Causation

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Brain-computer interfaces allow agents to control computers without moving their bodies. The agents imagine certain things and the brain-computer interfaces read the concomitant neural activity and operate the computer accordingly. But the use of brain-computer interfaces is problematic for criminal law, which requires that someone can only be found criminally responsible if they have satisfied the actus reus requirement: that the agent has performed some (suitably specified) conduct. Agents who affect the world using brain-computer interfaces do not obviously perform any conduct, so when they commit crimes using brain-computer interfaces it is unclear how they have satisfied actus reus. Drawing on a forthcoming paper by Allan McCay, I suggest three potential accounts of the conduct that satisfies actus reus: the agent’s neural firings, his mental states, and the electronic activity in his brain-computer interface. I then present two accounts which determine how actus reus may be satisfied – one a counterfactual and the other a minimal sufficiency account. These accounts are lent plausibility because they are analogous to the but-for and NESS (Necessary Element in a Sufficient Set) tests for causation which are generally accepted tests for causation in legal theory. I argue that due to the determinations of these accounts and considerations regarding the relationship between the mind and brain, actus reus is satisfied by either the agent’s neural activity or brain-computer interface electrical activity. Which of these satisfies actus reus is determined by how well the brain-computer interface is functionally integrated with the agent.

Counterfactual conditionals are used extensively in causal reasoning. This observation has motivated a philosophical tradition that aims to provide a counterfactual analysis of causation. However, such analyses have come under pressure from a proliferation of counterexamples and from evidence that suggests that the truth-conditions of counterfactuals are themselves causal. I offer an alternative account of the role of counterfactuals in causal thought that is consistent with these data: counterfactuals are used in a common method of causal reasoning related to John Stuart Mill's method of difference. The method uses background beliefs about causal relationships, history, and the natural laws to establish a new causal claim. Counterfactuals serve as a convenient tool for stating certain intermediate conclusions in this reasoning procedure, and that is part of what makes counterfactuals useful. This account yields a functional explanation of why our language contains a construction with the truth-conditions of counterfactuals. 3 For an interesting alternative explanation of the connection between causation and counterfactuals, see Maudlin (2004). 4 I do not claim that that is the only function of counterfactual conditionals. They clearly also serve other purposes, e.g. in making practical decisions.

A obra corresponde a uma dissertação que tem por objecto dois aspectos considerados absolutamente relevantes para a temática do nexo de causalidade - o fundamento e os limites do juízo de condicionalidade -, os quais não terão sido, pelo menos na responsabilidade civil delitual, ainda suficientemente explorados ou esgotados. O juízo de condicionalidade é essencial para a responsabilidade jurídica, uma vez que é através dele que se realiza o esclarecimento da conexão causal entre fenómenos ou eventos concretos que torna possível a emergência de um problema de responsabilidade no chamado "contexto atributivo de responsabilidade". O referido juízo, não sendo meramente extrajurídico, é recebido e moldado pelo direito de acordo com as suas próprias finalidades e tendo em consideração as exigências decorrentes da sua autonomia. Apesar de existirem limites ao juízo de condicionalidade, tais limites devem ser repensados e redimensionados e, com o auxílio de outros ramos do saber, será possível identificar e, porventura, solucionar novos domínios problemáticos relativamente ao tema do nexo de causalidade. As perspectivas de optimização do chamado "modelo de condicionamento ou condicionalístico" que foram apresentadas ao longo da obra desempenham, nesse particular, uma função importante. No que respeita à prova do nexo de causalidade, a natureza particularística da prova, a conjugação dessa natureza com a prova científica e com uma interpretação probabilística da prova e o recurso às generalizações causais mostram-se compatíveis com as referidas perspectivas de optimização e aparentam justificar, tal como se defende na obra, o recurso a uma teoria argumentativa-narrativa de prova.

Entrepreneurial exit is a major event in the development of a venture. However, we have little understanding of the factors that drive the development of an important pre-cursor to exit: the exit strategy of the founder. Based on the existing literature, we develop a typology of entrepreneurial exit strategies consisting of three higher-level exit categories (i.e., financial harvest, stewardship, and voluntary cessation) and develop an initial test of our typology. Specifically, we examine entrepreneurs' perceived innovativeness of their opportunity, motivational considerations, decision-making approach, founding team, and firm size. Our results show different predictors for each of the three exit strategy types and represent a significant contribution to the understanding of exit strategies in new ventures.

We consider evaluating the causal effects of dynamic treatments, i.e. of multiple treatment sequences in various periods, based on double machine learning to control for observed, time-varying covariates in a data-driven way under a selection-on-observables assumption. To this end, we make use of so-called Neyman-orthogonal score functions, which imply the robustness of treatment effect estimation to moderate (local) misspecifications of the dynamic outcome and treatment models. This robustness property permits approximating outcome and treatment models by double machine learning even under high dimensional covariates and is combined with data splitting to prevent overfitting. In addition to effect estimation for the total population, we consider weighted estimation that permits assessing dynamic treatment effects in specific subgroups, e.g. among those treated in the first treatment period. We demonstrate that the estimators are asymptotically normal and √ n-consistent under specific regularity conditions and investigate their finite sample properties in a simulation study. Finally, we apply the methods to the Job Corps study in order to assess different sequences of training programs under a large set of covariates.

Knowledge of crash causes is important because it directs the mind to the consideration of potential prevention actions and because knowledge of the frequency with which various causes arise in crashes is necessary for determining the promise of potential prevention actions. Clinical crash causation studies consistently found that in the majority of crashes the road user was the sole cause and that in almost all crashes the road user was one of the causes. This is a 'quasi-finding' which provides false respectability to a style of road safety management that makes the road-user the primary target of prevention actions. For the knowledge obtained by clinical crash causation studies to be useful 'cause' has appropriately defined.

Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuating and classifying diseases is a matter of great importance in the fields of law, ethics, epidemiology, and of course, medicine. In this paper, I first propose a means of achieving this goal, ensuring that no two distinct disease-types could correctly be ascribed to the same disease-token. I then posit a metaphysical ontology of diseases-that is, I give an account of what a disease is. This is essential to providing the most effective means of interfering with disease processes. Following existing work in the philosophy of medicine and epidemiology (primarily Christopher Boorse; Caroline Whitbeck; Alexander Broadbent), philosophy of biology (Joseph LaPorte; D.L. Hull), conditional analyses of causation (J.L. Mackie; David Lewis), and recent literature on dispositional essentialism (Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum; Alexander Bird), I endorse a dispositional conception of disease. Following discussion of various conceptions of disease-identity, their relations to the clinical and pathological effects of the diseases in question, and how diseases are treated, I conclude (i) that diseases should be individuated by their causes, and (ii) that diseases are causal processes best seen as simultaneously acting sequences of mutually manifesting dispositions.

The Thai phrase, “เวรกรรม” is used blamingly by those who feel as if things aren’t working out their way (Fate Karma [เวรกรรม]). Such reference to ‘Karma’ characterizes it as a controller of fate similar to the Christian God. Both are seen by people as having willed their experiences in life (Bible, Jeremiah 17:10). The objective of this exploration was to determine whether the Theravada Buddhist and Catholic Christian notions of causation are compatible. Causal principles in the Pali Canon were compared with Aquinas’s philosophy of divine causation in the Summa Theologica. It was found that the Karmic and Christian causal series are the same. This was proved via a mathematical fractal of point times, which demonstrated that an accidental causal series is the same as an essential one. Although the Buddhist and Christian causal series may align, their views of the causative agent, moral agent, and cause-effect union are conflicting. This prevents them from being compatible. This exploration clarified that Karma and God do not operate based on the same deterministic principle. Hence, allowing Thai Buddists to accurately calibrate their belief in fate.

Binding specificity​ is a centrally important concept in molecular biology, yet it has received little philosophical attention. Here I aim to remedy this by analyzing binding specificity as a causal property. I focus on the concept's role in drug design, where it is highly prized and hence directly studied: From a causal perspective, understanding why binding specificity is a valuable property of drugs contributes to an understanding of causal selection​ ーof how and why scientists distinguish between causes, not just causes from non-causes. In particular, the specificity of drugs is precisely what underwrites their value as experimental interventions on biological processes.

Substance-dualist interactionism faces two sorts of challenge. One is empirical, involving the alleged incompatibility between interactionism and the supposed closure of the physical world. Although widely considered successful, this challenge gives no reason for preferring materialism to dualism. The other sort of challenge holds that interactionism is conceptually impossible. The historically influential version of the conceptual challenge is now discredited, but recent discussions by Chomsky and by Crane and Mellor suggest a new version. In brief, the argument is that anything that interacts causally with physical things would have to be sanctioned by physics, and anything sanctioned by physics is ipso facto (as a matter of conceptual necessity) physical. I focus on the second premise. I show that plausible arguments for it are in fact fallacious and that counterexamples undermine it. Thus the argument fails: substance-dualist interactionism cannot be ruled out on conceptual grounds alone.

This (preprint) chapter argues that the 'thick' constructivism to which many prominent Feminist Security Studies authors currently subscribe is incapable of providing this sub-field of International Relations with adequate philosophical grounding. This is the case, it claims, because the textualist framework that results from this form of constructivism is unable to provide a basis and rationale for the kind of integrative, interdisciplinary research that is required to do justice to the events/ phenomena with which Feminist Security Studies is concerned. In contrast, the chapter contends that critical realist philosophy-especially its emergentist/stratified ontology and power-/ mechanism-based understanding of causality-does pave the way for such research. Moreover, it stresses that the heterodox and synthetic/preservative nature of this philosophical approach allows it to avoid the persistent theory/praxis inconsistencies which plague constructivist work.

Aristotle’s key thoughts on teleology are found in Physics II.8-9. My aim here will be limited: to understand the way in which a final cause, something good, acts as a cause. Hypothetical necessity provides the logical structure of how goals are present in changes and understanding this should help us understand how Aristotle saw goals functioning as causes. Final causes are not merely the limit at which some efficient cause ends, they are either prior to efficient causes, or they function as distinctive kinds of efficient causes.

En el presente trabajo se analiza la noción de complementariedad asociada a la coexistencia pacífica de modelos de explicación científica propuesta por Salmon. Se presenta un análisis de la relación entre la coexistencia de estos modelos y la reducción teórica. Finalmente se muestra una manera de entender la coexistencia pacífica que no apela a factores pragmáticos y que permite retomar la explicatividad de las teorías como un valor relevante para la elección racional entre teorías científicas.

Despite the widespread assumptions on the compatibility between nonrelativistic quantum mechanics and special relativity, there still remains a considerable amount of unresolved problems to which few authors explicitly pay attention. Most of them involve the aim of coherently achieving a relativistic description of quantum collapses and quantum entanglements. These processes seem to challenge our present picture of the physical world in terms of spacetime structures.

In this chapter I consider ways in which contemporary graphical causal models can be extended to model systems with complex temporal dynamics. I propose that the present limitations of many contemporary causal models in representing such dynamics are a legacy of their original application to simultaneous equations for long-term equilibrium relationships. Iwasaki and Simon (1994) provide a way of generalizing causal models to represent the dynamics of systems that are away from equilibrium. I clarify the temporal relationships among the variables in dynamic causal models, and illustrate how these relationships relate to those studied by time-series econometricians.

in "Mind, Self and Person, ed. Anthony O'Hear (Cambridge University Press 2015) - It is often thought that as human agents we have a power to determine our actions for ourselves. And a natural conception of this power is as freedom - a power over alternatives so that we can determine for ourselves which of a variety of possible actions we perform. But what is the real content of this conception of freedom, and need self- determination take this particular form? I examine the possible forms self-determination might take, and the various ways freedom as a power over alternatives might be constituted. I argue that though ordinary ethical thought, and especially moral blame, may be committed to our possession of some capacity for self-determination, the precise nature of this power is probably ethically underdetermined - though conceptions of the nature of the power that come from outside ethics may then have important implications for ethics.

A futurate is a sentence with no obvious means of future reference, which conveys that a future-oriented eventuality is planned or scheduled. I argue in this paper that the component of planning found in the meaning of futurates should be derived from the more familiar modal concepts of abilities and desires. A futurate statement presupposes that some contextually salient entity d, the director, has the ability to bring it about that p, and asserts that d is committed to bringing it about that p.

The aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end-of-life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. The argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. A clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions is provided which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This paves the way for a clarification, in conclusion, of important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.

In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally – and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should accept that processes are both occurrents *and* continuants; nothing, I argue, can truly occur, or happen, which does not have temporal parts. I make an alternative suggestion as to how one might deal with the peculiar status of processes without jettisoning a very natural account of occurrence.

The reality of free will has sometimes been argued for by appeal to a consciousness we are supposed to have of our own freedom.  But equally there are modern writers who claim that a proper understanding of consciousness will show free will to be wholly or partly an illusion.  And finally many philosophers, especially in the English-language tradition, have taken the view that the question of free will has nothing to do with consciousness.  For them the free will problem is about the correct semantic analysis of the expression ‘could have done otherwise’; and such an analysis is to be provided simply by considering concepts or sentence meanings, without any reference to consciousness or experience.  So given this wide variety in approach, what might the real connexion be between free will and consciousness?

What is it for an event not to occur? This is an urgent, yet under explored, question
for counterfactual analyses of causation quite generally. In this paper I take a lead
from Lewis in identifying two different possible standards of non-occurrence that we
might adopt and I argue that we need to apply them asymmetrically: one standard
for the cause, another for the effect. This is a surprising result. I then offer a
contextualist refinement of the Lewis approach in light of initial problems, and
discuss how the asymmetry remained hidden until now. I then relate the non-
occurrence problem to issues of transitivity and proportionality in causation, before
showing that a parallel problem exists for contrastivist and interventionist
approaches to causation too.

Ante las dificultades probatorias del nexo causal en supuestos de responsabilidad civil o patrimonial el Derecho obliga a que el peso de la incertidumbre recaiga en su conjunto sobre uno solo de los sujetos implicados: sobre el agente (posiblemente) dañoso, cuando el juzgador rebaja el estándar ordinario de prueba para afirmar un nexo causal dudoso y ordena la reparación total del daño padecido; o sobre la víctima, cuando el órgano judicial mantiene ese estándar ordinario y niega el nexo causal y con ello la responsabilidad. Es el principio del " todo o nada ". La teoría de la pérdida de oportunidad o " chance " altera este planteamiento, pues distribuye el peso de la incertidumbre causal entre las dos partes implicadas: el agente responde sólo en proporción a la probabilidad de que fuera autor del menoscabo; y, correlativamente, la víctima obtiene una reparación acomodada a la probabilidad de no haber padecido el daño de no haber mediado el hecho lesivo. De este modo se brinda una solución equilibrada que pretende adaptarse a una sensibilidad justicial a la que repugna la liberación del agente (posiblemente) dañoso por las dificultades probatorias, pero también que se le conmine a reparar la totalidad de un daño que pudo no haber causado. La profesora de filosofía del derecho Marina Gascón Abellán y el profesor de derecho administrativo Luis Medina Alcoz debaten en torno al fundamento de esta solución, empleada cada vez con más frecuencia (pero con poco rigor) por nuestros jueces y tribunales. La primera acude a la teoría de la prueba y el segundo a la teoría de la causalidad. Para la primera la doctrina de la pérdida de oportunidad no entraña ningún cambio significativo en los planteamientos causales tradicionales; para justificarla basta asumir que el conocimiento judicial de los hechos debe basarse en juicios razonados de probabilidad y acudir a la figura de la presunción iuris tantum del nexo causal. Para el segundo esa doctrina implica una corrección parcial de los planteamientos causales tradicionales traducida en una complicación de los sistemas de imputación causal; junto al " todo o nada " basado en la afirmación o negación vínculo etiológico opera el " ni todo ni nada " basado en la afirmación de causalidades solamente posibles. Palabras clave: Responsabilidad por daños; causalidad; responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración; responsabilidad proporcional; teoría de la pérdida de oportunidad; causalidad; prueba; incertidumbre; causalidad probabilística.

Exceptions are often cited as a counterargument against formal causation. Against this I argue that Aristotle explicitly allows for exceptions to essences in his biological writings, and that he has a means of explaining them through formal causation – though this means that he has to slightly elaborate on his general case theory from the Posterior Analytics, by supplementing it with a special case application in the biological writings. Specifically for Aristotle an essential predication need not be a universal predication. Rather an essential predication is where a property belongs essentially to a species or genus. This essential predication serves a causal and explanatory role, and is not dependent on a corresponding universal predication.

We defend a pragmatic approach in the philosophy of causation and explanation. Our approach is grounded in the more general pragmatic stance that we take towards the goals of the sciences. By means of our pragmatic view on explanation and causal reasoning we primarily want to do justice to the diversity in scientific practice. We show how this approach leads us to the defence of explanatory and causal pluralism. We further argue that a pragmatic approach, at least in the philosophy of causation and explanation, can lead to knowledge that is better achievable, more interesting, and more useful for practice, in comparison with the traditional approach which is routed in monistic presuppositions and which denies the diversity of scientific practice.

In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called ``Reality Criterion'' imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxi...

How does health insurance affect health? After reviewing the evidence on this question, we reach three conclusions. First, many of the studies claiming to show a causal effect of health insurance on health do not do so convincingly because the observed correlation between insurance and good health may be driven by other, unobservable factors. Second, convincing evidence demonstrates that health insurance can improve health measures of some population subgroups, some of which, although not all, are the same subgroups that would be the likely targets of coverage expansion policies. Third, for policy purposes we need to know whether the results of these studies generalize. Solid answers to the multitude of important questions about how specific health insurance policy options may affect health seem likely to be forthcoming only with investment of substantial resources in social experiments.

Self-Determination is the first volume in the two-volume The Ethics of Action. Self-Determination will be published by Oxford University Press in late 2016/early 2017 – December in UK, and January in US. The attached file from Self-Determination is the book’s introduction and summary.

Self-Determination looks at whether action involves distinctive powers or capacities – such as a power to determine for ourselves what we do – that might give action a special place in moral life. Do we have control of how we act, so that we are free to act in more than one way, and does it matter to morality whether we do? At the heart of Self-Determination is the problem of what kind of power we have over our action, and of the ethical significance of power.

Self-Determination argues that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive - a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do. This capacity might or might not take the form of a freedom to act in more than one way, and it might or might not be compatible with causal determinism. What really matters to morality is that it is we who determine what we do. What we do must not simply be a function of powers or capacities for which we are not responsible, or a matter of mere chance.

A second volume Normativity, to be published later, will examine the ways that moral standards make a call on us to meet them; in particular, can there be kinds of standard – such as duty or obligation – that peculiarly address and govern action? Central to the book is David Hume’s attempt to make sense of normativity apart from reason. Can Hume’s project succeed – and what might its success or failure imply, both about the role of reason within normativity and about the place of action in ethics?

This paper discusses recent arguments of Franklin Miller and Robert Truog about withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and causation. The authors argue that traditional medical ethics, and the law, are mistaken to take the view that withdrawal merely allows the patient to die, rather than causing the patient’s death, describing such a view as ‘patently false’. They argue that the law’s continued position to the contrary stems from a moral bias, resulting in the moral and legal fiction that withdrawal does not cause death but lets the patient die. In so arguing, Miller and Truog join a long line of academic criticism of the law that extends back to the seminal decision of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL) and beyond. In this paper, I take issue with these claims. I argue that there are reasonable grounds upon which traditional medical ethics and the law can regard withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as allowing the patient to die rather than causing death, and so the authors’ claims that such a view is patently false cannot be sustained. I then tease out the implications of my conclusions for the authors’ claim that there is not such a great distinction between withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, euthanasia and assisted dying. I conclude by discussing some possible objections to my own view.

This paper presents an analysis of the English instrumental markers with and 15 verbal use. As with other thematic roles, the semantic generalizations encoded by the role Instrument have been difficult to precisely characterize. In this study, we analyze the distinct semantic contributions of with and use, illuminating several properties of instrumental meaning. In particular, use specifies that the agent must act intentionally, which we formalize as universal quantification over possible 20 worlds within a Montague-style compositional framework. By contrast, with encodes a constraint whereby an instrument is a direct extension of the force initiated by the agent. This analysis is most consistent with theories in which thematic roles are clusters of event properties, rather than categories defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; our analysis does not make use of Instrument as a primi-25 tive role.

From Sandis, C. (ed.) Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe (Routledge 2018)

This new paper charts the route from Hobbes' attack on Suarez's theory of reason and power to Hume's reason scepticism.

The action theories of Suarez and Hobbes gave very different accounts of the purposiveness that distinguishes agency. But they also provided opposing theories of power - of capacities to determine outcomes. In Suarez humans possess both a capacity for reason and a capacity for self-determination. Each capacity involves a kind of power radically different from ordinary causation as now understood. Hobbes denied the existence of any power other than ordinary causation - but in so doing he opposed common sense psychology, which is very clearly committed to such powers; and in so doing Hobbes paved the way for Hume's scepticism about practical reason.

This paper explores the nature of causation within the framework of evidence-based practice (EBP) for health care. The aims of the paper were first to define and evaluate how causation is presently accounted for in EBP; second, to present an alternative causal account by which health care can develop in both its clinical application and its scientific research activity. The paper was premised on the idea that causation underlies medical and health care practices and impacts on the way we understand health science research and daily clinical practice. The question of what causation is should therefore be of utmost relevance for all concerned with the science, philosophy and progress of EBP. We propose that the way causation is thought of in contemporaneous health care is exposed by evidential frameworks, which categorize research methods on their epistemological strengths. It is then suggested that the current account of causation is limited in respect of both the functionality of EBP, and its inherent scientific processes. An alternative ontology of causation is provided, which has its roots in dispositionalism. Here, causes are not seen as regular events necessitating an effect, but rather phenomena that are highly complex, context-sensitive and that tend towards an effect. We see this as a better account of causation for evidence-based health care. bs_bs_banner

Ontological Apology attempts to examine how our attitudes and interactions with work both as individuals and a society have shaped our culture. Whereas for the majority of the modern age we have shirked Ontology [being] for Epistemology [process] this work hopes to bring the question of doing back into relation with meaning where it belongs. I hope to make the case for a neo-teleology born from what we can know via the guideposts rooted in the natural world all around us. By seeking purpose not to transcend but circulate, we may better prepare ourselves for the creativity the future will demand of us.

Causal Bayes nets (CBNs) can be used to model causal relationships up to whole mechanisms. Though modelling mechanisms with CBNs comes with many advantages, CBNs might fail to adequately represent some biological mechanisms because—as Kaiser (2016) pointed out—they have problems with capturing relevant spatial and structural information. In this paper we propose a hybrid approach for modelling mechanisms that combines CBNs and cellular automata. Our approach can incorporate spatial and structural information while, at the same time, it comes with all the merits of a CBN representation of mechanisms.

Citation information: Gebharter, A. & Koch, D. (2021). Combining causal Bayes nets and cellular automata: A hybrid modelling approach to mechanisms. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(3), 839-864. doi:10.1093/bjps/axy049

Functionalist theories have been proposed for just about everything: mental states, dispositions, moral properties, truth, causation, and much else. The time has come for a functionalist theory of nothing. Or, more accurately, a role functionalist theory of those absences (omissions, negative events) that are causes and effects.

Indonesian has three morphemes that are commonly used to express futurity, namely 'akan', 'mau', and 'pasti'. I argue that for certain speakers, the meanings of these three morphemes all contain a future modal, and that two of the morphemes (mau and pasti) each additionally include as part of their meaning a different aspectual operator (progressive-like and generic-like respectively) affecting the temporal argument of the accessibility relation of the modal. These combinations of aspect and a future modal I will call “aspectualized futures.” Throughout, I compare the Indonesian future forms with those in English: 'will' and 'be going to'. I propose that be going to is aspectually similar to 'mau', while 'will' is ambiguous between an 'akan' reading and a 'pasti' reading. I discuss as well a slightly different dialect of Indonesian in which the meanings of 'akan' and 'mau' are different.

If events exist, what are they like? It is common to accept events as the proper relata of the causal relation. If that is the case, and there is causation, then there must be events. There is disagreement over the character of these events. Specifically there is a question of grain. On the fine-grained account, prominently defended by Jaegwon Kim, there are many more events than on the coarse-grained account, which has Donald Davidson as its principle proponent. The ontological debate between fine-grained events and coarse-grained events is at least in part decided by implications for theories of causation. A number of arguments have tilted the balance in favor of fine-grained events. Arguments from emphasis in event sentences and arguments from the transitivity of causation have convinced some philosophers that more finegrained accounts of events, such as Kim's, are more plausible. In this paper I will evaluate the impact of the arguments from transitivity and emphasis by showing that both arguments have negative implications not only for coarse-grained events, but also for fine-grained events.