Due Process Rights

Since 1976, the VSBO disciplinary board has been only a body oF unauthorized individuals with no judicial authority created by fiat by the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Current research and evidence supports that Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia State Bar Organization routinely commit violations of the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The interests of justice demand an impartial tribunal , but the Court refused to request that the Virginia General Assembly to preside over the appeal of the Appellant’s matters and the appeals of all other misconduct and impairment matters involving attorneys practicing law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

On June 25, 2019, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to ask the Virginia General Assembly appoint an impartial tribunal and dismissed all related Motions for the same.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between socioeconomic vulnerabilities and due process violations in contemporary Mexico, using a novel survey of imprisoned populations. We further investigate whether institutional reforms—in particular, the 2008 reform that constitutionally mandated the provision of trained public defenders for those without private counsel—help offset the impact of preexisting socioeconomic disparities on the likelihood of suffering a due process violation. We find that women, indigenous people, and people with less schooling are more likely to suffer a due process violation. This finding, is, unfortunately, not surprising. The 2008 constitutionally mandated reform to provide quality public defenders has done little to alleviate this situation. Although it has improved the experience of defendants overall—whether represented by private or public counsel—it has failed to create an office of public defenders that successfully functions as an equalizing mechanism that offsets pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities. Instead, our analysis suggests that those most benefited by these reforms are those who did not need them as much to begin with: those who rely on private lawyers for their legal representation. This paper contributes to the literature that critically examines the idea of equality under the law and the mechanisms that seek to guarantee it.

This article addresses the question whether the European Union defaulted on the ‘strict observance’ of international law and ‘respect’ for the UN Charter, which are now express objectives of the EU following the Lisbon reform, in the course of the famous Kadi cases. With the final appeals judgment having been handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in July 2013, this question can now be conclusively answered in the negative. Despite the general tension these legal challenges created between EU law and international law, the EU managed, in the course of twelve years, to weave a seamless coat of compliance with international law. The article contrasts this finding with the general academic discourse on this case law, which tends to depict Kadi as a ‘sacrifice’ of compliance with international law for the benefit of fundamental rights (as well as the autonomy of the EU legal order). By retracing the entirety of this string of cases, the article demonstrates that, all rhetoric aside and for all practical purposes, the EU courts and other institutions managed to avoid any violations of international legal obligations towards the UN Security Council in this matter. The EU discontinued its own sanctions against Mr Kadi only after he had been delisted by the UN by means of a political decision, not by virtue of judicial intervention.

It has been argued, “the legal effect of the double jeopardy principle does not mean that a person cannot be prosecuted more than once for the same criminal offence”.  The principle had previously been subject to significant statutory amendment, most notably appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal pursuant to section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 where a retrial can be ordered notwithstanding the fact of the previous trial and conviction.

In this Essay, I sketch out some First Amendment and Due Process issues that arise from recent efforts by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) to revise U.S. copyright law. My focus will be on the WIPO Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (the “AV Treaty” for short). The AV Treaty expands upon other efforts to make it unlawful to reproduce or use nonliteral material having substantial value to another author; display or perform fragmentary content having substantial value to a record company or movie studio; or make a movie or YouTube video by transforming, recasting, or adapting information having substantial value to a corporation. Under WIPO's leadership, U.S. copyright law is moving to transfer more of the social value associated with copyrighted work to the copyright owner, and away from subsequent authors and consumers.

The Essay describes WIPO and its role in expanding copyright-like rights via the AV Treaty and statutes such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). It analyzes key provisions of the AV Treaty for whether they change U.S. law, or merely globalize its existing rules. Article 5 of it states that independently of any economic rights, and even after the transfer of them, a performer has a right as to his or her fixed, live performances, to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation, taking due account of the nature of audiovisual fixations. Article 6 seems to grant a broad new right to restrict the “communication” of unfixed performances not already broadcast, to which right some exceptions “may” be granted, but do not have to be granted. Article 12 contemplates additional royalties to be paid to performers; irrespective of existing contracts relating to performances embodied in movies, songs, television shows, or video games. Article 15 of the AV Treaty could provide legal reinforcement to efforts to utilize digital rights management and technological protection measures so as to restrict the fair use of performances. Article 16 of the AV Treaty requires parties to provide civil remedies against those who negligently facilitate the availability or distribution of a performance, knowing or having reason to know that the credits or terms of use have been omitted.

The Essay describes the threat posed to the First Amendment by the AV Treaty’s proposed changes to U.S. law. The AV Treaty alters the traditional contours of copyright in the United States by introducing moral rights, and outlawing the making available of performances even without distributing them. The Essay analyzes these First Amendment threats using the rubric provided by Eldred v. Ashcroft. It also outlines the Due Process concerns that arise from the AV Treaty’s vague language and arbitrary distinctions. The statutory damages that may be available under U.S. law if ordinary copyright remedies are extended to performance rights will threaten the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as Due Process. Moreover, the Essay points out that the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement may multiply all of the censorial provisions of the AV Treaty, by stating that criminal copyright infringement shall include instances of related rights infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain. The AV Treaty may also interact with proposals such as the Stop Online Piracy Act, which would make it easier for corporations or executive agencies to seize web sites that do not themselves infringe copyrights, but that might facilitate acts of infringement.

World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, audiovisual, performances, treaty, WCT, WPPT, phonograms, fixation, unfixed, authorship, copyright, fair use, First Amendment, Due Process, YouTube, Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, eBay, Amazon.com, Google, Yahoo!, Flava, SOPA, moral rights

Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, The Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel and Prosecutors before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers

The Texas Supreme Court recently held that a "proper court" under Civil Procedure Rule 202— the rule that allows a potential plaintiff to file a petition for a court order to depose a potential defendant—is one where venue would be proper, subject jurisdiction is proper, and the court may assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court did not address the question whether Rule 202 would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause absent a personal jurisdiction requirement, which raises two related constitutional questions: (1) Does a potential non-resident defendant waive personal jurisdiction in any ensuing litigation in the state by submitting to a Rule 202 deposition? And (2) Is a court's Rule 202 personal jurisdiction judgment binding on the parties on that issue at the trial level if the petitioner files suit in a Texas Court?

This article addresses these two questions by examining the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in In re Doe (Trooper) in relation to the United States Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction precedent.

Procedural flexibility and party autonomy are likely the most distinguishing features of arbitration that allow for arguably more efficient, cost-effective and individualised dispute resolution process than traditional recourse to national courts. However, this freedom in some cases might come at a cost of essential guarantees of a fair trial that would normally apply to court proceedings by virtue of Article 6 ECHR. Arbitral tribunals and national courts are expected to safeguard those guarantees and are vested with certain powers in order to do so, however, the extent of involvement of national courts in arbitration remains a controversial issue. Hence, this paper examines the guarantees of Art. 6(1) ECHR, its scope and application in every stage of the arbitral process together with the role of arbitral tribunals and national courts.

A competent United States Attorney should easily win any federal drug case. The elements of federal drug crimes are easy to prove, easy to explain, and easy for juries to comprehend. Why then does the government need members of law enforcement to testify as experts in federal drug prosecutions? The answer: they do not. Yet district courts routinely admit (and appellate courts uphold) expert agent and officer testimony on a wide array of drug topics – including when officers testify both as expert and lay witnesses. Were the examples of law enforcement expert testimony few, perhaps no problem would arise. But this problem is pervasive.

By frequently allowing members of law enforcement to testify in easily proven drug cases, federal district courts neglect their “gatekeeper” role to admit only reliable expert testimony. More problematically, officers’ expert testimony may implicitly comment on defendant’s mens rea, thereby reducing the prosecution’s burden to prove all elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, the fix is startlingly easy: the federal judiciary should disallow members of law enforcement from testifying as both an expert and lay witness in federal drug prosecutions. And, before admitting officer expert testimony, district courts must vigilantly guard against proposed officer testimony that is either empirically invalid, or could inappropriately comment on defendant’s mens rea.

Doing so would allow federal courts to meaningfully resume their roles as gatekeepers while simultaneously enabling the jury to perform its duty as fact-finder.

Th is article begins by recounting the facts and rulings of Atala-Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of the right to private and family life, its categorisation of sexual orientation as a social
condition that cannot be considered a basis for discrimination, and the limits to the application of the principle of protection of the child’s best interest. The article then describes the participation of Karen Atala’s daughters in this case, which was one of the most controversial procedural matters of Atala-Riffo and Daughters. After doing so, it engages in an analysis of the scope of this case, for instance, by determining the extent to which it applies to gender identity. Th e article also refers to the difficulties that may arise when trying to interpret this case in regard to family life, and the relation between morality and privacy. Finally, reference is made to Atala-Riffo and Daughters’ position within the wider context of the three
major human rights regional systems.

El artículo explora las relaciones entre el derecho, la democracia y el imperativo del trato igual, deteniéndose en el desarrollo de nociones como "comunidad política", "actos políticos" o "derechos", y proponiendo un entendimiento específico de los "derechos democráticos" en cuyo contexto el derecho de igual acceso a la protección judicial juega un papel crucial. El análisis combina exploraciones en el plano del lenguaje jurídico dogmático con acometidas filosóficas, filológicas, históricas y sociopolíticas, en consonancia con la idea de que las fuentes históricas (los hechos sociales y su reconocimiento teórico) son las coordenadas que rodean la experiencia jurídica y el juego democrático (donde lo hay).

The article explores the relations between law, democracy and equal treatment, developing in the way the meaning of notions such us "political community", "political acts" or "rights" and setting forth a specific understanding of what could be properly called "democratic rights" in whose context the right to have equal access to judicial protection plays a crucial role. The analysis combines inquiry at the level of legal language with inquiry at the philosophical, philological, historical and sociopolitical levels, in congruence with the idea that historical sources (social facts and their theoretical explanation) are axes that encircle both legal life and the democratic game (where it exists).

Nadie puede concebir hoy la existencia de una decisión judicial que carezca de motivación; esto es, que no explique a los justiciables las razones por las cuales resuelve el conflicto del modo en que lo hace y no de otro. El principio republicano y democrático de gobierno así lo exige; y la garantía de debido proceso legal incorporada de diversas maneras en los instrumentos convencionales y constitucionales que gobiernan la región latinoamericana –según veremos- también refleja este sentimiento compartido. Sin embargo, debemos tener presente que las cosas no siempre fueron así. En la antigua España, por ejemplo, llegó a existir una prohibición expresa de fundar las sentencias dictadas por las Audiencias. Pongo el caso de España como ejemplo ya que sus leyes procesales son fuente, directa o indirecta, de diversas regulaciones procesales de la región. ¿En qué se sustentaba dicha prohibición? Por un lado, en que la motivación de las decisiones consumía mucho tiempo y generaba mayores costos para las partes. Por otro, en que una decisión motivada generaba “cavilaciones en los litigantes”. Creo relevante subrayar que esta idea de pensar las “cavilaciones de los litigantes” como un argumento para justificar la prohibición de dar razones demuestra una vez más, al igual que el pasaje de Calamandrei citado hace un momento, la estricta ligazón que tiene la motivación con la idea de justificación del ejercicio del poder y con la coyuntura histórica y política en la cual se analice esta garantía. En la España monárquica no debía dejarse espacio para dudas, críticas o cuestionamientos; todos debían someterse a la decisión del monarca, porque era el monarca. En un contexto democrático como aquel donde Calamandrei escribió su obra, por el contrario, este argumento jamás podría haber sido esgrimido en la discusión sobre el tema porque,  justamente, la democracia necesita de esas cavilaciones, se desarrolla a través de la crítica y los cuestionamientos, exige que los gobernantes justifiquen el modo en que ejercen su poder. Veremos a continuación cómo se encuentra contemplada esta garantía fundamental en las cartas constitucionales de la región, para luego hacer lo propio con la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y la interpretación que de ella ha realizado la CIDH en el caso “Apitz Barbera” (donde dejó en claro diversas cuestiones relevantes en torno al concepto, alcance y limitaciones de esta garantía)

La cuestión de calificación de invalidez atañe principalmente a quienes se encuentran en la necesidad de ser calificados con el objeto de obtener una prestación económica, como las reguladas por la ley general de seguridad social; considerándose a las Juntas de Calificación como particulares que cumplen una función pública administrativa y conformadas en un órgano de creación legal vinculado a la seguridad social integral. En este artículo se analiza la aplicación de un debido proceso en el trámite de calificación de invalidez, propio de la salud ocupacional, desde la perspectiva del derecho público del Estado. Para ello hemos tenido en cuenta, a partir de una revisión legislativa y jurisprudencial, aspectos pilares del derecho público, como los
principios de legalidad y responsabilidad.

En la vida cotidiana del ejercicio del derecho, ya sea en el campo de la judicatura, ora en el del litigio, bien sea en el de la academia, o en actividades administrativas, es bastante común que se hable de la prueba sumaria; pero desafortunadamente no es común que se tenga plena conciencia de su entidad, alcances y usos conforme a su propia naturaleza. Es preocupante observar la peligrosa y antijurídica ligereza, con la cual se acude a la prueba sumaria; pero no para darle su natural uso, sino para superar omisiones de los sujetos procesales con interés de parte en el cumplimiento de las cargas probatorias. La prueba sumaria es utilizada en forma deliberada para conseguir ciertas ventajas probatorias en el proceso, con evidente desmedro del derecho de prueba de la contraparte, afectación de la garantía de la igualdad real de las partes en el proceso, y conculcación del derecho de defensa en toda su extensión. En realidad, el mal uso de la prueba sumaria implica violar los principios probato-rios de necesidad, publicidad, contradicción, legalidad y formalidad de la prueba. En otros términos, la utilización indiscriminada de la prueba sumaria, sin el cuidado y la estrictez exigidos expresamente por el mismo legislador para poder usarla, constituye una manifiesta violación al derecho constitucional fundamental al debido proceso. En efecto, el artículo 29 de la Constitución Política de 1991, ad litteram dispone: " Artículo 29. El debido proceso se aplicará a toda clase de actuaciones judiciales y administrativas. " Nadie podrá ser juzgado sino conforme a leyes preexistentes al acto que se le imputa, ante juez o tribunal competente y con observancia de la plenitud de las formas propias de cada juicio. " En materia penal, la ley permisiva o favorable, aun cuando sea posterior, se aplicará de preferencia a la restrictiva o desfavorable.

El ejercicio del derecho de defensa implica el acceso y toma de vista del expediente, pero muchas veces los funcionarios públicos impiden que se tome fotografías del mismo, exigiendo en su lugar que se solicite una certificación por escrito, pagando la tasa correspondiente. El estudio desarrolla las implicaciones prácticas de regir el procedimiento administrativo por sus principios rectores de simplificación, celeridad e informalismo en beneficio del administrado; así como la amplitud del derecho de acceso y reproducción de la información pública.

AInnocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim,@ A Ennio Cortese (3 Volumes. Roma: Il Cigno Galileo Galilei Edizioni, 2001) 3.59-73, a revised version translated into Italian as AInnocente fino a prova contraria: Le origini di una massima giuridica,@ Processo penale e tutela dei diritti nell=ordinamento canonico, ed. Davide Cito (Milano: Giuffré Editore, 2005) 33-61, and also revised and published in English ) 45-66 and published in French La procédure pénale et la protection des droits dans la législation canonique: Actes d=un colloque tenu à Université pontificate de la Sainte-Croix, Rome, les 25 et 26 mars 2004. edited by Patricia M. Dugan (Collection Gratianus Series; Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2008) 41-69.

Common false presumptions by revenue agents

For reasons why NONE of our materials may legally be censored and violate NO Google policies, see:
https://sedm.org/why-our-materials-cannot-legally-be-censored/

Disclaimer: https://sedm.org/disclaimer.htm

This article advances an interpretative account of parental rights and builds a normative case against them. This normative account considers how parental rights function in existing constitutional and family law, and assesses theoretical arguments that seek to justify them.

This article begins by describing the most common, child-centered justification for parental rights: that parents are empowered in order to protect children’s best interests. I argue that these child-centered accounts do not justify the current legal regime governing parental rights. Instead, current parental rights are better understood as quasi-property interests, residual from historical traditions where children were more explicitly regarded as their parents’ property.

The middle part of this article advances the thesis that the quasi-property functioning of parental rights is not a contingent feature of American law of parents and children. It is instead characteristic of granting parents separate autonomy interests in determining the path of their children’s lives. Parental autonomy rights displace and diminish consideration for children’s interests and objectify children. This article introduces the concept of “desire-contingent goods” and argues that parental autonomy rights are paradigmatically the right to choose desire contingent goods for children regardless of whether they are desired or not.  This denies the equal importance of children’s desires, subjective experiences and perspectives on their own lives. As a consequence, basic doctrines in constitutional and family law cannot be reconciled with liberal and egalitarian commitments.

The later portion of this article evaluates alternative theoretical justifications for parental rights. These include constitutional and philosophical arguments based on personal liberty and family privacy, as well as philosophical arguments based on relational rights, ethics of care, and the Lockean labor theory of value. These arguments all fall short and, in crucial ways, rely on denying children equal moral consideration. The article concludes with recommendations for legal reform.

The PPP attached is presented  in Law School, Tirana University, Albania - an open lecture. It analyses the application of the due process, a fundamental human right, as well as procedural right in  Albanian administrative law.  It also is a research of the due process principle/right application in the case  law  in the country as related to administrative actions conflicts.

The term ‘algocracy’ was coined by A.Aneesh to refer to a new form of governance which rivals bureaucracy.  The suffix ‘cracy’ derives from the Greek word for ‘rule’. Algocracy means rule by algorithms as opposed to bureaucracy which means rule by non-elected officials.    The term ‘bureaucracy’ carries with it negative connotations. When faced with an unjust decision by a governmental institution which seems frustratingly impossible to rectify, we speak of bureaucracy being ‘faceless’, and feel like Josef K in Franz Kafka’s ‘The Trial’, charged with an unspecified offence and tried by means of an incomprehensible court process. If decisions that affect the lives of ordinary individuals are produced by algorithms coded in a computer, then there is a threat that algorithmic decision-making can be even more Kafkaesque than decisions made by faceless bureaucrats.
In R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Anufrijeva, Lord Steyn actually referred to Kafka to justify the importance of due process in a constitutional state saying that: “The antithesis of such a state was described by Kafka: a state where the rights of individuals are overridden by hole in the corner decisions or knocks on the door in the early hours.”    Thus, where a system of law imposes a requirement of due process in administrative decision-making, algorithmic decision-making is subject to this requirement. In one of the earliest judgements on due process, Justice Fortescue exclaimed that “even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence.”  The implication is that even an all-knowing being, who had all the necessary information to reach a just decision, would grant a human being a fair hearing.  Can the same be said of algorithmic decision-making?

Ante las enormes lagunas existentes en este campo, y en un contexto social donde la promoción de acciones colectivas se ha multiplicado exponencialmente, la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (CSJN) asumió –especialmente a lo largo de los últimos diez años– un rol determinante en el establecimiento y desarrollo de diversos principios, reglas de debate e institutos procesales orientados a ordenar este tipo de discusiones.

Esa tarea, que fue llevada adelante no sólo por medio de precedentes sino también a través del ejercicio de las competencias reglamentarias del tribunal, será analizada en este trabajo con el objetivo de demostrar que es posible identificar en Argentina diversos principios que permiten hablar de un verdadero derecho constitucional a un “debido proceso colectivo”, orientados a garantizar pautas razonables y adecuadas para la discusión en sede judicial de conflictos complejos y policéntricos que son bien diferentes de aquellos que sirvieron como premisa para pensar y diagramar los contornos de la garantía de debido proceso legal individual (y, por tanto, las reglas procesales que de allí se han derivado). 

Mi trabajo parte de las clásicas enseñanzas de Chayes sobre la materia, las cuales –a  poco de cumplirse 40 años desde su publicación– han cobrado una inusitada trascendencia para comprender el fenómeno de la discusión de conflictos colectivos en sede judicial en la República Argentina, y tal vez en toda la región Latinoamericana.  Asimismo, asume una concepción fuerte de la idea de “principio”, tomando para ello la doctrina de Dworkin y de Díaz en punto a que los mismos configuran un verdadero condicionante constitucional para la actuación de los operadores jurídicos. Por último, también tengo particularmente presente el carácter normativo que ha adquirido la jurisprudencia en la República Argentina, donde “las decisiones judiciales han dejado de ser vistas como una mera fuente jurídica formal y (…) los  jueces resuelven los casos según decisiones precedentes”.

Sobre este piso de marcha contextual y conceptual, lo que postulo es que la identificación y determinación de los alcances del derecho a un debido proceso colectivo –que encuentra su raíz fundamental en el art. 43 CNA– configura una tarea conceptual útil para establecer las características esenciales que debería tener una legislación adecuada en la materia (cuya sanción se presenta como algo urgente), así como también para disponer –en el mientras tanto– de la mínima seguridad jurídica que exigen las trascendentes discusiones desarrolladas en este tipo de procesos sobre delicados asuntos sociales, políticos y económicos que involucran a grandes grupos de personas.  Grupos que, además, en muchos casos se encuentran relegados de los canales tradicionales de diálogo institucional en el marco de un mecanismo de democracia puramente representativa que se muestra cada vez más inadecuado para los tiempos que corren

Silvano Cantú, El régimen penal de excepción para delincuencia organizada bajo el test de los derechos humanos, en Ferrer MacGregor Poisot, Eduardo, José Luis Caballero Ochoa y Christian Steiner (Coord.), 2013, Derechos humanos en la Constitución: Comentarios de jurisprudencia constitucional e interamericana, México, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Pp. 1737 – 1765.

Disponible en: http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/8/3568/21.pdf

P. 181 (fol. 13):veritatem, dixit quod etnonverttutum. Dixit quod P. 181 (fol. 13), demière ligne : suppléez dixit avant quod ipse audiverat. P. 1 8l (fol. 13) : audiverat a quodam et non audiverat de quodam. P. 1 83 (fol. 13v) : in civitate Avinionensi etnon in civitate Avinioni. P. 183 (fol. l3v) : aliquid, sed ignorat quantum et non aliquid licet ignoral quantum. P. 183 (fol. 14) : Vasconie etnon Basconie. P. 184 (fol. 14) : in et super predictos etîon in et super predictis. P. 185 (fol. l4v): Dyabolus est intus etnonDyabolus esse intus. P. 1 85 (fol. L4v)'. expelleret et non expellet. P. 185 (fol. 15) : le guillemet après puerum doit être repoussé après ad domum dicti archiepiscopi. P. I 86 (fol. L5v) : quare scit predicta et rron quare scit predictum. P. I 86 (fol. liv) : sententialiter et nonlinaliter. P. I 86 (fol. liv) : profisciscebatur et non proJisiscebatur. P. 1 87 (fol. 16ÿ') i tradi et îon coadi P. 1 89 (fol. 17) : de quibus non recordatur et non de quibus non recordat. P. 189 (fol. l7v): itafuisse sicut in dicto articulo etîonitdfuisse sic in dicto articulo. P. 191 (fol. l8v) : rz ecclesia Sancti Salvatoris etnonquando, ecclesia Sancti Salvatoris. P. 192 (fol. l8v) : Interuogatus etiam dixit super universis etnoî Interrogatus tamen dixit super universis. P. 193 (fol. l9v): cui fficialis dixit etnoncui fficiali dixit. P. 195 (fol. 20v) : Intenogatus quare et qualiter scit etnon Interrogatus qualiter scit. P. 1 95 (fol. 20v) : dixit quia ita ÿidit et îoî dixit quod ita vidit. P. 196 (fol. 2l): adherebat consiliis etnonadhibebat consiliis. P. 197 (fol. 2lv) : omnes sicut currentes (erreur du scribe) et non omnes sic currentes (mais il faut effectivement corriger ainsi). P. I 98 (fol. 2lv) : livet audiverit et nor. licet audiverat. P. 201 (fol. 24) : snppléez sibi dixit après e, de hoc in Massilia publicam farnam esse. P . 202 (fol. 24v) : tubas defferentes et non tubas deferentes. P. 205 (fol. 26v) : ad sancta Dei Evangelia et non ad sancta Evangelia. P. 210 (fol. 30): quod dictos boves et mutones etnonquod boves et mutones. P. 213 (fol. 32) : in civitate Cavallionensi et non rz civitate Cavalhonensi. P. 213 (fol. 32): Guillelmus Fulco etnon Guillelmus Falco. P. 214 (fol. 33) : super dilapidatione etnon super dilapidationem. P. 218 (fol. 35): quam adduxerant etîoî quam adducebant. P. 218 (fol. 35): ...dicti archiepiscopi, quia de alio loco... etrton...dicti archiepiscopi ? Quia de alio loco... LE PROCÈS CONTRE L'ARCHEI/ÊQUE D'AIX 2t3 P. 219 (fol. 35v) ; etiam tempore quo visitabat et rLon etiam tempori quo visitabat. P. 219 (fol. 36) : ratione subÿentionis ettolrdtione subordationis. P. 219 (fol. 36) : in personas et non in personis. P. 220 (fol.36v) : cujus homicidii cognitio et r'oî cuiusdam homicidii cognitio. P. 228 (fol. 42) : inter habitatores dicti castri contra eundem el nLon inter habit at ore s c ontr a eundem. P. 229 (fol.43) : supprimez les crochets de part et d'autre de vero. P. 235 (fol. 46v) : Et dixit idem lestis etrrot Etiam dixit idem testis. P. 235 (fol. 47) : dixit quia sic ÿidit et audiÿit etrroî dixit quia sicttt vidit et audivit. P. 237 (fol. 48): Super dilapidatione interrogatus, dixit se nichil aliud scire et non Super dilapidatione interrogatus, dixit se nichil scire-P. 237 (fol. 48) ; omiltit etnlon omitat.

"El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo primordial el análisis de los estándares de la tutela judicial efectiva y del Debido Proceso en los procedimientos establecidos por la Ley Nº 20.600 que crea los Tribunales Ambientales, desde una óptica que, por necesidad, conecta las áreas del derecho procesal, constitucional, administrativo y ambiental.

El principal problema que suscita nuestro interés en la investigación es la novedad a la que se ve enfrentado el derecho nacional, esto es, la creación de los referidos tribunales, tornándose imprescindible un estudio de los procedimientos que contiene la ley, en vista a asegurar que éstos se regulen de modo tal que, quienes recurran de justicia, no vean entorpecida sus posibilidades de éxito por una regulación procedimental inadecuada, insuficiente o poco garantista.

Los tribunales –y el derecho en general– están al servicio de la persona, por lo cual es menester que, a través del engranaje institucional medioambiental conformado por diversos órganos interrelacionados, se logre su propósito esencial, servir a una mejora en las condiciones de las personas y del ecosistema en su conjunto. Los tribunales ambientales deben realizar este propósito apegados al derecho legislado, de la forma más adecuada, eficaz y efectiva posible, es por ello que el escrutinio de la institucionalidad se sitúa como uno de los mecanismos pertinentes para garantizar que se cumplan sus objetivos, y ese es el sentido que orienta esta investigación.

Con el fin anterior, en un primer capítulo se procederá con la historia, definición, descripción y forma de aplicación de lo que constituyen nuestras herramientas de investigación, la tutela judicial efectiva y el debido proceso. Se describirá su contenido a la luz de la doctrina de los autores y los pronunciamientos, a nivel nacional, de la Corte Suprema y el Tribunal Constitucional, y de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, a nivel internacional.

En un segundo capítulo se enunciarán los aspectos orgánicos, de funcionamiento y competencia de los tribunales, y las normas comunes de procedimiento de la Ley de Tribunales Ambientales.

Un tercer capítulo concentrará el análisis de algunos de los procedimientos que consideramos se encuentran regulados de manera más satisfactoria, y de otros en los que existen mayores problemas, teniendo como base los derechos expuestos en el primer capítulo, realizando un contraste entre los aspectos procedimentales y su adecuación con las garantías procesales constitucionales; en cada apartado se ofrecerán los reparos y soluciones que se estimen pertinentes para garantizar un procedimiento adecuado. Además de lo anterior, se formularán observaciones a otros aspectos relacionados a los  principios y la parte orgánica de los tribunales, en los que, a nuestro parecer, también existen dificultades y carencias de regulación."

The objective legal norm violated by the superintendent to issue the resolution 035 is  in Article 76 paragraph 7 literal l of the Constitution:

The lack of protection is abhorred in a State of Constitutional Rights and Justice because it mainly rules Constitutional guarantees, to the point that the Constitution guarantees jurisdictional fixing and the prosecution of rights are protected is available; also the main obligation of the State is to ensure the full enjoyment of rights and constitutional guarantees.
 
Art. 76. rules as follow: In any process in which rights and obligations of any kind are determined, the right to due process shall ensure the following basic guarantees:

(7) The right of persons to defense include the following guarantees:

 (L) The decisions of public authorities must be motivated. There will be no motivation if the resolution does not say the legal rules or principles on which it is based and the appropriateness of its application to the factual background set out is not explained. Administrative acts, decisions or failures that are not properly motivated shall be Voided. The servants or servants responsible shall be punished.

The Constitutional Court has shown that ensuring Motivation operates as:

i) The right of the people to have full knowledge of why it has made a decision that directly or indirectly affects them and

ii) As a duty of public officials, aimed primarily limit the discretion and exclude arbitrariness. For this reason, all public servants, including the judicial authorities are obliged to give reasons for their decisions ... "

As such, the motivation acts as a right and duty at the same time as people in all areas may require a reasoned decision, and in turn, the issuance of a decision unmotivated generates responsibilities of public servants, as determined the Constitution of the Republic. () Note: Bold and italics are mine

Lack of motivation in the resolution prevents the exercise of basic due process guarantees. As will be explained later, resolution 035 left in perfect state of helplessness to all those affected.

Professional regulatory bodies - including ethics committee, association boards, and government licensing authorities - oversee the ethical behaviour of professionals, specifically monitoring their use of power. However there is relatively less scrutiny regarding the use of power by such regulatory bodies in the consideration of grievances against professionals. The quasi-legal nature of their administration of justice is questioned here, and significant limitations in the implementation of administrative law are addressed. The use of adversarial models of investigation is called into question, and other possibilities are outlined The shortcomings of the ‘crime and punishment’ model are outlined, and a number of alternatives are examined. The foundation of professional ethical codes are addressed and critiqued.

Civil forfeiture is playing an increasingly prominent role in the fight against organised crime. While this tool is attractive to law enforcement agencies, it does give rise to concerns under Art 6 of the ECHR. Such proceedings ought to attract the full range of enhanced procedural protections inherent in the criminal process. Even if the Strasbourg Court decides otherwise, there is an argument that the presumption of innocence ought to apply where civil forfeiture proceedings are instituted against a person subsequent to that person being acquitted in criminal proceedings. The Strasbourg jurisprudence, though, is permeated by confusion and inconsistency, which does not inspire confidence that the rights of the individual will be protected. The final section of this paper, then, considers whether civil forfeiture represents a proportionate response in the fight against organised crime. Ultimately, though, given lack of information on such crime, we cannot provide an answer either way – what can be said, though, is that civil forfeiture has had a significant impact on the rights of the individual.

Trabajo final de Máster de la VII Edición del Máster de Gobernanza y Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

Estudio sobre el proceso de expulsión de un extranjero en Chile en comparación con los criterios de los distintos instrumentos universales, regionales y nacionales del debido proceso. Estudio comparado con legislación Española. Análisis de los proyectos de ley sobre la materia en Chile. Situación actual y conclusiones.