Al Qaeda

The article is opened with definitions of terms utilized throughout the article. Terrorism is defined as the threat or employment of violence against noncombatant targets for political, religious, or ideological purposes by sub-national groups and/or clandestine individuals who are willing to justify all means to achieve their goals. Terrorist conduct is designed to attract attention to the terrorist’s cause and to spread fear and anxiety among wide circles of the targeted population. Subsequently I analyse how terrorists use the Internet, and what can be done to counter their activities. The Internet is used to disseminate information, for propaganda, indoctrination, networking, psychological warfare, socialization, motivation, fund raising, spreading tactics, recruitment, planning activities and coordination. As the Internet became a major arena for modern terrorists, we need to devise appropriate methods to forestall their activities and establish security.

This article analyses the representations of terrorism that arise out of the BBC’s coverage of the Wood Green ricin plot (2003), the first instance of al-Qaeda-related activity in the United Kingdom during the “war on terror”. Inspired by the work Michel Foucault, the article suggests that the BBC’s representations form part of an emergent “terrorism” dispositif, or apparatus, which draws together seemingly disparate and antagonistic groups into a strategic, mutually-sustaining alliance. The analysis focuses on two weeks’ worth of BBC “News at Ten” bulletins, alongside speeches and press releases issued by the Prime Minister and propaganda statements released by al-Qaeda’s leadership. In particular, the article suggests that the BBC’s representations inadvertently work to the advantage of elements within al-Qaeda and the British executive due to the fact that they portray the Wood Green events in ways that are tactically useful to both groups. As such, the article not only provides substantive empirical insight into the way representations of terrorism were mobilised in the build up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but also shows how Foucauldian concepts can provide creative and innovative analytical tools for understanding the dynamics of the contemporary media-state-terrorism relationship.

This article examines the heritage destruction undertaken by the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. To date, their iconoclasm has been mostly characterised either as acts of wanton barbarism devoid of religious or political justification, or as a cynical performance designed as a mass media spectacle. Drawing on a systematic analysis of two key IS propaganda outlets – their on-line magazine, Dabiq, and the various slick films released by Al-Hayat – this article argues that the heritage destruction perpetrated by the IS are not only situated within a carefully articulated theological framework and key to the creation of a new and ideologically pure ‘Islamic State’, but that they are also constituted by several complex layers of religious and political iconoclasm. To demonstrate, this article documents the iconoclasm undertaken by the IS along two key axes: Symbolic Sectarianism (Shia and Sufi mosques and shrines); and Pre-Monotheistic Iconoclasm (ancient polytheistic sites). Attacks on key sites within these categories, such as the Sayyida Zaynab shrine in Damascus or the Mosul Museum, not only adhere to their religious and political framework but also serve broader geo-political agendas and are attacked as proxy targets for their physical and ideological opponents.

With the rise of global actors declaring statehood, the place branding competition has expanded beyond internationally recognized cities and nations. ISIS and al-Qaeda insist the establishment of the Caliphate defined both as a place and identity is paramount to reuniting Muslims under a supranational Islamic government. This study explores how each group presents the Caliphate as a place brand and identity construct in the online environment. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study investigates the discursive formation of place identity in ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) Arabic-language newsletters and examines the projections of Caliphate governance in over 3200 images. Using names, slogans, logos, and colours, ISIS targeted a niche Arab Muslim readership with contextual messages in al-Naba’ newsletter, while AQAP presented al-Masra as an Islamic, mainstream publication reinforcing the stated goal of liberating Jerusalem. The discursive strategies in al-Naba’ and al-Masra visuals further positioned ISIS as a self-governing Caliphate and AQAP as one of many sister brands with some capacity to govern. The study discusses the overlaps and distinctions between place and proto-state branding strategies and highlights the communicative threats the latter poses to cities and nations’ branding efforts worldwide.

Terrorism is designed to attract attention to the terrorist's cause and to spread fear and anxiety among wide circles of the targeted population. This paper provides information about the ways terrorists are using the Internet. The threat of terrorism is real and significant. As the Internet became a major arena for modern terrorists, we need to understand how modern terrorism operates and devise appropriate methods to forestall such activities.

To address if and how militant, non-state actors in the online environment react to on-the-ground military pressures facing their competitors, this study explores AQAP’s visual media campaign during the 2016–2017 military operations to retake Mosul and Raqqa from ISIS control. Using chi-square analyses and content analysis, we analyzed 4027 images from Inspire, Jihad Recollections, and al-Masra to reveal how the onset of the ISIS battles corresponded to changes in AQAP’s strategic use of visual content, presentational form, and language-based audience targeting. Significant changes in visual content related to the display of institutional power structures rather than identity markers. Shifts in presentational elements involved image positioning (foreground/background) and viewer distance (intimate/personal vs. social public). Language-based targeting strategies between English and Arabic publications, however, demonstrated the most substantial change from before to during the battles. The study concludes that a complete understanding of the military-media nexus of militant, non-state groups requires consideration of military pressure on competing groups.

The Global Jihadist Movement (GJM) has a series of well-defined objectives, which constitute the central points of their ideology. In the realization of these goals, propaganda and public communication play a central role. This article studies the evolution of the principal characteristics of GJM propaganda, analyzing over 2,000 documents issued by the GJM between 1996 and 2005.

Danial Byman‟s latest book, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Global
Jihadist Movement: What everyone needs to know, comes at a crucial
juncture in time when new terrorist outfits have been evolving out of the
old ones. This piece of writing by Daniel Byman qualifies more as a
handbook on Al Qaeda than an analytical attempt to ascertain how the
terrorist organisations have developed over time. It may as well have
been a detailed presentation of facts and figures if it were not for the
author‟s personal but biased take on certain matters. It starts with a
historical account of the pre 9/11 world and evolution of Al Qaeda long
before that. In this section, the author explains how 9/11 was
instrumental in bringing Al Qaeda from the periphery of global politics to
its white hot centre. The author takes the readers back to the era of
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to him, this time around, Al Qaeda was slowly establishing its organisational structure which was
upgraded with time. But the only thing more effective than the concrete
structure of the organisation was the idea behind its very existence. An
idea that made a small band of people powerful enough to terrorise the
world was the real ideology of this organisation. However, this premise
is based on a false assumption as these organisations are not merely
composed of a few adulterated minds and wrongly interpreted religious
notions. The truth, which the author completely ignores, is that there has
been substantial evidence which points to the bigger powers that have
funded such organisations.

The increasing rates of terrorism in Africa is a growing concern globally, and the realization of such dreadful circumstances demonstrates the need to disclose who is behind such terrible acts. Terrorists and extremist organizations have been known to use social media, and other forms of Internet-enabled technologies to spread idealism. Analyzing this data could provide valuable information regarding terrorist activity with the use of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools. This study attempts to review the applications and methods that could be used to expose extremist Internet behavior.

This paper examines the relationship between al-Qaida in Iraq and Islamic State, asking what remains of AQI within the current incarnation of IS. The study is based on available information concerning the backgrounds and the roles of the top leaders within AQI/IS over the last ten years, with a particular focus on their respective relationship to the Baath party, AQI, and al-Qaida Central. Despite the apparent historical continuity between AQI and IS, there are several differences concerning the background and networks of the respective leaderships. A case can be made that Jabhat al-Nusra is connected to some of same regional networks that established AQI, while IS is more of an extension of the Iraqi faction within AQI and of other indigenous networks like the Baath party and other insurgent groups.

This briefing offers preliminary reflections and insights into global jihadi discourses on women’s role as militant activists. It references primary source writings and audiovisual materials produced by jihadi groups and ideologues. The briefing will provide an overview of global jihadi discourses on Muslim women’s role as militant activists, firstly highlighting some of the more important contributions concerning women produced by jihadi ideologues, secondly, examining the place of the Muslim woman in jihadi media, and thirdly, comparing Sunni jihadi discourses on women with transnational Shi'i jihadi discourses. The tensions between the need to recruit women into the frontline and the importance of Muslim women’s traditional role on the home-front create competing discourses. This analysis opens possibilities for further research, and for feminist reflection on the operations of gendered forms of agency in the intersections of militancy and conservative neo-traditional interpretations of Islamic law.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10130950.2016.1268827?journalCode=ragn20

While known and feared as the most dangerous global jihadi group, since 2014 al-Qaida has only been involved in one attack in the West. In the same period, al-Qaida's renegade affiliate and current competitor, the Islamic State, has organised or taken responsibility for as many as 38 attacks, thus legitimately positioning itself as the primary threat against the West and pioneer of the global jihad movement. This article argues that the contestation and competition that emerged between the two groups as a result of their split in February 2014 is part of the explanation of the dramatic change in the enemy hierarchy, or political preferences, of the two most dominant Sunni jihadi groups. Furthermore, the article explains how the inter-group competition also prompted the definition of other jihadi actors, identified as the internal enemy, into the enemy hierarchy of al-Qaida and the Islamic State, although to a different extent.

AQ’s activities in Bangladesh have primarily been conducted through its South Asian
affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which has adopted a propaganda centric approach to gain a foothold in the country. This article assesses AQIS’ online
presence and propaganda aimed at recruiting affluent urban youth and exploiting
longstanding domestic and regional issues including the grievances of the Rohingya
Muslims and domestic Islamist extremist groups.

With the release of Hollywood blockbuster ‘Zero Dark Thirty’ renewed attention has been paid to the Operation in which
Osama bin Laden was killed, and questions have again begun circulating about the US programme of ‘targeted killings’ more
generally. Using the framework of international humanitarian law, this essay critically evaluates the legality of this particular
targeted killing. By determining whether the US was participating in an international or non-international conflict against
Al-Qaeda; whether bin Laden was a legitimate military target; and whether the Operation itself was conducted within the parameters
of international humanitarian law, that is whether it satisfied the requirements of distinction, proportionality and
(arguably) necessity, this essay reveals the Operation was most likely illegal under international humanitarian law. The essay
concludes by discussing the inadequacy of international humanitarian law as it applies to targeted killing, and offers some
general lessons to be learned from the Operation.

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Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) is one of the most powerful jihadi groups in Libya and it might, in fact, represent a more significant long-term threat than IS' provinces in Libya. However, there are few recent studies of ASL, so exactly what kind of threat the group poses has not been adequately understood. After examining the group's evolution, ideology, strategy and violent activities, we find that ASL is, and most likely will remain, more of a local and regional threat than a global one. The group still poses a significant threat to Western interests, as it has carried out attacks against Western targets in Libya, has close ties to al-Qaida, and operates training camps for international jihadis within its territory.

The Legacy of Iraq critically reflects on the abject failure of the 2003 intervention to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy, underpinned by free-market capitalism, its citizens free to live in peace and prosperity. It argues that mistakes made by the coalition and the Iraqi political elite set a sequence of events in motion that have had devastating consequences for Iraq, the Middle East and for the rest of the world. Today, as the nation faces perhaps its greatest challenge in the wake of the devastating advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and another US-led coalition undertakes renewed military action in Iraq, understanding the complex and difficult legacies of the 2003 war could not be more urgent. Ignoring the legacies of the Iraq war and denying their connection to contemporary events could means that vital lessons are ignored and the same mistakes made again.

Jihadist narratives have evolved dramatically over the past five years, driven by momentous events in the Middle East and beyond; the death of bin Laden; the rise and ultimate failure of the Arab Spring; and most notably, the rise of the so-called Islamic State.

For many years, al-Qaeda pointed to an aspirational future Caliphate as their utopian end goal — one which allowed them to justify their violent excesses in the here and now. Islamic State turned that aspiration into a dystopic reality, and in the process hijacked the jihadist narrative, breathing new life into the global Salafi-Jihadi movement. Despite air-strikes from above, and local disillusionment from below, the new caliphate has stubbornly persisted and has been at the heart of ISIS’s growing global appeal.

This timely collection of essays examines how jihadist narratives have changed globally, adapting to these turbulent circumstances. Area and thematic specialists consider transitions inside the Middle East and North Africa as well as in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. As these analyses demonstrate, the success of the ISIS narrative has been as much about resonance with local contexts, as it has been about the appeal of the global idea of a tangible and realised caliphate.

April 2016 • £30.00
9781849046473 • 256pp

The word 'madrasa' do generate a lot of curiosity and negative propaganda among scholars of international community. In most of the instances it is considered to be an institution of preaching hatred and violence. Moreover, the madrasas existing in Pakistan are considered to be factories producing religious extremists. But, strangely enough, the basic reason behind the emergence of madrasa-to seek knowledge as enshrined in the principals of Islam are not known. Therefore, fundamental objective or purpose of the study is to understand the changing pattern of madrasa and the role of government in Pakistan to 'modernise' it. The paper is also trying to understand the socio-political context of Pakistan under which the madrasas are operating. The study has been based on the research experience of the writer who has extensively studied the Madrasa Literature of Pakistan while writing her Doctoral thesis. The few core findings of the paper are the fact that over a considerable period of time, madrasas have evolved from an all encompassing educational institution to a centre of religious knowledge; the society of Pakistan to some extent has been segmented into western educated 'modern and fortunate' people versus madrasa educated 'traditional and less-fortunate' mass. Moreover, post 9/11, Pakistani Government did try to 'reform' the madrasa system but could not achieve much success due to shallow approach and non-compliance of various madrasa establishments.

In recent years, jihadist-inspired armed groups and individuals have planned and, in some cases, actually carried out terrorist attacks in the West using various types of firearms - some of them with severe consequences. After presenting an overview of the literature available on the subject, this article focuses on organizational-level terrorist weapon selection and, in particular, it addresses the issue of the acquisition and use of firearms for jihadist attacks in the West, on the basis of original data.

The conflict in Yemen has been labelled the 'worst humanitarian crisis in the world' by the EU and characterised by the UN as 'entirely man-made'. The UN has warned that Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the Arab world prior to the conflict, is now on the brink of widespread famine, which could lead to further massive loss of life. Yemen is also suffering from one of the largest cholera outbreaks in recorded history, with over one million suspected cases. The conflict has been variously portrayed as a civil war, a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and a supposedly ancient schism between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. The diversity and sheer number of actors involved in the conflict, however, demonstrates that these characterisations are far too simplistic and that the conflict defies neat categorisation. As such, the paper attempts to unpack and provide an up-to-date account of the conflict, both from a humanitarian and a political perspective. To this end, the paper explores some of the underlying causes of the conflict and the actions of the plethora of actors involved, notably the internationally-recognised Hadi government, the Houthi movement, the Saudi-led coalition, Iran, al-Qa’ida, and the West. The paper also examines Australia’s position vis-à-vis the conflict and some of the implications of the presence of foreign personnel serving as both fighters and high-ranking officers in the UAE armed forces.

This article investigates Twitter data related to the kidnapping case of two German nationals in the southern region of the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). It explores perceptions of the ASG, along with associated organizations and sentiments indicated in the tweets together with statistically significant relationships. Findings revealed that: “Rebel” and “Militant” were the most frequently used labels for the ASG; a majority of the tweets contained sentiments that assess threats such as abduction and kidnapping of hostages; and almost half contained words that indicate negotiation or concession to the demands of the captors. Logistic regression analyses on “Rebel” and “Islamist” revealed positive coefficients for these sentiments used as predictors. This meant that people who assessed threats and expressed sentiments that responders should concede to the captors’ demands were more likely to use the “Rebel” or “Islamist” labels. Rather than the two longstanding dominant narratives of the ASG as terrorists and criminals, the emerging rebel and militant labels suggest a more domestically and politically sensitive Twitter commentary than is represented in the work of the Al-Qaeda-centric paradigm exponents. These findings, along with the complex associated political and policy contexts and implications, are discussed in this article.

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

The unprecendeted growth of terrorism had made the environment of international peace and security far more complex than in the era of World war and Cold war. By utlizing the features of globalization the terror organizations had gone transnationalwith its elaborate complicated networks thereby changing the nature of conflict fought so far as these terror organizations as non-state actors tends to challenge the state stability as never before. Further the process of globalization had blurred the distinction between global and regional security because if there is a threat to regional stability then it willhave its spillover effects like in the form of refugee, migration crisis and other human right rights issues which became a matter of concern for international community as it threatens the international peace. Therefore in order to devise an efficient and effective counter policy to terrorism it is necessary to understand the perpetuators of terrorism- the terrorist organizations. This paper tends to analyse one of the prominent terror organization Al-Qaeda using the combined aspects of strategic framework and organizational theories that usually explains the decision making process of the organization. In this paper the background events that contributed to the evolution of Al-Qaeda as a organization, its objectives and underlying ideological narrative are discussed in detail. Further the modus operandi of Al-Qaeda are explained in the form of its terror tactics strategies, its organizational features and its revenue and logistics supply methods. Therefore this paper gives the detailed understanding about the working method of Al-Qaeda which helps to understand the policy implications that demands the combination of hard power to contain and soft power to curb it.

How do political and religious leaders and organizations
delegitimize rival perspectives within their own religious
tradition? What kind of frames do they use to undermine the
arguments of others? Although there is a rich literature that
studies interreligious violence and how religious organizations
use faith-based symbols and narratives to justify action against
“the other”, intra-religious dynamics of competition and how
public theologies, strands, and perspectives within religions
compete have been understudied. In this article, I introduce the
concept of “outbidding frames”. I show how two radical Islamic
organizations, Al-Qaida and the Islamic State employed different
frames against the like-minded groups and actors within their
tradition. Using organizations’ publications and statements, I
identify common outbidding frames based on political legitimacy;
loyalty; morality; (anti)secularity; and methodology.

Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie współczesnych narracji konspiracyjnych w kontekście społeczeństwa hiszpańskiego oraz tamtejszych środków masowego przekazu. Koncentruje się na sprzecznych teoriach spiskowych, jakie narosły wokół tragicznego w skutkach zamachu terrorystycznego, który miał miejsce 11 marca 2004 roku w Madrycie. Do dziś stanowi on pożywkę, dzięki której kiełkują zupełnie odmienne domniemania co do postaci jego sprawców, przyczyn oraz celów społeczno-politycznych, jakie przyświecać miały temu brutalnemu posunięciu. Narracje dotyczące ataku idą w zasadzie dwutorowo, a zasadniczymi aktorami, których hiszpańskie środki masowego przekazu podejrzewają o jego przeprowadzenie są z jednej strony islamscy fundamentaliści, a z drugiej strony baskijska organizacja terrorystyczna ETA.

2/2016

A Guerra Global contra o Terror tem consumido uma grande quantidade de recursos estadunidenses desde 2001. Operando no Iraque e no Afeganistão há quase duas décadas, os EUA têm até agora falhado na elaboração de um plano para o término da guerra no Oriente Médio. Isso levanta a questão se a estratégia da Al Qaeda – juntamente com movimentos associados – e operações relacionadas têm sido bem-sucedidas, ou não, desde que a guerra foi declarada aos Estados Unidos. Para responder a essa pergunta, comparamos elementos dos planos e ações da Al Qaeda com a teoria de Mao Tse-Tung sobre como realizar uma guerra prolongada em três fases. Ao fazer isso, pareceu razoável afirmar que a Al Qaeda, embora bastante bem-sucedida na implementação de sua fase 1, não conseguiu desenvolver seu próprio exército e assim lidar com as fases 2 e 3. Também observamos que tanto a Al Qaeda quanto o movimento associado chamado Al Qaeda no Iraque não reavaliaram oportunamente suas estratégias fracassadas.

This paper analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on extremist and terrorist actors with a special focus on the “Islamic State” (IS), “Al Qaeda” (AQ), their affiliates, and other active groups. The first aspect is the religious and ideological approach to the pandemic, misuse of religious scripts, and portraying the pandemic within extremist ideology. This is transferred in propaganda and inspiration and recruitment of new fighters and supporters, mainly via social media. The second aspect is the operational level, how extremists took the opportunity to implement a new strategy, “modus operandi”, and even use the virus as a weapon. There was a significant increase in activity especially in countries with the previous presence of those groups. The pandemic has also affected prisons and refugee camps as especially vulnerable, as well as the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). These aspects are analyzed through a comparative view of different countries and regions.

The Salafi-jihadi movement shifted to prioritizing local over global objectives during the Arab Spring. Analysts wrongly understood this as a weakening of the groups. Groups have hidden their true nature by hiding their ties to global jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and by rebranding and reorganizing on the ground. Movement leaders design and execute attacks in ways that create doubt and ambiguity about the responsible party. This new technique exploits US counterterrorism policy, which is not designed to pursue anyone other than the individuals directly responsible for the attack. American officials are countering a dynamic enemy with an irrelevant and outdated strategy.

—Syria’s complex internal conditions particularly since 2010 paved the way for civil war inside the country. Bashar al-Assad’s intricate schemes to subdue the impending ‘Arab Spring’ and remained to cling to power resulted in the deaths and destructions of immense proportion inside Syria. Assad’s employed virtually every conceivable fighter starting from
frontline soldiers to cyber hackers to civil police and bureaucracy to crackdown protest against his power. Assad succeeded in sticking to power but Syria entered into a spiral of civil violence. The growing civil unrest and official atrocities in neighboring Iraq was further fueling the crisis in Syria. The situation was ripening for the takeover of militants from whatever civil governance left with their leaders. It is in this background al Qaeda in Iraq spread its arm through Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Cross-fertilization of host of other militant groups, former soldiers who had been fired from their jobs, unemployed local youths and those who had suffered the atrocities of authorities made a robust gang to overrun the existing government. This gang fortunately bestowed by highly capable leaders, which became the
dreaded Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki adopted anti-Sunni policies to the detriment of his own fate and government, which paved the way for Sunni Awakening and rising of ISIS. Similarly, neighbouring countries Gulf countries particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in their quest for an extended Sunni principality in Iraq
and Syria supported the Sunni extremists who later became ISIS and who are now posing threat to the very regime which created the monster. The US and west simply gone by their profit motives and adopted dangerous policies in Iraq, which forced the Iraqi Sunnis, the al Qaeda and former Baath party supporters to take corrective measures. The West supported opposition parties in Syria, who were became future ISIS. Combinedly all these factors, which formed part of statecraft in their respective sphere had facilitated in the propping up of ISIS.

Saleem Shahzads Misperceptions regarding non state actors in af pak

Syed Saleem Shazads analysis of non state actors places non state actors on a higher pedestal than state actors. This scribes study of so called terrorism built over many physical personal visits to all provinces of Afghanistan down to sub district level as well as Pakistan pointed to a different conclusion. But there is a reason why Shahzads conclusions and this scribes conclusions are different. This is because Shahzad was making his living from journalism and that necessitated lacing and appetizing his conclusions with spice and salts .All that he wrote was with one eye on his audience . As a researcher this scribe did not have any audience to please nor any donor or paymaster to satisfy. So the basic difference between Shahzads conclusions and this scribes conclusions are as follows . I hold the view that non state actors acting independently of state actors are only TEN PERCENT PART OF THE PROBLEM. THAT NON STATE ACTORS ACTING AS PROXIES OF STATE ACTORS ARE NINETY PERCENT PART OF THE PROBLEM. SO NINETY PERCENT ONUS OF THE CRIME LIES SQUARELY ON SHOULDERS OF THE STATE WHILE INDEPENDENT NON STATE ACTORS ARE ONLY TEN PERCENT STAKE HOLDERS IN A MALICIOUS CAULDRON TERMED AS TERRORISM? Many years ago Sir Peter Ustinov defined all this very exactly albeit humorously. He thus stated “ War is terrorism of the rich and Terrorism is war of the poor”. This scribes studies carried out since 1976 or so lead him to the conclusion that (1) USA (2) Pakistan (3) USSR/Russia (4) Saudi Arabia (5) Turkey (6) Great Britain (7) France (8) Qatar and (9) Iran are lead terrorist sponsoring states. Any study of terrorism that fails to include these eminent states is incomplete and thus inconsequential. In preface Shahzad writes that he never worked for any well funded organization .This is a provocative statement as the way Syed Shahzad was sponsored on print and TV media points that he did have powerful patrons and well funded organizations who wanted to make sure that Syed Salim Shahzads message was disseminated as widely as possible. Shahzads assertion in the last page of his preface that “ defeat of the western coalition appears imminent” is also highly questionable and debatable. Guerrilla war has no winners. What happens is that a highly advanced powerful state occupies a country and devastates it and one fine day when it leaves this country those who are left behind proclaim and celebrate it as a great victory of Communism or Islam or x , y and z. Example US withdrew from Vietnam but this did not lead to the demise of USA as a super power. USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan had a far greater link with internal dynamics of USSR and the Saudi Oil prices crash lowering than with any thing to do with Afghanistan or Islamic martial fervor. Such sensational myths in latter part of the sentence were picked up by media and sold as tasty but cheap media masala curry.

The US strategy lacked that burning fire to beat the enemy. While US strategists rightly saw China as consolidating Pakistan as its western corridor to Gulf oil and mineral resources of West Asia their support to secessionists in Pakistani Balochistan was weak and instead of strengthening Baloch nationalism has actually weakened Baloch secessionism. Similarly US attempts to destabilize Pakistans Northern Area also lack serious strategic resolve. The US 2008 plan to establish civilian supremacy in Pakistan was also a strategic failure and has destabilized Pakistan rather than stabilizing Pakistans civil military equilibrium. The US strategists lacked the long term vision to create new states which could have stabilized the region which they had destabilized i.e Iraq and Afghanistan.Thus Iraq was shamelessly abandoned to become a haven of terrorism , whereas Iraqs division into Kurd , Sunni and Shia regions would have stabilized it and restrained and checked Iranian ambitions. Similarly US failure to divide Afghanistan will again go a long way to destabilize the whole region with a new Afghan Civil war. US failure to utilize its unique central position in Afghanistan to deal with Iran was also a failure and the US leaves the region greatly destabilized than it was on eve of October 2001. The report card for the US strategists is FAIL and FAIL in both Afghanistan and Iraq while in case of Pakistan again it was a grand failure. The US as it leaves the region in 2014 , leaves it with a feather in its cap of having created greater instability than was the case in 2001.

DEPOIS DE TER "PEREGRINADO" por vários países, Osama Bin Laden foi morto aos 54 anos no Paquistão. A sua morte de Bin Laden alimentou um certo sentido de justiça e de triunfalismo na luta contra o terrorismo e a Al-Qaeda. Afagou igualmente o orgulho americano e a imagem do presidente Obama. Mas suscitou também novas questões, nomeadamente, sobre o futuro da Al-Qaeda, os reflexos no Afeganistão, a relação EUA-Paquistão e o direito de "ingerência antiterrorista".

The present work consists of a reflexive commentary on the book of Professor Juan Avilés from an eminently psychological perspective, focusing on those aspects most significant for said discipline, pointing out some salient elements to conclude about them at the end.

El presente trabajo consiste en un comentario reflexivo sobre el libro del profesor Juan Avilés desde una perspectiva eminentemente psicológica incidiendo en aquellos aspectos más significativos para dicha disciplina, señalando algunos elementos salientes para concluir sobre ellos al final.

On the morning of the 8th of April 2013, the world woke up to Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi, the leader of what was called the Islamic State in Iraq or ISI, announcing the expansion of his group from Iraq into Syria. Al-Baghdadi also announced the merger of ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) into a new group called the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham or ISIS. Only one day after the announcement, JN released a recorded speech from its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, in which he denied the merger while accepting the ties between the two groups. To make things complicated, al-Jolani swore a new oath to the head of al-Qaeda Central (AQC), Aymen Al- Zawahiri. Tension escalated between the two groups until the dispute was referred to al- Zawahiri in his capacity as the head of AQC. In June 2013, al-Zawahiri sent a letter to both groups to resolve the dispute in which he ruled against ISI’s decision to merge the two groups and thus created a split between ISI and JN. This thesis contends that the split between JN and ISI has led to a theological debate between Salafi-Jihadi ulamaʾ, in which they interpreted the same Islamic concepts differently to argue about the validity of al-Baghdadi’s decision to merge with JN, al-Jolani’s refusal of the merger, and al-Zawahiri’s letter itself. On the one hand, this reflects the commonalities between the adherents of this interpretation of Islam, and on the other it shows that Salafi-Jihadism is not and has not been a homogenous entity.

In this exchange in International Security, I contest Barbara Walter's thesis that groups like ISIS benefit from being super extreme. I argue that extremism is counterproductive -- a point developed in far greater detail in my book, Rules for Rebels, which comes out in fall 2018.

This report calls on data from the largest collection of interviews with foreign fighters and those closest to them. It combines data from open-ended interviews with 43 parents, siblings, and friends of 30 men and women who travelled to Syria and Iraq. The findings and insights of this report examine two issues. Firstly, the report sheds light on the motivations of the thousands of foreign fighters who left their families, homes, and lives to fight for jihadist groups since the start of the Syrian civil war. Secondly, it provides insight into the difficulties which families of foreign fighters face when coming to terms with their loss. It examines common factors between foreign fighters, the process of radicalisation, and whether they had contact with their families once they made the hijrah (migration) to Syria.

For all the radical Islamists, the world is divided into two adobes, Darul Islam and Darul Harb, and their aim is to expand Darul Islam to the level where there is no place left for Darul Harb in the world. Only then would the jihad stop in this world. This makes the peaceful co-existence of Muslim countries and societies along with Muslim countries a difficult task. It is mostly, about the fact that, for the Islamists the concept of nation-states is not acceptable. They believe in establishment of a Muslim state where there is no need of borders. In short, it is almost impossible for radical Islamists to live peacefully in the nation-states. To argue in favor of the question, firstly the ideologies of Maududi, Qutb, Abdul Wahab and Khomeini are briefly defined in the context of jihad, then the relationship between the ideologues of Khomeini and Iran’s policy of exporting its revolution is explained, which then is followed by the explanation of connection between the three ideologues of Sunni jurisprudence and Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, in the context of Afghan-Soviet war.

Com'è sorto lo "Stato islamico" nell'Iraq e nella Siria devastati dalla guerra civile e perché il jihad armato è diventato un attore chiave del panorama internazionale? Qual è la forza di un messaggio che attrae migliaia di foreign fighters? Perché il radicalismo islamista compie atti di inaudita efferatezza?
Queste sono alcune delle domande cui il volume intende dare risposta, analizzando profili e strategie delle sigle che hanno scatenato una spirale di violenza capace di infiammare intere regioni del dar al-islam. Con la nascita di al-Qa'ida, e dopo l'11 settembre 2001, le formazioni che innalzano il vessillo del jihad armato hanno raggiunto un raggio d'azione che va dal Pakistan alla Mauritania e, nonostante sconfitte e ripiegamenti, sono riuscite a squassare i precari equilibri del mondo musulmano.
Un'analisi precisa e articolata che dimostra con quali strategie il terrorismo jihadista sia stato capace, dopo la morte di Osama bin Laden, di riorganizzarsi e diversificarsi per agire da protagonista nel grande disordine della geopolitica mondiale. Oggi sta sfidando il predominio di potenze regionali come l'Arabia Saudita, l'Iran e la Turchia in uno scontro dagli esiti imprevedibili, e ha portato la sua violenza sanguinaria anche nel cuore dell'Europa.

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader
Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

Most of the US public opinion generally remembers the 80s as a successful decade, characterized by a great economic recovery and the victory in the Cold War at the expense of the Soviet Union. Those years came after the uncertain 70s, when the American weakness was particularly visible. Many authors use to describe the then-President, Ronald Reagan, as the leading “actor” of that patriotic renaissance. More than thirty years on, the ghost of the US decline is back. Mitt Romney, the Grand Old Party candidate for the presidential election to be held in November 2012, declared one of his main goals is to reverse this widespread perception. What is his perspective of the world politics? And, should he won the election, how would he act on the international stage to defend the US and Western interests around the globe? The article addresses these issues, focusing on the suggested historical parallelism between Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama, and – as a consequence – between Reagan and Romney himself.

This Technical Memorandum discusses the nature and extent of the terrorist threat against the petroleum industry. It specifically focuses on al Qaeda’s efforts and stated intent to strike at energy infrastructure in the Middle East and in other parts of the world, including Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela. Additionally, it highlights economic costs of petro-terrorism and vulnerabilities to oil infrastructure, and suggests possible options for governments and industry to reduce the risks posed by terrorists.