Air Defence

With the shooting down of a US drone by Iran and the more recent killing of a top Iranian Commander in a US drone strike, tension in the region has gone up several notches. One of the key factors that will determine the future course of action, and will influence the outcome of any interplay between US and Iran is the Iranian Air Defence. This paper looks at the capabilities and limitations of Iranian Air Defences.

A photographic, drawn and written record of the World War 2 Stubb’s Hill Heavy Anti-Aircraft Site near Blunsdon, Swindon (including a Level 3 record and a systematic historic analysis of the origin, development and use of the standing buildings); the site and standing building surveys were completed on 29 November 2013.

Designated a Vital Point during the Second World War, the defence of Swindon against German air attack was important to the war effort. The surviving gun emplacements are the most complete remaining example of the four semi-permanent heavy anti-aircraft sites which defended the town between 1941 and 1944, and are of local and regional significance.

The Stubb’s Hill site is an important example of the tactical deployment and use of static (rather than mobile) anti-aircraft defences during the War, utilising the 3.7 inch heavy antiaircraft
gun attached via a holdfast to a concrete platform; a tactic which dominated UK based air defence from 1941 to 1944.

The site is also noteworthy as an example of the unique role of the ATS during the War. Designated a mixed site from 1941, the remaining buildings stand as a testament to the pioneering work of British female service personnel during the 1940s.

The four gun emplacements are in good condition, which is almost certainly due to their setting in a rural landscape; as evidenced by their physical condition, the total lack of graffiti, and the survival of some of the original internal paintwork. Now that the buildings
and the site have been recorded, schemes for their survival should be incorporated into any plans for the future development of the area.

These slides cover the basics of EW, Radar, EOIR and Communications.  In addition, it also discusses jamming and deception concepts.  Topics covered include History of EW, ES, EP, EA in modern warfare (specific to Air Warfare, including GBAD), Definitions and terms, Radar and Communications Fundamentals (surveillance and fire control radars), Radar and Communications Vulnerabilities, Jamming Concepts, Active vs Passive Jamming, Denial and Deception Jamming

ABSTRACT: There are three core parts of the present analysis. The first part is about whether the Turkish peacetime downing of the Russian military aircraft is justifiable or not on the basis of an alleged airspace violation. The second part is the analysis of Russian accusations
against Turkey, focusing on whether Turkey is an ally of ISIS by being involved in smuggling weapons, ammunition, explosives, cheap oil and gas, narcotics etc. to or from the terrorist organisation. Based on such an analysis the real reasons of downing of the Russian military
aircraft will emerge. The third main part of the analysis will examine possible escalation scenarios when Turkish calls for Article V. military operations against Russia will likely fail.
KEYWORDS: intervention, downing, smuggling, ISIS, Russia, Syria, US, West

History of the Air Defense of New York City form 1948-1974. This thesis covers some of the command and control aspect of Air Defense, as well as Radar, Fighters, and Antiaircraft Artillery in the use of air defense of New York City. This thesis also covers the history of the Highlands Air Force station in Highlands, New Jersey and its role in this defense as a long range radar station and as a command and control site for area Nike defenses.

Sub-conventional warfare refers to the grey region of the spectrum of conflict. From inception the face of the sub-conventional warfare remains in a continuous transition due to the changing dynamics of technology, interests of state/non state actors, global/regional political status etc. The unique characteristics of airpower such as height speed and reach empowered by flexibility, mobility and precision enables Air Forces to counter sub-conventional elements with asymmetric advantage. Hence it requires timely reviews of roles and missions ultimately lead to techniques and tactics with differing capabilities in dissimilar situations. Air power is offensive in nature. Conventional applications of air power can be improvised in dealing with sub-conventional elements such as surveillance and reconnaissance, bird eye view for decision makers, tactical air mobility and air strikes. Naturally sub-conventional elements emerge as a small group of insurgents usually untrained and inexperienced, which later develops and expands up to near conventional forces by winning the popular support where they dominate. Nipping it in the bud is the best approach to eliminate such armed elements. Paralyzing militarily where their roots are not deepened enough to withstand longer and heftier military encounters. For the betterment of the safety and security of the nation, at times command elements might need to take crucial decisions to launch kinetic air operations even with inevitable minute unintentional damages. Air power strategy should be in line with overall strategy. Triumph of airpower against sub-conventional elements depends upon three main rudiments. They are Intelligence, technology and joint operational effort. This study proposes an option in designing airpower strategy in countering sub-conventional warfare challenges.

S-400!..

Rus yapımı Hava Savunma Sistemi!

Rusya haricinde henüz kimsede yok ama Çin’e bu yıl 48 fırlatma rampası teslim edilecek. Hindistan’la ise henüz bir satış anlaşması yapılmamış.

Ermenistan, Vietnam, Mısır, Kazakistan ve Belarus’ta S-400’ler ile ilgileniyor.

Ülke olarak bugünlerde Rus yapımı S-400 satın alınması konusunda anlaştığımız haberleri yayılıyor…

Rusya tarafı her ne kadar "Taraflar ilgili ve görüşmeler devam edecek." dese de bir kısım Türk medyasına göre sanki S-400 alımı konusunda “işlem tamam” havasındayız…

S-400 konusu basit bir füze alımı ihalesi veya süreci değil…

This paper describes the practical use of ASTERIX CAT-240 messages for the network distribution of radar video. The standard, which has emerged from the European Air Traffic Control community, offers a method of harmonising the exchange of radar video from a sensor or server into multiple display clients. This paper describes the background to the standard and explains some of the practical challenges for deployed systems in terms of IP fragmentation, compression and standards.

Introduction. News in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region have been dominated in the past couple of weeks by Beijing's 23 November announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East-China Sea. 1 Four aspects are particularly relevant. First, it covers Japan's Senkaku Islands, 2 which China claims under the name Diaoyu. Second, it includes the waters between Japan and Taiwan. Third, it requires aircraft flying through it to provide information, regardless of whether they are China-bound. Fourth, it has been accompanied by renewed speculation about a similar move in the South China Sea. The official announcement required all "Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone" to provide "flight plans … maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries", maintain "transponder identification" and "clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification", following Chinese instructions. The text also warned that "China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions." and stated that the ADIZ would come into force that same day. 3 Commenting on Beijing's move two days later, Andrew S. Erickson (US Naval War College) explained that the Chinese Air Force "soon conducted its first patrol in the zone, with two large reconnaissance aircraft monitoring the area, early warning aircraft supporting and fighters providing cover", adding that "despite boilerplate disclaimers to the contrary, Beijing's action appears targeted precisely at stoking tension between China and Japan, and putting pressure on the U.S.-Japan alliance". Erickson believes that "particularly problematic is the fact that official Chinese statements imply that Beijing intends to use military force if necessary to ensure that all aircraft comply with Beijing's instructions within its declared ADIZ", stressing that "this is an unrealistic expectation, as an ADIZ is not synonymous with national airspace". 4 Professor Tomohiko Taniguchi, senior adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, considered Beijing's move to lead to "a whole new game", and stressed an aspect of China's ADIZ which has attracted much criticism, namely that in contrast with other such zones planes traversing them but not heading to "Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the

Integrating defense against air and missile threats require more than technical integration - it requires entities confer on how these systems fit in a strategic context, and a blend of policy, planning and supporting efforts.  This piece, published in DefenseOne, advocates integration be treated holistically and the utility of using a third neutral party to facilitate discussions in order to mitigate biases in finding solutions and maintain a long term perspective.

This article talks broadly about strategy, planning and its practice. It uses examples from Britain’s defence policy, and hard numbers from the Cold War experience, to illustrate some of the problems the RAF faces today. It looks at Britain’s commitment to the air defence of its islands during the Cold War – an age of certainty – and compares it directly to the current defence policy and practice in the age of uncertainty. A historically pessimistic view of international relations and strategy is taken. The reason for this pessimism is based on historical precedent. In 1914, Europe went from peace to war in less than two months. In the 1930s Britain’s rearmament began in mid-decade to replace bi-planes and other equipment, but the RAF still went to war in 1939 with obsolescent, vulnerable equipment, and suffered severe losses of personnel and machinery.

Ilgar Gurbanov, “Interaction with Turkish Air Forces Boosts Azerbaijan’s Air-Combat Capability”, The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol.14 Issue 137, https://jamestown.org/program/interaction-turkish-air-forces-boosts-azerbaijans-air-combat-capability/

A comprehensive look at the different aspects of Beijing's ADIZ in the East-China Sea, including the motivations behind the move, the reaction by different countries (including Taiwan and Russia), the origins and evolution of ADIZs in international law, and the underlying conflicts between China and other nations. The paper also provides an overview of ADIZs in international law, indluding their origins and evolution. The connections between EEZs and ADIZs are also noted, together with Chinese perspectives on International Law.

This paper highlights how the National Socialist regime in Germany created the so-called «Selbstschutz»  («self  protection»)  in  civil  air  defense  as  an  «apparatus  of  society»  (Michel Foucault)  to  educate  the  German  population  with  regard  to  the  new  possibility  of  aerial 
bombing. Mechanisms, functions of emotional control and their relationship to concrete practices of the people involved are shown alongside a local example. Regarding the spread and
development of fears, this article maintains that practices of «Selbstschutz» had to bridge the
temporal gap between future expectations and actual experiences in crucial ways. Before the
war, «Selbstschutz» followed its own logic of expectation of danger and risk, as exemplified
in  aerial-defense  simulation  exercises,  which  clashed  with  the  reality  of  bombs  falling  on 
German cities later on.

The defense of Taiwan is a two-dimensional problem. First, geography creates certain unusual problems for the Republic of China (ROC) government, and, second, the disparity in size and potential strength of the military forces of the PRC are such that the Taipei government would be unlikely to defend the island over the long-haul - without external assistance.

The article surveys the air, sea, and land environment and forces available to Taiwan, considers some of the alternative naval options available in the early-Eighties to strengthen forces, reviews the internal security issues, and recent missile development in Taiwan.

The article is supported by several tables, including: Significant Army Busy from the U.S.; Non-U.S. Arms Purchases; ROC Army Deployment; ROC Navy Fleet; and, ROC Air Force Deployment.

Australia’s entry into the Second World War created a demand for trained pilots. In July 1940 the Commonwealth Government acquired 468 acres of land on the Nepean River floodplain at Macquarie Grove `for defence purposes’ for an airfield.1 The site had been  inspected in January 1940 for the RAAF by Wing commander EC Bates (RAF).2 He had found it eminently suitable for the establishment of a flying training school. The Air Board had taken control of the airfield in April with the initial expectation for the airfield to house 150 men and 50 aircraft.3 According to reports the airfield had an ideal location with a long runway (1100 feet), clear approaches, room for expansion and existing hangars.4 The site had the advantage of a good surface, reasonable weather throughout the year, and quiet rural surroundings.