Euro-Zone Crisis

An easyJet inflight magazine article offers a great example of how ideology – in the Marxist sense of the word, i.e. a mystification of reality which ensures the continuous dominance of the ruling class – works, and why in this day and age it is a much more effective tool for shaping the forces of material and mental production than old-fashioned propaganda.

The euro has been in crisis for weeks. Amid market rumors and political trade‐offs, it can be hard
to find precise legal bearings. In such situations, the best way to understand the extent and limits
of the legal rules is to go back to the source: the contracts and statutes (in this case, the European
treaties).

For 5.000 years, since the first states were created in what is now southern Iraq, governments have been using violence to create political unity and then using politics (and, when necessary, more violence) to create economic and cultural unity everywhere that their power reached. From 3.000 B.C. through the late 1940s, it is hard to find a single example of a state formed in any other way. Since the late 1940s, though, Western Europeans have been turning history's most successful formula on its head. The European union has arguably been the most extraordinary experiment in the history of political institutions, but the reason its accomplishments seemed so boring was that dullness was the bloc's whole point. In committee meeting after the committee meeting, unsung bureaucratic heroes spun of web of rules and regulations that bound the Continent's formerly sovereign states into an economic and cultural unit and then began using economics and culture to create a political unit. De 5.000 de ani, de când primele state au fost create în ceea ce este acum sudul Irakului, guvernele au folosit violența pentru a crea o unitate politică și apoi folosind politica (și, atunci când este necesar, mai multă violență), pentru a crea unitate economică și culturală pretutindeni unde puterea lor a ajuns. Începând cu anul 3.000 î.Hr. până sfârșitul anilor 1940, este greu de găsit un singur exemplu de stat format în orice alt mod. Totuși, de la sfârșitul anilor 1940, europenii occidentali, au întors cu susul în jos cea mai de succes formulă din istorie. Uniunea Europeană a fost, fără îndoială, experimentul cel mai extraordinar din istoria instituțiilor politice, dar motivul pentru care realizările sale păreau atât de plictisitoare era monotonia care reprezenta întregul bloc. după reuniunea comisiei, în ședință, eroii birocrației necântați de normele și reglementările care au impus limitări fostelor state suverane de pe continent transformându-le într-o unitate economică și culturală care a început prin folosirea economiei și culturii pentru a crea o unitate politică.

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Referencia:
Berumen, S. A. (Coord.) [2014]: Crisis Monetarias y Financieras: lecciones para el futuro, Esic Business & Marketing School, Madrid, 182 páginas. ISBN. 978-84-7356-237-9.

La crisi finanziaria scoppiata nell’autunno 2008 ha sancito il successo di coloro che ne sono stati gli artefici. In Italia e Grecia sono andati al potere tecnocrati e banchieri, gli stessi che, fino al giorno prima, hanno lavorato per le istituzioni responsabili del crollo dell’economia. Ai vertici dei governi europei, delle istituzioni internazionali, dell’Unione europea (un «super Leviatano»), siedono i referenti delle banche e della finanza, nelle mani dei quali una classe politica incapace e inadeguata ha affidato le speranze di ripresa. Essi continuano a perseguire le politiche di impoverimento di 720 milioni di europei, con l’unico scòpo di trasformare il Vecchio Continente in un immenso lager di schiavi moderni: tagli, flessibilità, liberalizzazioni, privatizzazioni, queste le «ricette» per raggiungere falsi obiettivi: la riduzione del deficit ed il pareggio di bilancio (tecnicamente impossibile). Con la «privatizzazione» (svendita) delle ultime società pubbliche completeranno il disegno, raggiungendo l’obiettivo di distruzione degli Stati e della privazione dei più elementari diritti di cittadinanza. Sono politici, banchieri, economisti, editori, controllano i media, e attraverso essi ci tranquillizzano. Non possiamo illuderci che, coloro che hanno appiccato l’incendio, si trasformino improvvisamente in pompieri. Guardando i dati, viene spontaneo domandarsi come sia possibile che in soli tre anni dall’autunno 2008, il debito pubblico di alcuni Stati (Italia, Spagna, Portogallo, Irlanda) sia sensibilmente peggiorato. La risposta è semplice: la colpa è delle misure anti-crisi legate alle operazioni di sostegno al sistema bancario. Con i soldi dati alle banche a interessi irrisori (1.200 miliardi in Europa, e altrettanti negli Usa), queste non fanno altro che rifinanziare le loro obbligazioni o acquistare a loro volta il debito degli Stati, che è divenuto nel frattempo più oneroso da sostenere perchè è aumentato, e il rating è peggiorato. Le banche, quindi, chiedono interessi più alti agli Stati, e la voragine del debito pubblico aumenta in una spirale infinita. In tutto questo giro, chi ci guadagna, ancora una volta, sono proprio le banche. Ma come siamo arrivati fino a qui? Quali sono i sottili meccanismi che hanno privato gli Stati della loro sovranità? L’Ue, la Bce, l’euro, il Trattato di Lisbona, Basilea II, il Fmi, le agenzie di rating, sono tutti strumenti nelle mani della finanza, che ha piazzato i suoi uomini al vertice delle istituzioni nazionali e sovranazionali. Il potere, scippato da tecnocrati e banchieri, con la complicità di politici incapaci e corrotti, deve tornare nelle mani del popolo sovrano.

Die Veränderungen des Kapitalismus haben sich aus seinen organischen Krisen und ihrem staatlichen Management ergeben. Aus der Großen Depression entstand der zwischenimperialistische Organisierte Kapitalismus, aus der Weltwirtschaftskrise der Fordismus und aus dessen Großkrise der globalisierte Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Die Frage stellt sich: Ist aus der heutigen Formationskrise bereits ein neuer Kapitalismus entstanden?

The "Greek crisis" was officially inaugurated on May 2010 with the loan the Greek government took from the IMF-European Union-European Central Bank troika, the largest a country had ever taken (€110 bn). Since then, the social implications of this crisis have been dramatic. The form and the scale of social phenomena observed today in Greece and particularly in Athens--e.g., extreme poverty and inequality, profound police violence, organized racist violence--are unprecedented for the country. Nevertheless, a diachronic examination of some socio-spatial aspects of Athens reveals that the social character of the current crisis has been taking shape for some time. This article aims shed light on the social shape of the crisis by outlining three such socio-spatial dimensions as they materialized in the case of Athens during 1990s and 2000s: first, the emergence of new forms of social exclusion and inequality; second, the vast project of urban (re)development and the new spatialities it produced, and third the emergence of novel forms of political and xenophobic violence.

This white paper examines the current state of debate about – and evidence for – the links between cash, crime, and terrorism. Drawing from IMTFI’s accumulated expertise on monetary technologies, from cash to digital, it examines a range of institutional, legal, scholarly, policy, news media, and other sources to situate and understand this claim. What studies and data underlie the critical policy move of proposing to eliminate cash to address crime? Key findings include the importance of the interplay between multiple payment tools and jurisdictions. People use diverse payment methods together, and the movement of value across jurisdictions is subject to different regulatory environments and payment cultures. Targeting cash in isolation does not take into account this interplay, and risks displacing criminal activities involving cash to other tools and jurisdictions. Multiple methods of interdiction are therefore needed to address money laundering and terrorist financing.

Europe’s woes are the result failed economic policies. But in a wider sense, they are the result of a failed paradigm: the idea that the economy is best left to supposedly self-regulating markets, with the government intervening as little as possible. In this sense, we can say that the crisis of Europe – and of the EMU in particular – is largely a crisis of neoliberalism. The crisis, in other words, is systemic. And the response, therefore, must be equally systemic.

Lehrbeauftragte an der Fakultät für Sozialund Kulturwissenschaften der Hochschule Fulda und Vorstandsmitglied im Villigster Forschungsforum zu Nationalsozialismus, Rassismus und Antisemitismus e.V. Andreas Meyerhöfer, B.A., Student der Friedens-und Konfliktforschung an der Philipps-Universität Marburg. Sein Interessenschwerpunkt liegt hauptsächlich im Bereich kritische Migrationsforschung. Yves Müller, M.A., Mitarbeiter beim Zentrum für Demokratie Treptow-Köpenick (ZfD) in Berlin sowie freier Referent beim Verein für Demokratische Kultur in Berlin e.V. (VDK) und in der politischen und historischen Bildungsarbeit tätig. Aljoscha Pilger, Student der Politikwissenschaft und Friedens-und Konfliktforschung an der Philipps-Universität Marburg, Mitglied der Forschungsgruppe Europäische Integration. Oliver Römer, Dipl., promoviert an der Philipps-Universität Marburg zum Thema Fragmentierungen der Weltgesellschaft. Perspektiven einer postnationalen Soziologie. Anna-Franziska Stiede, Dipl., promoviert in Berlin und Hamburg zum Thema Reproduktionsarbeit in der Krise. Haris Triandafilidou, Dipl., promoviert an der Philipps-Universität Marburg zum Thema Widerstand auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene im Verhältnis zu transnationalisierter Staatlichkeit. Gerd Wiegel, Dr., Referent der Bundestagsfraktion DIE LINKE für die Themen Rechtsextremismus/Antifaschismus und Redakteur von Z. Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung.

Seitdem Syriza in Griechenland an der Macht ist, sind die politische Strategie und der ökonomische Plan der neuen Regierung Gegenstand zahlreicher Debatten. Finanzminister Varoufakis verfasste unlängst einen kleinen Band, der einige Fragen beantwortet. Philipp Metzger stellt die Vorschläge dar.

Goldman Sachs claims that its $2 billion Sukuk programme follows a Murabaha structure, Mohammed Khnifer claims otherwise – that it is nothing more than a
Reverse Tawarruq. What follows is an in-depth review of GS sukuk Offering Circular.
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EuroWeek: ADIB adds to Goldman sukuk heat with Shariah ruling
Provider: IFIS-February 15, 2012

Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's Shariah board has rejected Goldman Sachs's proposed $2bn sukuk programme as unacceptable for Islamic investment, according to a leaked email seen by EuroWeek and one senior official at the Abu Dhabi bank.

The euro crisis has not killed enlargement but it is relegating the region to the outermost circle in a multi-speed Europe – the periphery of the periphery. With Balkan economies beset by low or negative growth rates and rising unemployment, it has exposed the limits of the EU’s growth model and undermined the narrative of convergence between the EU

Celui du monde en tant que biosphère est déjà dépassé ; celui du monde minéral des ‘quatre pics et un déclin’ sera rejoint en 2030 ; celui du prolétariat sera atteint, nous l’espérons, bien avant. Notre modèle, qui, avec l’ensemble du matériel produit par le parti historique de la révolution, est certes plus vaste que les éléments qu'on peut synthétiser dans un article, ne prévoit pas que les classes restent sans réaction face à l’effondrement du capitalisme. Ce modèle prévoit plutôt que les classes le devanceront, surtout le proletariat, qui ne pourra qu'exploser dans une fureur revolutionnaire.

Die Krise der EU spitzt sich Ende 2012 wieder zu, und es ist kein Ende abzusehen. Es gibt viele gute Vorschläge von links, wie die Krise nachhaltig und gerecht gelöst werden könnte. Es mangelt also nicht an Ideen und Projekten. Warum wird dann nicht gehandelt? Einen Beitrag zum Verständnis des Krisenmanagements soll der Beitrag „Das Staatsprojekt Europa in der Krise. Die EU zwischen autoritärer Verhärtung und linken Alternativen“ von Fabian Georgi und John Kannankulam leisten. Die Autoren schlagen hierbei die Brücke zwischen sozialwissenschaftlicher Analyse und politischer Mobilisierung. Dieser Text ermöglicht zum Einen den unmittelbaren Einstieg in das Verständnis der Krisenpolitik der deutschen Elite. Für wen wird diese Politik eigentlich gemacht, mit welchen Mitteln, welche Interessen stehen dahinter, welche „Lesarten“ der Krise herrschen hier vor? Die Leser werden handlungsfähig, da Anknüpfungspunkte für konkretes Handeln sichtbar werden. Zum anderen erhalten die Leser aber auch einen Einblick in die materialistisch orientierte Sozialwissenschaft.

Μετά από μια σύντομη σκιαγράφηση των επιπτώσεων της παγκοσμιοποίησης στις κοινωνικές δομές των πόλεων, το κείμενο αυτό αναφέρεται στις ειδικότερες επιπτώσεις που υφίστανται ή διαφαίνονται στην Αθήνα ως αποτέλεσμα της κρίσης του δημοσίου ελλείμματος. Η συζήτηση επικεντρώνεται στις σχετικώς περιορισμένες κοινωνικά διαχωριστικές επιπτώσεις της παγκοσμιοποίησης στην κοινωνία της πόλης, τουλάχιστον μέχρι τα μέσα της προηγούμενης δεκαετίας, καθώς και στις νέες οικονομικές, κοινωνικές και δημογραφικές εξελίξεις οι οποίες συνθέτουν το νέο πλαίσιο μέσα στο οποίο οι κοινωνικά διαιρετικές επιπτώσεις της κρίσης προοιωνίζονται ιδιαίτερα αρνητικές.

Der Beitrag untersucht die Rolle des EuGH als Konfliktbearbeitungsinstanz in der Eurokrise. Ausgangspunkt ist die Beobachtung, dass die Eurokrise die Qualität und Reichweite der Konflikte, mit denen der EuGH konfrontiert ist, erheblich transformiert. Vor allem die verteilungspolitische Dimension und die neuen Konfliktparteien, die die Eurokrise hervorgerufen hat, fordern den EuGH prozedural und materiell heraus. Mit Hilfe soziologischer Konflikttheorien lassen sich Kriterien entwickeln, wie der EuGH das integrative Potential dieser zunehmend hoch politisierten Konflikte freisetzen, oder zumindest ihr destruktives Potential bannen kann. Zentral hierfür ist erstens eine Weiterentwicklung des Verfahrensrechts, damit die neuen Konflikte sichtbar gemacht werden können und einen inklusiver Zugang zum Gericht garantiert ist. Hierfür zeigen in der jüngeren Rechtsprechung des EuGH erste Ansätze. Zweitens muss der EuGH materiell sicherstellen, dass seine Entscheidungen den Kriterien der Fairness und der Offenheit genügen. Dies verlangt insbesondere dogmatische Figuren zu entwickeln, durch die soziale Grundrechte dem Krisenmanagement gehaltsvolle Grenzen setzen. Zugleich muss die gerichtliche Konfliktbearbeitung die Bedingungen für einen offenen Prozess der demokratischen Willensbildung in repräsentativen Organen sicherstellen. Hier hat die Rechtsprechung des EuGH bisher noch Entwicklungspotenzial.

On the basis of a brief reconstruction of the causes and impacts of the Euro crisis, this paper explores, counterfactually and hypothetically, whether the new Euro regime, insisting on fiscal austerity and supply-side reforms, could have prevented the rise of the crisis or is able to deal with its disastrous economic and social impact. A comparison with the likely impact of transfer-based Keynesian reflation suggests that, in both cases, economic success is uncertain, while both approaches are likely to produce severely negative sideeffects.  In light of such dismal policy choices, attempts to politicize European election campaigns are more likely to provoke unmanageable policy conflict than to overcome the input-oriented, democratic deficit of  European economic governance.

While it is early to mourn the euro, it would be unwise to ignore the magnitude and significance of the changes now taking place in the Eurozone. No doubt, the economic and financial problems in the Eurozone are serious and plentiful. The area is in the midst of multiple, frequently overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises. First, a fiscal crisis is centred
in Greece but visible across the southern Eurozone and Ireland. Governments in Greece and Italy have been replaced in the space of a week because they were unable to guarantee the
rapid implementation of economic reforms. Second, a competitiveness crisis is manifest in large and persistent pre-crisis current-account deficits in the Eurozone periphery and even larger intra-Eurozone current-account imbalances. Italy has accepted IMF and EU monitoring of reforms including deep liberalisation measures that had so far seemed out of reach, notably on labour legislation. Third, a banking crisis was first evident in Ireland but is now spreading throughout the Eurozone via accelerating concerns over sovereign solvencies. Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece are undertaking fiscal and structural adjustment measures – in Ireland, these are already paying off in terms of economic performance and credibility. However, one of the fascinating aspects of the European debt crisis has been the resilience of the euro, suggesting
these fears are overblown. The euro is still a reserve currency, oblivious to the chaos ravaging European economies. As the Euro zone debt crisis enters a new uncertain year, the
question about whether the euro can survive rises. This paper argues that the European crisis is political, and even largely presentational. The paper shows that the Euro can survive as the policymakers in the Eurozone still have various tools to use. These tools include creating exit rules, implementing new stabilisation rules and instruments, adopting new fiscal policy, introducing conditional Eurobonds, using inflation differentials and providing more independence to the European Central Bank.

The European economy has finally started growing again, but the news to date is hardly cause for celebration. The European standard of living as measured by gross domestic product per capita remains statistically lower than in the United States – the benchmark in most areas for economic performance in
a modern industrial economy.  And the performance of the European economy – post 2008 crisis – has been consistently poorer than its trans-Atlantic neighbour on pretty much any indicator.  What’s more, the persistent inability to get a grip on the current “euro crisis” has led international attention to focus on Europe not as a promising market of tomorrow, but as a potential source of turbulence in the months and years to come.

The work of Jürgen Habermas became famous for his studies on topics such as public sphere, discourse ethics and communicative action. However, given the current crisis of capitalism, it may be productive to revisit a moment of his intellectual experience that was, in a sense, relegated to the background: the crisis theorems of late capitalism, discussed by him in Legitimation Crisis (1973). In this article, we argue that, at a time when critical theory seems to face the challenge of bringing back a reflection about the imbalances and the possible internal limits of capitalism, the kind of analysis that Habermas undertakes in this work can offer us elements for developing new diagnoses of contemporary capitalism.

The Draft Treaty on the Democratization of the Governance of the Euro Area (dubbed “T-Dem”) is an academic project aimed at reducing the democratic deficit in the euro area by creating a Parliamentary Assembly of the Euro Area, outside of the EU institutional framework, which would exercise political control, exercise a legislative function and adopt a budget for the Member States of the Euro Area. Democratizing the governance of the Euro Area is certainly a priority; however, like any serious institutional endeavour, it is not without risks and challenges. The present Overview aims at providing a summary legal analysis of the project, focusing on its two main features. First, I will comment the project of the Assembly itself, analysing its powers and composition. Then, I will analyse the choice the authors of the draft made for an external institutionalisation, i.e. the creation of institutions outside of the European Union to deal with EU-related issues. I will contend that this choice raises questions of legality and constitutionality and generates legal complexities I call “legal costs”.

As with every EU Member State, the Euro crisis had an impact in Bulgaria, albeit limited. Bulgaria’s initial reactions to the Euro crisis started in late 2009 with the newly-formed (at the time) Government. The European emergency measures – the EFSF and the EFSM – were not subject of public discussions in Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s position in the negotiations of these measures is also not publicly available, probably due to their limited applicability to the Eurozone Member States and, as such, not to Bulgaria.

However, with the intensification of the Euro crisis and its increased economic impact across Europe, in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011, Bulgaria was getting increasingly involved in the preparation of the Euro-crisis measures. The Bulgarian Government realised that the new measures were going to restructure the Eurozone regime. Since Bulgaria has Eurozone membership aspirations, the Government saw an increased involvement as vital for protecting Bulgaria’s interests. Furthermore, since the Bulgarian currency is pegged to the Euro, saving the Euro was just as important to Bulgaria.

Initially, Bulgaria’s participation in the negotiations and the adoption of the Euro crisis measures in early 2011, namely the Euro-Plus Pact and the amendment of Article 136 TFEU, was marked by a high level of criticisms for lack of transparency and accusations by the opposition of back-door dealings at the EU level. Once bitten, twice shy, the Government involved the National Assembly much more in the negotiation process of the Six Pack and the Fiscal Compact and explained its participation in the negotiations of the ESM, to which Bulgaria was not going to participate before joining the Eurozone. A main point of discussion in Bulgaria, with respect to the Euro-crisis measures, has been preserving Member States’ competence in taxation matters. The debates on the Euro-crisis measures stayed only at the political level and did not reach the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. Bulgaria also did not participate in any bail-out schemes.

In late 2010 and early 2011 the Finance Minister of Bulgaria started developing and looking for political support for a Bulgarian Pact for Financial Stability. This Pact envisioned a constitutional amendment and an amendment of the Law on the Planning of the State Budget. The main aspect of this Pact were the inclusion of (stricter than EU’s requirements) numerical fiscal rules as well as putting in place a ⅔ qualified majority for introducing new taxes or changing already existing ones. The Pact had limited success. The proposed constitutional amendment eventually failed but the strict numerical fiscal rules were nevertheless included in an ordinary law.

The implementation of the Euro-crisis measures itself, has not faced particular political or legal difficulties, with the exception of the long delay in the creation of a Fiscal Council for which infringement proceedings were initiated. Until late 2012, the political situation in Bulgaria remained stable, notwithstanding the crisis. However, since late 2012 the political situation has been in turmoil. It involved the resignation of two Governments and the respective appointment of two Caretaker Governments, the formation of two minority Governments, a recent banking crisis and raging protests for the bigger part of this, less than triannual, period.

In this paper we explore the different political responses to the eurocrisis among European publics since the financial crisis in Europe started in 2008 by concentrating on the two most important organizational vehicles in a democratic polity: political parties and social movements. We examine the political geography of possible shifts in support patterns for competing parties at national elections (in the member states where they have been held) and the geographical distribution of popular protests related to the crisis in 2011-2012. Finally we address the risks of democratic deterioration by comparing current developments with the interwar period.

This article evaluates the dynamics behind the contagion of 2007 US Subprime crisis to the European Monetary Union from a Post-Keynesian view. In doing that, it focuses on the peculiarities of the union regarding its structural difference from the USA, the fragility of the European financial architecture and the trade pattern. Rather than traditional orthodox arguments of inefficient governance, public extravagance or rigidities in the labor market, it elaborates on the dual character and hegemonic production relations of core and periphery within the union. Emergence of financial privatized Keynesianism, neomercantilism and internal devaluation are its basic focal points.

This research project examines the relationship between leadership and the ongoing euro zone crisis by examining what effect those in command have when they make their decisions. Outlining the current progress of the crisis and how leadership has thus far influenced that progress, it is possible to hypothesise the role that leadership must play in order to stop the crisis from becoming worse than it is currently. This research project will primarily deal with how leadership might be used to resolve the crisis along with other methods such as quantitative easing and bailouts. This project found that strong leadership has a calming effect on the markets and helped to move towards a successful conclusion to the euro zone crisis and that poor leadership has the opposing effect. The project will conclude by stating that regardless of the method used in bringing about a successful conclusion to the euro zone crisis, strong leadership will be necessary in order to ensure that the markets react positively as turbulent markets will make it considerably more difficult to end the crisis.