G. A. Cohen

According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only holds people responsible for creating disadvantage. This revision enables luck egalitarianism to offer compensation to those who are disadvantaged by preventing disadvantage to others, like dependent caretakers, without compromising the responsibility–sensitivity at the heart of luck egalitarianism.

Building on arguments from G.A. Cohen and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, I argue here that our rights in our bodies are not well explained by self-ownership – and thus that we cannot infer self-ownership from intuitions about body rights, via inference to the best explanation. I begin by arguing that self-ownership does not explain our rights in our bodies unless it is a reflexive relation, wherein for each rational adult X, X quite literally owns X – whatever X is. In the bulk of the paper, I canvas the most prominent metaphysical theories of what we are, arguing that each of these theories makes it hard to see how our self-ownership implies (much less explains) any plausible profile of claims regarding rights in bodies. I go on to sketch an alternative ownership-like theory of our rights in our bodies, on which our interests in fluent bodily functioning explain why others should respect our authority over our embodiments. Such an explanation, I argue, requires reference to social practices: our body rights are grounded, partly, in facts about actual practices, and partly, in facts about what any practices worth hoping for would require. I defend this appeal to social practices against objections, appealing to Kantian ideas about hope and faith to show why we might have reason to respect some body rights in advance of the arrival of practices that protect them.

ABSTRACT
Drawing on the criticisms posed by fraternal egalitarianism against luck egalitarianism, G. A. Cohen proposed a trade-off through the so-called camping-trip model. Since that trade-off was not quite formalized, this article tries to bring up some elements in that direction. To be precise, it will be argued: a) that Cohen wants to bridge his own conception with fraternal

egalitarianism by making a distinction between the fairness and legitimacy aspects of justice, together with the affirmation that option luck never preserves justice; b) that the egalitarian and communitarian principles that Cohen considers desirable for socialism operate on the basis of the fairness-legitimacy distinction, so that inequalities generated by genuine choices and bad option luck are just from the perspective of legitimacy but not when seen from fairness, and, as a result, inequalities that hurt the social fabric are causally fundamental whereas the communitarian principle is normatively fundamental; and c) that the communitarian elements that drive Cohen’s compromise are already present in his notions of voluntary equality, egalitarian ethos, strict reading of the Rawlsian difference principle, and justificatory community.

RESUMEN A partir de las críticas que el igualitarismo fraternal lanzó contra el igualitarismo de la suerte, G. A. Cohen propuso un compromiso a través del denominado modelo de campamento. Puesto que dicho trade-off no quedó formalizado, en este artículo se intenta aportar algunos elementos en tal dirección. En concreto, se argumenta: a) que Cohen tiende un primer puente hacia el igualitarismo fraternal al distinguir los aspectos de equidad y legitimidad en una concepción de lo justo, conjuntamente con la afirmación de que la suerte en las opciones nunca preserva la justicia; b) que los principios igualitario y comunitario, que Cohen postula como deseables para el socialismo, operan sobre la base de la distinción equidad-legitimidad, de modo que las desigualdades generadas por elecciones genuinas y mala suerte en las opciones son justas en tanto resultan legítimas pero no son justas en términos de equidad y, en consecuencia, las desigualdades que rasgan el tejido social son causalmente fundamentales mientras que el principio comunitario es normativamente fundamental; y c) que los elementos comunitarios que impulsan el compromiso de Cohen ya están presentes en sus nociones de igualdad voluntaria, ethos igualitario, lectura estricta del Principio de Diferencia rawlsiano y comunidad justificatoria.

Mills writes: G. A. Cohen's influential ‘technological determinist’ reading of Marx's theory of history rests in part on an interpretation of Marx's use of ‘material’ whose idiosyncrasy has been insufficiently noticed. Cohen takes historical materialism to be asserting the determination of the social by the material/asocial, viz. ‘socio‐neutral’ facts about human nature and human rationality which manifest themselves in a historical tendency for the forces of production to develop. This paper reviews Marx's writings to demonstrate the extensive textual evidence in favour of the traditional interpretation ‐ that for Marx, the ‘material’ includes the economic, and is thus ineluctably social in character. Thus those critics of Cohen who have urged the inclusion of the relations of production in historical materialism's explanans do seem to have Marx's terminological and conceptual backing.

There is, on Scanlon’s view, a great deal more to the normative significance of equality. We don’t just want to see equal distribution of some thing. We want to live together, on terms of equal recognition, in ways that avoid interpersonal domination, prevent the emergence of stigmatizing differences in status, allow people to retain the self-respect that comes with seeing themselves as equal to others, and preserve the kind of background equality that can be a precondition for fair competition in the political and economic domains.

Scanlon’s account of equality isn’t simple; it resists capture in a one-line slogan. It is, one might say, frustratingly complicated. But that is completely right and proper, because the normative reality of our political lives just is frustratingly complicated. Our philosophical thinking about political values should be as simple as possible, but not simpler.

Conceptul de „dreptate socială” este, fără îndoială, unul dintre conceptele cheie ale filosofiei politice. În orice caz, el este unul dintre cele mai utilizate concepte de către filosofii politici recenţi. Bănuiala mea este că foarte puţine concepte – precum, spre exemplu, cel de „democraţie” – pot rivaliza din acest
punct de vedere conceptul de „dreptate socială”. Pe ce îmi bazez această bănuială? Pe faptul că, aşa cum se poate constata examinând cărţile sau revistele din acest domeniu, dreptatea socială este unul dintre cele mai abordate şi mai dezbătute subiecte din filosofia politică a ultimilor cincizeci de ani.
        Această situaţie nu este rezultatul întâmplării. Problema identificării principiilor organizării drepte a unei societăţi este considerată – şi, fără îndoială, este – una dintre cele mai importante probleme ale filosofiei politice. Pentru mulţi filosofi politici, ea este chiar cea mai importantă problemă a filosofiei politice, la fel cum dreptatea este cea dintâi virtute a unei „societăţi bune”. John Rawls, spre exemplu, filosoful care a avut cea mai mare contribuţie la concentrarea filosofiei politice recente pe problema dreptăţii sociale (din păcate, de multe ori în detrimentul celorlalte probleme importante ale acesteia), şi-a dezvoltat celebra sa teorie a dreptăţii sociale (şi) ca urmare a convingerii că dreptatea „este prima virtute a instituţiilor sociale, la fel cum este adevărul pentru sistemele de gândire. Oricât de elegantă sau economică ar fi, o teorie trebuie respinsă sau revizuită dacă nu este adevărată; la fel, indiferent de cât de eficiente sau bine organizate ar fi, instituţiile trebuie reformate sau abolite dacă sunt nedrepte. (…) Singurul lucru care ne permite să acceptăm o teorie eronată este lipsa uneia mai bune; în mod analog, o nedreptate este tolerabilă numai atunci când este necesară pentru a evita o nedreptate şi mai mare. Fiind primele virtuţi ale activităţilor umane, adevărul şi dreptatea sunt de necompromis”.
      Conceptul de „dreptate socială” este, însă, şi unul dintre cele mai controversate concepte ale filosofiei politice. Foarte puţine aspecte legate de acest concept nu sunt înconjurate de controverse şi dezbateri argumentative. Cred că nu greşesc dacă afirm că există doar trei astfel de aspecte. Primul este acela că
dreptatea, fie ca virtute individuală, fie ca virtute a unei societăţi, constă, în esenţă, în a da fiecăruia ceea ce i se cuvine (sau ceea ce i se datorează, ceea ce este îndreptăţit să primească). Al doilea este acela că, spre deosebire de conceptul de „dreptate distributivă”, introdus în vocabularul filosofic încă de Aristotel,
conceptul de „dreptate socială” este unul mult mai recent, utilizat pentru prima dată abia în prima jumătate a secolului XIX. În sfârşit, al treilea este acela că dreptatea socială nu trebuie confundată cu dreptatea legală sau retributivă (dreptatea în pedepsirea celor vinovaţi de infracţiuni).
      Unii autori ar introduce pe lista aspectelor necontroversate legate de conceptul de „dreptate socială” şi un al patrulea aspect. Mă refer la ideea că dreptatea socială se distinge în mod clar de caritate. Este adevărat, cei mai mulţi filosofi operează o astfel de distincţie. De obicei, caritatea este prezentată ca o
virtute morală privată şi strict voluntară faţă de ceilalţi membri ai societăţii, în vreme ce dreptatea este prezentată ca o virtute sau o datorie morală a cărei respectare poate fi impusă (enforced) în mod legitim de către stat. Există însă şi filosofi care au contestat, mai mult sau mai puţin explicit, legitimitatea şi semnificaţia morală a acestei distincţii. Doi dintre aceşti filosofi sunt Allen Buchanan şi Jeremy Waldron. Ambii au încercat să arate că, de fapt, şi respectarea exigenţelor carităţii poate fi uneori impusă în mod legitim din punct de vedere moral de către stat. Buchanan a făcut chiar mai mult: a încercat să demonstreze caracterul problematic al tuturor modalităţilor prin care filosofii politici au încercat să traseze o distincţie netă între dreptatea socială şi caritate.
        Unele dintre cele mai importante controverse declanşate de conceptul de „dreptate socială” sunt cele legate de definirea, de specificarea şi de legitimitatea acestui concept. Prima este, în esenţă, o controversă în privinţa răspunsului la următoarea întrebare: care este cadrul conceptual care surprinde cel mai
bine trăsătura fundamentală a dreptăţii şi nedreptăţii sociale? A doua este o controversă în privinţa exigenţelor sau a principiilor „corecte” sau „adecvate” ale dreptăţii sociale. În sfărşit, a treia este o controversă pe marginea acceptabilităţii apelului la conceptul de „dreptate socială”.
      În cea mai mare parte a capitolului de faţă prezint pe scurt principalele idei, poziţii şi argumente invocate de filosofii politici recenţi în cadrul fiecăreia dintre aceste controverse. Pentru a respecta specificul unui capitol introductiv, am încercat să fiu cât mai imparţíal în prezentarea lor. Există însă şi locuri în care am exprimat sau măcar am sugerat propriile mele opinii. Sper totuşi că acest lucru nu îl va împiedica prea mult pe cititor să caute să-şi formeze şi să-şi întemeieze cât mai solid propriile sale opinii cu privire la chestiunile în dispută.

Cet article propose une réflexion sur la notion de décentrement – empruntée à l’anthropologie et à la psychologie du développement – et son intérêt pour la philosophie morale et politique. Il fait l’hypothèse que ce concept permet de mieux penser l’articulation de la moralité individuelle et de la justice sociale. En effet, si l’on renonce à l’utopie libérale de la société comme harmonie d’intérêts et que l’on refuse par ailleurs d’assimiler l’idée de justice avec celle d’avantage mutuel, il s’avère que les intérêts individuels ne convergent pas vers le bien public. La capacité de décentrement individuel devient alors un élément clef dans la quête de justice sociale. Après avoir exploré divers usages et définitions du concept, l’article situera l’importance de l’idée de décentrement dans la philosophie morale impartialiste, avant de proposer une réflexion sur l’importance de la moralité individuelle pour l’avènement de la justice sociale. Il terminera par une brève exploration des moyens de promouvoir, au niveau sociétal, une véritable culture du décentrement.

G.A. Cohen argues that Rawlsian constructivism mistakenly conflates principles of justice with optimal rules of regulation, a confusion that arises out of how Rawls has us think about justice. I use the concepts/conceptions distinction to argue that while citizens may reasonably disagree about the substance and demands of justice, some principled convergence may be possible: we can agree upon regulative principles consistent with justice, as each of us understands it. Rawlian constructivism helps us find that principled convergence, and this too is a conception of justice.

In recent work in political philosophy there has been much discussion of two approaches to theorizing about justice that have come to be called 'ideal theory' and 'non-ideal theory.' The distinction was originally articulated by Rawls, who defended his focus on ideal theory in terms of a supposed 'priority' of the latter over non-ideal theory. Many critics have rejected this claim of priority and in general have questioned the usefulness of ideal theory. In diagnosing the problem with ideal theory, they have frequently fingered for blame the idealization it involves. In this paper I focus on one particular, much-discussed idealization – full compliance – in order to defend it. Focusing on the assumption, I argue that Rawls's work is not ideal in the way that it is usually thought to be, is less ideal than is widely recognized, and became less ideal over time. I also argue that critics who in effect claim that it is not realistic enough simply fail to understand Rawls's central motivation. Finally, I defend the assumption by arguing that there is an important sense in which all theories of justice must assume full compliance. Such an assumption, I argue, is needed if we are to have a plausible basis on which to judge the normative attractiveness of a theory.

Every system of cooperation is sustained by a particular “institutional toolkit” – devices used to promote cooperative behaviour and to discourage defection. A particular toolkit is scalable to the extent that it can incorporate an increase in the number of individuals participating, while maintaining roughly constant levels of cooperative behavior. My central contention in this paper will be that our evolved psychology provides us with a set of pro-social psychological dispositions that can be used rather effortlessly to establish small-scale systems of cooperation, but that the fundamental architecture of these systems is such that they lack scalability. This is what accounts for many of the phenomena associated with our “unsocial sociability.” Various behavioral dispositions we have, that are pro-social in small groups, start to become increasingly anti-social as the size of the group increases. This puts an upper bound on the level of social complexity that can be sustained using those resources. Thus it is only when cooperation is reorganized, and placed on a different footing, that it can be further expanded. In order to motivate the discussion, I start by showing how this issue of scalability matters to political philosophy, by discussing some recent work that neglects it. I then go on to show how it is important to recent discussions about the rise of the state. I argue that in complex societies we should regard major elements of social structure as essentially a set of kluges, designed to overcome the limitations of our natural sociability.

El argumento de este libro es más o menos el siguiente: con la irrupción de la teoría de John Rawls se recupera para la filosofía y la teoría política la crucial interrogación sobre qué es una sociedad justa. Y la respuesta rawlsiana reintroduce la casi olvidada dimensión igualitaria como rasgo necesario de un orden social justo. Con humores diversos, exponentes de la tradición socialistas aceptan la carencia de una teoría propia sobre la justicia distributiva y buscan ya sea refutar o superar al igualitarismo liberal rawlsiano. En general, las principales objeciones marxistas a Rawls ponen en cuestión su método contractual, los límites de su igualitarismo, su aceptación acrítica del capitalismo, y la falta de guías concretas para la acción hacia una sociedad justa. Cohen, en particular, cuestiona a Rawls por permitir desigualdades en nombre de la justicia, y por restringir la justicia al plano meramente institucional. La crítica de Cohen al igualitarismo rawlsiano, a nuestro juicio, es certera. Sin embargo, Rawls y Cohen coinciden en que: a) Marx afirmaba (o no rechazaba suficientemente) la tesis de autopropiedad; b) pronosticaba un futuro de abundancia plena en el comunismo; y por lo tanto: c) el comunismo marxiano es una sociedad más allá de la justicia, donde si bien hay instituciones justas, el sentido de la justicia y valores como la fraternidad ya no son necesarios y se han perdido para siempre. La vocación utópica que anida en buena parte de la tradición socialista –y, a su modo, en el liberalismo rawlsiano- se metamorfosea, por obra de Rawls, en una inquietante distopía de la abundancia. Así, contra Cohen y contra Rawls sostenemos: a) que Marx sí rechazaba suficiente y normativamente la autopropiedad, y que por ello habría aceptado una norma como el Principio de Diferencia; b) que su visión del comunismo plenamente desarrollado no supone abundancia material plena; c) que en el comunismo hay una estructura básica organizada en torno de dos principios distributivos; y d) que no existen suficientes razones para afirmar la evanescencia del sentido de justicia y que la fraternidad, en tanto elemento clave del socialismo, es la virtud que hace posible una sociedad comunista constitutivamente justa. Por todo lo anterior, entonces –y contra lo que piensa Cohen- diremos que la igualdad voluntaria –que supone instituciones justas, rechazo de la autopropiedad, y personas motivadas por un ethos igualitario y fraterno- es una visión que Marx habría aceptado sin mayores objeciones. De algún modo, si se nos permite, así como Cohen quiere rescatar a la igualdad de las manos de Rawls, aquí nos proponemos rescatar a Marx de las visiones sobre el comunismo que han elaborado Cohen y Rawls. Finalmente, así como el utilitarismo fue dominante en el campo de la filosofía moral y política, hoy parece que el igualitarismo liberal rawlsiano se ha ganado, con sobrados méritos, un lugar preeminente. Quizá Cohen, como rawlsiano de izquierda, haya llevado a la teoría que principia en Rawls hasta el límite mismo de sus posibilidades. Nunca hay garantías de poder articular una teoría socialista de la justicia que supere lo existente. Pero, como diría el mismísimo Rawls, “eso no es razón para no intentarlo”.
                                                                  ***
Este libro reúne y combina un conjunto de artículos, capítulos y ponencias publicadas en diversas revistas y actas de congresos nacionales e internacionales en los últimos diez años. En todos los casos hemos introducido modificaciones de estilo y suprimido fragmentos para evitar repeticiones. Las reiteraciones que subsisten buscan mantener la integridad de cada capítulo como ensayo independiente. Esto es, el libro puede leerse de manera no rayueliana, es decir, de corrido; o en cualquier orden. La idea es que tenga algún sentido sea cual fuere la opción de los lectores.

This paper aims to clarify what it means for a normative theory to be fact-sensitive, and what might be wrong with such sensitivity, by examining the ways in which "justice as fairness" depends upon facts.  While much of the fact-sensitivity of Rawls's principles consists of innocent limitations of generality, Rawls's appeal to stability raises a legitimate worry about defining justice down in order to make "justice" stable.  If it should turn out that the correct principles of justice are inconsistent with human nature, it might be important for us to recognize that as a feature of human psychology we regret, rather than revising our principles for the sake of stability in a way that obscures the fact that there is anything to regret. Whether or not Rawlsian principles are in fact watered down depends on how one interprets the role of reciprocity in the theory.  Reciprocity can be seen as a fact about human psychology that limits the extent to which justice can be realized where assurance of compliance on the part of others is lacking.  Or it can be seen as a fact about justice, to wit, that its point is to create a relationship of mutual recognition and respect, making strictly unilateral compliance pointless.

"Marx’s account of capitalist exploitation is undermined by inter-related
confusions surrounding the notion of “labour power.” These confusions relate to [i] what
labour power is, [ii] what happens to labour power in the labour market, and [iii] what
the epistemic status of labour power is (the issue of “appearance and reality”). The central
theses of the paper are [a] that property ownership is the wrong model for understanding
the exploitation of labour, and [b] that the concept of exploitation is linked more fruitfully
to a conception of distributive injustice than to Marx’s theory of surplus value."

For people starting from a presumption in favor of equality, the very idea of a sufficiency threshold where the demands of justice would stop because everyone has enough is puzzling. However, Liam Shields, offers an account of sufficiency that has the potential to reconcile these egalitarians with the principle of sufficiency. This comes from his endorsement of what he calls " the shift thesis ", stating roughly that there is a discontinuity in the weight of our reasons to benefit people once they have enough. This thesis distinguishes his theory from other accounts of sufficientarianism by not denying the injustice of inequalities above the threshold. It thereby changes the way one can look at the relation between sufficiency and equality. The principle of sufficiency becomes the first principle of a conception of justice that must be completed by another – possibly egalitarian – principle. In the first section, I start with a brief exposition of the shift thesis and the way it relates to other accounts of sufficiency. In the second, I introduce a distinction between agnosticism and indifference towards inequalities above the sufficiency threshold. In the third, I argue that pragmatism might provide positive reasons to focus on insufficiency if one is agnostic about these inequalities. I conclude with a brief discussion of this pragmatic stance and of the choice to defend a partial view of justice as Shields does.

As its title suggests, in this paper I want to defend one of the best known liberal theses: that of the primacy (or the priority) of justice among all other very important social values. This thesis was formulated and defended in several versions. Here I want to defend only its most famous, Rawlsian, version. More precisely, I want to defend the Rawlsian version of this thesis from three arguments against it. The first argument was developed by Marcus G. Singer, the second by G.A. Cohen, and the third by David Miller.
KEYWORDS: primacy of justice, John Rawls, Marcus G. Singer, G.A. Cohen, David Miller

Abstract

The main goal of this dissertation is to present an interpretation of what it should mean for a society to fulfil the ideals of freedom and equality. I argue that society should equalise levels of individual freedom. I defend this thesis in three stages, which are associated to the three parts of the dissertation.

Part (A) is devoted to the elaboration of a new conception of freedom. The objective is to rehabilitate the intuitive idea that associates individual freedom with the ability to do or be what one wants. In chapter 1, I engage with the analytical literature on freedom and develop a conception of freedom according to which individuals are free overall to the extent that they have the specific freedoms they authentically prefer, where a specific freedom is defined by the probability that the agent will realise a phenomenon. The extent of one’s freedom is thus made to depend on how reality relates to what one authentically wants it to be. In chapter 2, I offer a method for the measurement of freedom so conceived. According to this method, a person’s level of overall freedom is obtained by multiplying the physical extent of her actual specific freedoms by the evaluative extent to which these actual specific freedoms correspond to her authentically preferred ones.

In part (B), I defend the claim that a strictly and continuously equal distribution of this individual freedom is the best embodiment of moral equality. Firstly, in chapter 3, I argue that freedom is a better egalitarian currency than welfare, resources, capabilities and pluralist alternatives because freedom’s anti-perfectionism, anti-fetishism and flexibility make it an optimal tool for the pursuit of any life plan. Freedom supports equally moral persons regardless of the ends they require, the means they need or the relative value they assign to these means. Secondly, in chapter 4, I defend strict and continuous equality as a distributive criterion over time. I show that efficiency-based and responsibility-based arguments in favour of inequalities are incompatible with the equal respect owed to moral persons. As long as individuals qualify as moral persons, they are owed equal respect and hence equal amounts of overall freedom. Thirdly, I address the famous claim according to which freedom and equality are conflicting ideals. I argue that this claim either stems from mistaking a conceptual distinction between a currency and a distributive criterion as a conflict of ideals, or expresses deeper disagreement over the meaning of freedom or the role of aggregative considerations in moral distributions. In any case, the claim is seriously weakened if not entirely destroyed.

Parts (A) and (B) form the ideal theory of Equal Freedom. In part (C), which is constituted by chapter 5, I try to show how this ideal theory can guide us in nonideal circumstances. Firstly, I suggest a model to understand the relation between ideal and nonideal theory. I argue that nonideal theory is best understood as involving the maximisation of the realisation of the ideal under feasibility constraints and moral constraints imposed by the very nature of the ideal. Secondly, I apply this model to Equal Freedom. The main result is a radically egalitarian balance between concerns for feasibility, relative and absolute levels of overall freedom. Thirdly, I discuss in more detail policy strategies and proposals to equalise freedom in nonideal circumstances. As an example, I assess the desirability and feasibility of a ‘right to be heard’, which is an enforceable right given to employees that provides them with a capacity to alter their workplace environment in accordance with their life plans. This evaluation concludes my defence of Equal Freedom as the core of a theory of social justice.


Résumé

Le principal objectif de cette thèse est de présenter une interprétation de ce que devrait être une société qui réalise les idéaux de liberté et d’égalité. J’y défends l’idée selon laquelle une telle société devrait égaliser la liberté individuelle. Cette défense s’articule en trois moments, qui correspondent aux trois parties de la thèse.

La partie (A) est consacrée à l’élaboration d’une nouvelle conception de la liberté. Il s’agit de réhabiliter l’intuition qui associe la liberté individuelle à la capacité de faire ou d’être ce que l’on veut. Dans le chapitre 1, je me sers de la littérature analytique portant sur la liberté pour développer une conception de la liberté selon laquelle les individus sont libres dans la mesure où ils possèdent les libertés spécifiques qu’ils préfèrent authentiquement, considérant qu’une liberté spécifique se définit par la probabilité qu’un agent réalisera un phénomène. L’étendue de la liberté d’une personne dépend donc du degré de correspondance entre la réalité et ses préférences authentiques portant sur la réalité. Dans le chapitre 2, je propose une méthode pour mesurer cette liberté. Selon cette méthode, le niveau de liberté globale d’une personne s’obtient en multipliant l’étendue physique de ses libertés spécifiques actuelles par le degré de correspondance entre la valeur de ces libertés spécifiques et celle des libertés qu’elle préfère authentiquement.

Dans la partie (B), je défends l’idée qu’une égalisation stricte et continue de cette liberté individuelle est la meilleure interprétation de l’égalité morale. Premièrement, dans le chapitre 3, je suggère que la liberté est une meilleure unité de comparaison pour l’égalitarisme que le bien-être, les ressources, les capabilités et les alternatives pluralistes car son anti-perfectionnisme, son anti-fétichisme et sa flexibilité en font un outil optimal pour la poursuite de tout plan de vie. La liberté offre en effet un soutien égal aux personnes morales sans égard aux fins qu’elles poursuivent, aux moyens qu’elles requièrent ou à la valeur relative qu’elles accordent à ces moyens. Deuxièmement, au chapitre 4, je propose l’égalité stricte et continue comme critère s’appliquant aux distributions ayant une dimension temporelle. Je montre que les arguments qui justifient des inégalités en se fondant sur des considérations d’efficacité ou de responsabilité sont incompatibles avec l’égal respect qui est dû aux personnes morales. Tant et aussi longtemps que des individus se qualifient comme personnes morales, on leur doit un égal respect et par conséquent, des quantités égales de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je traite de la fameuse idée selon laquelle la liberté et l’égalité sont des idéaux qui s’opposent. Je soutiens que cette idée découle soit d’une méprise concernant la distinction conceptuelle entre une unité de comparaison et un critère distributif, ou d’un désaccord plus profond portant sur le sens de la liberté ou le rôle de considérations agrégatives dans la détermination des distributions morales. Dans tous les cas, cette idée en sort sérieusement affaiblie sinon complètement anéantie.

Les parties (A) et (B) constituent la théorie idéale d’Égale liberté. Dans la partie (C), qui est formée du chapitre 5, je tente de montrer comment cette théorie idéale peut nous guider dans des circonstances non-idéales. Premièrement, je suggère un modèle pour comprendre la relation entre la théorie idéale et la théorie non-idéale. Je soutiens que la théorie non-idéale doit être comprise comme impliquant la maximisation de la réalisation de l’idéal moyennant le respect des contraintes de faisabilité ainsi que des contraintes morales imposées par la nature même de l’idéal. Deuxièmement, j’applique ce modèle à l’idéal d’Égale liberté. Le résultat principal de cette application est un équilibre radicalement égalitaire entre l’importance à accorder à la faisabilité, aux niveaux relatifs ainsi qu’aux niveaux absolus de liberté globale. Troisièmement, je discute plus en détail de stratégies et de propositions de politiques publiques pouvant égaliser la liberté dans des circonstances non-idéales. En guise d’exemple, j’évalue la désirabilité et la faisabilité d’un « droit d’être entendu », qui est un droit destiné aux employés afin de leur offrir une capacité de modifier leur environnement de travail en conformité avec leur plan de vie. Cette évaluation conclut ma défense d’Égale liberté en tant que composante essentielle d’une théorie de la justice sociale.

Robert Nozick may be most remembered for his part in the revival of analytical political philosophy in 1974 with the book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. A number of criticisms have since been leveled toward the work by political philosophers of various views, particularly G. A. Cohen. This essay serves to clarify the discourse surrounding some of Cohen's key criticisms to Nozick's philosophy, particularly through the tool of his famous Wilt Chamberlain thought experiment. I proceed by revisiting Nozick's argument for societal justice and seeking to counter the objections raised by Cohen in his work, "Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty.” I ultimately find that many of Cohen's criticisms of Nozick are hasty and do not lead to necessary flaws in Nozick's argument concerning the preservation of justice.

This article reconstructs and reflects on the 1989 debate between Jerry Cohen and myself on market socialism in the light of Cohen’s ongoing defence of communitarian socialism. It presents Cohen’s view of market socialism as ethically deficient but a modest improvement on capitalism, and outlines some market socialist proposals from the 1980s. Our debate centred on the issues of distributive justice and community. I had argued that a market economy might be justified by appeal to desert based on productive contribution, but Cohen saw effort as the only relevant desert base, and claimed that only non-comparative judgements of economic desert were possible. Market-derived inequalities, therefore, could not be deserved. He also condemned markets for relying on the motives of greed and fear, and therefore as destructive of community. In reply, I asserted that markets also liberated people from fixed social roles, and that market competition could be viewed differently, as providing the most effective way for people to contribute to each other’s welfare. In retrospect, this debate can be seen to raise questions about the nature of justice and the purpose of political philosophy that have come to the fore in recent exchanges between ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’.

T. M. Scanlon’s work on the value of equality provides the resources for developing a powerful and distinctive contractualist egalitarian view. This view acknowledges a range of egalitarian concerns, of a diverse nature, and points us towards a picture of the place of equality in the normative landscape that is richer and more complex than some other alternative views. I describe the outlines of this contractualist egalitarian view, addressing questions regarding its strength and scope. I then discuss the relationship of equality to other values, such as fairness and community (or fraternity), and examine the contrast between contractualist egalitarian and luck egalitarian views. I conclude with a sketch of some of the practical implications that might follow from further pursuit of Scanlon’s insights on the value of equality, in the hope that this may suggest an interesting direction of travel for further work.

In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls’ emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense of self which is vital for one’s own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens’ ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen’s critiques of Rawls are made.

In this paper, I will criticise Rawls’s ideal theory from the perspective of a nonideal approach to political theorising which combines a political realist stance with a particularist ethical conception. This will involve showing the comparative benefits of theorising from the realist/particularist perspective over Rawls’s ideal theoretical approach. By forwarding an alternative approach to political theorising, I will be focusing on a recent movement in political philosophy which has been interrogating the strengths and weaknesses of the different methodological practises used by political theorists. This is referred to as the ideal vs. nonideal theory debate, and the stance I will forward will be distinctive, because unlike other arguments in this area, it combines a political stance with a complementary ethical conception. I will advance two arguments which show the benefits of adopting a realist/particularist approach to political theorising. These will expose flaws in the way Rawls ascertains his principles of justice, by outlining a particularist critique of the ethics-first approach which Rawls follows. Secondly, I will show how each aspect of Rawls’s ideal theory (full-compliance; utopia; end-state) is less applicable to the real world, imperfect agent when compared to the aspects of the realist/particularist stance, which include an emphasis on agent-relative reasons and context-sensitivity. By comparing the benefits of the realist/particularist stance up against Rawls’s ideal theory, I will demonstrate that identifying what justice corresponds to, and recognising and acting in accordance with norms of action can be done without relying on ideal theory. Furthermore, unlike Rawls’s ideal theory, the realist/particularist stance can change what justice corresponds to, in accordance with changes in contextual situations. Therefore, if one wishes to dispense with ideal theory, the realist/particularist approach offers a positive alternative.

An endorsement of capitalism is often thought to be a concession to human selfishness. The thought runs that whilst some other socioeconomic system – socialism, perhaps – would be morally preferable, we cannot live up to those high ideals. Jason Brennan has recently attempted to show that this widespread view is mistaken. Even in terms of ideal theory, Brennan argues, capitalism is morally superior to its great rival. To make this case, Brennan critiques the work of the late socialist political philosopher, G. A. Cohen. Brennan argues that Cohen’s justification of socialism is ill-conceived, and, in fact, Cohen’s failure helps to reveal that capitalism is morally superior to socialism. In this review article I argue that Brennan’s critique and attempted counter-claim is unsuccessful. Amongst other failings, Brennan leaves us with no adequate answer to the question, why capitalism?

PERNÝ, L. Vybrané kapitoly zo súčasnej anglo-americkej sociálnej filozofie. Liberalizmus. Komunitarizmus. Neomarxizmus. [Monografia]. Prešov: Vydavateľstvo Prešovskej univerzity. 1. vyd. 2018. ISBN: 978-80-555-2045-2. Dostupné online: http://www.pulib.sk/web/kniznica/elpub/dokument/Perny1

The aim of the book Selected Chapters from Contemporary Anglo-American Social Philosophy is to critically map, summarize and compare a relatively wide range of contemporary Anglo-American social philosophers. The methodological approach is chosen on the basis of information-summarizing and comparative character of the work. The main goal of the thesis is not the in-depth analysis of the authors, but briefly, clearly and accurately outlining the nature of attitudes in a small space of trends, opinions, relationships and comparison of key opinions as a stimulus for further possible analyses, interpretations and studies. Because in many cases there are living authors, the book remains open for future modifications of their attitudes. As the title suggests, the selected authors and directions are geographically determined by the Anglo-American space and focused primarily on concepts that have influenced the 20th and 21st century social thinking. Introduction is a short excursion into the history of social philosophy. The thesis is divided into three separate chapters.
Selected were those which correspond in particular to the definition of social philosophy as the study of social life, which results in a certain image of social life, especially in the context of the perception of social as a philosophy of society accepting social justice as a value criterion (it takes into account the social interests of citizens, their social needs, like food, housing, education, culture, health, etc.). The work is based on theoretical sources, especially written by the authors Ľuboš Blaha, Marek Hrubec, Emil Višňovský, Ivan Buraj, František Novosád, Ladislav Hohoš and Ľubomír Belás. The first part, called Revision of Liberalism, analyses in particular the Dewey line of egalitarian or social liberals (Berlin, Rawls, Dworkin, Sen, Ackerman) who opened the door to the new direction, analysed in the second chapter — Communitarism (Taylor, MacIntyre, Sandel, Walzer), and culminating in a critique of the left (third part of the work), that is to say, inspired by Marx; neoutopism and critical theory (Roemer, Peffer, Cohen, Wallerstein, Jameson). The conclusion of the work belongs to the statistics of the current world and the question of why we are dealing with social philosophy.


Úlohou knihy Vybrané kapitoly zo súčasnej anglo-americkej sociálnej filozofie je kriticky zmapovať, zosumarizovať a komparovať pomerne rozsiahlu škálu súčasných predstaviteľov anglo-americkej sociálnej filozofie.  Hlavným cieľom práce nie je hĺbková analýza autorov, ale  vecne, jasne a správne vystihnúť na pomerne obmedzenom priestore podstatu postojov, názorov, ako aj vzájomnú podmienenosť konceptov sledovaných autorov tak, aby daná práca mohla slúžiť nielen edukačným cieľom, ale aj ako podnet pre ďalšie možné analýzy, interpretácie a štúdie. Nakoľko v mnohých prípadoch ide o žijúcich autorov, kniha zostáva stále otvorená pre možné modifikácie ich názorov a postojov.  Ako už názov napovedá, vybraní autori sú predstaviteľmi anglo-amerického  diskurzu, ktorí významne ovplyvnili sociálno-politické myslenie 20. a 21. storočia. Práca je členená do troch samostatných kapitol. Úvod tvorí krátky exkurz do dejín sociálnej filozofie a jej členeniu. Vybrané boli tie smery, ktoré zodpovedajú svojím zameraním povahe sociálnej filozofie najmä tým, že venujú podstatnú pozornosť rôznym aspektom sociálneho života človeka, akými sú napríklad otázka spravodlivosti v jej rôznych aspektoch, problému rovnosti, slobode, odcudzeniu, spoločným etickým hodnotám, normám a pod.  Vybraní autori pristupujú k daným témam z rôznych metodologických pozícií, a preto aj vidia vyššie nastolené problémy inou optikou. Analýza sociálne orientovaných konceptov bude okrem diferencií medzi jednotlivými autormi čiastočne skúmať a porovnávať ich názory s filozofmi, ktorí tvoria líniu filozofického myslenia, orientovanú predovšetkým na obhajobu slobodného trhu, a z toho plynúci postoj k sociálnym otázkam ako nutným dôsledkom realizácie slobodného trhu. Uvedenú líniu by bolo možné v danej súvislosti označiť za antisociálnu, reprezentovanú napríklad Hayekom alebo Nozickom. To, čo sa napríklad z pohľadu Rawlsa javí ako spravodlivosť, sa z pohľadu Nozicka javí ako nespravodlivosť, a z pohľadu Hayeka ako „fatamorgána – mirage“. Práca vychádza predovšetkým z analýzy pôvodných teoretických prác skúmaných autorov, ako aj zo sekundárnych teoretických zdrojov, predovšetkým z prác Ľuboša Blahu, Mareka Hrubca, Emila Višňovského, Ivana Buraja, Františka Novosáda, Ladislava Hohoša, a Ľubomíra Belása. Prvá časť, s názvom revízia liberalizmu, analyzuje predovšetkým deweyovskú  líniu egalitárnych alebo sociálnych liberálov (Berlin, Rawls, Dworkin, Sen, Ackerman), ktorí revíziou liberalizmu otvorili dvere novému smeru, ktorý je analyzovaný v druhej kapitole – komunitarizmu (Taylor, MacIntyre, Sandel, Walzer), a ktorý vyvrcholil kritikou zľava (tretia časť práce), teda autormi inšpirovanými Marxom; neoutopistami a kritickou teóriou (Roemer, Peffer, C. A. Cohen, Wallerstein, Jameson a ďalší). Záver práce patrí štatistikám súčasného sveta a otázke, prečo sa v dnešnej dobe zaoberať sociálnou filozofiou.

The first principle of Rawls's conception of justice secures a set of 'basic liberties' equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The 'worth' of citizens' liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth. Against Rawls, G.A. Cohen contends that an absence of money often can directly constrain citizens' freedom, and not simply its worth. This is because money often can remove legally enforced constraints on what citizens can do. Cohen's argument – if modified to apply to citizens' 'moral powers' rather than 'negative liberty' – threatens a core feature of Rawls's conception of justice, as it is unclear why the parties within the 'original position' would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the 'difference principle' (which concerns the distribution of wealth) if both principles similarly shape citizens' freedom. I concede Cohen's point regarding the relation between freedom and money, but argue that it is not fatal to Rawls's conception of justice if the 'basic needs principle' is understood to enjoy lexical priority over the first principle, and is modified to include a right to adequate discretionary time. Nonetheless, Cohen's argument helpfully highlights the infelicitous nature of Rawls's terminology with respect to liberty: the basic needs principle, the first principle, and the difference principle all should be understood as shaping citizens' freedom to exercise their moral powers.

This paper explores G. A. Cohen’s claim that Althusser’s Marxist philosophy is bullshit. This exploration is important because, if we are persuaded SI by Cohen’s assertion that there are only three types of Marxism: analytic, pre-analytic, and bullshit and, further, that only analytic Marxism is concerned with truth and therefore “uniquely legitimate” then, as political philosophers interested in Marxism’s potential philosophical resources, we may wish to privilege its analytic form. However, if Cohen’s attribution
is misplaced, then we may wish to explore why Cohen was so insistent in this ascription and what this insistence reveals about his own political philosophy.The first half of this paper explains what Cohen means by bullshit and it examines the distinction between bullshit and non-bullshit Marxism.The second half explores what the insistent misattribution of the epithet “bullshit Marxism” to Althusser’s Marxism reveals about Cohen’s own Marxist political philosophy.

The idea of equality features in a number of competing accounts of the demands of justice, and does so in a variety of different ways. In what follows here I first examine the background role of a formal idea of equality in all plausible accounts of justice, before then moving on to describe the place of a more substantive idea of equality in the best known and most influential account of justice, that of John Rawls. I then consider a number of post-Rawlsian accounts of the place of equality as an ideal of justice, including an examination of the " equality of resources " view of Ronald Dworkin, and the " luck egalitarianism " of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, before discussing the contrast between 'distributive' and 'social' (or 'relational') approaches to equality.

The main theme of this thesis is the bioconservatism as a movement and the arguments that have been produced by notable bioconservatives against the notion of the term human enhancement as transhumanists approach the term. First, the terms human enhancement, and its types, transhumanism, transhumanists, transhumans, cyborgs / metahumans, posthumans (and posthumanism) are explained. Secondly, the bioconservatism movement and the writer’s idea of the three different ways of being a bioconservative when leaving in a liberal state are presented. Then, it follows the second part of the thesis which it is constructed by showing six basic bioconservative arguments against the transhumanist approach to human enhancement. The arguments are: the “Human Nature Preservation” summa of arguments, the “best value” argument by G.A. Cohen and N. Agar, the “Factor X” argument by F. Fukuyama, the “precautionary principle” argument by G.J. Annas, the J. Habermas’ argument on how “the (reproductive) enhancements are against autonomy” and L. Kass’ “Yuck Factor” argument. We conclude with some closing remarks on the human enhancement, the bioconservative rhetoric against transhumanism, the character of the bioconservative argumentation and the usefulness of the debate.

This article contrasts the sense in which those whom Bernard Williams called ‘political realists’ and John Rawls are committed to the idea that political philosophy has to be distinctively political. Distinguishing the realist critique of political moralism from debates over ideal and non-ideal theory, it is argued that Rawls is more realist than many realists realise, and that realists can learn more about how to make a distinctively political vision of how our life together should be organised from his theorising, although it also points to a worrying tendency among Rawlsians to reach for inappropriately moralised arguments. G. A. Cohen's advocacy of socialism and the second season of HBO's The Wire are used as examples to illustrate these points.

This essay draws on G. A. Cohen’s work on self-ownership to consider the social and ideological consequences of market transition as represented in 1990s Chinese fiction. A close reading of Yu Hua’s novel _Xu Sanguan the Blood Merchant_ (1995) is set within the context of 1990s Chinese fiction to consider how works that seem to promote market rationality also present values that may contest commodification of human labor, bodies, and products.  Although critics of the Enlightenment hold that the two are often inseparable, the article seeks to distinguish (a) Enlightenment values of freedom, autonomy and the importance of not treating people as mere means from (b) more limited and specifically capitalist values such as self-ownership.  Through interpreting the social, economic and moral foundations of selfhood and autonomy in Yu Hua’s novel, I argue with Cohen that analysis of the uses of self-ownership diminishes its attractiveness as a primary value in favor of values less complicit with capitalist principles.

The first principle of Rawls’s conception of justice secures a set of ‘basic liberties’ equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The ‘worth’ of citizens’ liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth. Against Rawls, Cohen contends that an absence of money often can directly constrain citizens’ freedom and not simply its worth. This is because money often can remove legally enforced constraints on what citizens can do. Cohen’s argument – if modified to apply to citizens’ ‘moral powers’ rather than ‘negative liberty’ – threatens a core feature of Rawls’s conception of justice, as it is unclear why the parties within the ‘original position’ would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the ‘difference principle’ (which concerns the distribution of wealth) if both principles similarly shape citizens’ freedom. I concede Cohen’s point regarding the relation between freedom and money but argue that it is not fatal to Rawls’s conce...

În acest capitol îmi revine sarcina de a prezenta unul dintre cele mai influente şi mai dinamice curente din filosofia politică actuală. Este vorba, desigur, despre curentul care dă titlul acestui capitol: egalitarianismul.Din nefericire, la noi, egalitarianismul este şi unul dintre cele mai puţin cunoscute curente ale filosofiei politice, cel puţin în dezvoltările sale cele mai recente. Speranţa mea este ca acest capitol să poată remedia, chiar dacă în mod inevitabil doar parţial, acest neajuns.
      Ţin să fac, de la bun început, o precizare: probabil că titlul corect al acestui capitol ar fi trebuit să fie „Egalitarianismul domestic”. Aceasta deoarece el prezintă doar teoriile egalitariene interesate cu precădere sau chiar exclusiv de problema dreptăţii în cadrul unei comunităţi statale. Dezvoltările recente ale egalitarianismului ne obligă însă să distingem şi un egalitarianism global sau internaţional (unul care extinde problema dreptăţii dincolo de graniţele statului) şi un egalitarianism local sau specific (focalizat doar pe distribuţia unui anume bun în cadrul comunităţii, de cele mai multe ori accesul la îngrijirea medicală sau, mai recent, sănătatea). Nu în ultimul rând, egalitarianismul a fost dezvoltat şi ca poziţie referitoare la problema dreptăţii între generaţii. Nici egalitarianismul global, nici cel local şi nici cel intergeneraţional nu vor fi însă, după cum am sugerat, discutate aici. Aceasta nu pentru că ele nu ar fi trebuit sau nu ar fi meritat să fie prezentate în acest capitol. Totuşi, dacă aş fi făcut acest lucru, capitolul s-ar fi extins nepermis de mult. În plus, în decizia mea a contat foarte mult şi faptul că cel puţin egalitarianismul local sau specific (aşa cum a fost el dezvoltat în teoria dreptăţii în distribuţia serviciilor de îngrijire medicală) beneficiază deja de o prezentare şi o analiză (critică) atentă şi extinsă la noi.
      Exceptând această introducere, capitolul este structurat în patru secţiuni principale. El debutează aşa cum se aşteaptă de obicei de la un text introductiv: cu o încercare de definire sau caracterizare generală a egalitarianismului. Deşi poate părea surprinzător, definirea egalitarianismului este o problemă controversată. În cadrul acestei secţiuni prezint pe scurt opinia mea în problema în cauză şi – totodată – alte câteva aspecte importante legate de specificul egalitarianismului ca teorie filosofico-politică.
      Prima secţiune evidenţiază, de asemenea, că egalitarianismul a fost şi este apărat în mai multe versiuni de către filosofii politici contemporani. De o importanţă fundamentală în acest sens este distincţia între egalitarianismul distributiv şi egalitarianismul relaţional. Fiecare dintre aceste versiuni fundamentale ale egalitarianismului contemporan, dar mai ales prima dintre ele, a fost apărată, la rândul său, în mai multe variante. De altfel, egalitarienii se află de ceva vreme într-o dezbatere adesea aprigă şi furtunoasă cu privire la care dintre aceste variante reprezintă cea mai bună interpretare a egalitarianismului. Următoarele două secţiuni ale capitolului prezintă cât mai exhaustiv mi-a stat în putinţă cele mai importante idei, intuiţii şi argumente aflate la baza celor mai influente teorii egalitariene şi a dezbaterilor şi controverselor dintre apărătorii lor.
      Capitolul se încheie tot „la modul clasic” pentru un text  introductiv. Astfel, ultima lui secţiune este dedicată unei scurte prezentări şi analize a principalelor obiecţii aduse egalitarianismului de către criticii săi."

This essay articulates a kind of conservatism that it argues is the most fundamental and important kind of conservatism, viz. existential conservatism, which involves an affirmative and appreciative stance towards the given world. While this form of conservatism can be connected to political conservatism, as seen with Roger Scruton, it need not be, as seen with G. A. Cohen. It is argued that existential conservatism should be embraced whether or not one embraces political conservatism, though it is also shown that existential conservatism imposes constraints on our political thinking. In particular, it is argued that Cohen's 'luck egalitarianism' stands at odds with his existential conservatism and that one should be a sufficientarian rather than an egalitarian with regard to economic justice.

Marxists claim capitalists unjustly exploit workers, and this exploitation is to show that workers ought to hold more than they do. This paper presents two accounts of exploitation. The Theft Account claims that capitalists steal some of the value to which workers are entitled. The Underpayment Account holds that capitalists are not entitled to pay workers as little as they do, even if the workers are not entitled to the full value they produce. This paper argues that only the Theft Account can explain why workers ought to hold more than they do. The Underpayment Account cannot yield this conclusion. The Theft Account is superior to the Underpayment Account insofar as exploitation is to be an injustice—a wrong that requires the exploited party to hold more.

Suppose that the basic structures of two societies conform to Rawls's principles of justice. One of these societies, however, includes-in addition to a just basic structure-an egalitarian ethos that further reduces inequalities that do not benefit the least advantaged. G. A. Cohen and others have argued that the second society is more just, thus rejecting any restriction of Rawls's principles of justice to the basic structure. Andrew Williams has revived the basic structure restriction in the form of a publicity requirement. This paper highlights various problems with this attempt. In addition, it shows that an egalitarian ethos admits various plausible reformulations that could meet Williams's publicity requirements. This only amounts to a partial victory for Cohen, however. In fact, the Rawlsian position could come out of this discussion strengthened, not because it can resist the egalitarian critique, but because it can incorporate its essence in the form of a set of more precise and specific public rules.

Nesse artigo buscaremos a análise do movimento de complexificação da concepção marxista da política na figura das contribuições das vertentes estrutural e analítica. Iniciaremos pela categorização da noção instrumental de Estado que marcou o assim chamado marxismo clássico. Mostraremos, com referência a textos já críticos, as bases fundamentais e mais influentes dessa concepção no âmbito dos textos de Marx e Engels e também nas formulações teóricas posteriores nas quais não lograram ruptura. Após solidificar o que se entende por marxismo clássico passaremos ao estudo dos projetos de renovação que se construíram em relação íntima com o projeto das ciências sociais. São esses o marxismo estrutural e pós-estrutural francês, aqui analisados nos textos de Althusser, Poulantzas e Balibar, e o marxismo analítico, nas figuras de Elster, Roemer e Przeworski. O objetivo final do presente artigo é mostrar as alternativas ao economicismo.

Il faudrait, répète la philosophie politique, prendre les hommes tels qu’ils sont, au risque de sombrer dans l’utopisme. Il est certes pertinent de partir du réel pour mieux le transformer, mais faut-il pour autant délaisser la théorie idéale, qui porte sur ce qui devrait être, et n’arrivera jamais ?

G. A. Cohen was a philosopher who developed, first, a distinctive Marxist theory of history, and, later, a distinctive ethical theory: luck egalitarianism. This chapter discusses the internal tensions within each theory, their relation to one another, and their relation to socialism. The development thesis and the primacy thesis that are central to Cohen’s account of history are not an exact fit with Cohen’s account of a distinctive contradiction in advanced capitalism. Nor can either of these accounts explain Cohen’s later normative concern with equality, other than indirectly. One uniting feature of Cohen’s theory of history and his later ethics is their respective failure to explain or indict the contradiction of advanced capitalism.