Collective Responsibility

The question of who exactly is responsible for an organization's actions cannot be too carefully considered, as a clear understanding of this point is crucial from ethical, moral, managerial, and public perspectives. This article discusses how to justify a non-participant member's responsibility for the actions of other group members, establishing collective responsibility. The article develops a novel context-depended framework that solves this problem by supplying good grounds for perceiving organizations as organic entities, which is adequate for establishing collective responsibility. I suggest that to be responsible for the actions of an organization, one has to belong to that organization, even if one has not taken any part at any level in group actions. The more regular concept of causal responsibility is not applicable here since it cannot account for the responsibility of non-participant members.

How are we to think about our responsibility, both individually and collectively, in relation to revolution? How might recent conversations among philosophers help us think through questions of this sort, and where might we need to do some thinking for ourselves? For guidance, I turn to recent conversation concerning responsibility for collective inaction. My purpose is to reflect on how philosophers have been encouraging us to think about collective responsibility in relation to revolution, making explicit certain underlying assumptions about what a revolution is, when we are justified in bringing one about, and under what circumstances we can hold one another responsible for failing to do so. In the process, I put the academic literature on collective responsibility into conversation with the thought and practice of James and Grace Lee Boggs, a pair of movement intellectuals who devoted their lives to building the next American revolution from their home in Detroit. By contrasting the thought of academic and organic intellectuals concerned with questions of collective responsibility, I hope to generate enough friction to conjure up even better questions-ones that will aid us in developing a more expansive understanding of ourselves in relation to our shared future.

This article considers whether the idea of collective responsibility is relevant to the problems of morality and whether it is amenable to conceptualization in moral philosophy. It examines the discussion of collective moral responsibility from two angles: problematization of collective action and problematization of the collective agent, with a focus on revealing the specificities of the individual moral agent as the main topic of moral philosophy.
The author demonstrates that the principle of conceptualization of collective moral responsibility is a reduction: The collective agent and collective actions are seen as forms of the individual agent and his actions by isolating the characteristics of the individual agent and his acts that warrant ascribing moral responsibility to them. This article determines types of such reduction: reduction to the individual, and reduction of qualitative and quantitative characteristics. Reduction to the individual leads to objectification of the individual, stripping him of agency in terms of the attribution of responsibility, but viewing him as the agent in terms of fulfilling a responsibility (the morally paradoxical status of the object bearing moral responsibility is called “noxal”). Reduction of characteristics does not make it possible to consider the
collective agent a morally valid agent in its own right. Instead of a substantive
definition, the collective agent is accorded merely a formal definition, with
the main thought operation being analogy and association, which precludes
considering reduced forms of the collective agent to be totally valid. Thus, the
division of methods of conceptualizing moral responsibility into individualistic and holistic advocated by some researchers is not valid, because holism is
essentially exhausted by the analogy and association of characteristics of the
collective agent with those of the individual agent.
The article concludes that the problem of collective responsibility lacks an adequate object, although the formal definition of the collective agent is sufficient for the legal regulation of collective activity without turning to morality.

Gypsies have been a persecuted minority for more than five centuries. Our paper examines how exposing Spaniard participants to information according to which they personally, or their ingroup collectively, discriminate against the Gypsy minority influences (i) their attitudes toward the Gypsy minority (e.g., experience of collective guilt or support for affirmative action and other forms of compensation) and (ii) the collective (but not individual) accusation of discrimination against the Gypsy minority transforms attributions of the causes of their marginalization. We discuss the societal ethos that the new victimized minorities have introduced as regards majority-minority relationships.

International customary law provides the bulk of guidance in determining criminal responsibility for systemic atrocities with a nexus to armed conflict. Id. 8 Ratner and Abrams, supra note 6 at 160. 9 Juan Mendez "argues that the most extreme form of tokenism in transitional justice is to set up a truth commission as an alternative to criminal prosecution, rather than as a step toward accountability. Aeyal M.

International customary law provides the bulk of guidance in determining criminal responsibility for systemic atrocities with a nexus to armed conflict. Id. 8 Ratner and Abrams, supra note 6 at 160. 9 Juan Mendez "argues that the most extreme form of tokenism in transitional justice is to set up a truth commission as an alternative to criminal prosecution, rather than as a step toward accountability. Aeyal M.

In my personal narrative below, I discuss the challenges and opportunities
of leading activist work in two public four‑year comprehensive universities
both as a faculty member doing service for the Center for Teaching and
Learning (CTL) and as a 12‑month administrator working for the Inclusive
Excellence Ofce. I describe my work creating professional development
programs to support the anti‑racism goals of each campus. I discuss
contradictory experiences of appreciation and support versus tokenism,
cultural taxation, gaslighting, and deceit. I reveal tensions and contradictions
of being a white‑appearing Latina activist whose identity lies between
assimilating to the dominant culture of predominantly white institutions
(PWIs) and centering my ethnic identity to advocate for social justice. I
highlight the importance of doing activist work in community and collaboration
while advocating for support, funding, and protection for activist
faculty and administrators. I also provide background to understand why
and how faculty activists should take care of their well‑being.

This paper implements a novel approach to analyzing the degree of Collective Cognitive Responsibility (CCR) in a Knowledge Building community, based on socioeconomic and scientometric measures. After engaging in Knowledge Forum (KF) discussions for one semester, 36 students identified impactful ideas in their portfolios, which were then used to develop their impact scores. These scores were then transformed and plotted along the Lorenz Curve and the Gini coefficient to visualize the degree of equidistribution of recognition in the community and, by extension, the degree of collective responsibility shared by members of the community. Additionally, students were classified into member roles based on the impact of their contributions, and we explored the flow of member roles across several discussion topics, based on Price’s model of scientific production. Our results show convergence between peers’ and teachers’ ratings of impactful contributions, which both point to medium levels of...

Professor Lawrence Solan for inviting me to the stimulating interdisciplinary conference on corporate misbehavior held at Brooklyn Law School on November 12, 2004, and to contribute a paper on relevant ideas of my own to the associated volume of the Brooklyn Law Review.

The article analyzes existing classifi cations of types of invalidity in law. Based on the results of the analysis, it should be concluded that invalidity in law is objectifi ed in the inability of certain legal phenomena (deeds, acts of state authorities, local selfgovernment bodies, documents, etc.) to cause legal consequences, to cause a legal eff ect that was supposed to occur (occurrence, change or termination of rights and obligations / legal relationship). The characteristics of certain types of invalidity in law are given. Based on the conducted research, a separate classifi cation of types of invalidity in law is proposed. All types of invalidity can be divided into two large groups: public legal invalidity and private legal invalidity. The classifi cation of invalidity in law can be carried out depending on: the type of legal norms that establish invalidity; type of legal phenomenon, the invalidity of which is provided by law; the degree of invalidity of a certain legal phenomenon; the subject of initiation of the invalidity of a certain legal phenomenon; subject, by which the invalidity of a certain legal phenomenon is determined. Each of the above classifi cation groups of invalidity may include a number of subgroups. It is also possible to classify invalidity in law on other grounds. Key words: law; invalidity; types of invalidity; classification of types of invalidity.

У статті досліджується поняття неефективної норми права і встановлю- ються її ознаки та критерії. На основі проведеного аналізу пропонується класифікація неефективних норм права з метою визначення їх характерних ознак, а саме: неможливість досягти поставленої мети правового регулювання, забезпечити інтереси держави та суспільства; невідповідність закріпленим правилам нормативної техніки та існуючому стану розвитку суспільних відносин; колізійність. Враховуючи існуючі помилки законодавця та дефекти правотворчості серед неефективних норм, можна, зокрема, виділити такі: фіктивні норми, норми з негативною ефективністю та дефектні норми. Наголошується, що своєчасне виявлення неефективних норм та їх усунення має бути в центрі уваги як суб’єктів законодавчої ініціативи, так і науковців і активних членів громадянського суспільства. Крім цього, окремої уваги потребує дослідження інституту відповідальності за розроблення та прийняття неефективних норм.

The concept of a civilizationally transformed state envisions a new governance paradigm that emphasizes moral values, collective responsibility, and compassion over traditional ideas of sovereignty and legality. This model emerges from the failure of conventional states to address global crises like climate change, economic instability, and democratic erosion. It proposes a state that prioritizes human dignity, justice, and the common good. Drawing from philosophical traditions such as Ubuntu, it seeks to foster mutual accountability and elevate compassion as a guiding principle of governance to ensure care for the vulnerable. The 2024 Bangladeshi student-public uprising reflects this vision by rejecting repressive governance and demanding moral accountability. Realizing this transformation requires a cultural and ethical shift where the state serves as a moral authority inspiring pluralism, collective growth, and humanity's highest aspirations.

Isayvani Naicker explores Africa's cosmovision of Ubuntu, which offers as its starting point that humanity is deeply linked to nature through the life of the community. In order to elaborate the usefulness of Ubuntu as a vision for collective engagement, Naicker examines the writings of postcolonial thinker Frantz Fanon, as well as British ecological and ontological discourses, in order to propose an alternative vision for a collective responsibility to the modern climate and environmental discourse.

This Special Issue brings together five articles from different disciplines. It aims to contribute to the emergent critical voices in research about collective trauma and collective healing by introducing novel perspectives and inviting further debates on the relevant issues evoked. For this reason, the Special Issue focuses on collective healing through a number of prisms. First, it delves into the notions of wounding and trauma, with a view to advance a well-argued theoretical framework for understanding collective healing. Second, it identifies underlying ethical pillars for collective healing, especially the principles of equality and well-being that affirm human dignity founded on our intrinsic non-instrumental value as persons. Third, it interrogates one of the deeply seated root causes of transatlantic slavery, and establishes a connection between capitalist expansion and systematic subjugation of human beings to brutal forces for the sake of materialistic production and weal...

який мав статус міжнародного суду над військово-політичної верхівкою нацистської Німеччини-відомого як Нюрнберзький процес. Хоча то був перший приклад міжнародного суду над керівниками держави, тоді йшлося про індивідуальну відповідальність окремих осіб. Філософське обґрунтування саме колективної відповідальності до цього часу залишається проблематичним. Головними питаннями, щодо яких точаться суперечки, є питання про можливість існування колективних соціальних агентів і колективної вини як підстави для покладення відповідальності. В цій статті пропонується поглянути на діяльність Європейського суду з прав людини як на практику колективної відповідальності в міжнародному праві. Діяльність Європейського суду з прав людини може слугувати практичним орієнтиром для оцінки певних теоретичних позицій. З урахуванням зазначеного практичного прикладу колективної відповідальності в дослідженні пропонується здійснити вибірковий реверсивний огляд філософських поглядів Ханни Арендт і Карла Ясперса. Дослідження демонструє, що хоча розмисли зазначених філософів виявилися і не позбавленими певних вад, Арендт і Ясперс, акцентуючись переважно на різних аспектах, змогли запропонувати загалом слушне обґрунтування колективної відповідальності. Запропоноване ними обґрунтування може слугувати фундаментом для подальших розробок у цій галузі. Практичне значення цього висновку полягає в тому, що він може надати поштовх до розробки нових юридичних механізмів колективної відповідальності росіян за наслідки безпідставної агресії проти України. Юридизація підсилить моральний і політичний виміри колективної відповідальності, а також сприятиме підвищенню ефективності так званого суспільного «освітнього процесу» (Lernprozess).

The recent identification of over 1,500 unmarked graves of Indigenous children on the grounds of residential schools across so-called Canada has raised pressing questions about intergenerational responsibility for colonial violence. This paper sketches a critical phenomenology of settler responsibility, drawing on Ariella Aïsha Azoulay’s call to “potentialize” colonial violence in a way that makes it impossible.  Azoulay rejects the moral division between victims, perpetrators, and spectators, arguing that these “personae” are scripted to pursue opposing interests by claiming innocence for themselves and assigning guilt to others.  She argues for an ethics of worldcarefulness that reclaims the right to refuse complicity with imperial violence and affirms nonimperial ways of organizing the “phenomenological field” of time, space, and the body politic.  This paper explores the implications of Azoulay’s ethics for a critical practice of phenomenology and for addressing ongoing colonial violence in the wake of the Indian Residential School system.

This article delves into the religious conflict that transpired in Ambon from 1999 to 2004, with a specific focus on elucidating the formation of collective memory as a pivotal mechanism for fostering post-conflict reconciliation. Employing a methodology amalgamating literature review and in-depth interviews, this research scrutinizes the intricate dynamics of the conflict, delineating the roles played by both Muslim and Christian communities, not only as victims but also as perpetrators. The principal findings underscore the shared responsibility of both groups in instigating the conflict, resulting in egregious acts such as assaults, homicides, and property destruction. The article accentuates the imperative of mutual acknowledgment regarding each community's role in the conflict as an indispensable stride towards reconciliation. It posits that an accurate and all-encompassing collective memory of the conflict serves as a catalyst for communities to critically assess their religious practices and fosters a climate of receptivity to broader religious understandings. The research underscores the significance of cultivating a nuanced collective memory in upholding peace and harmony within a diverse post-conflict society.

This is an encyclopedia entry written for the Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. It provides an overview of the concept of and literature surrounding "group agency" from the perspective of analytic philosophy. It begins with an introduction to agency in its most general sense before examining agency in the social world. Next, group agency as a research field is presented in the context of the problem of collective intentionality. Here, accounts of group intentions are presented, before moving into considerations on structure and metaphysics of group agents. Then, the features of and conditions for group agency are clarified, as well as its relation to rationality and mind. The entry closes with heterodox views of group agency and a description of group agency’s lasting relevance to law and social philosophy.

Shussett, Daniel. 2024. “Group Agency.” In M. Sellers & S. Kirste (Eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_1151-1

Although academic work on conspiracy theory has taken off in the last two decades, both in other disciplines as well as in epistemology, the similarities between global sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories have not been the focus of attention. The main reason for this lacuna probably stems from the fact that most philosophers take radical scepticism very seriously, while, for the most part, regarding ‘conspiracy thinking’ as epistemically defective. Defenders of conspiracy theory, on the other hand, tend not to be that interested in undermining radical scepticism, since their primary goal is to save conspiracy theories from the charges of irrationality. In this paper, I argue that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories exhibit importantly similar features, which raises a serious dilemma for the ‘orthodox’ view that holds that while we must respond to radical scepticism, global conspiracy theories can just be dismissed. For, if, as I will show, both scenarios can be seen to be epistemically on a par, then either radical sceptical scenarios are as irrational as global conspiracy theories or neither type of scenario is intrinsically irrational. I argue for the first option by introducing a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ sceptical scenarios and showing how this distinction maps onto contemporary debates concerning how best to understand the notion of a ‘conspiracy theory’. I demonstrate that, just as in the case of scepticism, ‘local’ conspiracies are, at least in principle, detectable and, hence, epistemically unproblematic, while global conspiracy theories, like radical scepticism, are essentially invulnerable to any potential counterevidence. This renders them theoretically vacuous and idle, as everything and nothing is compatible with what these ‘theories’ assert. I also show that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories face the self-undermining problem: As soon as global unreliability is posited, the ensuing radical doubt swallows its children – the coherence of the sceptic’s proposal or the conspiracy theorist’s preferred conspiracy. I conclude that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories are indeed partners in crime and should, therefore, be regarded as equally dubious.

Theories of intergenerational obligations usually take the shape of theories of distributive (social) justice. The complexities involved in intergenerational obligations force theorists to simplify. In this article I unpack two popular simplifications: the inevitability of future generations, and the Hardinesque assumption that future individuals are a burden on society but a benefit to parents. The first assumption obscures the fact that future generations consist of individuals whose existence can be a matter of voluntary choice, implying that there are individuals who are responsible and accountable for that choice and for its consequences. The second assumption ignores the fact that the benefits and burdens of future individuals are complex, and different for different ''beneficiaries'' or ''victims.'' Introducing individual responsibility for procreation as a (crucially) relevant variable, and allowing a more sophisticated understanding of the impact of new individuals, generates grounds to prioritize the individual's interest in responsibility for (creating and equipping) future individuals over any collective intergenerational obligation. I illustrate this by introducing a series of moral duties that take precedence over, and perhaps even void, possible collective redistributive duties.

In National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller defends the view that a member of a nation can be collectively responsible for an outcome despite the fact that: (i) she did not control it; (ii) she actively opposed those of her nation's policies that produced the outcome; and (iii) actively opposing the relevant policy was costly for her. I argue that Miller's arguments in favor of this strong externalist view about responsibility and control are insufficient. Specifically, I show that Miller's two models of synchronic collective responsibility*the like-minded group model and the cooperative practice model*ground neither synchronic nor diachronic national responsibility, nor apply in the case of nations generally speaking.

is the author of a number of articles on governance and international politics, including the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, the resurgence of the extreme Right in Europe, implications of mass terrorism for the Caribbean Community, and the Reagan-Thatcher "Special Relationship". His research interests include governance and vulnerability in small island developing states, the North-South divide, and policy toward the Eastern Caribbean.

the article explores the contested meanings of Fascism and collective guilt in postwar Italy. a large body of recent scholarship suggests that the myth of the Italiani brava gente served to suspend questions of collective responsibility and to conceal striking continuities between the fascist regime and the postwar republic, creating a kind of national 'amnesia' by 1947. Focusing on events of 1948-1949, the article takes issue with this view, citing examples of widespread awareness and fears of a return of Fascism. luigi Zampa's film, Anni difficili, created a controversial definition of Fascism-its origins and its consequences-and addressed collective guilt in a manner that made the film a sensation between 1948 and 1949. the public, far from complacent to programmes of national repression of the memory of Fascism, was in fact eager to examine these issues, even to the point of discussing widespread guilt. Making particular use of newspaper reviews, the article examines the public interpretations of Anni difficili in order to expose the terms by which different political orientations defined the fascist past and imagined its future danger in the emerging republic KEYWORDS Fascism, Italy, guilt and responsibility, memory, cinema, Luigi Zampa, newspapers, repression Nearly all scholars are in agreement that Fascism, already deeply undermined by the events of 1943, had been discredited for most Italians by war's end in 1945. But there were significant disagreements among Italians in the early postwar era regarding the meaning of Fascism and the explanation for its earlier power. 1 At one end of the spectrum of opinion in 1946, Italian judges acquitted high-ranking military officers and state officials clearly responsible for ordering atrocities, ruling that theirs were excusable 1 The great variety of meanings of anti-fascism in the immediate postwar have been the focus of scholarly study, but far less attention has been given to the varying meanings of Fascism. Roy Domenico has pointed to the diversity of types of anti-fascism in the postwar, particularly the starkly different anti-fascisms of the DC and the Left. Roy Domenico, 'The Many Meanings of Anti-Fascism',

This edited collection presents a selection of papers from the 2012 conference of the Society for the Study of Nanoscience and Emerging Technologies (S.NET), an international network of scholars and practitioners who seek to understand and influence the relationships between technologies and socioeconomic contexts. Like S.NET itself, the collection is heterogeneous: organized under the headings of Engagements, Regulatory Governance, Innovation, and Discourse, its sixteen chapters reflect a broad range of political, epistemological, and methodological standpoints. Thus, unlike many other conference publications, this one speaks to no single disciplinary audience. Researchers interested in emerging technologies will likely find at least one chapter that resonates with their own approach, plus a host of other perspectives, some of which may challenge their views about how and why such research should be undertaken in the first place. This plurality will be familiar to readers of NanoEthics, as will many of the collection's editors and contributors, roughly half of whom have also published in this journal. Much as these authors seek to infuse greater reflexivity into the process of technological development, juxtaposing their divergent standpoints may prompt readers to consider scholarly assumptions that they would otherwise take for granted. The collection's first section, Engagements, focuses on modes of promoting deliberation and reflexivity, Nanoethics

attention, the issue of responsibility gaps and my arguments here are not limited to them. I am concerned with the sorts of emerging military technologies that threaten to open responsibility gaps, and as has been persuasively argued by Van Rompaey (2019: 35), "the essential qualities of [these] emerging or current technologies are not that they are weaponized, individualized, and embodied". They are not necessarily weaponized, nor are they necessarily lethal in a direct sense. Rather, the responsibility concerns about the introduction of AMS are taken to centre on their autonomous nature. Although how to understand autonomy has been the subject of heated philosophical debate for a long time (Dworkin, 1988; Feinberg, 1989; Christman, 2015; Mele, 2001 among others), the "autonomous" component of AMS is usually taken to refer to the ability to decide and act without human input or direction, or what Liu calls discretionary autonomy (2016). Thus, an autonomous system of this sort would be one where the system can make a discernment as to what to do, and then proceed to do so without a human being in the loop at any stage. It is precisely this discretionary aspect that is taken to open a gap in my responsibility practices, since notions of autonomy understood in this way-as a form of individual control-is intimately related to notions of responsibility. One might say: If a weapon Niël Henk Conradie

This essay takes a cursory look at one of the problems in moral philosophy, which possibility or existence has been a subject of a long-standing debate among moral philosophers: the idea of moral responsibility. It has been simply described as having to do with one’s capacity to be held responsible for his/her actions. Hywel Lewis, bearing this in mind, sets out to strongly affirm the attribution of moral responsibility only to individual moral agents, on the grounds that only the individual is the sole bearer of moral responsibility. In order to maintain and preserve his position, he criticizes the idea of collective responsibility. As argued by Lewis, it is unethical to hold one responsible for the actions of another on the basis of both parties being members of a collective. In other words, the effects of the deeds of one, should not rub off on the other, either positively, in terms of a good deed, or negatively, in terms of a bad deed. This essay takes a critical look at this position of Lewis regarding moral responsibility: with the aim of contending the claim that collective responsibility should be out-rightly disregarded. It is true that one should not be rewarded for the deeds of another, but there are cases where a contrary idea; in this case collective responsibility, is expedient. It concludes by providing relevance of both Lewis’ position and his opposition. Its method is expository, analytical, critical and evaluative.

This chapter presents an examination of the portrayal of HIV/AIDS as social suffering in media representations. It elucidates how cultural representations, social experiences, and political processes shape public perceptions of HIV/AIDS, often perpetuating stigma and influencing policy. The chapter critiques the commodification of suffering in the media and the resultant distortion of social realities. By appropriating the narratives of those living with HIV/AIDS, media narratives often construct a spectacle that divorces audiences from the authentic experiences of people living with HIV/AIDS. The chapter argues for a transformation in the representation of social suffering to counteract its trivialisation, advocating for more nuanced and empathetic portrayals that can inspire a collective responsibility and action towards addressing social suffering, particularly in the context of HIV/AIDS. It underscores the potential of media to redefine public engagement with social issues and to foster a global cosmopolitanism that recognises and responds to suffering beyond the spectacle.

In the spring of 2013, a racially controversial incident occurred on the Washington University Campus. The incident raised questions about the racial tolerance of the university community as well as exactly who should be held responsible for the injustice. Most importantly, the community's response to the incident exemplified how a community with the potential for substantial collective action can fail to mobilize and improve when they are called upon to do so. This paper examines recent psychological research that studies the existence of subconscious racial prejudices in order to examine its implications in community responses to racial injustices. Results show that the majority of people hold unconscious prejudiced attitudes and are unaware of it, and that these attitudes can lead to discriminatory behavior. This suggests that when a racial injustice occurs in a community, the perpetrators may have been influenced by implicit prejudices held by the communities to which they belong. While literature on structural injustice considers how communities are responsible for the actions of those within them, they are insufficient to deal with issues of race, as they do not account for human reactions to such a sensitive subject. The Community System of Responsibility is introduced as a system that assigns responsibility to community members in a way that is practical in its expectations of individuals and that motivates community progress. Rather than searching for others to accuse, individuals following the community system look inward at consequences of their own behavior and the behavior of the communities to which they belong.

Euro-American exclusivity has mostly been responsible for eclipsing the universalizing appeal of trauma studies. In a bid to cater for trauma accounts of the Global South, the present study attempts to look into the trauma of people living in Kashmir, a conflict zone in the middle of the third-world Asian countries. Kashmir is one of the disputed regions and a center point of conflict between India and Pakistan since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The political turbulence as well as the resulting militarization has rendered the entire Kashmiri community listless and prone to traumatic experiences. Despite the serious nature of the traumatic experiences of the people living in Kashmir, and as depicted in the literature produced therein, little scholarly attention has been given to it to voice out these accounts, which are necessary for claiming the truthful depiction of the Kashmiris. This article uses Jeffery C. Alexander et al.'s Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity and Kai. T. Erikson's Collective Trauma as the theoretical framework to analyze the selected Kashmiri Anglophone literary text titled The Collaborator by Mirza Waheed. The study finds that the traumatic memories of Kashmiri people, as a community, are no different from the likewise traumatized people of the Global North. Here, the Kashmiri narrative takes the responsibility of presenting the reality of life. The investigation concludes that fictional narratives, through memory of the past, bring a compelling tale of eternal suffering, establishing the fact that it is not the individual that must bear the moral responsibility; rather, it should be the collective.

Scientists have the epistemic responsibility of producing knowledge. They also have the social responsibility of aligning their research with the needs and values of various societal stakeholders. Individual scientists may be left with no guidance on how to prioritise and carry these different responsibilities. As I will argue, however, the responsibilities of science can be harmonised at the collective level. Drawing from debates in moral philosophy, I will propose a theory of the collective responsibilities of science that accounts for the internal diversity of research groups and for their different responsibilities.

Studies to teach student-writers the rhetorical flexibility needed to navigate a post-pandemic world. She holds a PhD in English Studies (2016) and a Graduate Certificate in Women's and Gender Studies (2016) from Illinois State University, an MFA in Creative Writing/Poetry (2007) from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, and a BA in Women's and Gender Studies (2002) from the University of California Davis. When she's not teaching or writing, she's probably hiking, pleasure reading, or cuddling with her two cats, Patu and Glacia. www.emilyronayjohnston.org Dr. Amanda Solomon Amorao received her MA and PhD in literature from UC San Diego, and her research and teaching interests include U.S. multiethnic literature, Asian American Studies, Filipino/a/x American cultural productions, critical race studies, decolonizing pedagogies, and women of color feminism. She is currently the director of the Dimensions of Culture Program at UC San Diego's Thurgood Marshall College, which teaches first-year writing through the exploration of diversity, justice, and social change in U.S. culture and society. Her current book project, a coedited Dr. Amanda Solomon Amorao received her MA and PhD in literature from UC San Diego, and her research and teaching interests include U.S. multiethnic literature, Asian American Studies, Filipino/ a/x American cultural productions, critical race studies, decolonizing pedagogies, and women of color feminism. She is currently the director of the Dimensions of Culture Program at UC San Diego's Thurgood Marshall College, which teaches first-year writing through the exploration of diversity, justice, and social change in U.S. culture and society. Her current book project, a coedited volume with D. J. Kuttin Kandi and Jen Soriano on Filipina American feminism and activism, will be published in spring 2023 by Cognella Academic Publishing. Dr. Solomon Amorao has over 15 years of experience teaching writing at UCSD, including serving as a lecturer at Revelle Humanities and as Associate Director of Writing in Sixth College's Culture, Art, and Technology Program. Dr. Solomon Amorao also served for six years as the executive director of the Kuya Ate Mentorship Program, a grassroots educational organization that empowers Filipino American youth in their exploration of history, culture, identity, and social justice.

A more correct concept of "collective ordeal" is proposed instead of the often incorrectly used term "collective responsibility". The definition of collective ordeal is given and examples of situations that may be incorrectly described by the term "collective responsibility" and which are better described by the term "collective ordeal" are shown.

The question on guilt that Jaspers poses to the Germans was not only valid after the Holocaust, it can be raised to other peoples who must answer for the crimes committed by the state which act on behalf of the people that gave support to them. In this paper, I elaborate a notion of citizens' political responsibility in order to argue to what extent-and under what circumstances-the citizens of a political community must respond for the deeds of the political institutions that govern them. For that purpose, I try to explain Spinoza's notion of political authority in relation to Jaspers' notion of political guilt. This Spinozistic approach has the advantage of freeing us from moral guilt-a misleading notion in political arena as I will argue-but it demands from us a genuine self-reflective and therapeutic procedure that if applied to politics would reveal a different path from Jaspers' guilt. The aim of this therapeutic is to bring about a profound change in the personal and political identity of both citizen and political community.

This Special Issue brings together five articles from different disciplines. It aims to contribute to the emergent critical voices in research about collective trauma and collective healing by introducing novel perspectives and inviting further debates on the relevant issues evoked. For this reason, the Special Issue focuses on collective healing through a number of prisms. First, it delves into the notions of wounding and trauma, with a view to advance a well-argued theoretical framework for understanding collective healing. Second, it identifies underlying ethical pillars for collective healing, especially the principles of equality and well-being that affirm human dignity founded on our intrinsic non-instrumental value as persons. Third, it interrogates one of the deeply seated root causes of transatlantic slavery, and establishes a connection between capitalist expansion and systematic subjugation of human beings to brutal forces for the sake of materialistic production and weal...

In this article, we show how pathways to justice and reconciliation pertaining to the transatlantic slavery should begin with collective healing processes. To illustrate this conclusion, we first employ a four-fold conceptual framework for understanding collective healing that consists in: (1) acknowledging historical dehumanizing acts; (2) addressing the harmful effects of dehumanisation; (3) embracing relational rapprochement; and (4) co-imagining and co-creating conditions for systemic justice. Based on this framework, we then examine existing collective healing practices in different contexts that are aimed at addressing legacies of transatlantic slavery. In doing so, we further identify challenges and pose critical questions concerning such practices. While globally there are, and have been, many different kinds of racism and slavery, and even though transatlantic slavery has many features specific to it, nevertheless, we hope that this exploration of collective healing will be...

În articolul "Logic of Catastrophe — Deeper Logic of Reality," Jovan Babić de la Universitatea din Belgrad analizează pandemia de coronavirus, argumentând că aceasta este o catastrofă, nu doar o criză. El explică faptul că astfel de catastrofe sunt evenimente externe, imprevizibile și bruște, care subminează normele existente și necesită noi reglementări rapide. Babić subliniază că în astfel de situații drepturile considerate sacrosancte devin subiecte de reinterpretare și adaptare, prioritizând obligațiile și interesele fundamentale ale vieții intergeneraționale peste drepturile individuale. El explorează rolul ignoranței în contextul pandemiei, evidențiind cum aceasta generează neîncredere și prevenirea rezultatelor pozitive. În secțiunea despre dreptul de a refuza vaccinarea, Babić argumentează că în situații de catastrofă acest drept devine neconvingător, deoarece exercitarea lui de către toți ar compromite sănătatea publică. El subliniază importanța imunității colective și responsabilității comune, concluzionând că, în contextul pandemiei, obligațiile colective trebuie să prevaleze asupra drepturilor individuale pentru a proteja societatea.

It is argued that political realists have framed internationalized relations by way of an implicit appeal to what is called the 'agent-exclusion principle.' The agent-exclusion principle holds that in cases where agency is nested, agency at one level precludes or displaces agency at another level. This paper interrogates the truth of the agent-exclusion principle by reformulating it as an agent-exclusion problem: when agency is nested, is it the case that agency at one level necessarily excludes agency at another? Or is multi-level agential co-presence possible? By problematizing the agent-exclusion principle in this way, I can leverage the considerable effort that has been put into understanding and resolving the agent-exclusion problem in other domains to better understand its expression in the context of globalized relations. In particular, a critical evaluation of the agent-exclusion principle motivates, against the political realist, the rejection of state-centric realism but also points to the impossibility of a cosmopolitan world state. I conclude with a reflection on the significance of these findings for scholarship globally in higher education. Keywords Agent-exclusion principle • Globalization • Higher education reforms • Ideology • The state 1 A subdiscipline of philosophy concerned with the nature and properties of the social world (Epstein, 2021).

A growing number of technologies are currently being developed to improve and distribute thinking and decision-making. Rapid progress in brain-to-brain interfacing and swarming technologies promises to transform how we think about collective and collaborative cognitive tasks across domains, ranging from research to entertainment, and from therapeutics to military applications. As these tools continue to improve, we are prompted to monitor how they may affect our society on a broader level, but also how they may reshape our fundamental understanding of agency, responsibility, and other key concepts of our moral landscape. In this paper we take a closer look at this class of technologies-Technologies for Collective Minds-to see not only how their implementation may react with commonly held moral values, but also how they challenge our underlying concepts of what constitutes collective or individual agency. We argue that prominent contemporary frameworks for understanding collective agency and responsibility are insufficient in terms of accurately describing the relationships enabled by Technologies for Collective Minds, and that they therefore risk obstructing ethical analysis of the implementation of these technologies in society. We propose a more multidimensional approach to better understand this set of technologies, and to facilitate future research on the ethics of Technologies for Collective Minds.