Applied Game Theory

Conventional microeconomics concludes that firms prefer high demand but low competition, however, many locations where firms selling a homogeneous product agglomerate in are evidenced. When the consumers have imperfect information regarding the selling locations and location search is prohibited, each location is identical to them and they random uniformly for a location to visit. When the number of locations increases, the expected demand in each location decreases which creates demand uncertainty in each location. The existence of an operating store in a particular location guarantees that it has a sufficient demand to sustain its business. An entering firm selling a similar product must consider the tradeoff between locating in the same location as the existing store and face a direct competition or locating in other areas with low competition but uncertain demand. This tradeoff is the main study of this paper. If the number of locations exceeds the threshold level, all firms are willing to agglomerate in the location with a certain demand. Otherwise, firms in the location with uncertain demand can coexist with firms in the location with a certain demand.

Due to the simplicity of Burdett and Judd (1983), the number of competing firms has no effect on the equilibrium price distribution and expected price. In chapter two, heterogeneous search cost is introduced to create heterogeneity in search behavior between the two groups of consumers. Local consumers have low search cost and compare price more intensively than the foreigners who have high search cost. As a result, the location with a higher number of local consumers has a lower expected price. This finding has a negative effect on agglomeration since lower expected price discourages firms from locating in the location with a high number of local consumers.

Chapter three introduces the density-dependent search cost, that lowers cost per price sample in the location with a higher density of firms, into the model in chapter one. Lower cost per price sample intensifies the consumers’ price search behavior and increases the degree of price comparison. Consequently, the number of firms has an effect on the price distribution such that higher number of firms lowers the expected price. The consumers’ location distribution is endogenized using the two steps searching, which is a search method that doubles the process of non-sequential search. In the first step, consumers sample for a highest expected utility location from the utility distribution derived from the outcome of the second step, where consumers sample for a lowest price firm from the price distribution of the arrival location. As a result, the consumers’ location distribution is a function of the firms’ location distribution. Firm agglomeration in a particular location creates a popularity of that location since it increases the number of the optimal location sample which increases the probability that its location will be discovered. The equilibrium location distribution of the consumers and firms is obtained using numerical analysis.

This book is about the three identities of the videogame, the gamer, and Game Studies. I write that there are no definitive truths but rather discourses and constructions; ideas, actions, beliefs, and practices related to videogames are discourses that merge and shape our perception of videogames as an area of study of its own right. These discursive responses meet and clash creating what we call truths, which are temporary and negotiable.

This perspective is inspired by Foucauldian ideas and present few questions about videogame-related identities in and outside of academe. Does Game Studies have a conceptual core? What makes game studies difficult to be disciplined in academe? What do we learn from the scholarly and popular discourses on videogames that would help understand the identity questions related to games?

I go on to describe what makes the videogame identity according to game studies: aesthetics, fictions, meaning-making, performance, transformation, etc. and what makes it difficult for game studies being an open market of ideas and an academic "un-discipline". This leads me to the gamer's identity: an aficionado first, and a connoisseur of fictional worlds.

In recent years, communication and digital technologies have widely affected the cultural heritage sector, offering incredible opportunities to enhance the experiential value of heritage assets and improve cultural activities. Furthermore, another trend has gained significant attention: increasing users’ engagement through gamification. Several studies have shown the efficacy of gamification for learning achievements, and gaming is also emerging as a useful tool for touristic objectives such as marketing, dynamic engagement with users, and audience development. This chapter aims at presenting two Italian game projects for mobile devices, created to enhance and promote the cultural offer of two peculiar territories. Game design choices, objectives, and outcomes will be discussed to highlight the benefits and limits of these tools and point out the changing practices of cultural institutions and local administrations, which are showing an increasing interest in the exploitation of video games, considering them as strategic marketing tools to promote cultural heritage and tourism.

This article deals with the philosophical idea of worldmaking pursued through techné, meaning the fusion of the technical means of artistic creation, theorizing, and analysis, but specifically occurring in a feedback loop involving introspection and computation (cybernetic phenomenology). The discussion ranges over a wide variety of topics, including (1) the history of music theory from Ancient Greece to the present (including a rebuttal to Daniel Chua’s (2001) account of music history); (2) emergent properties in music arising from self-organization (explored through the Ancient Chinese abstract strategy board game go); (3) the ontology of musical qualities (properties) and categories (including their relation to visual, tactile, and olfactory qualities and categories). 
Various repertoires, artists, and philosophies are referenced. The essay analyzes aspects of Ligeti’s Violin Concerto, Carter’s String Quartet No. 5, and Lachenmann’s Kinderspiel.  Connections to the author’s own previous analytical and theoretical work are also discussed in relation to his interactive algorithmic audio-visual works (such as Fluxations and FluxNOISations). The techné of these is discussed in terms of logistics as well as aesthetic influences, including Wagner, Liszt, Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Crawford, Babbitt, Carter, Xenakis, Parker, Reich, Ligeti, Truax, Oliveros, Kandinsky, Miro, Pollock, Pollock, Hofmann, Rothko, Louis, Frankenthaler, Moholy-Nagy, Newman, Richter, and Brakhage.  The essay touches on philosophical ideas of Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, Harman, and Bogost, and more fully engages the philosophies of Nelson Goodman and Hannah Arendt in connection with artistic creation as relating to the theorizing and analysis of artistic works.     

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In media studies, there is recurrent fascination with how communication , especially when couched in terms of "information," tends to influence many spheres of social life and intellectual endeavor. Some of the key figures in that discipline have been especially attentive to the implications for politics of the modern advent of the "information economy." Nevertheless, we think that there has been little impetus among media scholars to explore how other disciplines , and in this case orthodox economics, have been providing competing accounts of the nature and importance of information over the same rough time frame. Furthermore, we think they might be surprised to learn that Friedrich Hayek and the neoliberals have been important in framing inquiry into the information economy for the larger culture for a couple of generations. This essay is a preliminary report on what would happen to intellectual history if media studies took the early development of the "economics of information" into account.

Contracts are designed to govern the relations between business partners and allocate risk among them, yet they cannot mitigate all risks; hence, dispute resolution mechanisms have been developed to assist. According to research, arbitration is considered one of the most efficient legally binding dispute resolution mechanisms. Since initiating an arbitration case against business partners often severs the business relationship between them, predicting the arbitrator's decision becomes valuable to the arbitrating parties. To do so, arbitration prediction models are suggested in this paper through modeling the arbitrator's award in two stages: evidence admissibility and evidence evaluation. While arbitrators currently admit evidence in a relatively unsystematic way, this proposed admissibility framework systemizes the current practice by preserving its subjectivity, yet aligning it with the widely deployed rules of arbitration. This research further proposes an evidence evaluation model, providing a rapid answer to the famous commercial arbitration battle, discovery. While the current arbitrators' practice in allowing discovery is not systematic, the proposed optimization model is a tool that could systematically assist arbitrators trading between the arbitration key characteristic, efficiency, and justice. This is achieved by assigning weights to evidence parameters such as sufficiency and credibility, which in turn provide numerical measures to reduce the decision's subjectivity.

The complex nature of construction projects and the involvement of a large number of unpredictable correlated factors make them susceptible to disputes. Although a wide range of dispute resolution mechanisms exists, experts in the construction industry favor arbitration over litigation when legally binding dispute resolution mechanisms are concerned. Because initiating a litigation or arbitration case against a business partner often severs the business relationship between them, predicting the arbitrator’s decision becomes valuable to the arbitrating parties. Because arbitration has been extensively treated as a game, and because the proposed approach relies on the wealth maximization concept, which is in turn dependent on the sum of utility sources of a firm, modeling arbitration is best achieved as a game with disputing parties’ utility profiles that would have an agreement zone. A construction-specific utility framework for the disputing parties arbitrating before a single arbitrator is proposed based on the additive expected utility theory. The proposed additive utility framework preserves the industry practicality and, most importantly, considers direct short-term factors and indirect long-term factors that would address factual disputes related to claim entitlement and quantification. It is expected that such a framework could then be used to identify utility equilibrium points between the disputing parties, which would serve the purpose of predicting the arbitration outcome.

The aim of this paper is to present a model structure that analyses the hub-spoke network design issue within a competitive framework. Under deregulation, airlines have developed hub-and-spoke networks enabling them to increase frequency by aggregating demand and to prevent
entry into the marketplace by reducing airfares. Whilst liberalization in the United States and Europe was undertaken in order to increase competition, the results in this direction are unclear. This research evaluates airline profits based on a micro-economic theory of its behavior under deregulation and its use of hub-and-spoke networks. Through a two-stage Nash best-response game, we search for equilibria in the air-transportation industry. The game is applied to Western Europe where profitable hubs and monopolistic equilibria are clearly identifiable and duopolistic equilibria are potentially possible given sufficient demand.

Güz el Sonuçlar P uççini Tosca isimli operasında kahramanını korkunç bir açmaz içinde bırakır. Tosca'nin sevgilisi Cavaradossi polis şefi Scarpia tarafından ölüme mahkum edilmiştir. Scarpia Tosca'ya bir teklif yapar : Tosca onunla sevişmeyi kabul ederse ölüm mangasına kurusıkı mermi kullanmaları talimatını verecek ve Cavaradossi'nin hayatı kurtulacaktır. Tosca teklifi kabul etmiş gibi görünür. Asıl amacı, sevgilisinin yaşamı kurtulur kurtulmaz Scarpia'yı bıçaklayarak öldürmektir. Planladığı gibi de yapar; ne yazık ki iş işten geçtikten sonra öğrenir ki Scarpia da onu kandırmıştır. Ölüm mangası kurusıkı değil gerçek mermileri kullanmış, Cavaradossi ölmüştür. Üzüntüsünden Tosca da kendi yaşamına son verir. Her üçü de ölmüştür.

Dynamic modelling of foreign aid is rather scarce in the literature of bilateral development cooperation. This paper applies formal game theory to aid effectiveness by analysing dynamics of conditionality and compliance. My analysis highlights three (3) determinants of bargaining power in bilateral aid negotiations: priority, credibility and proactive ownership. Specifically, I suggest that first-mover advantage, credible commitments (e.g. threats and promises) and recipients’ increased ownership of aid modalities determine the effectiveness of aid conditionality and compliance. Evidence from empirical research on recipients’ compliance with aid agreements and two (2) relevant cases studies support our insights.

In master thesis, we give a modelization of associatives practices in Cameroon using tool in non cooperative game theory. Precisely we define a game "Tontine-Saving game" and we found all its perfects subgames equilibrium in presence of some asumptions. we discover that those equilibrium depends on the interest rate of savings and the tontine average rate of returns.

The current implementation of TLS involves your browser displaying a padlock, and a green bar, after successfully verifying the digital signature on the TLS certificate. Proposed is a solution where your browser's response to successful verification of a TLS certificate is to display a login window. That login window displays the identity credentials from the TLS certificate, to allow the user to authenticate Bob. It also displays a 'user-browser' shared secret i.e. a specific picture from your hard disk. This is not SiteKey, the image is shared between the computer user and their browser. It is never transmitted over the internet. Since sandboxed websites cannot access your hard disk this image cannot be counterfeited by phishing websites. Basically if you view the installed software component of your browser as an actor in the cryptography protocol, then the solution to phishing attacks is classic cryptography, as documented in any cryptography textbook.

This article seeks to address hypocritical behavior in interpersonal communication in organizations and it's relationship with organization size. In the first step our game theory model studies the hypocritical behavior between two persons. In the next step, with some adjustments, the model studies hypocritical behavior in the organization. This research provides a unique mathematical model on the use of hypocritical behavior and interestingly suggests that, the larger is the organizational size (number of members), the greater is the risk that all members of the organization turn to adopt a hypocritical behavior.

GAMES 2020, the 6th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, will be held at Budapest Congress & World Trade Center from 13 to 17 July 2020. Game Theory focusses on models of conflict, competition and cooperation, in which the different parties focus on their own individual aims. GAMES 2020 will be co-located with EC’20, the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.

El presente estudio analiza una de las novelas clave de Mario Bellatin, El Gran Vidrio (2007), homónimo a la obra maestra de Marcel Duchamp. Tras una introducción en la que se presenta un esbozo de la dificultad de interpretación de la obra bellatiniana, siguiendo el estudio de Patricia Waugh (1984) se ofrece un breve apartado teórico sobre la metaficción como juego. Posteriormente, partiendo principalmente del ensayo clásico de Octavio Paz sobre la obra del vanguardista (1973), se presentarán las analogías temáticas y estructurales principales entre texto e imagen, para argumentar después sobre el método reapropiativo bellatiniano y los elementos metaficcionales de su novela. Así se llegará al apartado último, dedicado a las conclusiones, donde se argumentará que El Gran Vidrio pertenece a la categoría de la metaficción radical.

This paper proposed a new average non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm (NAVNSGA). This idea is inspired from the combination of non-elitist multi-objective evolutionary algorithms, elitist multi-objective evolutionary algorithms, and statistical calculations. The proposed NAVNSGA is improved the disadvantages of the Elitist multi-objective algorithms and Non-elitist multi-objective algorithms as possible. The NAVNSGA is compared with useful algorithms such as the non-elitist sorting genetic algorithm (NSGAI) and non-elitist sorting genetic algorithm (NSGAII) and the results obtained are showed the superiority of the proposed algorithm. Additionally, the NAVNSGA algorithm is combined with the concepts of the Game theory to propose a hybrid algorithm for determining Nash equilibrium in the game theory. The combination of the NAVNSGA algorithm with the game theory previously is used for improving engineering systems, such as I-beam designing. The results obtained are showed the advantage of the proposed algorithm with those reported in the literature.

Advocates for a ‘different and innovative approach’ to conceptualizing
markets have argued that it is possible to reengineer markets to deliver any
number of salutary public policy goals. These ‘consulting engineers for the market
economy’ have supported their ambitions by referring to the participation of
game theorists in the design and implementation of spectrum auctions. However,
the variegated and inconsistent lessons drawn from their participation indicate
that the role game theorists actually played in the auctions is not well understood.
The confusion appears to stem from significant omissions in the available (mostly
first-hand) accounts, which are boastful in taking credit for the performance of
the auctions but strangely demure in recounting the precise measures undertaken
to bring it about. In this paper, I provide an unexpurgated account of the
circumstances surrounding the participation of game theorists in the most
celebrated of spectrum auctions, those held under the auspices of the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Using the FCC’s archival records, I recover
the suppressed role of the commercial funding of economic research in
determining both the extent and the nature of the economists’ participation. This
analysis emphasizes the crucial importance of the method of funding in
determining how economic research is brought to bear on public policy.

Wat leren jongeren van het spelen van games (informele educatie) en hoe kunnen games voor de formele educatie (scholen) van waarde zijn voor openbare bibliotheken? Scholen, ondersteund door bibliotheken, moeten games op waarde schatten en voor informele en formele educatie hier hun slag mee slaan. Games zijn informeeleducatief door de goede  hersenprocessen die het stimuleert, zoals de informatieverwerking via meerdere kanalen. Content moet worden aangepast wil het ook formeeleducatief zijn. Er zijn uitzonderingen waar entertainmentgames al formeeleducatieve elementen bevatten. Formeeleducatieve games moeten echter meer van entertainmentgames overnemen om effectief te zijn: fun factor helpt bij leren, goede games zijn 'hard fun', bieden motivatie voor moeizaam plezier, uitdagingen.

Under deregulation, airlines developed hub-and-spoke (HS) networks enabling them to aggregate demand, increase frequency, reduce airfares and prevent entry into the marketplace. This research evaluates airline pro®t based on microeconomic theory of behaviour under deregulation. Through a two-stage Nash best-response game, equilibria in the air transportation industry is sought to evaluate the most pro®table HS network for an airline to survive in a deregulated environment. In the ®rst stage of the game, an integer linear program aids in generating potential networks. In the second stage, a nonlinear mathematical program maximizes pro®ts for each airline, based on the networks chosen by all participants. The variables of the mathematical program include frequency, plane size and airfares. In an illustrative example, both monopoly and duopoly solutions are attainable as a function of demand. Ó

RecDroid is a smartphone permission response recommendation system which utilizes the responses from expert users in the network to help inexperienced users. However, in such system, malicious users can mislead the recommendation system by providing untruthful responses. Although detection system can be deployed to detect the malicious users, and exclude them from recommendation system, there are still undetected malicious users that may cause damage to RecDroid. Therefore, relying on environment knowledge to detect the malicious users is not sufficient. In this work, we present a game-theoretic model to analyze the interaction (request/response) between RecDroid users and RecDroid system using a static Bayesian game formulation. In the game RecDroid system chooses the best response strategy to minimize its loss from malicious users. We analyze the game model and explain the Nash equilibrium in a static scenario under different conditions. Through the static game model we discuss the strategy that RecDroid can adopt to disincentivize attackers in the system, so that attackers are discouraged to perform malicious users attack. Finally, we discuss several game parameters and their impact on players' outcome.

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy.

The paper analyzes a political accountability game with an electorate of ‘partisan’ and ‘independent’ voters. It is shown that politicians have a strategic incentive to engage in ‘divisive politics’, that is, to force some independent voters to take sides, even if the direct electoral benefits are higher for their opponents than for themselves. By polarizing the electorate, the incumbent politician weakens the ability of independent voters to make him accountable for his policies in the common interest. Moreover, the interests of the incumbent and the opposition are aligned: the opposition also benefits from divisive politics because, in equilibrium, its election probability increases.

To make an ad hoc network work properly, wireless nodes are usually requested to cooperate in routing operations. However, there is currently a lack of behavior-tracking mechanisms, so certain nodes can freely play a selfish role at the detriment of altruistic ones. In this paper we try to answer the question in the title, by showing how cooperation can definitely help reduce the overall energy consumed in an ad hoc network. By exploiting a behavior-tracking algorithm mutuated from game theory, we allow traffic to be forwarded only towards cooperative nodes. We hence prove that we can reduce power wastage at the same time maximizing the delivery rate. With the mentioned approach, selfish nodes are isolated from the network unless they decide to start cooperating. Our experimental tests aim at verifying the quick reaction time in response to variable nodes' behaviors as well as presenting a comparative analysis of the actual energy spent to successfully send traffic towards destinations.

Since the end of the Second World War, civil war has been the most frequent and deadly form of armed conflict. This has resulted in an abundance of explanations of the occurrence of civil war. Nevertheless, a complete explanation of any phenomenon must be able to explain the absence as well as the occurrence of said phenomenon. The time has come to turn to the non-events, the dogs that do not bark; the countries where we should expect to see civil war, but where no civil war occurred. One such country is Tanzania. Within Tanzania’s postindependence history, the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar, and the 1990-2010 period stand out as particularly conflict-prone. Therefore, the research question is: Why was there no civil war in Zanzibar in the period 1990 – 2010? To answer this question, I combine various theories of the causes of civil war into a comprehensive and systematic theoretical framework, which incorporates both structural and process-based theories of civil war onset. The resulting theoretical framework holds that governments and their domestic opposition produce their own civil wars, but not at their own accord; they produce them under certain structural conditions, given and transmitted from the past. This theoretical framework is developed in the theory chapter and operationalized in the methods chapter. I apply this theoretical framework to Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period, and argue that Zanzibar avoided civil war in this period for three reasons. First, in years preceding elections, escalation to civil war was prevented because of a belief held by the opposition that the next election would lead to substantial political change. Second, regardless of the level of objective opportunity, lack of perceived opportunity has prevented the opposition from initiating a civil war. And third, the leadership of the opposition has acted in a risk-averse manner at key moments. In total, the empirical case study explains the puzzle of Zanzibar’s relative peacefulness and illustrates the advantages of theory synthesis and methodological pluralism in the analysis of civil war risk in specific cases.

As we approach the end of the second decade into this millennial, rationality should prevail in all activities and decisions. Sequel to this, is the rationale behind use of paradigms, models and assumptions from Economics which support rational behaviour and decision-making for a better society.

The resurgence of measles is largely attributed to the decline in vaccine adoption and the increase in mobility. Although the vaccine for measles is readily available and highly successful, its current adoption is not adequate to prevent epidemics. Vaccine adoption is directly affected by individual vaccination de- cisions, and has a complex interplay with the spatial spread of disease shaped by an underlying mobility (travelling) network. In this paper, we model the travelling connectivity as a scale-free network, and in- vestigate dependencies between the network’s assortativity and the resultant epidemic and vaccination dynamics. In doing so we extend an SIR-network model with game-theoretic components, capturing the imitation dynamics under a voluntary vaccination scheme. Our results show a correlation between the epidemic dynamics and the network’s assortativity, highlighting that networks with high assortativity tend to suppress epidemics under certain conditions. In highly assortative networks, the suppression is sustained producing an early convergence to equilibrium. In highly disassortative networks, however, the suppression effect diminishes over time due to scattering of non-vaccinating nodes, and frequent switch- ing between the predominantly vaccinating and non-vaccinating phases of the dynamics.

When a product of unknown quality is first introduced, consumers may choose to strategically delay their purchasing decisions in order to learn from the reviews of their peers (social learning). This paper investigates how the presence of social learning affects the strategic interaction between a dynamic-pricing monopolist and a forward-looking consumer population, within a simple two-period model. Our analysis yields three main insights. First, we find that conventional wisdom regarding the optimal implementation of dynamic pricing may not apply: In the absence of social learning, price-skimming policies are always optimal; by contrast, in its presence we show that (i) if the firm commits to a price path ex ante (pre-announced pricing), the optimal policy typically consists of increasing prices, while (ii) if the firm adjusts price dynamically (responsive pricing), the optimal policy consists of an initially lowered price that may either rise or decline over time. Second, we estab...

RecDroid is an Android smartphone permission control framework which provides fine-grained permission control regarding smartphone resources and recommends the permission control decisions from savvy users to inexperienced (novice) users. However, malicious users, such as dummy users created by malicious app owners, may attempt to provide untruthful responses in order to mislead the recommendation system. Although a sybil detection function can be used to detect and remove some dummy users, undetected dummy users may still be able to mislead RecDroid framework. Therefore, it is not sufficient to depend on sybil detection techniques. In this work, we investigate this problem from a game-theoretical perspective to analyze the interaction between users and RecDroid system using a static Bayesian game-theoretical formulation. In the game, both players choose the best response strategy to minimize their loss in the interactions. We analyze the game model and find both pure strategy Nash ...

We consider three models of economies in which the distribution of the labor force between the private and the public sectors is determined by game-theoretic considerations. More specifically, the only active market in our models is the labor market, and we determine and investigate its Nash equilibrium points. The models vary in the degree of influence that government has in determining the wage of public servants. It should be emphasized that in our models unemployment is possible when the labor market is in equilibrium. Moreover, the rate of unemployment in equilibrium in our models has a simple and natural explanation.

An article on terrorism as it affects Nigerian economy and the need for welfare of Nigerian Army and Forces which is germane to the morale of the fighting troops as their victory goes a long way not only to end the insurgency but to put a stop to the menace causing setback in the economy of Nigeria.

Under deregulation, airlines developed hub-and-spoke (HS) networks enabling them to aggregate
demand, increase
frequency, reduce airfares and prevent entry into the marketplace. This research evaluates airline
profit based on micro- economic theory of behaviour under deregulation. Through a two-stage Nash
best-response game, equilibria in the air transportation industry is sought to evaluate the most
profitable HS network for an airline to survive in a deregulated environment. In the first stage of
the game, an integer linear program aids in generating potential networks. In the second stage, a
nonlinear mathematical program maximizes profits for each airline, based on the networks chosen by
all participants. The variables of the mathematical program include frequency, plane size and
airfares. In an illustrative
example, both monopoly and duopoly solutions are attainable as a function of demand.