Criminal Insurgency

Mexico's cartels are significant social, political, and economic actors. The extent of their socioeconomic and political influence is the subject of great debate yet, as their recent response to natural disaster demonstrates, they are influencing the populace in new and diverse ways. In the aftermath of recent hurricanes (i.e., Hurricanes Manuel and Ingrid) in Mexico cartels provided " humanitarian " aid to the victims of the storms. As a result they positioned themselves in a positive light in the communities they assisted. This strategic note documents and assesses this cartel foray into the provision of social goods—specifically " humanitarian aid. " Cartel Disaster Relief On 22 September 2013, Proceso reported that the Gulf Cartel (Cártel del Golfo/CDG) dispensed tons of supplies to persons impacted by Hurricane Ingrid in Tamaulipas. In this report, it was noted that the CDG posted a video on YouTube claiming that " they help because they have a heart " (" Si ayuden es por que tienen corazon ").[1] The video—punctuated by a " rap style corrido " voice over—shows pickup trucks loaded with supplies: food, water, rice, masa, milk, that are then dispensed to the affected community.[2] The ability for the cartel to mobilize and distribute groceries and aid without government interdiction raises questions about state capacity in the contested disaster zone. Questions about state capacity and cartel intentions were raised on social media in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Tweets became the common method of sharing disaster situation reports. Social media also became a way for the CDG to publicize its relief efforts. As one report noted: The most interesting twist came Sunday when an Internet video claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel began circulating through social media. The video shows several pickup trucks filled with food items being driven across the state and through dirt roads where the food was delivered to the communities. In the video, a written message claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel says that the organization is from Tamaulipas and cares for the people of the state.[3] The aid to the town of Aldama provided by the CDG was publicized on social media and widely reported

The nature of crime and conflict is rapidly evolving. Postmodern war is increasingly influenced by non-traditional and irregular combatants: non-state soldiers. These actors are exploiting technology and networked doctrine to spread their influence across traditional geographic boundaries. This emphasis on non-traditional actors accompanies a shift in political and social organization. This shift may well be a shift in state form: from nation-state to market- state. This transition is fueled by rapid developments in technology and the adoption of network organizational forms. Conflict during this transition blurs the distinctions between and among crime, terrorism and warfare. This essay explores the dynamics of terrorism, crime and private armies during this epochal shift.

The US Consulate in Guadalajara, Jalisco was attacked with two grenades in the hours before Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (ALMO) was sworn in as Mexico’s new president. The attack, which occurred around 2300 hours on Friday, 30 November 2018, involved two grenades thrown at the consulate. While the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)—has been mentioned as a possible suspect group in the attack—which yielded no injuries the CJNG denies involvement.

In an apparently significant acceleration of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), Mexican cartel violence embraced the car bomb in an attack on Federal police in embattled Ciudad Juárez last Thursday, 15 July 2010. Not only did the attack employ a car bomb (apparently a primitive improvised explosive secreted inside a car not the fully-integrated variant found in Iraq, and the AfPak theatres known as a VBIED), but it also was an ambush that directly targeted police. This TTP is a classic insurgent attack method that promises to be part of Mexico's future engagements in its on-going criminal insurgencies.

Al conmemorarse una década desde que el ex presidente Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) declaró la Guerra contra el narcotráfico en México, este trabajo analiza la pertinencia de clasificar aquel enfrentamiento como un conflicto armado interno bajo los estándares de la legislación internacional. Se plantea como hipótesis que la confrontación desarrollada en territorio mexicano no cubre los parámetros establecidos para la existencia de un conflicto armado no internacional conforme al Derecho Internacional Humanitario, calificando más bien como ‘Otra Situación de Violencia’ conforme a la terminología propuesta por el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, escenario que no se encuentra contemplado en la jurisdicción internacional.

Organizaciones criminales transnacionales y las pandillas están amenazando instituciones estatales en todas partes de las Américas. En circunstancias extremas, los carteles, las pandillas o maras, las organizaciones de tráfico de drogas, y sus encargados de hacer cumplir paramilitares están librando de facto insurgencias criminales para liberarse de la influencia del estado.

Una gran variedad de pandillas criminales están librando una guerra entre si y contra el estado. La violencia criminal desenfrenada realizada por la corrupción y la debilidad de las instituciones estatales han permitido que algunas empresas criminales desarrollen estados virtual o correspondiente. Estas zonas disputados o "temporal autónomos" introducen lo que el teórico John Robb llama "estados vacios" con áreas donde la legitimidad del estado está severamente desafiada. Estas zona frágiles, a veces sin ley (o enclaves criminal) cubre el territorio que se extiende de las vecindades individuales, a favelas o colonias, hasta ciudades enteras—tales como Ciudad Juárez—a grandes segmentos de terrón afueras en la provincia de Guatemala, Petén, y en zonas escasamente vigiladas de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua.

Como consecuencia, las Américas son cada vez mas sitiado por la violencia y la influencia corruptora de los actores criminales explotando territorios sin estado (enclaves criminales y los municipios dominados por la mafia) vinculado a la economí­a criminal global para construir musculo económico y, potencialmente, la fuerza polí­tica.

While the strategic and operational levels of the
Mexican cartel war have gained much prominence in
analytical assessments, the tactical level has received
less attention. This article is an attempt at tactical assessment of
the drug war. It will provide a brief sketch of evolving tactical
missions in the cartel war and the challenges faced by Mexican
police and military forces. Cartel tactics have undergone a
disturbing evolution over the past few years. The resulting trend
includes greater proficiency, lethality, and barbarism as the conflict matures.

The first-phase cartel form originated in Colombia during the 1980's in response to the increasing demand for cocaine in the United States. This type of cartel, characterized by the Medellin model, realized economies of scale not known to the individual cocaine entrepreneurs of the mid-1970's. This early cartel was an aggressive competitor to the Westphalian state because of its propensity for extreme violence, uncompromising nature, and willingness to directly challenge the authority of the state. The Medellin model was hierarchical and revolved around its kingpin, Pablo Escobar. The second phase of the cartel form also originally developed in Colombia in the city of Cali. Unlike its Medellin counterpart, the Cali group, which emerged in the early 1980's, was a shadowy organization devoid of an actual kingpin. Its organization was more distributed and network-like, rather than traditionally hierarchical. Many of its characteristics and activities were stealth-masked and dispersed, thereby providing many operational capabilities not possessed by the first-phase cartel form. Third-phase cartels, if and when they emerge, have the potential to pose an even more significant challenge to the modern nation-state and its institutions. A third-phase cartel would result from unremitting corruption and co-option of state institutions. Although this "criminal state successor" has yet to emerge, warning signs of its eventual arrival are present in many States worldwide. Such an entity would challenge our current institutions and, at least during a transitional period, could be expected to exploit corruption, co-option, terrorism, crime, and violence toward its ends.

As violence has continued to rise in Mexico year after year, criminal groups have adopted an increasingly militarized approach to their tactics, weaponry and training.

InSight Crime sat down with Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, founders of Small Wars Journal-El Centro and editors of a new book, "Illicit Tactical Progress: Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes 2013-2020," which dives deep into how this evolution has taken place.

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a ‘criminal insurgency’ against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors.

This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space—ranging from ‘failed communities’ to ‘failed regions’—will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as ‘lawless zones,’ ‘ungoverned spaces,’ ‘other governed spaces,’ or ‘zones of impunity’) where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or ‘criminal enclaves’ in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into ‘accidental guerrillas’ and ‘social bandits’ will be explored through the lens of ‘third generation gang’ theory and ‘power-counter power’ relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels.

Crime  wars and  criminal  Insurgencies challenge  states  as  they emerge at the intersection of crime and war. In many nations these conflicts involve  protracted gang and drug  wars.  These situations of insecurity range in the level of intensity and complexity.  At times the lower levels of violence result in local consequences:  violence and  insecurity.  In others the  criminal organizations  challenge  the  state  and  establish  alternative  of  parallel  power structures.  This short paper  will discuss these issues by briefly summarizing the  situation  in  Mexico  and  Colombia.  This  summary  will  then  identify  the need for further research and development of legal and policy approaches in these  states,  as  well  as  others  facing  similar  challenges  such  as  Brazil and Central America.

Mexico is engaged in a complex drug war. This war is actually an interlocking series of networked “narco-“or "criminal insurgencies" waged by criminal syndicates and gangs, popularly known as cartels. This situation challenges state institutions and the rule of law as Mexican drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) seek to penetrate Mexico’s political institutions to further their lucrative drug black market. The situation has profound human and national security implications throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond. This article looks at the current situation in Mexico. It will briefly examine the cartels and related criminal enterprises (i.e., gangs and enforcer organizations), the nature of their assault on Mexico’s institutions, and the impact on Mexican police and Mexico’s military. Finally, it will suggest potential bi-lateral and multilateral approaches for building police and military capacity to counter the threat.

Los cárteles de la droga y bandas latinas suponen un desafío a  la autoridad estatal en México y América Central. Esta lucha de poder-contrapoder resta legitimidad y solvencia al estado a la vez que otorgan poder económico y político a los carteles y las bandas criminales. En esta lucha, los cárteles suministran bienes utilitarios y sociales, escriben narrativas de poder y rebelión y actúan como “bandidos sociales post-modernos” para obtener apoyo y legitimidad dentro de sus propias organizaciones y las áreas geográficos que controlan. Su mensaje se difunde a través de la violencia instrumental y simbólica, operaciones de información (incluyendo la influencia de la prensa y una narrativa social – narcocultura- donde los gánsteres se retratan como contrincantes poderosos al estado corrupto). Narcocorridos (canciones populares), narcomantas (lonas, banderas, pancartas), narcobloqueos (cortes de tráfico), narcomensajes (mensajes en muchas formas incluyendo “cadáver-mensajes”), y narco santos (sistemas alternativos de veneración incluyendo Jesús Malverde y la Santa Muerte) son empleados para construir estas narrativas de contrapoder. El siguiente artículo examina estas dinámicas desarrollándose actualmente en América Latina y las describe colocandolas en una perspectiva teorética.

Transnational gangs challenge states in a variety of way. First, they transcend geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. Second, when left unchecked, they can erode the legitimacy of state institutions, co-opt state officials, and exceed state capacity to control their actions. A combination of crime, corruption, and impunity can empower criminal enterprises—gangs and criminal cartels—at the expense of the state. Finally, transnational crime blurs the distinctions between crime and war, local and global, and state and non-state violence. This essay examines these challenges and the evolution of gangs and criminal cartel conflict.

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent,” a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

Urban conflict and transnational crime are pressing concerns in many regions. This is especially true in Latin America. This chapter explores the relationship between crime and conflict in Latin American cities. The concepts of "global cities" and "global gangs" are reviewed to illuminate the interactions between illicit and licit activities-that is, underworld and upper-world economic flows and political economy-corruption, and linkages to global and transnational economics. The Rise of Urban Conflict Urban conflict comes in many guises. These can include full-blown urban warfare involving international armed conflicts, noninternational armed conflicts, or a complex combination of both; endemic crime; and urban terrorism and civil strife (Konaev and Spencer 2018; Sullivan 2018a). Obviously, conflict in urban settings poses many challenges to the populace and the state. While protecting the public is foremost among these challenges, a range of tactical, operational, and strategic considerations arise for police, state security services, and urban political organs-mayors, city councils, and the public services they provide, ranging from physical infrastructure through healthcare, education, and policing. The most

This chapter examines the reconfiguration of power within states as the are challenged by illicit transnational networks.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter examines the problématique of illicit networks and transnational crime’s impact on sovereignty.  Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and gangs challenge states and sovereignty in a variety of ways.  These include eroding state solvency through corruption, subtle co-option of state officials and institutions, direct assault on state functions and, in the worst case, state capture or failure under the threat of criminal challengers.  Rarely do criminal enterprises totally supplant states; rather they change the nature of state functioning.  This chapter looks at how gangs and TCOs influence state change at local, state, federal, and transnational levels.  Specifically, this chapter looks at networked TCOs and transnational gangs in Mexico and Latin America (Colombia, Guatemala, and Brazil) to gauge the current and emerging threats to state functions.

MAIN ARGUMENT

State reconfiguration, including co-option, and the rise of criminal enclaves involves the establishment and proliferation of lawless or other-governed zones (including failed communities or failed zones) through corruption and the application of force by private non-state armies.

“Criminal insurgency” is a mechanism for “battle for the parallel state” (dual sovereignty) and the potential rise of “narco-states” and “narco-networks.”

The logic structure of criminal state-challengers facilitates the establishment of “neo-feudal” governance structures.
The emergence of gangs and criminal cartels as “accidental insurgents” and/or “social bandits,” as well as the use of information operations, narcocultura, and instrumental violence to free themselves from state interference (aka sovereignty) is Central to this discussion.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The potential—or actuality—of gangs of criminal cartels emerging as new warmaking and potentially networked state-making entities.

“Criminal insurgency” is a means of removing the criminal enterprise from the control of the state, enabling it to pursue its goals to dominate the illicit economy. Despite this economic agenda, a political agenda emerges.

Gangs and TCOs become political actors influencing the reconfiguration of states requiring a strategy for addressing “criminal insurgency” and violent non-state actors.

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a 'criminal insurgency' against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors. This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space -- ranging from 'failed communities' to 'failed regions' -- will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as 'lawless zones,' 'ungoverned spaces,' 'other governed spaces,' or 'zones of impunity') where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or 'criminal enclaves' in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into 'accidental guerrillas' and 'social bandits' will be explored through the lens of 'third generation gang' theory and 'power-counter power' relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels.

Conflict and crime are converging in interesting ways worldwide.  Gangsters, revolutionaries, and terrorists interact in a variety of ways complicating state response, policing, military, and intelligence operations.  This article looks at the Bacrim—an emerging adaptive adversary—in this ‘convergence’ of war and crime in Colombia, the epicenter of contemporary drug wars.

As the decade ends, Mexico's criminal insurgency continues. Yet the narco-war in 2010 is not identical to the violence that began three years ago. Mexico's criminal insurgency at the beginning of 2010 is distinguished by three main trends: continuing (though increasingly diffused) violence against the state, increasing militarization of the Mexican state's response, and a growing feeling of defeat among some within Mexican policy circles. Additionally, the conflict has assumed broader transnational dimensions.

On the surface, the conflict has entered into a period of seeming stasis. But it is a bloody stalemate—and the war promises to continue simmering well into this year and beyond. According to the Mexican press, 2009 may have been the bloodiest year of the war, with 7,600 Mexicans perishing in the drug war. Whatever the nature of the conflict, the danger still remains to American interests. As we have noted before, loose talk of a Mexican "failed state" obscures the real problem of a subtler breakdown of government authority and bolstering of the parallel authorities that cartels have already created.

Driven by globalization, Internet communications technology (ICT), and new economic forms the nature of states may be changing. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) – including what are commonly known as cartels – are early adopters to the new political/economic landscape. In addition to seeking to rule the illicit economy, criminal actors (networked cartels and gangs) are challenging states through high-order violence and leveraging nascent social/spiritual movements (narcocultura) to potentially usher in a new political dynamic. These violent non-state actors (criminal soldiers) are insurgent actors. They are waging new forms of insurgency – criminal and possibly spiritual – that have the potential to reconfigure states.

This paper examines the impact of attacks on journalists on media reportage within Mexico's drug wars, known as "la Inseguridad" in Mexico. It examines two concepts in communication theory (agenda-setting theory and "mind framing" for power and counter-power) to frame the impact of drug cartel information operations (info ops). Specifically, It examines cartel attacks on media outlets, and kidnappings and assassinations of journalists by narco-cartels to gauge the potential impact of the attacks in terms of censorship, cartel co-option of reportage, and the use of new media (horizontal means of mass self-communication).

Mexico is under siege, and the barbarians are dangerously close to breaching the castle walls. Responding to President Felipe Calderon's latest drug crackdown, an army of drug cartels has launched a vicious criminal insurgency against the Mexican state. So far, the conflict has killed over 1,400 Mexicans, 500 of them law enforcement officers. No longer fearing retaliation, cartel gunmen assault soldier and high-ranking federale alike. The criminal threat is not only a threat to public order but to the state. A top-ranking Mexican intelligence official has noted in interview that criminal gangs pose a national security threat to the integrity of the state. Cartels are even trying to take over the Mexican Congress by funding political campaigns, CISEN director Guillero Valdes alleged. Should Mexico's gangs cement their hold further, Mexico could possibly become a criminal-state largely controlled by narco-gangs. This is not just a threat to Mexico, however.

As the intensity of the violence grows, so does the possibility that Tijuana and Juarez's high-intensity street warfare will migrate north. Recent cartel warfare in Arizona indicates that America has become a battleground for drug cartels clashing over territory, putting American citizens and law enforcement at risk. But the northward migration of cartel warfare is not the worst consequence of Mexico's criminal insurgency. A lawless Mexico will be a perfect staging ground for terrorists seeking to operate in North America. American policymakers must act to protect our southern flank.

The 4th Small Wars Journal-El Centro anthology comes at a pivotal time, roughly a third of the way through the term, for the Enrique Peña Nieto administration in Mexico. The mass kidnapping and execution of 43 rural student teachers in Iguala, Guerrero in late September 2014 has only served to further highlight the corruptive effects of organized crime on the public institutions in that country. In addition, many other states in Latin America are now suffering at the hands of criminal insurgents who are threatening their citizens and challenging their sovereign rights.

India is perhaps one of the most experienced counterinsurgents in the world, having fought a huge array of insurgencies since Independence. To date, the dominant guiding principles and benchmarks established to evaluate India’s performance can be likened to a ‘classical’ model of COIN, forming a consensus across scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike of at least the rhetorical importance of adherence to democracy-friendly practices such as minimum force, the pursuit of political resolutions and hearts and minds. Charting the evolution of and analysing tensions within the model, this paper tests the extent of India’s actual adherence to the model in COIN campaigns in the Punjab and the Northeast, before proposing an alternative model, combining aspects of Kautilyan philosophy with some contextual indicators to better pin down how India responds to insurgencies.

Mexico’s criminal conflicts continue to rage, and the government, cartels, and vigilantes increasingly contest the crucial plazas surrounding drug trafficking routes. Our series on Mexico’s criminal insurgency (or more specifically interlocked criminal insurgencies) has covered a number of trends—such as the emergence of cartel operations against the state in 2007, the growing trend of “societal warfare” and barbarism as well as internecine cartel warfare since 2010, the narco-cultural dimension and the growing international element of cartel operations. In the time since our last assessment in February 2010, many of these trends have intensified.

This essay will focus primarily on methods of interpreting the drug war, societal warfare, sophistication of cartel operations, and the internationalization of the conflict. This piece aggregates other publications on the violence since our last update, collecting many pieces of events and trends and modes of analysis observed and published in the interim.

"Sustained penetration by transnational criminal networks (cartels and gangs) of state institutions is challenging Mexico and states throughout Latin America.  This paper discusses ‘criminal insurgencies’ as a power-counterpower dynamic where criminal combatants use violence, corruption, and information operations (including new media) to challenge state capacity and legitimacy, and exert territorial control for supporting their illicit economic domains. Social/environmental modification, including information operations (e.g., narcocorridos,
narcomantas, and narcopintas), alternative belief systems (i.e.,
narcocults), targeted symbolic violence (including attacks on journalists and government officials), direct attacks on the police and military by criminal bands (sometimes wearing uniforms), and the provision of social goods while adopting the mantle of social bandit or primitive rebel are stimulating a new narcocultura. This paper examines these irregular conflicts through a comparative ethnographic lens to inform intelligence analysis and practice supporting an understanding of strategic shifts in sovereignty and governance."

This edited collection from 'Small Wars Journal - El Centro' examines Mexico's drug war/criminal insurgencies.  Primary authors are John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker. Includes contributions from Hal Brands, Pamela Bunker, Dave Dillege, Adam Elkus, Paul Rexton Kan, Robert Killebrew, and Max Manwaring.

For a couple of decades now, the security environment of Latin America has seen the emergence of new violent non-state actors (VNSA) whose activities pose a serious threat to national security. There are some geographical areas within Brazil, especially in the town of Rio de Janeiro, in which these actors violate the sovereignty of the State by preventing it from becoming the only source of authority to legislate, enforce laws and regulate business within a given territory. Some of these VNSA are what we call “criminal insurgencies”. This type of insurgency is driven by economic gains and therefore it seeks to obtain autonomy and economic control of parts of the territory within a State in order to carry out its criminal activities. These VNSA threaten the viability of the state by generating instability and violence, thus reducing the state's ability to control parts of its territory. In respect to this article, the author describes the “criminal insurgency” as a threat to the viability of Rio de Janeiro city. However, Rio de Janeiro is not an isolated case. Even worse, this type of VNSA is emulated in other Latin American countries, especially in highly populated urban areas devoid of State presence.