Family Law

"Im Recht überdauern besonders kurze Rechtssätze häufig nicht allein wegen ihrer juristischen Bedeutung, sondern aufgrund leicht eingängiger und sprichwortartiger Prägnanz. Hierin liegt auch eine der Besonderheiten des nur 13 Wörter zählenden Art. 213 Code civil von 1804.  Der Artikel statuiert für die verheiratete Frau, dass sie ihrem Ehemann gegenüber zur obéissance, also zum Gehorsam, verpflichtet ist. Zwar trifft den Mann im Gegenzug eine ehebedingte Schutzpflicht, Gehorsamkeit wird von ihm indes nicht verlangt. Dieses asymmetrische Pflichtenverhältnis zwischen beiden Ehegatten hat Vorbildcharakter für das gesamte französische Ehe- und Familienrecht des Code civil. Danach ist der Ehemann nicht nur sein eigener Herr, sondern zugleich auch oberster Souverän von Frau und Familie. Es liegt deshalb nicht fern, den Inhalt von Art. 213 auf folgende Maxime zuzuspitzen: Beschützen und Befehlen darf der Mann, Dulden und Gehorchen muss die Frau.
Diese im Gehorsamsartikel zum Ausdruck kommende patriarchale Herrschaftsstruktur der Ehe, in welcher der Ehemann eine nahezu unbeschränkte Autorität über seine Frau genoss, war bei weitem keine Seltenheit im Kodifikationszeitalter des 19. Jahrhunderts. In allen Zivilgesetzbüchern Kontinentaleuropas dieser Epoche finden sich solche ehemännlichen Privilegien, die aus heutiger Sicht eher in der Vor-Moderne verortet zu sein scheinen als in einer Zeit, die von fortschreitenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Veränderungen begriffen war und deren Gesellschaften doch eigentlich noch vom individualistisch-liberalen Geiste der Aufklärung hätten getragen sein müssen. Allerdings dürfen hier die gerade Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts zum Teil noch großen Differenzen in der sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung, die zwischen einzelnen Staaten, Fürstentümern und sonstigen politischen Gemeinschaften bestanden, nicht pauschalisiert werden. Wie der Gehorsamsartikel indes exemplarisch auch für andere Länder zeigen kann, sind die Unterschiede speziell im Ehe- und Familienrecht eher marginal. Für die Stellung der Frau in der Ehe galten andere historische Wirkungsgesetze als für den technischen Fortschritt oder die Emanzipationsprozesse des (männlichen) Bürgertums.
Zwar ist die Frau im 19. Jahrhundert mittlerweile als Rechtssubjekt anerkannt, d. h. sie ist Trägerin von eigenen Rechten und Pflichten. Dies gilt jedoch nicht in gleich unbeschränkter Weise für die Ehefrau. Dem Ehemann als Oberhaupt, ‚Geschäftsführer’ und Leiter der ehelichen Gemeinschaft kommt eine überragende Stellung zu. Er besitzt in den meisten Ehe- und Familienrechten der europäischen Kodifikationen die Eheherrschaft.  Der Begriff Eheherrschaft ist dabei weniger als ein subsumierfähiger Rechtsbegriff zu verstehen, sondern vielmehr im Sinne eines eherechtlichen Leitgedankens, der alle möglichen Vorrechte des Mannes gegenüber der Frau umfassen kann. Inhalt und Umfang der Eheherrschaft gestalten sich in den verschiedenen Gesetzestexten sehr facettenreich und können für die Ehefrau von Beschränkungen der rechtlichen Handlungsfreiheit über güterrechtliche Benachteiligungen bis hin zum Ausschluss in Erziehungsfragen der Kinder reichen. Demgemäß ist auch die französische Gehorsamspflicht der Ehefrau nach Art. 213 zwar Ausprägung und Konkretisierung eines eheherrschaftlichen Prinzips, jedoch nicht ihre Ursache. Dabei verdeutlicht der in Art. 213 kodifizierte Begriff Gehorsam und die als Normadressatin festgelegte Ehefrau, dass sich die Frau einer unbedingten Autorität, namentlich dem Ehemann, zu fügen hat, was bereits eine hohe Intensität der französischen Eheherrschaft vermuten lässt.
Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist die Frage, welche Bedeutung Art. 213, der die unbedingte Gehorsamspflicht der Ehefrau gegenüber ihrem Ehemann gesetzlich verankerte, für die Rechtswissenschaft und aufkommende Frauenbewegung im Frankreich des 19. Jahrhunderts hatte. Nach einer kurzen Analyse des Wortlauts und der Systematik wird der Gesetzgebungsprozess zum Art. 213 vor dem Hintergrund seiner Ideengeschichte rekonstruiert. Dabei sollen auch Gesetzgebungsentwürfe während der Revolutionszeit mit einbezogen werden, die zwar nur einige Jahre vor Einführung des Code civil verfasst wurden, im Familienrecht allerdings wesentlich mehr von den Leitgedanken der Revolution beeinflusst waren als die restaurative Kodifikation von Napoléon Bonaparte. Auf Grundlage zeitgenössischer Urteile der französischen Rechtsprechung sowie einer gegen Art. 213 gerichteten Petition der Frauenbewegung, veröffentlicht von einem ihrer bedeutendsten männlichen Vertreter, Léon Richer (1824-1911), wird anschließend die Aufnahme des Gehorsamsartikel analysiert und bewertet.
Im Ergebnis zeigt der Beitrag einerseits, dass der Gehorsamsartikel in der Prozesswirklichkeit des 19. Jahrhundert einen bloßen Auffangtatbestand bildet und in nur wenigen Ehescheidungsklagen unmittelbare Bedeutung erlangt. Andererseits fungiert die gesetzliche Gehorsamspflicht als Begründung eines autokratischen Familienmodells, das auf unbedingtem Zusammenhalt und hierarchisch geordneter Rollenverteilung mit dem Mann als Haupt der Familie beruht. Diese rechtliche Ehekonstruktion ist in Zusammenhang mit nachrevolutionären restaurativen Tendenzen zur Wiederherstellung eines ‚starken Staates’ zu sehen. So bilden die beiden Begriffe Schutz und Gehorsam in Art. 213 spezifisch juristische Topoi, welche sich im gesamten Ehe- und Familienrecht des Code civil wiederfinden. Gegen dieses patriarchale Rollenverständnis richtet sich die Kritik der zeitgenössischen Frauenbewegung, deren Forderungen primär auf formelle Rechtsgleichheit der Geschlechter zielen. In den durch die Frauenbewegung ausgelösten Diskussionen um die Gehorsamspflicht der Ehefrau, die ab den 1830er Jahren in die französische Öffentlichkeit gelangen, drückt sich auch die zunehmende Diskrepanz zwischen kodifiziertem patriarchalen Eheverständnis und gesellschaftlicher Realität aus. Allerdings erstarken erst in dieser Zeit allmählich Reformvorhaben der Frauenbewegung zur Gleichberechtigung von Ehefrau und Mutter zu konkreten Versuchen, die französische Gesetzgebung zu einer Revision des Familienrechts zu bewegen."

The promulgation of the Turkish Civil Code of 1926, a nuanced translation of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907, has long been celebrated as an exceptionally thoroughgoing instance of "legal transplantation". Despite their pervasiveness, such assessments cloud appreciation of the multifarious power dynamics at work in the Code's preparation and implementation, especially the mechanisms through which it was made to serve Kemalist ideology’s twofold agenda of "modernising" socio-legal relations while retaining--and, in certain instances, augmenting--those "traditional" practices which early republican legislators and administrators found to be of especial value for their "nation-building" project. The chief objective of this study is to reveal the inadequacies of the Turkish Civil Code’s standard characterisation as a "success story" in comparative legal scholarship. Specifically, I demonstrate that the 1926 Code is best understood as the product of a deeply gendered tension between Kemalism's dedication to a state-driven programme of national "modernisation" and elements of the "tradition" this programme was crafted for the sake of mobilising, radicalising and transforming.

This chapter is a first step towards a comparative history of child adoption law and practices in Western Europe since child adoption became legal in Germany (1900), Sweden (1917), France (1923), England and Wales (1927) and Italy (1942). Relying mainly on long time series from these five countries, I analyze the incidence and the developments of domestic adoptions of both unrelated and related children as well as more recent developments in inter-country adoption. In most Western European countries child adoption incidence increased from the early 20th century to approximately the 1970s, likely because of rising demand for child adoption. Child adoption incidence has decreased since the 1970s because of a fall in adoptable children from both domestic and foreign backgrounds. In addition, the people of Sweden and England and Wales have long adopted children much more frequently than those of Germany, let alone France and Italy. The history of child adoption in Western Europe thus reflects major demographic trends since 1900 as well as a North-South gradient in child adoption incidence.

This article seeks to advance our understanding of how intimate relations and racial logics are co-constituted and matter-subjectively, culturally, materially, and politically-in our colonial present of economic inequalities, nationalist populisms, anti-migrant discourses and xenophobic hostilities. Addressing these crisis conditions is urgent, yet critical interventions indicate that prevailing accounts inadequately address the scale, complexity, and fluidity of racisms operating today. This article proposes to think racial logics 'otherwise' by drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship and intersectional analytics to produce a genealogy of state/nation formation processes, imperial encounters, and legitimating ideologies that illuminates how 'intimacy builds worlds'. 1 A deep history of political centralisation reveals that regulation of intimate, familial relations is a constitutive feature of successful state-making and crucial for understanding how modernity's 'race difference' is produced and how the racialisation of 'Other' ('non-European', undesirable) sexual/familial practices figures in contemporary crises. Locating intimate relations-'family'-in (birthright) citizenship, immigration regimes, and political-economic frames helps clarify the amplification of global inequalities and the power of stigmatisations to fuel nationalist attachments and anti-migrant hostilities. Foregrounding intimacy and integrating typically disparate lines of inquiry advances our analyses of today's often opaque yet intense racisms and their globally problematic effects.

A fundamental contradiction in the legal definition of family lurks at the intersection of family law and zoning law. One set of doctrines has increasingly recognized the claims of “functional families,” the other has come to rely on the definition of “formal family”- those related by blood, marriage or adoption. As a result, the “functional turn” in family law is undermined or unstable in at least 32 states. Using original legal analysis and historical research, this paper illuminates that contradiction, explains how it came about, and argues that it must be resolved in favor of functional families. After a brief introduction (Part I), Part II surveys the functional turn in state family law, while Part III offers a novel history of the definition of family in zoning law, which I call the formal turn. Part IV offers normative and practical reasons why the definition of family should be loosened, offering recommendations for legislative and judicial solutions.

Background: HIV-1 is usually transmitted in the presence of semen. We have shown that semen boosts HIV-1 infection and contains fragments of prostatic acid phosphatase (PAP) forming amyloid aggregates termed SEVI (semen-derived enhancer of viral infection) that promote virion attachment to target cells. Despite its importance for the global spread of HIV-1, however, the effect of semen on virus infection is controversial.

The theme of this book is the right to procreate in the Israeli context. My discussion of this right includes the implementation of the right to procreate, restrictions on the right (due to societal, legal, or religious concerns), and the effect of the changing conception of the right to procreate (both substantively and in practice) on core family concepts, such as parents, father, and mother.

In the current Israeli legal and cultural sphere, two issues are at the forefront of the discussion over the right to procreate: first, the regulations governing and the conflicts surrounding surrogacy and egg donation, and second, the debate over posthumous fertilization. These issues are the focus of Assisted Reproduction in Israel.

Enclosed: Abstract and Introduction. For more information: https://brill.com/view/title/34887
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הספר עוסק בזכות להוֹרוּת בישראל: ביישומה (הנרחב) של הזכות באמצעי הפריה מלאכותית, במגבלות על הזכות (משיקולים חברתיים, משפטיים או דתיים) ובהשפעה שיש לשינויים בתחום ההפריה המלאכותית על מושגי יסוד בתחום המשפחה, כדוגמת ההגדרה המושגית של הורות, אב ואם.

החיבור מתמקד בשני נושאים: האחד, פונדקאות ותרומת ביציות. השני, הפריה לאחר המוות. נושאים אלו נבחנים מפרספקטיבות של החוק הישראלי, המשפט העברי וההשפעה הדו-כיוונית שיש למפגש בין השניים.

למידע נוסף: https://brill.com/view/title/34887

We argue that the fragility of contemporary marriages—and the corresponding high rates of divorce—can be explained (in large part) by a three-part mismatch: between our relationship values, our evolved psycho-biological natures, and our modern social, physical, and technological environment. “Love drugs” could help address this mismatch by boosting our psycho-biologies while keeping our values and our environment intact. While individual couples should be free to use pharmacological interventions to sustain and improve their romantic connection, we suggest that they may have an obligation to do so as well, in certain cases. Specifically, we argue that couples with offspring may have a special responsibility to enhance their relationships for the sake of their children. We outline an evolutionarily-informed research program for identifying promising biomedical enhancements of love and commitment.

These tales are true, And can be sad. FIXTURES in our mind, assuming all bad. There's more to their stories, Than what I can share. But they will remind us Why we choose to care. AUTHOR'S NOTE: Patients suffering from opioid use disorder have unique stories. Primary care providers are in a special position to positively change the lives of patients and families in recovery, and to find joy and meaning in practice.

Child welfare systems often have unintended and undesirable consequences for children and their social environments. They will be analysed by applying the concept of “normative paradoxes” (Honneth and Sutterlüty) and drawing mainly, but not exclusively, on Germany. The normative aim of child welfare legislation will be reconstructed and it will be argued that the law can be perceived as an institutionalisation of a single, albeit internally complex normative principle – i.e., the principle of the child’s autonomy or self-determination. Using this principle as a yardstick, three types of paradoxical effects will be identified. These counter-productive effects of the autonomy-centred welfare principle will be described as the “undermining”, the “subsumption”, and the “distortion” paradoxes. Because discourse in this field has always had some awareness of these paradoxes, legal developments can be interpreted as ongoing attempts to overcome them.

One-third of the world’s population lives under personal law systems. These systems regulate family matters by applying different ‘personal laws’ ― ostensibly based on religious doctrine ― to people depending on the religious group with which they are identified. Personal law systems generally raise serious concerns relating to religious freedom, non-discrimination, familial rights and procedural rights. Despite these concerns, complex political considerations keep personal law systems in place, and thwart efforts to reform them. This paper proposes a way out of the stalemate that has dogged efforts to reform the personal law system in India, the country with the largest number of people living under such a system. This proposal entails the enactment of a uniform family law supplemented by a regime of state-recognised religious alternative dispute settlement. The paper argues that this proposal has the potential to address major concerns raised by the personal law system, provide a means of valuable recognition for religious identities, support religious practice and religious expression, promote justice for women, and enhance group autonomy. The paper also offers a number of recommendations that would help the proposed regime realise its potential. Finally, the paper indicates its significance beyond India, for other jurisdictions facing contentious issues relating to the accommodation of religious norms in family law.

In the past two decades a growing body of empirical research has purported to demonstrate that transracial adoption does not negatively impact, and may positively benefit, children of color, particularly Black children. This manuscript critically examines the studies purporting to establish this conclusion. It is argued that several methodological difficulties exist in these studies. In addition, both legal and scientific assessments of children's well-being define adjustment and maladjustment according to Eurocentric norms that define individual well-being in isolation from the well-being of one's racial or ethnic group. It is suggested that further research is necessary, most notably research that takes an Africentric approach, in order to establish that transracial adoption serves the best interests of Black and other ethnic minority children.

This paper pushes against the successful rhetoric of formal equality by which same-sex couples are the same as different-sex couples and opening existing regimes of marriage to them best recognizes their equal moral worth. Drawing on social-science research that indicates differences in the economic organization of same-sex couples, the paper explores the possibility that a different marriage regime for the spouses’ reciprocal duties might combine recognition of their equal moral worth with sensitivity to their needs. The study sharpens the understanding of contemporary investments in marriage law for everyone and offers a better justification for formal equality: same-sex couples may be treated identically to different-sex couples not because they are the same, but despite their differences.

Studies undertaken on women incarcerated in African countries are limited. In this article we explore Kenyan women's (n = 49) narratives of their journeys into prison using life history interviews and a feminist pathways approach. Results show the life stories of imprisoned women in Kenya reflect those of female prisoners elsewhere. In particular, victimisation, disordered familial and intimate relationships, low levels of education, poverty and motherhood (often in teen years) characterised many women's lives. Some also struggled with addiction (usually to alcohol but sometimes illicit drugs) and poor physical health due to HIV infection. Barriers to justice were a generic problem. In addition to these broad categorical findings six different pathway experiences were identified: 1) the economically motivated pathway; 2) domestic violence pathway, 3) harmed and harming pathway, 4) deviant women pathway, 5) pathway of negligible culpability and justice in-accessibility, 6) pathway of one life changing moment.

Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, -and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Although polygyny is mubah (permissible) in Islamic law, it is not an absolute right that every man can use arbitrarily. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny has been attributed to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintnance. However, the observance of these conditions that is left to the mercy of men leads to the exploitation of the right for practicing to polygyny and victimization of the first spouse. Therefore, inserting some restrictions for using this right has come to the agenda from time to time in Islamic legal history. The first legal arrangements concerning the restriction of the polygyny (taaddud al-zawjāt) in the history of Islamic law were indirectly made with the Family Law Decree of 1917 which was prepared in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. Among the late Islamic jurists, the issue of the limitation of polygyny by public authority in Islamic law continues to be discussed. The civil laws of contemporary Muslim countries contain different regulations on the issue. In this article, the restriction of polygyny by the public authority in Islamic family law will be focused on.

Summary: Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Thus, relevant verses in the Qur’an (al-Nisa 4/3, 129) and the Prophet’s own practice (al-Ahzab 33/50, 51, 59 al-Tahrim 66 / 3-5) show that it is legitimate for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in Islamic law.

Although polygyny is legally permissible (mubah) in Islamic law it is not an absolute right that every man can arbitrarily use. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny has been attributed to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintenance.

On the other hand, there may be some exceptional circumstances permitting polygyny in Islamic law. For example, when female population is much more than male in the society and when a, woman is can not fulfill her family duties due to her cureless illness, polygyny is permitted in Islamic law.

As it can be understood from the explanations above, polygyny in Islamic law is not a general and mandatory provision that should be applied by every man who has legal capacity to marry. On the contrary, it is an exceptional provision that is justified if there are certain conditions and justifications.

According to this; polygyny is a moral and legal institution that is made up of mutual consent based on individual and social conditions and needs in Islamic law. Therefore, men do not have to marry a second woman on their current wives, as well as women have the right to say “no” to marry a married man as a second wife.

When the conditions and rationales indicated in the relevant verses and doctrine are evaluated together, it can be said that in order to be able to legitimize the polygyny in Islamic law, there must be three basic conditions:

(1) Observing justice among spouses,

(2) Having sufficient financial power to provide maintenance for spouses,

(3) Existence of individual or social need or necessity.

Therefore, in order to prevent the exploitation of polygyny, which is justified under certain conditions and justifications in Islamic law, the above-mentioned conditions must be fulfilled. Otherwise, polygyny can cause some problems, unrest and injustice for individual, family and society. Hence, in the presence of certain conditions and justifications, polygyny accepted in Islamic law as a moral and legal institution aiming the elimination of individual and social arbitration.

Although the legitimacy of polygyny in Islamic law depends on the existence of certain conditions and special circumstances, it is a known fact that they are not always observed in practice. It can be said that the right of polygyny is a subject of abuse in practice. Therefore, the limitation of polygyny  by the public authority has come to the fore in Islamic legal history. Today, control of the public authority and inserting some restrictions of polygyny  continue to be discussed among the Islamic jurists.

In the past, it is possible to say that the control of the exercising of this right has been done relatively by society (social environment). However, nowadays, since the society cannot perform the control mechanism, it is brought up by the state (public authority) on behalf of the society.

Among the contemporary Islamic jurists regarding the supervision or limitation of polygyny  by the public authority; there are two approaches: “those who accept” and “those who do not accept” such restrictions.

Islamic jurists, who accept that public authority is allowed to intervene in polygyny, grounded their views on two perspectives: The first is that the polygyny is legally permissible and the public authority has the authority to limit the permissible (mubah) in Islamic law. The second is that polygyny is restricted with the conditions in the Qur’anic verses such as “husband’s observation supervision of justice among his wives” and “having the power for ensuring the livelihood (nafaqa) of his wives” and it is more appropriate for the benefit of society and the purpose of the legislator (Shari’) to be subject to the control of the public authority whether these conditions are present or not.

Islamic jurists, who do not agree that the public authority has the right to intervene in polygyny grounded their views on two perspectives as well: First, polygyny is a legitimate right mentioned in the verses in Islamic law and there is no definite proof that this can be prohibited or restricted by the public authority. Secondly, it is contrary to the verses to prohibit or limit the right that the Qur’an makes legitimate (free).

Thus, it is possible to say that the opinion which accepts that the public authority has to limit polygyny is more accurate in terms today’s social conditions. Namely, polygyny is linked to two basic conditions: ”husband’s observance of justice among his wives and having the power to provide maintenance for his wives. Therefore, supervision of the public authority on checking the existence of these conditions is more appropriate for the purpose of the legislator (Shari legitimizing polygyny  and social benefit.

In fact, the Ottoman Family Law Decree of 1917 indirectly limited the right of the husband to marry more than one woman, giving the woman right to stipulate a condition in her marriage contract that her husband not to marry a second woman. In the 1924 Draft of Family Law Decree, which was prepared after the repeal of the Family Law Decree of 1917, but not enacted, it was proposed that the application of polygyny should be presented to the approval judge.

In today’-s Muslim countries, there are three different practices: namely “completely prohibiting polygyny”, ”releasing polygyny” and “giving the court the right to monitor the existence of necessary conditions “. In countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Indonesia, Malaysia (and Pakistan), the validity of polygyny  depends on the permission and supervision of the judiciary. Some of these countries which have accepted judicial review have given the judicial control for the requirement of justice, some of them the conditions of justice and maintenance some of them for the conditions of justice, maintenance and a legitimate justification.

In sum, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant verses, polygyny in Islamic law is legitimately permissible (mubah). However, the public authority has the right and authority to limit the mubah in Islamic law in the case of the elimination of damage and the necessity of the public interest. On the other hand, the public authority has the right and authority to enact the law in Islamic law by preferring one of the existing ijtihads that meet the needs of the society and conforms to the conditions of the age.

According to this, when the public authority made a statutory regulation that links the use of right of polygyny  to the permission of the judge, this regulation is binding on society.Therefore, in the event of such a legal arrangement, it is possible for the public authority to allow the men who comply with the conditions and not to allow the ones who are not to comply with the conditions after conducting the necessary investigation. As a matter of fact, now Family Laws of many Muslim countries now include such legal arrangements.

It is also worth mentioning here that there may be a necessity for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in terms of social benefits, when the population of male and female in a society is excessively disproportionate. In such circumstances, it is also possible that the public authority encourages, or even mandates, the marriage of men who have fulfilled the conditions to more than one woman.

According to the Italian 1865 civil code, the father (or the mother) were liable for the torts of minor children living with them, unless they proved that they could not prevent the wrongful act. Like in France, in this system, liability was based on a presumption of fault, which could be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. This paper analyses the way in which exculpatory proof was interpreted by the Italian courts during the time the 1865 civil code was in force. Starting in the period following the Unification of Italy, the tradition laid the foundations of longstanding arguments thanks to some interpretative choices whose repercussions lasted well beyond the first Italian civil code. However, to this day there is still no historical analysis of the decisions taken by the courts. The most typical situations of parental civil liability are examined, together with the lines of defence allowed by the judges. Following a widespread line of orientation in case law, the courts considered the parents liable for negligence both in supervising and in educating the child. From the analysis of the cases it emerges that the courts judged the parents according to a series of parameters, such as the nature of the tort, the child’s character and temperament, the existence of specific reasons for suspicion, and age. The cases show that the post-Unification experience in Italy was more varied and better developed than is commonly thought. Tendencies denoting extreme strictness in claiming the parents were negligent, for instance, when children committed intentional crimes and were generally ill-natured, or when they rode bicycles or motor vehicles, co-existed with more liberal perspectives, which allowed for the parents’ exemption from liabilities by concretely assessing negligence in a more flexible and balanced way, especially when the children were close to the age of majority.

This article challenges the widely diffuse view of family law as peripheral to private law. It aims to the de-marginalisation of family legal issues, by showing their ties to the market realm and freedom of contract. In this theoretical framework, the article analyses the process of family law harmonisation in Europe. In particular, it focuses on three steps or aspects in respect to which the presumed peculiarity of family law is proclaimed and reveals, at the same time, its groundlessness: the status/contract dichotomy as a reflection of the family/market divide which seems to influence future developments of the harmonisation of law in Europe; the presumed political character of family law, which represents the leitmotiv in most recent harmonisation projects; and the subsequent strictly national character of family law, which makes EC institutions much more cautious in intervening in these matters than in any other field of private law.

Welcome to the eighth edition of the AFRC newsletter, Family Relationships Quarterly. In this edition, Professor Richard Chisholm and Dr Jennifer McIntosh summarise an upcoming journal article on the difficulties faced by the family law system in judging what is best for children in shared care arrangements. The reported research findings suggest that a significant number of children emerge from Family Court proceedings with arrangements that can place them under psychological strain and/or compromise their attachment security. The article is a reminder that shared care arrangements need to proceed according to children's needs, not parental rights. This edition's "Family Statistics and Trends" article looks at men's and women's attitudes towards marriage and cohabitation, following a further decline in the proportion of registered marriages in the 2006 Census of Population and Housing. The summary notes that the endorsement of marriage as an institution still appears to be widespread, although cohabitation is also widely approved. Age and gender differences in responses are noted. Other articles include a "Program Spotlight" on the Partnership program in Western Australia, which includes marriage preparation and enrichment programs, and a conference report on the Sixth Australian and New Zealand Youth Health Conference. A review of the Raising Children DVD is included, along with a book review of "Remember Me": Commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the Bringing Them Home Report. "Literature Highlights" focus on articles relating to later-life divorce and living alone. The AFRC offers many ways to share information with fellow service providers, practitioners and policy makers, as well as other professionals. Contributions of articles and reviews are always welcome for the newsletter-see our author guidelines on page 23 for details. In addition, Family Relationships Practice Profiles 1 are aimed at increasing an understanding of family and relationship issues and responses to these issues.

Purpose of review. Well-functioning romantic relationships are important for long-term health and well-being, but they are often difficult to sustain. This difficulty arises (in part) because of an underlying tension between our psychobiological natures, culture/environment, and modern love and relationship goals. One possible solution to this predicament is to intervene at the level of psychobiology, enhancing partners’ interpersonal connection through neurochemical modulation. This article focuses on a single, promising biobehavioral sub-system for such intervention: the attachment system, based largely upon the expression of the neuropeptide oxytocin. Could the exogenous administration of oxytocin—under the right conditions—be used to facilitate relational or marital well-being?

Recent findings. If so, it would require considerable forethought. Recent research complicates the popular image of oxytocin as a universal social enhancer or ‘love hormone’ and shows that it may exert a variety of different effects, at different dosages, on different people, under different circumstances. Accordingly, we discuss what is known about oxytocin, including its “good” and “bad” effects on human behavior and on higher-order functional processes.

Summary. Building upon animal-model, human preclinical, and clinical findings, we outline a proposal for the use of oxytocin in the therapeutic neuroenhancement of contemporary romantic relationships. Highlighting key targets for future research along the way, we then conclude by discussing some of the clinical and ethical considerations that would pertain to the implementation of this knowledge in applied settings.

"Feminism’s achievements regarding violence against women are a key target for the fathers’ rights movement. This article provides an overview of the impact of the fathers’ rights movement on men’s violence against women. It documents the ways in which fathers’ rights groups in Australia have influenced changes in family law, which privilege parental contact over safety, particularly through moves toward a presumption of children’s joint residence. They have attempted to discredit female victims of violence, to wind back the legal protections available to victims and the sanctions imposed on perpetrators, and to undermine services for the victims of men’s violence.

Citation: Flood, M. (2010). ‘Fathers’ Rights’ and the Defense of Paternal Authority in Australia. Violence Against Women, 16(3), 328-347."

Children tend to be represented as the quintessential victims of the ‘drug problem’, with drug-using parents, particularly mothers, characterised as vectors of the risks posed. Although evidence of drug use is not per se an impediment to retaining care of, or contact with, children (per Lady Hale in Re B [2013] UKSC 33, at para. 143), it does pose one of the greatest challenges to social and political norms about ‘good parenting’, and often has a powerful impact on decisions about care within UK family courts. While there is a considerable body of scholarship assessing criminal justice responses to drug use, there has been little research into how the family serves as an important site for the constitution of drug harms and the making of ‘drugs’ and ‘addiction’. This paper is informed by qualitative analysis of approximately 150 case reports in which drug use has been cited as relevant in the determination of guardianship/parenting. The purpose will not be to contest the difficult decisions that judges had to make in these cases but, using perspectives rooted in Science and Technology Studies and feminist drug scholarship, to remain attendant to the ontological multiplicity of objects that emerge from attempts to stabilise drug harms in legal narratives.

Parental alienation is the unwarranted denigration or rejection of a parent where there was a previous loving relationship. Despite thirty years of study establishing its aetiology, prevalence , appropriate interventions and outcomes for children, parental alienation remains a highly contentious concept in the UK. Additionally, there has been minimal exploration of the experiences of alienated parents across the globe. A recent Q analysis uncovered the subjective and intersubjective experiences of British alienated parents. An unexpected consensus became apparent which merited further analysis of the data. Through this phenome-nological exploration of the participants' narratives, a pervasive sense of " powerlessness " emerged. The source of this felt sense of powerlessness is considered and recommendations for policy and practice are suggested.

The concept of the ‘best interests of the child’ is both pivotal in family law and yet essentially contested. This paper reflects on the concept's position within a number of longer-term histories – of the jurisprudence surrounding child custody, of the social construction of childhood, and of the emotional constitution of family life more broadly. The turn to a co-parenting model from the 1970s onwards and the rise of the concept of the ‘civilized divorce’ is analysed by drawing on Norbert Elias's analysis of ‘processes of civilization’ in Western social life. The paper argues that the post-separation co-parenting model is only partially explained as the outcome of political manoeuvring by particular social and professional groups; it should also be understood as part of longer-term trends in family life, emotional management, and the socio-legal construction of childhood, as part of the on-going ‘civilizing of parents’.

Should a democratic regime formally incorporate religious laws and courts into its otherwise secular legal system? This is not a hypothetical question. Some democratic nations already formally integrate religion-based laws in the field of family law (especially Muslim Family Law – MFL). Although state-enforced MFLs often affect human rights negatively, many governments, especially non-Muslim majority ones, have refrained from direct legislative interventions into substantive MFLs. Instead, they have empowered civil courts to play the role of "reformer. " But how successful have civil judiciaries in non-Muslim regimes been in " reforming " Muslim laws? On the basis of an analysis of the MFL jurisprudence of Israeli and Greek civil courts over the last three decades, I argue that civil courts could not have brought about any direct changes in Muslim law, however, they have had an indirect effect by pressuring religious courts/ authorities to undertake self-reform.

Recent scholarship has critiqued the tendency for separated mothers in custody disputes to be defined as hostile and alienating. Through the presentation of three case studies, drawn from an interview-based study with 21 women, we show how such pejorative constructions only arise when the conflicting gendered moral accountabilities of contemporary motherhood are overlooked. We found that mothers tend to believe that contact with non-resident fathers is generally in a child's best interests. However, as a result of balancing complex moral obligations for the care of their children, they may raise questions about particular kinds of arrangements for contact with particular fathers. We argue, therefore, that family law practice will lead to better outcomes for children when professionals listen to the history of, and reasons for, mothers' positions. To enable family law professionals to undertake this task, we offer an alternative interpretive framework for making sense of women's stories. Should family law professionals make use of this framework, it is likely that they will understand that the positions mothers adopt are often the outcome of the difficult moral dilemmas they encounter in caring for their children, and that the reductive rubric of the 'hostile mother' needs to be treated with scepticism.

In olden days, a glimpse of stocking Was looked on as something shocking. But now, God knows, Anything goes.-Cole Porter, Anything Goes (1934) I. INTRODUCTION Protecting children from contamination by speech has become the focus of national attention. The content of the protected speech that the state seeks to regulate is as varied as the form of communications targeted, including the allegedly indecent, sacrilegious, and violent in media ranging from books to the Internet. Echoing similar crusades to protect children from virtually every new form of entertainment over the last century, contemporary regulatory efforts to protect children reflect the unique legal status of children and the fragility of constitutional liberties where their vulnerabilities are invoked. But content-based restrictions on speech-even in the name of protecting young people-presumptively violate the First Amendment, 1 which mandates "above all else. .. that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content." 2 Strict scrutiny under the Speech Clause requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest in regulating speech based on its content and to show that a real harm exists which the restriction on speech will redress. Confronted with the incantation that the state aims to safeguard children, courts at every level, including the Supreme Court, have regularly failed to scrutinize the interest alleged by the government. This lack of analysis is all the more striking because the speech at issue in this Article is protected under the Constitution. It is neither legally obscene nor used in the service of criminal acts against children. Both of these categories of speech are unprotected, and are subject to criminal prosecution under pertinent statutes. Although many parents and other adults might wish it were otherwise, the Supreme Court has recognized that as long as controversial speech is available, some "enterprising youngsters" will find it. 3 The Supreme Court has conceded that no "fail-safe" methods can block the most determined teen, especially since government regulations based on content must be narrowly tailored. 4 The Supreme Court has long held as inviolable the principle that even the desire to protect youth will not allow the state to "reduce the adult population. .. to reading only what is fit for children." 5 Regardless of the strength of the government's interest in protecting children, the Court has insisted that "the level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox." 6

In this article, I consider the implications of an ethic of care for reforming U.S. family-based immigration admissions and waiver policies. Using an ethic of care as a starting point, I make a normative argument for extending family-based immigration benefits to the primary caregivers of resident and citizen-children. This policy reform would provide a basis for recognizing the social membership of the children of immigrants and rewarding the dependency work of their deportable parents or other primary caregivers. It would also broaden the definition of family in immigration law to encompass a wider range of caregiving relationships beyond blood and kinship relations.

Cet article reprend des réflexions issues d’une recherche en bioéthique qui s’attachait à analyser le croisement
de trois phénomènes : le développement des nouvelles technologies utilisées dans les processus
de reproduction humaine ; leur encadrement juridique et normatif ; l’ouverture des droits aux minorités
sexuelles, notamment la reconnaissance de l’homoparentalité. Mon propos se concentrera sur les évolutions
juridiques dans le contexte espagnol concernant la filiation monosexuée, tant masculine que
féminine, à travers les techniques de reproduction assistée. Ce choix est motivé par le fait que l’Espagne,
en ouvrant le mariage aux couples homosexuels, est allée plus loin que d’autres pays européens dans
la reconnaissance de la filiation homosexuelle. Mais dans les faits, plusieurs sortes de no man’s land
juridiques posent des problèmes concrets quant à la reconnaissance de cette nouvelle filiation. C’est
dans ces impasses juridiques que la composante biologique et génétique ressort fortement dans le débat
juridico-politique actuel. L’analyse visera donc à montrer plus précisément comment, dans ces débats,
la composante biogénétique est engagée dans la conception de la filiation, tant du point de vue du droit
que des pratiques des couples homosexuels.

Ever since its inception in the mid-forties of the last century, the Moroccan feminist movement has evolved around the family law Code. The post-independence family law denied women basic rights and thus fueled the disappointment and anger of the female intellectual elite (journalists, writers, politicians and activists). Legal rights have always constituted a priority in Moroccan women's struggle for dignity in and outside the home. These rights became central with women's increasing access to education and the job market. Today, women's legal rights are associated with democratization and political openness. This paper addresses these issues and underlines the impact of the family law in generating and accelerating feminist ideas in Morocco.

Both sides in this case agreed on the following events. About twenty years earlier, the plaintiff-an {kyeame (spokesperson) of the Ad[ntenhene of Kwawu 3-had a house built at a cost of £52 for his late mother, Akosua Okyeraa, in the Christian Quarters of Abetifi. After his mother died, the {kyeame made an attempt to sell the house in order to recover some of his debt. His brothers, however, did not permit the {kyeame to part with the house. The brothers met under the mediation of their abusua (matrilineage) chief, Akwamuhene Kwabena Adofo, to find a compromise. One brother, Yao Charles, brought the {kyeame £13, for which a receipt was issued, in order to cover some of the {kyeame's debt on the house. The receipt of £13 was presented to the Tribunal as crucial evidence of a money transaction between Yao Charles and the {kyeame. This dispute over the ownership of the house, as it was brought to the Tribunal, rested on two different readings of the receipt. The plaintiff, {kyeame Ansong, saw the receipt as acknowledgement that Yao Charles, on behalf of his brothers and the abusua, had given him £13 to help repay the loan on the house. Since the brothers had contributed £13 to the outstanding debt, the house became, according to the {kyeame, property of his whole abusua. The defendant, Kwaku Ansong, presented a different reading of this receipt to the Tribunal. He maintained that the receipt was a part-payment of £13 for the purchase of the house by Kwasi Akuamoa-one of the brothers of the {kyeame-who had sent the money to the {kyeame through Yao Charles; hence Kwasi Akuamoa had become the owner of the house. After this alleged sale of the disputed house, Kwasi Akuamoa had occupied the house with his wife and children until he died. The disputed house was inherited patrilineally-as defendant Kwaku Ansong explained to the Tribunal-by the children of the late Kwasi Akuamoa. 4 Defendant Kwaku Ansong was the brother-in-law of Kwasi Akuamoa; he represented the interests of the late Kwasi Akuamoa's children as their w[fa (maternal uncle). Kwaku Ansong's interpretation of ownership and succession was vehemently disputed by the {kyeame, who stated that the house was never sold and still belonged to his Daasebr] Akuamoa Boateng II, {manhene of Kwawu, and Mr. E.A. Apeadu, Registrar of Kwawu Traditional Council, for providing me access to these customary court records. 3 The Ad[ntenhene of Kwawu is also the chief of Abetifi. 4 Kwasi Akuamoa was a Presbyterian and lived within Christian Quarters of Abetifi. Rules of inheritance associated with Christian practice were applied after his death.

This paper aims to understand the extent to which monogamy operates not only as a constitutive element of marriage-like institutions but also as a meta-judicial source of frequently overlooked forms of state violence. Drawing on the case of the Spanish law, it explores the privilege-driven logic that regulates the access to a complex set of economic benefits and legal protections, including immigration related rights, in order to show the extent to which monogamy is part of the grounding structure of an exclusionary constitutional citizenship. In addition, drawing on semi-structured interviews held with Spanish poly activists and biographical interviews held with LGBTQ non-monogamous people, it offers a view of non-monogamous communities as paramount spaces of resistance when it comes to re-imagining the relationship between the state and the intimate realm, beyond the mere inclusion of poly and other non-monogamous intimate relationships in certain pieces of legislation.