Cognitive Artifacts

Personal AI assistants are now nearly ubiquitous. Every leading smartphone operating system comes with a personal AI assistant that promises to help you with basic cognitive tasks: searching, planning, messaging, scheduling and so on. Usage of such devices is effectively a form of algorithmic outsourcing: getting a smart algorithm to do something on your behalf. Many have expressed concerns about this algorithmic outsourcing. They claim that it is dehumanising, leads to cognitive degeneration, and robs us of our freedom and autonomy. Some people have a more subtle view, arguing that it is problematic in those cases where its use may degrade important interpersonal virtues. In this article, I assess these objections to the use of AI assistants. I will argue that the ethics of their use is complex. There are no quick fixes or knockdown objections to the practice, but there are some legitimate concerns. By carefully analysing and evaluating the objections that have been lodged to date, we can begin to articulate an ethics of personal AI use that navigates those concerns. In the process, we can locate some paradoxes in our thinking about outsourcing and technological dependence, and we can think more clearly about what it means to live a good life in the age of smart machines.

The complementary properties and functions of cognitive artifacts and other external resources are integrated into the human cognitive system to varying degrees. The goal of this paper is to develop some of the tools to conceptualize this complementary integration between agents and artifacts. It does so by proposing a multidimensional framework, including the dimensions of information flow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural transparency, informational transparency, individualization, and transformation. The proposed dimensions are all matters of degree and jointly they constitute a multidimensional space in which situated cognitive systems can be located and have certain dimensional configurations. These dimensions provide a new perspective on the conditions for cognitive extension. They are, however, not meant to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but to provide a toolbox for investigating the degree and nature of the integration of agent and artifact into "new systemic wholes". The higher a situated system scores on the proposed dimensions, the more functional integration occurs, and the more tightly coupled the system is.

EN/[PT]: The objects of analysis in this article are digital picturebooks, which may be called e-picturebooks. This research contributes to a definition of e-picturebook as a distinct storytelling experience from printed picturebook, introducing distributed cognition as a new theoretical perspective for the analysis of the phenomenon. This perspective emphasizes cognitive systems related to specific features of this category of digital book. In this sense, picturebook and e-picturebook are defined as cognitive artifacts that constrain storytelling tasks very differently from each other, not only because of their constitutive features but also because of the cognitive systems involved in the understanding of stories in each medium. /
[Os objetos de análise neste artigo são os livros ilustrados digitais, que podem ser chamados de e-picturebooks. Esta pesquisa contribui para a definição do e-picturebook como uma experiência de storytelling distinta dos livros ilustrados impressos, introduzindo a cognição distribuída como uma nova perspectiva teórica para a análise do fenômeno. Essa perspectiva enfatiza os sistemas cognitivos relacionados a características específicas desta categoria de livro digital. Desta forma, livro ilustrado e e-picturebook são definidos como artefatos cognitivos que restringem as tarefas de contar histórias de forma muito diferente um do outro, não só por causa de suas características constitutivas, mas também pelos sistemas cognitivos envolvidos na compreensão de histórias em cada meio.] ***Article resulting from the communication previously presented at the ELO'17 - Electronic Literature Organization 2017 Conference (July 18-22), at University Fernando Pessoa, Porto, Portugal.

The goal of this paper is to develop a systematic taxonomy of cognitive artifacts, i.e., human-made, physical objects that functionally contribute to performing a cognitive task. First, I identify the target domain by conceptualizing the category of cognitive artifacts as a functional kind: a kind of artifact that is defined purely by its function. Next, on the basis of their informational properties, I develop a set of related subcategories in which cognitive artifacts with similar properties can be grouped. In this taxonomy, I distinguish between three taxa, those of family, genus, and species. The family includes all cognitive artifacts without further specifying their informational properties. Two genera are then distinguished: representational and non-representational (or ecological) cognitive artifacts. These genera are further divided into species. In case of representational artifacts, these species are iconic, indexical, or symbolic. In case of ecological artifacts, these species are spatial or structural. Within species, token artifacts are identified. The proposed taxonomy is an important first step towards a better understanding of the range and variety of cognitive artifacts and is a helpful point of departure, both for conceptualizing how different artifacts augment or impair cognitive performance and how they transform and are integrated into our cognitive system and practices.

PT/[EN]: A invenção de dispositivos computacionais portáteis, como tablets e smartphones, influenciou o desenvolvimento de experiências digitais de leitura com recursos ainda mais diversos que os e-books (livros digitais) produzidos para os primeiros e-readers (dispositivos de leitura). Entre essas experiências estão os chamados e-picturebooks, terminologia usada para categorizar os livros ilustrados digitais (PINTO; ZAGALO; COQUET, 2012). O propósito desta pesquisa é explicar como uma nova configuração digital do livro ilustrado, a partir de suas características específicas, reestrutura o modo como histórias são concebidas e compreendidas; e porque isso pode apontar para sistemas cognitivos diferentes operando na leitura e compreensão das histórias, com relação ao livro impresso. A abordagem parte da definição de conceitos-chave como storytelling (ALBÆK et. al., 2011) e compreensão (KINTSCH; RAWSON, 2007). Para definir o livro ilustrado impresso, recorre-se ao campo que se convencionou chamar picturebook theory (NIKOLAJEVA; SCOTT, 2011). A fim de analisar o book-app – aplicativo para dispositivos móveis que é o formato mais intimamente associado ao conceito de e-picturebook –, exemplos são agrupados segundo cinco principais diretrizes referentes às características desse tipo de livro digital: (i) recursos multimídia; (ii) múltiplas formas de apresentação do texto; (iii) interatividade em tempo real; (iv) gamificação; (v) novas formas de organização do conteúdo. A fonte dos exemplos abordados na pesquisa é o Bologna Ragazzi Digital Award, prêmio da Bologna Children's Book Fair que vem sendo oferecido desde 2012 aos melhores book-apps infantojuvenis de cada ano. Para investigar como o surgimento do e-picturebook influencia o ambiente em que histórias são concebidas e apreendidas, busca-se introduzir uma estrutura teórica baseada em abordagens recentes da Ciência Cognitiva: a cognição distribuída e o conceito de artefato cognitivo (CLARK, 2003, HUTCHINS, 1995; 2001, NORMAN, 1993). Essa teoria contribui para a compreensão do e-picturebook como experiência de storytelling distinta do livro ilustrado impresso, apresentando uma nova ótica de análise do fenômeno, que privilegia as oportunidades relativas a capacidades cognitivas e os potenciais específicos dessa categoria de livro digital. /
Link para a Dissertação: https://repositorio.ufjf.br/jspui/handle/ufjf/5375
[The invention of portable computing devices, such as tablets and smartphones, has influenced the development of digital reading experiences with even more varied features than the e-books designed for the first e-readers. Among these experiences are the so-called e-picturebooks, terminology used to categorize digital picturebooks (PINTO; ZAGALO; COQUET, 2012). The purpose of this research is to explain how a new digital configuration of picturebook, based on its specific features, restructures the way in which stories are conceived and understood, and why that may indicate different cognitive systems operating in reading and understanding of the stories. The argumentation starts from the definition of key concepts such as storytelling and comprehension (ALBÆK et. al., 2011; KINTSCH; RAWSON, 2007). Then, we resorted to the field that was conventionally called picturebook theory to define the printed picturebook (NIKOLAJEVA; SCOTT, 2011). In order to analyze the book-app - application for mobile devices which is the format most closely associated with the concept of e-picturebook - examples are grouped according to five main guidelines regarding the features of this type of digital book: (i) multimedia resources; (ii) multiple forms of the verbal text; (iii) real-time interactivity; (iv) gamefication; (v) new forms of content organization. The source of the examples approached in the research is the Bologna Ragazzi Digital Award, an award that has been offered since 2012 to the best book-apps for children of each year. In order to investigate how the emergence of e-picturebook influences the environment in which stories are conceived and apprehended, we introduce a theoretical framework based on recent approaches in Cognitive Science: the distributed cognition and the concept of cognitive artifact (CLARK, 2003, HUTCHINS, 1995; 2001, NORMAN, 1993). That theory contributes to the understanding of the e-picturebook as a distinct storytelling experience of the printed picturebook, presenting a new perspective of phenomenon analysis which privileges the opportunities related to cognitive abilities and the specific potentials of that category of e-book.]
Link to the Thesis: https://repositorio.ufjf.br/jspui/handle/ufjf/5375

What are the possible varieties of cognition-artifact relations, and which dimensions are relevant for exploring these varieties? This question is answered in two steps. First, three levels of functional and informational integration between human agent and cognitive artifact are distinguished. These levels are based on the degree of interactivity and direction of information flow, and range from monocausal and bicausal relations to continuous reciprocal causation. Second, a multidimensional framework for exploring cognition-artifact relations is sketched. The dimensions in the framework include reliability, durability, trust, procedural and representational transparency, individualization, bandwidth, speed of information flow, distribution of computation, and cognitive and artifactual transformation. Together, these dimensions constitute a multidimensional space in which particular cognition-artifact relations can be located. The higher a cognition-artifact relation scores on these dimensions, the more integration occurs, and the more tightly coupled the overall system is. It is then better, for explanatory reasons, to see agent and artifact as one cognitive system with a distributed informational architecture.

In this paper I explore systematically the relationship between Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) and their human users from a phenomenological and cognitive perspective. First, I functionally decompose BCI systems and develop a typology in which I categorize BCI applications with similar functional properties into three categories, those with (1) motor, (2) virtual, and (3) linguistic applications. Second, developing and building on the notions of an embodied tool and cognitive tool, I analyze whether these distinct BCI applications can be seen as bodily or cognitive extensions. Contrary to some recent philosophical claims, I will argue that, although BCI technology may have the potential to become bodily and cognitive extensions for skilled users, at this stage they are not. And while the electrodes may to a variable degree be transparent and incorporated in the body schema, the BCI system as a whole is not. Moreover, BCIs do not have a functional role characteristic for cognition and are therefore not cognitive extensions. Third, based on concepts from the distributed cognition framework, I give a number of suggestions to improve the interface design of linguistic applications, i.e. BCIs that allow its user to spell words by selecting letters on a screen. These suggestions may result in cognitive extension and would enhance the autonomy and quality of life of its users. In sum, in this paper I develop a typology, analysis and critique on the current philosophical debate on BCIs, thereby providing a richer conceptual understanding of BCI systems which allows me to offer some suggestions for improving the interface design of linguistic applications.

It is widely assumed that there is a natural, prelinguistic conceptual domain of time whose linguistic organization is universally structured via metaphoric mapping from the lexicon and grammar of space and motion. We challenge this assumption on the basis of our research on the Amondawa (Tupi Kawahib) language and culture of Amazonia. Using both observational data and structured field linguistic tasks, we show that linguistic space-time mapping at the constructional level is not a feature of the Amondawa language, and is not employed by Amondawa speakers (when speaking Amondawa). Amondawa does not recruit its extensive inventory of terms and constructions for spatial motion and location to express temporal relations. Amondawa also lacks a numerically based calendric system. To account for these data, and in opposition to a Universal Space-Time Mapping Hypothesis, we propose a Mediated Mapping Hypothesis, which accords causal importance to the numerical and artefact-based construction of time-based (as opposed to event-based) time interval systems.

It is widely assumed that there is a natural, prelinguistic conceptual domain of time whose linguistic organization is universally structured via metaphoric mapping from the lexicon and grammar of space and motion. We challenge this assumption on the basis of our research on the Amondawa (Tupi Kawahib) language and culture of Amazonia. Using both observational data and structured field linguistic tasks, we show that linguistic space-time mapping at the constructional level is not a feature of the Amondawa language, and is not employed by Amondawa speakers (when speaking Amondawa). Amondawa does not recruit its extensive inventory of terms and constructions for spatial motion and location to express temporal relations. Amondawa also lacks a numerically based calendric system. To account for these data, and in opposition to a Universal Space-Time Mapping Hypothesis, we propose a Mediated Mapping Hypothesis, which accords causal importance to the numerical and artefact-based construction of time-based (as opposed to event-based) time interval systems.

A criatividade artistica pode ser observada como uma propriedade da manipulacao de artefatos cognitivos. Mais especificamente, esta distribuida atraves de artefatos cognitivos, como oportunidades para a emergencia de entidades e processos surpreendentes. Quando novos artefatos sao criados, ou usados em novos contextos, observamos o que Boden chama de ‘criatividade transformacional’. Em danca, a manipulacao de novos artefatos cognitivos, como tecnicas de danca, softwares, notacoes, levam a transformacao de ‘espacos conceituais’ de danca. Interessa-nos como a introducao e a manipulacao de novos artefatos em exemplos historicos contribuem para a transformacao de espacos conceituais da danca.

In this paper, we focus on the development of geometric cognition. We argue that to understand how geometric cognition has been constituted, one must appreciate not only individual cognitive factors, such as phylogenetically ancient and ontogenetically early core cognitive systems, but also the social history of the spread and use of cognitive artifacts. In particular, we show that the development of Greek mathematics, enshrined in Euclid's Elements, was driven by the use of two tightly intertwined cognitive artifacts: the use of lettered diagrams; and the creation of linguistic formulae (namely non-compositional fixed strings of words used repetitively within authors and between them). Together, these artifacts formed the professional language of geometry. In this respect, the case of Greek geometry clearly shows that explanations of geometric reasoning have to go beyond the confines of methodological individualism to account for how the distributed practice of artifact use has stabilized over time. This practice, as we suggest, has also contributed heavily to the understanding of what mathematical proof is; classically, it has been assumed that proofs are not merely deductively correct but also remain invariant over various individuals sharing the same cognitive practice. Cognitive artifacts in Greek geometry constrained the repertoire of admissible inferential operations, which made these proofs inter-subjectively testable and compelling. By focusing on the cognitive operations on artifacts, we also stress that mental mechanisms that contribute to these operations are still poorly understood, in contrast to those mechanisms which drive symbolic logical inference.

Time is at once familiar and mysterious, its status in the physical universe being uncertain and contested. Time seems to be fundamental to both biology and to the world of human experience. It seems certain that human beings in all cultures experience time, and have ways of linguistically referring to relations between events in time. It has been proposed by some cognitive scientists that there is a natural, transcultural conceptual domain of time. Cultural conceptions of time, however, vary considerably. I present anthropological linguistic data from a study that my colleagues and I conducted in an indigenous Amazonian community. Concepts of time are cultural and historical constructions, constituted by schematic time interval systems, and embodied in language and culture dependent symbolic cognitive artefacts. ''Living in time'', I contend, is to live in a model. Time is both artifactual model and cognitive niche, made possible by the wider biocultural niche of language.

An almost ubiquitous demand for design competence currently manifests itself, outside of the classical disciplinary boundaries. Within future markets, which will increasingly and decisively be driven by the currency of attention, design is more and more faced with questions regarding the fabrication of meaningfulness and significance. This book argues that the most promising strategies for the design disciplines of tomorrow can be seen in symbolizing the codes of virtual relations among material, biological, technological, cognitive, and medial perspectives. It provides material as well as a tentative theoretical framework to develop and bring to fruition thought-images for a design of the potential.

The book features contributions, statements, and conversations with internationally renowned authors such as Greg Lynn, Christopher Peterka, Wolfgang Weingart, Marcel Alexander Niggli, Christian Labonte, Fiona Raby and Anthony Dunne, Christian Doelker, Philipp Sarasin, Raymond Guidot, Eric Zimmerman and Manfred Fassler among others. It is designed by Ludovic Balland, and published with the Institute for Research in Art and Design HGK FHNW in Basel.

Existing accounts of cognitive artefacts are a useful starting point for developing the emerging notion of situated affectivity. Starting from a recent taxonomy of cognitive artefacts, I propose a taxonomy of material affective scaffolds (material objects that we use to support, shape and more generally regulate our affective states). I distinguish representational material affective scaffolds (divided into iconic, indexi-cal and symbolic ones) from nonrepresentational ones (chemical and sensory ones). I conclude by pointing out that the resulting taxonomy is based not only on properties of objects but also on the user's stance towards objects, which in turn depends on other contextual factors.

Memories of our personal past are the building blocks of our narrative identity. So, when we depend on objects and other people to remember and construct our personal past, our narrative identity is distributed across our embodied brains and an ecology of environmental resources. This paper uses a cognitive niche construction approach to conceptualise how we engineer our memory ecology and construct our distributed narrative identities. It does so by identifying three types of niche construction processes that govern how we interact with our memory ecology, namely creating, editing, and using resources in our memory ecology. It also conceptualises how identity-relevant information in objects and (family) stories is transmitted vertically, i.e., across different generations of people. Identifying these processes allows us to better understand the cultural information trajectories that constitute our memory ecologies. Thus, what I'll argue is that our memory ecology distributes our narrative identity and that engineering our memory ecology is a form of narrative niche construction.

Modeling the relationship between cognitive artifacts and rationality is the central issue with which this paper is concerned. In the research on cognitive artifacts, two models of the relationship between cognition and artifacts can be identified: the amplification model and the transformation model. It is argued that the amplification model leads to trivial conclusions about the role of artifacts for cognition. The transformation model provides an insightful perspective on cognitive artifacts, but needs to be submitted to careful scrutiny. Research on problem solving is used in order to make the advantages of the transformation model explicit.

Abstract—Studies of patient safety have identified gaps in cur-rent work including the need for research about communication and information sharing among healthcare providers. They have also encouraged the use of decision support tools to improve human performance. Distributed cognition is the shared aware-ness of goals, plans, and details that no single individual grasps. Cognitive artifacts are objects such as: schedules, display boards, lists, and worksheets that form part of a distributed cognition. Cognitive artifacts that are related to operating room (OR) sched-uling include: the availabilities sheet, master schedule, OR graph, and OR board. All provide a “way in ” to understand how teams in the acute care setting dynamically plan and manage the balance between demand for care and the resources available to provide it. This work has import for the way that information technology supports the organization, management, and use of healthcare resources. Better computer-supported...

The objective of this article is to take into account the functioning of representational cognitive tools, and in particular of notations and visualizations in mathematics. In order to explain their functioning, formulas in algebra and logic and diagrams in topology will be presented as case studies and the notion of manipulative imagination as proposed in previous work will be discussed. To better characterize the analysis, the notions of material anchor and representational affordance will be introduced.

Penultimate version of the paper published in special issue of Pragmatics and Cognition 2013, 3(21), p. 469-484 Bridging the gap between writing and cognition: materiality of written vehicles reconsidered Marcin Trybulec ABSTRACT: A part of the criticism formulated against Literacy Theory results from the vagueness of the concept of mind it employs. The need for reconsideration of the concept of mind used within Literacy Theory can be clearly observed in the case of debates regarding technological determinism. In these debates, the classical Cartesian model of mind is usually employed. Such an internalistic framework leaves unexplored the cognitive consequences of the material dimension of writing. Therefore, in order to dismiss the accusations of technological determinism, the model of mind and cognition needs to be reconsidered. The paper demonstrates how the framework of situated cognition helps to account for the cognitive consequences of written artifacts themselves. Material characteristics of written vehicles such as spatial and temporal stability of the content, fixity of information with reference to page boundaries, lightness and small size of paper sheets, spatial layout of documents make up the most relevant material factors enabling the distribution of cognitive work.

Lines are mysterious. They are drawn by the hand, they are seen by the eye, they appear in the world. Lines are what the hands draw, what the eyes see, and what the page represents. Lines form forms. Simple regular visual/spatial forms like dots, lines, and containers, have meanings that are readily apparent in context. They are used in the service of clear communication, to self and others, notably in diagrams and gesture. They are used to organize, indeed to diagram, the world. Other, messy sketchy lines are used for exploration and discovery.

The paper poses the question of how the use of external artifacts contributes to the stabilization of meaning and thought. On the basis of the private language argument and the problem of objective meaning, I argue that Wittgenstein's considerations regarding meaning-making should be sensitive to how materiality bears on the interactions with semiotic artifacts produced in speech and writing. The distributed language perspective and the concept of languaging (Cowley 2011, 2007; Steffensen 2011) is then linked to a metacognitive theory of writing (Goody 1977; Olson 1994, 2016) to clarify how social and material settings contribute to the lived experience and metalinguistic awareness that is essential to meaning-making. It is argued that, if material characteristics of symbolizations change metalinguistic awareness, the interpretation of the private language argument partly depends on the types of external artifacts the private linguist is allowed to exploit. The frameworks of distributed language and the theory of writing thus shed new light on the private language argument by making it even more radical than has previously been assumed.

A disseminação, na última década, de dispositivos computacionais portáteis, como tablets e smartphones, influenciou o desenvolvimento de experiências de storytelling digitais como os e-picturebooks, experiências com recursos ainda mais diversos que os e-books (livros digitais) produzidos para os primeiros e-readers (dispositivos dedicados à leitura digital).
O objetivo deste artigo é descrever as mudanças incorporadas nesse correspondente digital do livro ilustrado e propôr uma estrutura teórica para analisar as consequências resultantes da introdução de dispositivos computacionais portáteis no domínio das narrativas ilustradas, definindo seus recursos como novos artefatos cognitivos. Em Ciência Cognitiva, artefatos cognitivos são descritos como ferramentas que modificam e ampliam as tarefas cognitivas, criando problemas e novos espaços de soluções concebíveis.
O propósito é analisar um tipo específico de e-picturebook, os book-apps. Como fonte de exemplos elucidativos, nos concentramos no Bologna Ragazzi Digital Award, premiação da Bologna Children's Book Fair. O prêmio vem sendo oferecido desde 2012 aos melhores bookapps infantojuvenis de cada ano. Os vencedores e menções honrosas do período 2012-2015 na categoria “Ficção” totalizam doze títulos.

This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artifacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artifacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artifacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artifacts. Having identified the target domain, it then briefly looks at the multiple usability of physical structures and the multiple realizability of cognitive function. Further developing insights from the "dual nature of artifacts thesis", the article ends with conceptualizing the structure-function relations of cognitive artifacts. More specifically, it unpacks the relation between physical structure, representational structure, information, and cognitive function.

Neste artigo apresento sucintamente alguns dos pressupostos das discussões sobre identidade pessoal, em especial a tese da identidade pessoal de John Locke. Após a contextualização, exploro alguns desdobramentos da tese original lockeana, bem como invisto em uma alternativa, a saber, a tese narrativista. Por último, aponto como a ciência cognitiva e temas correlatos da filosofia da mente, como a mente estendida, tornam-se partes indispensáveis da leitura narrativista  da identidade pessoal através de artefatos.

Attempts to account for the significance of materiality for cognition should pay special attention to the vehicle in which meaning and information are embedded. Distributed cog-nition pays surprisingly little attention to conceptualizing the distinction between transitory and durable representations. I use the example of David Kirsh's research to argue that the bias toward defining cognitive extensions in terms of stable objects existing in space leads to their reification. The aim of this paper is to indicate the sources of reification and argue that implicit ambiguity emerges toward external representations due to an over-rei-fied view of cognitive extensions.

The aim of this paper is to substantiate the thesis that contemporary linguistic philosophy has not been consistent enough in researching the relations between language, speech and writing. Speech and writing are two distinct ways of representing knowledge, they also encourage a different organisation of the cognitive processes. The problems of the relationship between written and spoken word are of particular concern to philosophy in the light of recent studies conducted under the theory of literacy. The paper will pose the question of the theoretical sources of philosophy's indifference towards the problem of writing and literacy.

A criatividade artística pode ser observada como uma propriedade da manipulação de artefatos cognitivos. Mais especificamente, está distribuída através de artefatos cognitivos, como oportunidades para a emergência de entidades e processos surpreendentes. Quando novos artefatos são criados, ou usados em novos contextos, observamos o que Boden chama de 'criatividade transformacional'. Em dança, a manipulação de novos artefatos cognitivos, como técnicas de dança, softwares, notações, levam a transformação de 'espaços conceituais' de dança. Interessa-nos como a introdução e a manipulação de novos artefatos em exemplos históricos contribuem para a transformação de espaços conceituais da dança.

"A suspension in space, a hiccup of weightlessness before a violent plunge, a pursuit of entropy against the pull of the equilibrium, a game against gravity: a swing is not merely a playground item but a complex phenomenon/experience with multiple sense-modalities. However, there seems to be little place for swings in the constellation of human adult games and play. With this research, we explore the influence of self-propelled swinging movement on a manifold of cognitive processes in adults. 
The approach used for the research consists of two main parts, an analytical and an empirical study.
For the analytical part, we deconstruct swinging into three levels:  the first level studies the pendulum motion from the point of view of physics and mathematics, a macroscopic perspective [1]. With a turn to kinaesthetics and body scheme theory, the first level spills into the second, microscopic level: an outlook from neurophysiology, where we investigate proprioception, sensory and motor systems involved, visual and vestibular systems and finally, the psychophysiological effects. Where the second level converges to psychology, we arrive to the third one: the cognitive science in humanities approach. Here we argue that swings are a physical interpretation of ilinx- a term in game studies that describes a kind of play that causes temporary perception disturbance. The third level finishes with an overview from philosophy ('what is it like' to swing), semiotics, ethology and cultural anthropology- building a case of a swing as a cognitive artifact. The initial three-level analytic part of our research concludes with a comparative study between the swinging motion as an (un)conscious oscillatory movement and the rocking motion as an ideomotor phenomenon.
The empirical core of the research is a synthesis of a questionnaire, an experiment and an EEG study. The questionnaire presents an overall statistical foundation and is an overview of 250 adult participants, their aerobic exercise habits [2], engagement in play behavior etc. The experiment employs 40 adults in two groups, swinging and control, both tested with a Torrance test of creative thinking, not evaluated by the experimenter to avoid rating bias. Lastly, the EEG study presents a pioneer measurement of effects of swinging such as neural oscillations, heart rate, pulse.
The results from the first, analytical part, present a ground base for the study of swings as cognitive artifacts/interface; while the second, empirical part, confirms our hypothesis that swinging motion has a substantial (immediate) effect on cognition i.e. increases one’s creativity. 
Our research shows that a simple phenomenon can lead to complex consequences; and while the study is ongoing and exploratory, the implications of this discovery can offer insight to cognitive technologies, play studies, environmental design and affective neuroscience.

References
[1] M. R. Matthews, “Philosophical Perspectives,” in The Pendulum: A Case Study in Physics, 1st ed., New York, Springer-Verlag, 2006
[2] D. M. Blanchette et al., Aerobic Exercise and Cognitive Creativity: Immediate and Residual Effects, Creativity Research Journal, 17(2&3), 257-264, 2005
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