, coordination and leadership. Treating coordination as a subset element of wider cooperation, this paper addresses the main challenges of achieving effective coordination in a given context. The paper highlights the relevance of information carrying capacity and premediated appointment of a leader when developing particular coordination mechanisms.

This paper demonstrates sustainable development and governance as contested concepts, constructed, and appropriated, to meet diverse agendas. It argues that sustainability and governance are inextricably linked. It examines how different disciplinary approaches have framed the relationship between sustainability and governance and identifies and discusses two dominant perspectives: the socio-political and the socioecological. It argues that these two viewpoints have framed debates about alternate approaches to promoting sustainable development and sustainability transitions through governance. The study emphasises how each perspective has produced a unique vision of governance by emphasising power, scale, system dynamics, uncertainty, involvement, and solutions. However, it reveals that the recent emergence of sustainability science has highlighted the need to transcend these two prevailing viewpoints and rethink governance in terms of a solution-oriented strategy that supports structural reforms on both a socio-political and a socioecological level.

This paper builds on recent insights from network theory and on the rich dataset made available by the Panama Papers in order to investigate the micro-economic dynamics of tax-evasion. We model offshore financial entities documented in the Panama Papers as links between jurisdictions in the global network of tax evasion. A quantitative analysis shows that the resulting network, far from being a random collection of bilateral links, has key features of complex networks such as a core-periphery structure and a fat-tail degree distribution. We argue that these structural features imply that policy must adopt a systemic perspective to mitigate tax evasion. We offer three sets of insights from this perspective. First, we identify through centrality measures tax havens that ought to be priority policy targets. Second, we show that efficient tax treaties must contain exchange information clauses and link tax-havens to non-haven jurisdictions. Third, we show that the optimal deterrence strategies for a social-planner facing a strategic tax-evader in a Stackelberg competition can be characterized using the notion of Bonacich centrality.

This paper firstly provides an ethnographic account of the dynamic of events in Geneva in 2004, when meetings of various multilateral agencies and global civil society organizations were held simultaneously to discuss the proposal to include the Development Agenda as a key element of intellectual property rights (IPR), seeking to insert some public policy aspects into the existing legal frameworks on IPR. Secondly we describe the historical context for the emergence of the intellectual property system as global legislation, explaining how it came into being and the ways in which it intertwines with international trade, examining the extent of its impact and its interfaces with various domains of social life, including culture and knowledge. Finally, based on interviews, documents and minutes from international agency meetings, we reconstruct the three-year process of negotiating the Development Agenda at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), describing the role of its main actors. Since Brazil, a member state of the organization, assumed a lead role in promoting the Agenda, we examine the disputes that occurred during this process as political actors veered back and forth in their support for the international system to protect and enforce intellectual property rights, and the tensions generated as IPRs become barriers to the trade and development of developing nations.

This article reviews the options for future international climate policy after the 2009 Copenhagen conference. It argues that a major reassessment of the current approach to building a climate regime is required. This approach, which we refer to as the ‘global deal’ strategy, is predicated on the idea of negotiating a comprehensive, universal and legally binding treaty that prescribes, in a top‐down fashion, generally applicable policies based on previously agreed principles. From a review of the history of the ‘global deal’ strategy from Rio (1992) to Kyoto (1997) and beyond we conclude that this approach has been producing diminishing returns for some time, and that it is time to consider an alternative path – if not goal – for climate policy. The alternative that, in our view, is most likely to move the world closer towards a working international climate regime is a ‘building blocks’ approach, which develops different elements of climate governance in an incremental fashion and ...

The ShorT View: The Global ConjunCTure and The need for CooperaTion jameS a. haley THe sHorT view: THe Global ConjunCTure and THe need for CooperaTion James a. haley Five YeaRS aFTeR THe FaLL: THe GoveRNaNCe LeGaCieS oF THe GLoBaL FiNaNCiaL CRiSiS 8 • THe CeNTRe FoR iNTeRNaTioNaL GoveRNaNCe iNNovaTioN

Target 16.3 appears to provide a good example of ‘slippage in the level of ambition’ in moving from visionary goals to watered‐down targets and indicators, due to the influence of powerful interests – in this case the UNODC. However, the SDG Agenda offers an important corrective measure, by encouraging Member States to ‘domesticate’ individual goals and targets – adapting them to local circumstances. Tunisia provides a vivid illustration of how a national SDG16 monitoring system can drive national accountability and contribute to positive change on the ground – provided indicators have broad‐based buy‐in and resonate with local grievances and priorities. First, the conceptual scope of the Tunisian Governance Goal was greatly expanded to include a strong focus on participation and human rights. Second the Tunisian SDG16 indicator set is dominated by survey‐based indicators thus placing people's voice at the centre of the monitoring system. Third, the regular publication of nation...

HIV/AIDS has been a major focus for research funders. The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) alone has spent over $70bn on HIV/AIDS. Such investments ushered in antiviral drugs, helping to reverse a rapidly growing HIV/AIDS pandemic. However, the idea that research can deliver unexpected benefits beyond its targeted field, in fact, predates HIV/AIDS to at least Vannevar Bush's influential 1945 report. Cross-disease spillovers – research investments that yield benefits beyond the target disease – remains unexplored, even though it could inform both priority-setting and calculations of returns on research investments. To this end, we took a sample of NIH's HIV grants and examined their publications. We analyzed 118,493 publications and found that 62 % of these were spillovers. We used Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) terms assigned to publications to explore the content of these spillovers, as well as to corroborate non-spillovers. We located spillovers on a network of MeSH co-occurrence, drawn from the broader universe of biomedical publications, for comparison. We found that HIV spillovers were unevenly distributed across disease-space, and often in close proximity to HIV (60 % local; 40 % remote). We further reviewed 1000 grant–publication pairs from a local sample and 1000 pairs from a remote sample. For local spillovers, a quarter seemed to be unexpected, on the basis of their grant description; for remote spillovers, that proportion increased to one third. We also found that the NIH funding institutes whose remits were most closely related to HIV/AIDS were less likely to produce spillovers than others. We discuss implications for theory and policy.

Historically, natural resources have been instrumental in conditioning and shaping public policy outcomes. Oil, gas, and mining projects have driven economic growth, provided employment opportunities, and injected capital into infrastructure development. However, scepticism abounds concerning Africa’s natural resources and development transformation. Whereas some resource-rich economies, particularly Norway, have made fortunes and transformed their economies through an efficient management of their natural resource revenues, the same cannot be said of most African countries. The question then arises as to the lessons that can be learned from best global practices as championed by international agencies so that African economies do not miss out on this wave of resource boom. In addition, how do these policy prescriptions fit into the African context in the wake of attempts by transnational actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to push their pet policy ideas and preferences? This chapter examines how policymakers and practitioners in Ghana and other African countries engage with standards and benchmarks established by transnational actors to promote good governance in the extractive sector.

The concept of organizational accountability is central to good governance both domestically and internationally. However, assessing accountability in densely institutionalized global governance spaces requires new conceptual and ana- lytical tools. Rather than concentrating on the accountability of states, intergov- ernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational corporations as distinct sets of global actors to whom different accountability criteria and mechanisms may apply, we want to focus on how growing overlap and interplay among diverse global policy actors affects organi- zational accountability. And rather than focusing exclusively on accountability in terms of retrospective sanctioning based on fixed standards or legal obligations, we suggest that, in a densely institutionalized world, accountability also needs to be thought of as a prospective process. We therefore suggest a stronger focus on pluralistic, participatory, and deliberative forms of accountability that emphasize standard-setting and responsiveness through collective deliberation, learning, and competition.

The article critically analyses how the transformative ambition of the SDGs may be threatened in the process of moving from vision, through goals and targets to indicators. This is exemplified by a case study concerning sustainable agriculture, and most specifically indicator 2.4.1, where two contrasting approaches – industrial agriculture and agro‐ecology – stand in opposition, each with its associated discourse and interests. The process is analysed in great detail, noting the complex interplay of political and technical considerations. FAO has played a central role in establishing a compromise with regard to the wording of indicator 2.4.1 which papers over the disagreements and does not explicitly promote either of the two competing approaches. And the organisation has facilitated a technical process which, instead of one simple indicator, has led to a composite, multidimensional version with nine sub‐indicators, as a result of which it has been relegated to ‘Tier III’ status, im...

There are obvious reasons why citizens of the nations we mark out as democracies fail to support policies that address catastrophic threats. The current condition of many such nations allows for marked differences between preferences and interests (to the extent that the choice of the label ‘democracy’ can be seriously questioned). Failures in the transmission of crucial information are intensified because of market competition among media sources and widespread difficulties in understanding issues couched in terms of probabilities. Beyond these, however, are prevalent social conditions that interfere with citizens’ abilities to discern their interests. I suggest an account of the notion of interests (and of the related concept of freedom) in terms of an environment that provides opportunities for reflective choice. Such environments are highly vulnerable, and political and economic institutions within ‘democratic’ nations can systematically destroy them. Throughout, I use the examp...

Humanitarianism 2.0 Bridging the digital deficit in the Democratic Republic of Congo © jbdodane "…It works because art changed me. I was part of the conflict and after art gave me the opportunity to do positive things that contribute. " Maurizio Cortez, artist, Comuna 13, Medellín.