Conflict prevention and resolution

Initiatives to change or sidestep presidential term limits are often presented as a response to popular demand, yet tend to be deeply polarizing and may even lead to violence. Opinion on the legality of changing term limits tends to be sharply divided not only in the country concerned but also among the international community. In an effort to fine-tune policy debate, this paper looks at the normative framework relating to term limits and their removal. It recommends that, in the absence of clear international norms, the issue be approached as a matter of maintaining confidence in a country’s electoral process and political system. This means focusing on the process by which term limits might be amended or interpreted.

The African Union (AU) has often used mediation as one of its key approaches in its efforts in conflict prevention. As a result, mediation has become a flagship initiative of the organisation, and is undertaken by various actors within the AU. In order to become more effective, the AU now needs to clarify its approaches, roles and responsibilities.

INTRODUCTION The idea of conflict prevention is making a comeback. Though at the heart of the United Nations (UN) charter , previous attempts to make conflict prevention a concrete reality within the UN system had limited success and were restricted primarily to the prevention of imminent or recurring conflict via mediation and good offices. How can a preventive approach be made more effective? In order for conflict prevention to become more than a buzzword, three overarching changes are needed. Firstly, at the diagnostics level, improved risk assessment methodologies (including early warning systems and response) should adopt a longer-term view of the conflict cycle, and incorporate innovations such as artificial intelligence. Secondly, with respect to response design, greater synergy across the three UN pillars (peace & security, development and human rights) is crucial. Thirdly, at the political level, more advocacy is needed for conflict prevention, notably by convincing stakeholders that preventing conflict (rather than merely reacting to it) is far less costly, not only economically but also in terms of human lives and suffering, and the resulting international repercussions.

* Publication sponsored by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (www.auswaertiges-amt.de)

The long-standing disagreements between NATO and Russia have been left unresolved for decades. In 2014 they finally escalated into an outright confrontation on the European continent, in which most European countries are now involved. Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, information warfare, along with a military buildup – these developments signalize clearly that European security is in danger today.

If the OSCE is to resolve this crisis, there needs to be more than a high-level dialogue among the OSCE participating States on the future of European security. It could be years before such a dialogue would bring results and a way out of the dangerous confrontation would be found. Until then, this dialogue should be complemented by the OSCE’s work on the ground, through its field operations, targeted at preventing new conflicts similar to that in Ukraine.

This work is particularly needed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus where the lines of geopolitical confrontation are drawn today. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – over the fate of these six states a particularly intense struggle has unfolded. While they have been developing closer relations with NATO and the EU, the example of Georgia in 2008 has shown that Russia will oppose the Western influence in its neighbourhood. The more recent example of Ukraine has further demonstrated that the increasing instability in Europe puts even the states without ‘frozen conflicts’ on their territories at risk of an armed conflict that could lead to civil war and partition.

The OSCE and its field operations have been slow to respond strategically to these new challenges. In contrast to the field operations in the Western Balkans, the OSCE operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are much smaller and have lower budgets. Unlike the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, they do not have explicit conflict prevention mandates focusing instead on the resolution of already existing ‘frozen conflicts’. Moreover, in three of the six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia – there is no OSCE field operations at all.

This chapter will present the evidence of why the risk of new armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is real. It will then argue that the OSCE should respond to the challenge by, firstly, enlarging its field operations in Moldova and Armenia, secondly,  re-establishing  the  field operations in  Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, and, thirdly, tasking all field operations in Eastern Europe  and the South Caucasus with conflict prevention.

Nous présentons ici de façon synthétique les débats ayant animé le séminaire sur « Les systèmes d’alerte précoce » organisé au profit du Secrétariat général de la défense nationale par l’Ifri, en y ajoutant une présentation du contexte destinée au non-spécialiste ainsi que parfois des réponses ou idées tirées des ouvrages spécialisés sur la question.
Nous traiterons donc ici des procédés d’anticipation, regroupés sous le vocable de « systèmes d’alerte précoce », qui ont pour objet d’identifier le plus tôt possible un risque ou une situation que l’on désire prévenir, afin que les moyens nécessaires à cette prévention puissent être mis en œuvre. L’acte spécifique d’alerter sur les risques ou situations identifiés n’est qu’une étape de ce processus.
Dans le cadre d’un État, nous présenterons, tout d’abord le contexte dans lequel s’insère le système d’alerte précoce, soit le processus global de prévention, dans le cas des conflits.
Les principales interrogations, oppositions et résistances opérationnelles vis-à-vis des systèmes d’alerte précoce seront ensuite analysées. Les difficultés ainsi soulignées seront retenues comme devant être résolues lors de la création du système d’anticipation. Sont donc posées les questions suivantes :
􏰀 La nécessité de certaines crises remet-elle en question la prévention et donc, a fortiori, l’anticipation ?
􏰀 Un système d’alerte précoce et une réflexion sur sa substance sont-ils nécessaires ?
􏰀Les difficultés de la réponse invalident-elles les systèmes d’alerte précoce ?
Finalement, il sera suggéré que, compte tenu de la diversité des types d’actions et acteurs impliqués dans la prévention et donc dans l’anticipation, une structure fédératrice, ayant suffisamment d’autorité dans les limites de sa mission, pourrait être responsable de la création, mise en place et utilisation
du système d’alerte précoce. Puis, seront examinées les différentes étapes de mise en œuvre d’un système d’alerte précoce :
1. Définition des objectifs politiques et stratégiques de l’acteur se dotant du système d’alerte précoce ;
2. Définition de l’objet de l’alerte (conflits, instabilité, etc.) ;
3. Création du système : modélisation et définition de la « population » sur laquelle portera l’alerte ;
4. Utilisation du système: définition du schéma organisationnel,
évaluation des informations et résultats obtenus ;
5. Mise en relation des résultats provenant du système d’alerte précoce, des objectifs politiques et stratégiques et des moyens; 6. Déclenchement de l’alerte: diagnostic, propositions succinctes d’actions et surveillance ;
7. Gestion du système d’alerte précoce dans la diversité de
l’environnement international.

This 12 page document provides detailed guidance in leading a workshop on conflict styles with the online version of "Style Matters", a conflict style inventory by Ron Kraybill, published by Riverhouse ePress. 

The guide provides guidance for pre-workshop planning, suggested inputs and exercises during a workshop, and ideas for followup activities.

Style Matters is a psychometrically-validated, culturally flexible conflict style inventory in the Mouton-Blake tradition.  It is widely used by professors, consultants, coaches, and conflict resolution trainers.

ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the importance of the delimitation of Mozambique's maritime boundaries in the context of discoveries of offshore natural gas reserves (in the sea), in the main sedimentary basins located on the Mozambican coastline, among them: the Mozambique basin, Angoche and of Rovuma. The central idea of the study lies in the fact that the delimitation of maritime boundaries is important for Mozambique, especially due to the discovery of natural gas along the Mozambican coast (international border areas).
Natural gas as a strategic resource can serve as a source of conflict and/or cooperation between state and non-state actors in international relations, because the access to this resource is a vital and strategic interest in the external policies of the states. Considering this aspect, the existence of natural gas and other energy resources in the Mozambican channel may, on the one hand, promote greater cooperation between Mozambique and other countries of the Mozambique channel, towards accelerating the process of delimiting its maritime boundaries. On the other hand, the existence of these resources may hinder the process of delimitation of the Mozambican maritime borders.
The research data were obtained from primary sources, through interviews, and from secondary sources, by reviewing the literature on the subject. The research was conducted through Pluralist Paradigm of International Relations. This paradigm allowed the analysis and a better understanding of the efforts of the Mozambican authorities in conducting negotiations with the countries with whom it shares maritime boundaries in the Mozambican channel.

Keywords: Maritime Boundaries, Natural Gas, Conflict and Cooperation.

Ivan Katchanovski, a political science professor with expertise on Ukraine and Russia at the University of Ottawa, told The Maple that …. claims [that the Russia-Ukraine war could not have been prevented] are not supported by evidence or scholarship. "[The war] could have been avoided and prevented," Katchanovski explained.

This paper looks at the state of and challenges ahead for preventive diplomacy in four different regions of the world: Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia.

As Francesco Mancini, IPI's Senior Director of Research, noted in the paper's introduction, the instruments of preventive diplomacy are more cost-effective than the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and can avert the loss of innocent lives and prevent the devastating consequences produced by internal displacement and economic upheaval. It remains a key priority for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has called it “one of the smartest investments [the UN] can make.”

Additionally, Mr. Mancini wrote that the preventive diplomacy field has become increasingly crowded, and now comprises a vast array of international, national, and local actors. Furthermore, this new wave of prevention is no longer primarily externally driven. Local actors have become more proactive in expanding their roles in support of preventive initiatives within their own countries.

GSDRC topic guides aim to provide a clear, concise and objective report on findings from rigorous research on critical areas of development policy. Rather than provide policy guidance or recommendations, their purpose is to signpost policymakers and practitioners to the key debates and evidence on the topic of focus to support informed decision-making.

Terrorism by an Islamist group known as Boko Haram has been raging in Nigeria since 2009 and has spilled over into neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Consequently, two million people have been displaced, 100,000 lives lost and properties worth N3.2 trillion ($9 billion) destroyed in the three-worst hit northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The Federal Government has been collaborating with the international community in the counter-terrorism, gaining huge successes including the rescuing of nearly 200 of the 276 Chibok schoolgirls kidnapped in 2014 and dislodging the terrorists from their base in the infamous Sambisa Forest. However, the Government’s militarized approach toward the counter-terrorism has been critiqued in the literature, with suggestions for a multi-dimensional approach. This book recommends a research approach and proposes the Adoption and Use of Cyber Technology by Terror Groups Model (AUCTTGM). The model is expected to explain and predict factors determining terror groups’ cyber technology usage to threaten the peace and spread annihilative extremist propaganda in society as well as proffer clues to the ways of ending terrorism for good.

Peace negotiations often seek to resolve protracted conflicts and provide a vision for inter-group or interstate relations at the local, national and regional level. This is done through reaching a peace accord or agreement. As agreements are reached on key issues, the foundations of peace are strengthened. Nevertheless, for peace to take root, negotiations are an important starting point. In many cases, the negotiation efforts fail and recourse to more violence follows. After careful examination, it turns out that sometimes the approaches and strategies applied to such peace negotiations add up to factors that cause either their failure or even the failure of the agreements that culminate from them. This article therefore examines negotiation as a tool for conflict prevention, management and resolution. It explores the nature, elements and processes of an effective peace negotiation which has its ultimate goal of establishing a sustainable peace agreement and consequently building durable peace.

Our intention in A Watching Brief (volume 8 of this series) was to jump-start creative thinking and debate among progressive cadres of Ulster loyalism on the nature and trajectory of their developing political project, particularly since the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994. Judging by the subsequent feedback we received from members of the UVF-RHC-PUP constituency we feel that we successfully accomplished our mission. Our intention here in this latest instalment is to once again return to the core issues at stake for loyalists involved in the conflict transformation process in Northern Ireland and to provoke and inspire discussion among their ranks. It is important also to stress at the outset that, although we do not condone the actions of the UVF and RHC, our work is written with this readership in mind.

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich diese Arbeit selbständig und nur mit den angegebenen Hilfsmitteln angefertigt habe und dass ich alle Stellen, die dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach anderen Werken oder dem Internet entnommen sind, durch Angabe der Quellen als Entlehnung kenntlich gemacht habe. Mir ist bewusst, dass Plagiate als Täuschungsversuch gewertet werden und im Wiederholungsfall zum Verlust der Prüfungsberechtigung führen können. ____________ ________________ ________________________________ Ort, Datum Unterschrift

This eBook is a response and contribution to the challenges of the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect principle. This pillar focuses on the international responsibility to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity in those instances where a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own population. As RtoP moves further away from discussions on norms towards operationalization, and following the concerns raised by the intervention in Libya, further thinking and clarity needs to be developed on the capacities needed for a timely and decisive response under pillar three. This eBook is a contribution to this end.

Editors: Daniel Fiott, Robert Zuber & Joachim Koops.

Authors: Eamon Aloyo, David Curran, Caroline Fehl, Daniel Fiott, Melina Lito, Ruben Rieke, Sheri Rosenberg, Robert Schütte, Kate Seaman, Conor Seyle, Ekkehard Strauss, Peiran Wang and Robert Zuber.

Published by: Madariaga - College of Europe Foundation, Global Action to Prevent War, the Global Governance Institute and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect

Myanmar has been one of the most secluded nations on earth in the past two to three decades. It was only recently that the military junta which ruled the nation with an iron fist decided to not only hold free and fair elections but also to open up its borders. As more interactions happen between the outside world and Myanmar, the rest of us get to understand the intricacies of Myanmar. Myanmar has been plagued by internal conflicts ever since independence. The conflicts not only take place between the government forces and certain sections of the population, but also between different ethnic and religious groups. Ever since 2011, the clashes between Rohingya Muslims on one side and the Arakan Buddhists and the government forces on the other have created international headlines.

The past two and a half decades in the South Caucasus leave little hope to entertain for the eventual integration of the region. So far the fragmentation of the South Caucasus into different blocks is the only reality. The different integrational processes and transnational alliances that the South Caucasus countries have engaged in surely contribute to the creation of new spaces for cooperation, but also to the perpetuation of the conflicts in the region. In fact, often conflicts have been defining the design and implementation of these transnational alliances and integrational processes. With this reality, regional transnational integration as an avenue for conflict resolution seems to be part of a vicious circle since conflict resolution is often seen as a precondition for regional integration. This is not only due to the conflicts within and among the countries, but also to the complex and sometimes strained relations with the big neighbors – Turkey, Iran, and Russia.

This paper aims to explore economic options for inserting a wedge in this vicious circle. Convinced that regional economic cooperation could be an important step towards conflict transformation in the South Caucasus, this paper suggests that the prospects of such integration be considered. Be it in the form of exploring opportunities in the different integrational paths that the countries of the South Caucasus have taken or challenging the isolationist economic policies that have outlived their goals and utility, this paper offers all stakeholders to look at economic cooperation with rather than against each other as the option that could lead to the resolution of conflicts in the region.

This study aims at exploring the inner application of the lesson-learning process on the European Union’s evaluation of its Common Security and Defence Policy missions. This approach is based on a careful examination of the principal and fundamental characteristics of the concept, notably insisting on its rational nature. Yet, even though lesson-learning is an instrument originally based on organisational learning, it has been applied to a structure where the strategic end and the political apparatus are constantly diverging. Therefore the central tension of this concept lies in its adaptation to a particular organisational framework, where other parameters have the upper hand. In order to provide a meaningful illustration, this work also entails a case-study, which is focused on the Security Sector Reform missions with a strong military component: EUSEC RD Congo, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali. Analysing as many lessons which have been identified as possible, it appears indeed that some lessons are learnt and implemented, while some others are only half-learnt, and others are not learnt at all. The consequence of the confrontation between theory and practice in the case of the European Union is that lesson-learning is used in a fragmented and non-systematic way, being constantly under the scrutiny of the political side. The latter has indeed the main influence when it comes to deciding whether a lesson is to be carried on in the process, or is to be abandoned because it is too sensitive for the member states. This means, finally, that the rational of using lesson-learning is deeply constrained and intertwined in the intricate CSDP decision-making process, which follows its own logic. Indeed, quite often, the EU and the member states are more interested into launching a mission for putting into practice an unused instrument or even acting in order to remain active in the field of CSDP, rather than taking into full consideration the lessons observed and identified previously if these go against the diplomatic parameters of the mission.

This paper is structured as follows: firstly, it clarifies the concept of ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ and the lesser known concept of ‘track 11/2 diplomacy’ (or ‘track one and a half diplomacy’); in a nutshell, this second term is employed in the scientific fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution and refers to peacebuilding and negotiation initiatives that occupy the intermediate zone between official (‘track 1’) and unofficial (‘track 2’) diplomacy. As implied in the title, it is argued that the engagement of parliaments and parliamentarians in such conflict resolution processes is an example, indeed a neglected one, of track 11/2 diplomacy. Subsequently, the paper elaborates on the various features of track 11/2 diplomacy on behalf of parliamentary actors.

This short booklet is a product of several years spent analysing Ulster Loyalism from a personal and academic perspective. It is something of a truism that those who write regularly on this topic are often socially and geographically detached from their subject matter. In our case the reverse is more accurate. While we both hail from similar working class Protestant
backgrounds we nevertheless hope that our academic and professional training has enabled us to run a fairly objective diagnostic check on the current condition of Progressive Loyalism, a decade on from the paramilitary ceasefires, in order to provide helpful recommendations for its future development. To that end our work here is intended principally as a problemsolving exercise rather than as a purely academic treatise: we find little merit in pontificating about something that ultimately invites dispassionate and critically rigorous analysis.

GİRİŞ-ÖNSÖZ:Bazen, tartışma (ekseriya yabancı kaynaklı) programlarında, kimi konferanslarda konuşmacılarını ya da basın mensuplarının makalelerini “besmele” çekerek başlattıklarına tanıklık eden biri olarak hukuk konulu bir makaleye ve mülkün temelinin kutsallığına yakışacağı kanaatiyle “Honeste  vivere (şerefli yaşa), Neminem  laedere(başkalarını rencide etme,zarar verme), suum cuique tribuere (herkese payına düşeni ver)” diyerek makaleyi hukukun üç payandası üzerine yerleştirerek açıyorum ben de  ilk paragrafımı.      Avukatlık mesleğinin icrasıyla ilgili ortak menfaatlerin korunmasıyla birlikte hukukun demokratik ve seküler bir anlayışla gelişmesini, yaygınlaştırılmasını, anlaşılmasını önemseyen, avukatların, fikri anlamda özgür olmaları ve dürüstlük ilkesine bağlılığının önemli olduğu fikrini benimsemiş ve kuvvetler ayrılığı ve  hukukun üstünlüğünü savunan Av.Berra Besler, Av.Serdar Akdeniz, Av. Hülya Aksakal, Av. İfakat Aydemir, Av.Sima Baktaş, Av.Hanımşah Bayram, Av. Rifat Çulha, Öğr. Gör. Fahrettin Demirağ, Av.Naim Karakaya, Prof.Dr. Ayşe Nuhoğlu, Av.Dr. Salih Oktar, Av.Oya Şahin, Av.Tamer Şahin, Yrd.Doç. Dr.Melis Taşpolat, Prof. Dr. Durmuş Tezcan, Av. Aynur Tuncel, Av. Cengiz Yaka, Prof.Dr.Feridun Yenisey, Doç.Dr.Neylan Ziyalar ‘ın katkılarıyla  Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi IGUL Direktörlüğü tarafından düzenlenen ve dört gün boyunca dikkat ve hevesle, “Adli Bilir Kişi” ve  “Çatışma Yönetimi, Müzakere ve İletişim” konulu eğitimlerde uzman  şapkamla  takip ettiğim  “Avukatlık Hukuku İhtisas Semineri”,  daha yeni bitmişti ki ardı ardına Resmi Gazete’de çeşitli kanun değişiklikleri ve yönetmelikleri yayınlanmasındaki ardıl eşzamanlılık, seminer esnasında edinilen birikimlerin de verdiği itici güçle bende üzerinde çok konuşulan diğer yandan kavramsal ve uygulama açısından  çok da karıştırılan alternatif uyuşmazlık çözüm yollarından “Uzlaşma” mevzusunu  sıcağı sıcağına işleme isteği yarattı.            Bu çalışmada Seminer Programı’nda  hediye edilen Prof. Dr. Feridun Yenisey  , Prof. Dr. Ayşe Nuhoğlu, Av. Rıfat Çulha ,Fahrettin Demirağ,Av Dr. Salih Oktar, Prof Dr.Durmuş Tezcan  tarafından hazırlanıp  Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi IGUL Direktrlüğü tarafından yayınlanmış olan  Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku Başvuru  Kitabından da faydalanılmıştır. Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi’nin kapılarını bize açarak ağırlayan Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi IGUL Direktörlüğüne, Seminer’e ve kitaba katkı sunan ve emeği geçen herkese, bizlere kattıkları vizyon ve deneyim paylaşımı için bu vesile ile teşekkürlerimi de sunarım.



AMAÇ: Seminerin akabinde yukarıda bahsettiğim değişikliklerden biri  Ceza ve Hukuk yargılamasında 05.08.2017 tarihinden itibaren verilen kararlara karşı , (5 Ağustos 2017 Tarihli ve 30145 Sayılı Resmî Gazete’de Mükerrer yayınlanan 7035 sayılı yasa ile CMK , HMK ve İYUK da önemli değişiklikler yapılmasına ve Ceza Yargılamasında temyiz süresinin 7 gün iken 15 güne çıkartılmasına CMK 291/1 Hukuk Yargılamasında temyiz süresi-1 ay iken 2 haftaya düşürülmesine dair idi HMK 361/1
Bir diğeri ise 5 Ağustos 2017 tarihli Uzlaştırmaya yönelik olan Yönetmelik idi.  5271 sayılı Kanunun 253 üncü maddesi ile 29/3/1984 tarihli ve 2992 sayılı Adalet Bakanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamenin Değiştirilerek Kabulü Hakkında Kanunun 9 uncu maddesine dayanılarak ve  4/12/2004 tarihli ve 5271 sayılı Ceza Muhakemesi Kanununun 253, 254 ve 255 inci maddelerinde düzenlenen uzlaştırmanın uygulama alanı, uzlaştırmacıların nitelikleri, eğitimi, sınavı, görev ve sorumlulukları, denetimi, uymak zorunda oldukları etik ilkeler, uzlaştırmacı eğitimi verecek kişi, kurum ve kuruluşların nitelikleri ve denetimleri, uzlaştırmacı sicilinin düzenlenmesi, uzlaştırmacılar ve eğitim kurumlarının listelerinin oluşturulması, Cumhuriyet başsavcılığı bünyesinde kurulan uzlaştırma bürolarının çalışma usul ve esasları, uzlaşma teklifi ile müzakere usulü, uzlaşma belgesi ve uzlaştırma raporunda yer alacak konular, uygulamaya dair diğer hususlar ile Alternatif Çözümler Daire Başkanlığının çalışma usul ve esasları kapsamında 5 Ağustos 2017 tarihinde yayınlanan  ve Yönetmelik hükümleri Adalet Bakanı tarafından  yürütülen yönetmelik yayımı tarihinde (5 Ağustos 2017) yürürlüğe girerken 26/7/2007 tarihli ve 26594 sayılı Resmî Gazete’de yayımlanan Ceza Muhakemesi Kanununa Göre Uzlaştırmanın Uygulanmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik de  yürürlükten kaldırılmıştır. Geçiş hükmü kapsamında düzenlenen geçici maddeye göre , Bu Yönetmeliğin yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren en geç altı ay içinde Daire Başkanlığınca uzlaştırmacı listeleri oluşturulur. Bakanlık tarafından bu listelere uygun uzlaştırmacı görevlendirmesi amacıyla bir ilân yapılır. İlân yapılıncaya kadar Kanunun 253 üncü maddesinde 6763 sayılı Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun ile yapılan değişiklik öncesinde öngörülen usule göre belirlenen uzlaştırmacılardan görevlendirme yapılmasına devam olunur ve bu uzlaştırmacılar görevlerini tamamlar.
Bu makale birbirlerine çok karıştırılmaları bakımından genel olarak ayrımın altını çizebilmek için kısaca alternatif uyuşmazlık çözüm yollarından tahkim, arabuluculuk ve uzlaşmaya dair bir özet anlatımı içeren uyuşmazlık çözümünde alternatif  barışçı yollara bir giriş yapmanın akabinde mezkur yönetmeliğin temel etik ilkeler, genel hükümler soruşturma ve kovuşturma evresindeki uzlaştırma süreçleri, edim, zamanaşımı gibi fazları, süreçlerine, edime  ve neticelerine odaklanacaktır.

Peace is one of the most contested research agendas in security studies. In recent times, proactive efforts towards peace have been epitomized by a peacemaking agenda that has been seen to be regional and home-grown in its approach. The experience in Africa indicates that the continent has been progressively advancing conflict resolution approaches which have been generally characterised by the logic of solidarity and respect of sovereignty. But at the heart of this daunting task lies the question of leadership and interests, which keep haunting comprehensive peace efforts of the continent. Southern Africa has been looking to South Africa as a pacesetter in SADC's peace agenda yet its efforts towards peacemaking seem to be encapsulated within a rather naive approach of quiet diplomacy. Hence, this paper argues that by accommodating the quiet diplomacy approach in the resolution of regional conflicts, SADC may be jeopardising its own commitment to peace and security, making it subject to capture by powerful interests. And the tendency to tolerate impunity on the basis of gradual reforms further shows the weakness of the approach as a credible peacemaking strategy. This paper draws lessons from the mediation efforts of South Africa in the Zimbabwe crisis.

In 2014, the sharia-ruled Aceh province of Indonesia legislated bylaw qanun jinayat no.6/2014, which criminalised same-sex acts, and imposed a caning punishment consisting of a hundred lashes if a person was found guilty. The law impelled a hunt and persecution of LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) individuals, thereby worsening discrimination against the already hampered LGBT community. This study investigated how LGBT individuals are portrayed in Aceh, specifically how the former mayor of Banda Aceh Illiza Sa’aduddin Djamal understands the LGBT phenomenon. The research uncovered (1) the different discourses on LGBT individuals that emerged according to Djamal’s understanding, (2) how LGBT individuals are portrayed within the Acehnese society, and (3) how LGBT issues contrast the Acehnese Muslim identity. With the assessment of various gender theories and insights to Islamic paradigms from the Sunni Shafi’i School – the most practised type of Islam in Aceh – the analysis of this study discussed the salience of religion in the society. The results showed that LGBT individuals are portrayed in different discourses – as a threat, disease, deviancy from traditional gender norms, family problem, and a crime. The outcomes further indicated that “LGBT behaviour” is categorically perceived as a threat to Aceh, and incompatible with the Acehnese Muslim identity.

The present article uses terror management theory (TMT) to explore the psychological, social and cultural forces that lead diverse groups and individuals to endorse, promote and enact violence against innocent individuals. From this perspective, it is the psychological function of religious, ideological, national or ethnic ties that is crucial for understanding how they can lead to hatred and violence. TMT provides an empirically based theoretically driven explanation of how ideological, nationalistic and religious values combine with historical events and concrete grievances to make terrorist violence appealing to those facing individual or group suffering. Research is presented which suggests that many of the same psychological forces that lead terrorists to their violent actions also lead to counter-terrorist policies that create massive collateral damage. This collateral damage appears to further escalate the cycle of violence and may aid the targets of those attacks in recruiting people for the terrorist cause. After examining the issues that inspire such violence, research is presented that suggests possible avenues to decrease support for actions that prolong inter-group conflicts.

In the 1990s, Greece  reached a turning point with regard to its national security. The  1996  Imia crisis,  in particular,  manfisted a further escalation of Turkey's claims in the Aegean, which for the first time became direct territorial claims against Greece.  In response, Greece readjusted its  national defense doctrine, encompassing  the necessary political-military “tool” of crisis management.  Readjustments were made to ensure an adequate, determined response , while containing bilateral tensions at the lowest possible level.  These readjustments further clarified the ultimate Greek defence message to Turkey, which is that the threat or use of force  provide no credible alternative to International Law and the international conventions that determine the current Greek-Turkish border status quo. Since then, although bilateral tensions have been indeed  contained at a low level, Ankara has persisted in its unilateral claims against Greek sovereignty rights and territory.

This dissertation will explore four developments and examine the possibilities and opportunities for an integrated track 1½ approach, focussed on regional conflict prevention and de-escalation of intrastate conflict. The principal focus will be on how track one diplomacy can cooperate with track two diplomacy on a regional level in order to de-escalate intrastate conflicts and regional conflict complexes, and prevent them from crossing the violence threshold. More specifically, this dissertation will focus on creating a framework for track one and track two cooperation in which regional organisations can utilise Interactive Conflict Resolution methods to de-escalate intrastate conflict. To this end, socialpsychological theories of conflict and conflict resolution will be explored in an effort to uncover the potential of a track 1½ interactive conflict prevention approach. While confining the boundaries of track 1½ diplomacy, attention will be focussed upon the design of a regional interactive conflict prevention framework, which will draw upon ICR as a preventive measure to de-escalate intrastate and regional conflicts before they cross the violence threshold.

A literatura de prevenção de conflitos violentos que trata de “eficácia da ação preventiva” ressalta que as chances de sucesso tendem a aumentar quando a prevenção é estrutural e quando a abordagem é multissetorial. A pesquisa realizada indica que, antes de se falar na eficácia da ação preventiva, deve-se verificar a existência das condicionantes da ação preventiva, que limitam ou favorecem o envolvimento de atores internacionais. Argumenta-se que a ação preventiva internacional está condicionada a três elementos: (i) a construção de um conceito de prevenção; (ii) a criação de mecanismos que visem à implementação de tal conceito; e (iii) a interpretação do contexto local como sendo passível de interferência com objetivos preventivos. A pesquisa conclui que, nos casos do Kosovo e da ex-República Iugoslava da Macedônia, a promoção
do discurso de prevenção por atores internacionais não leva necessariamente à sua adaptação institucional. Além disso, ainda que mecanismos estejam disponíveis aos potenciais preventores internacionais, só serão implementados se a situação concreta for interpretada como passível de prevenção. Destaca-se ainda que os casos em estudo reforçam o  entendimento da literatura ao demonstrar que as chances de sucesso das medidas preventivas foram menores no Kosovo devido à inação e à ação superficial, tardia e descoordenada de alguns atores internacionais. A ação preventiva na Macedônia, por sua vez, teve maiores chances de sucesso porque teria sido estrutural e multissetorial – devido à interpretação que se fez do contexto local na época da iminência das crises.

"This anthropological study describes a specific form of mediation, as it is practiced in Ethiopia (Northeast Africa) by members of the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups. It introduces elders as male household-heads in their advanced ages, who settle conflicts and arrange marriages for the members of the junior generations. There are not only 'easy' cases dealt with, which one might assume to be too 'unimportant' for state courts or other juridical institutions but also aggravated cases that may affect the wider group or that have inter-ethnic dimensions. The study uses specific case studies of marriage, bride abduction, physical injury and homicide for illustration. Within the book, reference is made to speech-act-theory and the 'new ethnographic' approach related to it. Both rhetoric strategies and non-verbal means of communication are discussed, such as postures, gestures, spatial arrangements, numerical symbolisms, or the deliberate use of certain kinds of dress and of material objects. Special attention is paid to the use of ritual in mediation procedures. The book brings to light significant regularities that are inherent to the different types of elders' proceedings. Peculiar elements and phases can be distinguished that re-occur in all types of processes analysed in the study. This cannot exclusively be explained by reference to 'process', as a general idea of people negotiating law. It moreover hints to the existence of a formal 'procedure', which follows its own rules. Accordingly, a change of perspective 'from process to procedure' is suggested in the book's programmatic title.

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If our education systems seek to prepare students to live constructively in the real world, and if that goal is to be more than a mouthed platitude, then part of that education must include conflict resolution skills. Conflict resolution skills are a form of social skills that enable students to constructively deal with the conflict they will encounter in their own lives (Johnson, 2009).

The legal, moral and political responsibility to stop mass atrocities is not new, yet over the last decade a significant momentum has emerged around the idea that preventing these crimes from occurring in the first place is infinitely preferable to the situation arising when they are already in full-swing. It has also become increasingly important to distinguish between preventing conflict and preventing mass atrocities.


Even if correlated in practice, conflict prevention and mass atrocities prevention are not the same and require somewhat different approaches, particularly when it comes to the response side. For example, when conflict prevention has failed, it is not too late to reduce the risk of mass atrocities. Moreover, mass atrocities can occur outside of armed conflict or after fighting has ended.


To respond more effectively to the specificities of genocide and mass atrocities prevention, the UN has established the Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the ‘Responsibility to Protect.’ Similarly, the US administration has taken a number of significant steps to strengthen its capacities, including the eventual creation of an Atrocities Prevention Board.


With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union has made strategic steps towards pooling its instruments and enhancing the culture of prevention and the responsibility to protect. The creation of the European External Action Service and the double-hatted High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy augment the EU’s potential to become more active, more coherent and more effective in this crucial area.


Since 2008, a series of conferences have been organised in Europe by numerous institutions, including the EU Institute for Security Studies, the European Parliament, the Budapest Human Rights Forums, the Memorial de la Shoah in Paris, the Regional Forum on the Prevention of Genocide in Bern, the Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation and the Folke Bernadotte Academy where numerous experts, EU policymakers and representatives exchanged views on the possibilities and means to promote the implementation of the Genocide Convention and the concept of the Responsibility to Protect.

On each occasion, the various aspects of the commitment and activities of the European Union to enhance its capabilities in this domain were also intensively discussed.


On the initiative of the Budapest Centre for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities a Task Force was established in January 2012 to prepare a report on the EU’s capabilities to prevent mass atrocities and to foster a dialogue on their improvement.


The Task Force has reviewed best practice in the area, conducted interviews with officials of the European Union institutions and governments, and held consultative meetings with leading experts, EU policy makers, representatives of EU administrations and NGOs in Brussels, Paris and Berlin.


The Task Force’s report analyses the strengths and weaknesses of EU capabilities in the area of mass atrocities prevention, and makes recommendations to improve the EU’s capacity to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.

All around the world, men are the primary perpetrators
of violence, making up 95 per cent of people convicted of homicide, as well as being the majority of combatants in conflicts. In most cultures, violence is associated with men and boys in a way that it is not associated with women and girls. Interrogating the reasons behind this trend, this report does not argue that men are naturally violent. Rather, socially constructed gender norms often associate masculinity with power, violence, and control. Such notions of masculinity can play a role in driving conflict and insecurity. Where this is the case, Saferworld suggests that peacebuilding efforts can and should address this by taking steps to promote notions of masculinity which favour non- violence and gender equality. A number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have developed programming approaches
for engaging men and boys to promote gender equality and non-violence, which have made demonstrable impacts on the lives of men and women. International donors, policymakers and NGOs should consider how such approaches can be developed to help build peace.

This article examines the efforts of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to manage tensions in Ukraine between the substantial Russian minority and the Ukrainian government, and to prevent potentially violent conflict in Crimea from 1994 to 2001, as well as the subsequent efforts to promote peace and stability. It questions why the HCNM was remarkably successful in crisis management from 1994 to 2001, especially in averting secessionism in Crimea, but was hampered in his efforts to achieve a solid foundation for durable peace through the creation of a robust system of minority rights protection. The central argument is that regional politics often preclude the construction of a minority rights regime that could otherwise provide the foundation for durable peace.

Today there are more than 1.85 billion young people around the world. Globally, many of them work tirelessly, creatively, and productively to build peace and respond to violence. Yet, young people have often
been marginal to peace and security solutions on the international stage; seen problematically simply as a “problem to be solved or a threat to be contained.”  UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (UNSCR2250)
fundamentally challenged this framework. 

The story of how UNSCR 2250 came to life is the story of a youth-driven, adult-supported process; the story of people and organizations coming together around shared principles and common goals to achieve a
collective impact. Drawing on desk research and interviews conducted with young people and practitioners from the United Nations (UN), adult-led non-governmental organizations, and youth-led organizations,
The Road to 2250 outlines fundamental approaches that led to this critical policy shift. Key lessons from this process highlight the importance of collaboration and inclusive inter-agency coordination.
They also show that the multilateral system can greatly benefit from adopting new ways of working, in which partnership with civil society and young people truly serve its objectives.