Abkhazia

The competing theories of state recognition and their failings actively demonstrate that recognition of a state does not have any normative content per se, but rather, that the rules of state recognition, although legal rules, are legal vehicles for political choices. We have the dilemma of concurrently wanting the right cases to result in independent states while prohibiting the wrong ones from becoming so, and so we sail between political choices, using the language of law. The state is neither truly free to recognize another entity nor entirely bound. Differing cases require different legal criteria and different legal results. This flexibility in state recognition theory though, while depriving the act of any inherent legal meaning, has value in its utility for establishing lawful relationships.

This paper will argue that the reason we find it difficult to resolve the controversy over state recognition theory is because the international legal system translates political controversies into legal questions that can then be addressed through legal means. Legal actors, by announcing preference for one side of the question, often reveal certain legal and moral choices they are making about the nature of the state and the legitimacy of the international legal system - law and politics. In the area of state recognition, no theory of recognition has extinguished competition because no political choice has gained universal acceptance. The predominant political choice is most frequently deliberate indeterminacy, a co-existence of mutually opposing arguments. This indeterminacy is most likely deliberate because it permits the underlying rationale for the legal actor’s policies to change and evolve to suit the situation.

This article is dedicated to the Novorossiyan political myth among the populations of Southeastern Ukraine, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. The author analyzes this myth in terms of the peculiar transnationalism and political imagination that led to the formation of a utopian alternative to the existing East European order. The author argues that the Novorossiyan myth is the separatists' response to the needs and demands of groups that feel excluded from post-Soviet title nations. Also, the myth is a response to needs and demands of the populations of unrecognized states—the "invisible nations" that are now seeking a new "international or-der".

This is the proceedings of the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group workshop that took place in Reichenau, Austria, 9-11 November 2017. It focuses on problems of media bias, information operations, psychological operations, etc. The aim of the workshop was to determine whether biasing news content was acceptable to build peaceful relations.

This paper examines the impact of Soviet nationality policy in the region of Abkhazia, de jure a part of modern Georgia, between the years of 1921 and 1953. They years selected, which begin with the onset of Soviet rule in the area and end with the deaths of both Joseph Stalin and Lavrenti Beria, are used as this era saw the greatest impact of the nationality policy in Abkhazia. The hypothesis presented is that it was this nationality policy, and its consequent results, that led to the current conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, and that the Abkhaz feel they were unjustly targeted by the Soviet authorities as a result of both Stalin and Beria being ethnic Georgians. Evidence is presented that this was not the case, and instead Abkhazia was not singled out but were treated much as other parts of the Soviet Union were during this era, regardless of the ethnicity of the Soviet leadership. A case is made that because of initial Soviet policy to grant minority groups increased standing in their homelands, the Abkhaz, under the tutelage of Nestor Lakoba, were actually given increased independence, which was reduced as a consequence of an overall Soviet policy during the late 1930s. However due to a personal conflict between Beria and Lakoba, whom was murdered by the former, the Abkhaz instead believed that they were integrated into Georgia because of Stalin and Beria’s ethnic background, and consequently took issue with the Georgia, fearing they were to be eradicated as a distinct people. This research is important to show that the modern conflicts between Abkhazia and Georgia are not simply a post-Soviet conflict, but indeed have a background that dates back to the very formation of the Soviet Union, and thus to properly understand the current issues, and resolution, it is necessary to understand its causes.

This article sheds light on the Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia by situating it in a wider frame. It provides an analysis of its Euro-Atlantic orientation by presenting it as a continuation of past efforts to involve European powers in Georgian affairs and highlights changing trends in this aspect of contemporary foreign policy. Far from determining whether or not the Georgians are European, the different arguments that have been used to support Georgian “Europeanness” are evaluated to assess its role in the national identity construction process. Focusing primarily on the United National Movement government led by Mikheil Saakashvili, we demonstrate how the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been employed domestically by the political elite as a legitimacy management strategy and explore its function in seeking Western patronage, a key foreign policy goal.

This article examines aspects of cultural exchange between the Middle East and the West in which Sufism, Christianity, the traditions of the Circassians and New Age concepts played a central role. It focuses on the teaching of Murat Yagan, of Abkhaz-Circassian origin who grew up in Turkey and immigrated to Canada in the 1960s, where he developed his philosophy, Ahmsta Kebzeh ("the knowledge of the art of living"). The Kebzeh way of life emphasizes modesty, mutual responsibility and compassion. Yagan linked these values to the ancient ethos of the Caucasus Mountains which he sought to revive as the basis of a universal vision. The nature of Kebzeh was influenced by the cosmopolitan environment in which Yagan was educated in Turkey; by his enrollment with Sufi circles in North America; and by the multicultural Canadian atmosphere. These diverse influences enabled him to devise an ecumenical model of dialogue between cultures. The article provides a first-time survey and analysis of Kebzeh ideological and communal features. It sheds new light on the role of ethnicity and cultural heritage in immigrant societies in the context of the evolution of spirituality in Canada, a relatively unexplored milieu in comparison to the United States and Europe.

While working to seal off Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia after the 2008 war, Russia
promised to play a constructive role in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Transnistrian conflict. This
paper aims to assess how Russia delivered on its renewed peace-making pledge. It also will
spell out how Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova have reacted to the new Russian undertaking
to revive negotiations within the Minsk Group, the “5+2” format or other formulas with the
direct participation of Moscow. The paper will address how other international stakeholders
have adapted to the 2008 post-conflict situation and will uncover the developments relevant
for the conflict resolution process in the breakaway regions. It will conclude with an analysis
on prospective strategies to be employed by all sides and regional players in dealing with the
conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood and what could be done in 2013 to push the negotiations
forward.

Abkhazia during the Stalin era was at the same time a subtropical haven where the great leader and his lieutenants built grand dachas and took extended holidays away from Moscow, and also a key piece in the continuing chess match of Soviet politics. This paper will examine how and why this small, sunny autonomous republic on the Black Sea, and the political networks that developed there, played a prominent role in the politics of the south Caucasus region and in Soviet politics as a whole during the Stalin period.

This article investigates the intersection of Soviet nationality policy, ethno-federal territorialism, clientalism and the creation of new administrative institutions and in the course of the establishment of Soviet power in Abkhazia, an ethnically diverse territory in the periphery of the former tsarist empire. Based on materials from the Georgian archives, as well as from the personal collections of Efrem Eshba and Nestor Lakoba, this article demonstrates the ways in which nationality policy played out at the local level and how the ‘indigenization’ of local titular elites intersected with contestations over power and the distribution of resources inherent to the construction of the new institutions of Soviet rule.

Bu çalışma, Rusya'nın Güney Kafkasya ile ilgili hedeflerini sağlama çerçevesinde bir uluslar arası hukuk kurumu olan UCM 2 'yi nasıl kullanmak istediğini incelemektedir. Bu çerçevede self-determinasyon ile ilgili mevcut uluslararası hukuk kurallarını temel alarak Güney Osetya'nın Gürcistan'dan ayrılmasının mümkün olmadığı açıklanmakta ve ancak Kosova örneği takip edilerek bağımsızlık ya da ilhakın gerçekleştirilebileceği gösterilmektedir.

Looking, then, at the recent history, we may, without exaggeration, consider the last two decades to be the re-birth of the state of Abkhazia, even if the bulk of the international community (notably the USA and EU) persists in the erroneous belief that Abkhazia’s destiny (like that of South Ossetia) can be decided in international discussions from which the Abkhazians themselves are excluded.

This project aimed to bring together different points of view on Abkhazia. The authors were given complete freedom regarding the content of their texts. Their views in this project do not necessarily reflect the views of the AW website. The texts have been listed alphabetically according to the names of the authors.

National elections have remained, surprisingly, largely absent in most nation- building debates where focus has tended towards either the instrumentalism of political elites and/or much wider structural explanations (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Anderson 1991). Whether fair and free or unfree, national elites depend upon elections for their legitimation, both domestic and international. In many parts of the post-Soviet space elections are rigged, with turnout and the distribution of votes decided in advance of election day. (Wilson 2005). Nevertheless, while elections in the post-Soviet space may not serve their typical function of translating policy preferences into political representation, it has been argued that electoral processes can play a central role in nation-state building processes as part of efforts to legitimise authoritarian regimes (Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan 2015). In an attempt to build on previous observations regarding the relationship between elections and nation-building efforts in the post-Soviet space, this chapter examines the role elections have played in nation-state formation efforts in the unrecognised state of Abkhazia.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there remains a number of protracted conflicts, within and between the successor states, concerning irredentist entities. This article examines four cases of such de facto states, the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. After reviewing the genesis and geopolitical significance of these conflicts, the article focuses on the role of the European Union in conflict resolution. We argue that the EU plays a marginal role in all the protracted conflicts. Based on an analysis of its recent policies, we claim that the Union will maintain a low profile in the foreseeable future. 7 'Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond -A Blueprint for an integrated European energy network', Communication

The people of Abkhazia have a long history of nationhood: a Kingdom in 8th – 10th centuries, a Principality in 13th – 19th centuries, a Soviet Republic in 1921 – 1931, on par with Georgia, an autonomous State within the Georgian SSR in 1931 – 1992, an independent Republic in 1993, recognized in 2008 by Russia and Nicaragua. The main part of the present book is a demonstration of the international legitimacy of the Abkhazian State. For the sake of convenience the text is given in the form of questions and answers. Attached to the main article are historical tables and statistical data, as well as images of historical symbols and portraits of the leaders of Abkhazia, from the period of the Abkhazian Kingdom to the modern times.

In many respects, de facto states play a highly specific role as actors within the international system of sovereign states. The lack of international recognition has tangible political and economic impacts on the functioning of de facto states, and so the attempt to persuade domestic actors and the international community of the legitimacy of their claims to independence ranks among the most important components of these states' policy-not only in foreign policy, but also in domestic policy. The aim of this text is to contribute to our understanding of how internal legitimization strategies for Abkhazian statehood are constructed and how they impact upon the foreign policy of this de facto state. Field research was carried out via interviews with important official state representatives of Abkhazia and important non-state actors-including journalists and representatives of non-profit organizations, universities, the Church and other key institutions which influence public opinion within and beyond this de facto state.

The roots of today’s Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts can be traced to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the civil war that followed. Locating these origins in revolutionary times is not just a temporal exercise. These conflicts had their roots in social and ideological differences both between and within ethnic categories. While most politically active Abkhazians and South Ossetians harbored ethnic aspirations, expressions of Abkhazian and Ossetian ethnonationalism were heterogeneous and not all dedicated to complete territorial independence. The tragedy for Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian relations is that primarily political disputes became overwhelmed by chaos and violent revolutionary events.

Книга посвящена мало известной истории и искусству христиан-
ской державы — северокавказской Алании, и охватывает Χ–ΧV вв.
В монографии разбирается история аланского христианства, цер-
ковная архитектура и монументальная живопись. Представлены
результаты раскопок авторов. Издании сопровождает обширный
изобразительный материал, в т. ч. уникальные архивные фотогра-
фии, рисунки и чертежи.
Книга содержит также три приложения корпусного типа: о ка-
менных и металлических кресты с территории Алании (В. Н. Чхаидзе),
о кирпиче в церковном зодчестве Кавказа (Д. Д. Ёлшин), о пе-
трографическом анализе кавказского кирпича (А. Ю. Виноградов,
Д. Д. Ёлшин, М. А. Кулькова).
Предназначена для специалистов по истории, искусств и архео-
логии Кавказа и Христианского Востока, а также для всех интере-
сующихся историей Северного Кавказа.

In August 2008 Russia recognized the independence of the separatist Georgian province of Abkhazia invoking the right of self-determination of peoples. Moscow's move was a response to the recognition of Kosovo's independence by some members of the international community earlier that year. Some commentators argued that the independence of Kosovo constituted a legal precedent that could be invoked by other separatist regions, as in the case of Abkhazia. A comparison of events in Kosovo and Abkhazia refutes the argument that Kosovo's independence is a sui generis case. Furthermore, due to insufficient state practice and opinio juris the Kosovo case has not led to the formation of a new rule of customary international law concerning the right of external self-determination of peoples in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, Kosovo's and Abkhazia's declarations of independence and their recognition by some members of the international community constitute violations of international law.

This thesis will attempt to explain what were the most determinant factors which led to outbreak of August War 2008. In theory of peace and conflicts studies researchers underline that is possible to highlight many different aspects influential for process of increasing hostility and final war outbreak. This work will describe bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia in the context of conflicts over the Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those unresolved frozen conflicts are the significant factors for the war eruption. In introduction the reader can find scope and delimitations of thesis, research question and hypothesis. Next methodology and conceptual framework will be described. The analysis is based on pre-post case study. Therefore, the third chapter will contain the historical approach – relations between Russia and Georgia before the Rose Revolution in November 2003. In the fourth chapter is included the analysis of events and actions held since the Rose Revolution and 8 August 2008. The main materials which are using by the author of thesis are the press contents and official documents. This analysis will be supported by deep library research. In the last chapter the reader can find conclusion and answers for the hypothesis. The conclusion chapter will give the confirmation that frozen conflicts over the Abkhazia and South Ossetia were the most essential factors which were caused the war.

This article assesses the EU’s impact and effectiveness in promoting peace in its neighbourhood through the use of its contractual relations. It does so by focusing on two conflict zones at the EU’s doorstep: Turkey’s Kurdish question and Georgia’s conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This essay proposes the notion that there are many similarities between the 2008 war in Georgia and the 2014 conflict in Ukraine yet there are obviously cosmetic differences too. The Russian motivations for aggression remain constant, and both conflicts are similar in that Russia succeeds in annexing territory. The west's response to both conflicts have been different however, and the essay shall further examine the volatility that surrounds the west's decision making. The disputed territories of Crimea, Abkhazia and South Ossetia fall within Russia's supposed 'sphere of influence' which has diminished after the Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine. The pro-Western orientation of these two countries became a major issue for Russia yet for Georgia and the Ukraine, maintaining territorial integrity is the major issue.

"Long before the demise of the USSR, Western Sovietologists had noted the fact that in the Soviet Union the official version of history changed frequently. However, there is something that has passed almost unnoticed by the majority of scholars; namely, the debate about which version of history should be considered as true, and accepted as the official version to be included in school textbooks in the Soviet autonomous republics. This paper deals with several aspects of this process and its legacy by examining the way in which the distant past is presented in Soviet and post-Soviet  school history textbooks. The author reveals the conflicting ethnic
historical narratives in the textbooks of rival ethnic groups, focusing on the use of linguistic arguments to link ethnic identity to the territory controlled by the ‘titular’ ethnic group, and on the justification of the historical legitimacy of claims to territories by neighboring rival ethnic groups."

In this article the values of the “Abkhazian-Abazinians” and the “Circassians” who commemorated 147th year’s of the “Circassian exile” and their relatives living in Abkhazia; and also Armenians who resettled in Abkhazia after 1915 and those living in Turkey will be discussed under the perspective of “acculturation”.
The research has done both in Abkhazia and Turkey in 2010 with 698 participants. According to the results,  the values of the “Abkhazian-Abazinians” living in Abkhazia and Turkey are differentiated from each other while their values became similar to the values of other ethnic groups both in Abkhazia and Turkey. On the other hand the values of the Armenians, who almost have similar deportation process, with 50 years of difference, living in Abkhazia and Turkey stayed closer to each other while resembling to other ethnic groups in both of the countries. According to Berry’s (1997) acculturation strategies, it can be said that there are different acculturation processes in the same country. Thus the “Abkhazians-Abazinians and the Circassians) living in Turkey are “assimilated”, while the Armenians living in Abkhazia and Turkey are “integrated” into the new culture.
Key Words: Values, Acculturation, Abkhazian-Abazinian, Circassian, Armenian, Abkhazia-Turkey
.
Özet
Bu makalede 21 Mayıs 2011’de Çerkes  Sürgünü’nün 147. yılını anan Türkiye’deki “Çerkesler-Abazalar” ve bu grupların Abhazya’daki akrabaları  “Abhazlar” ile, 1915 tehcirinden sonra Abhazya’ya yerleşen ve Türkiye’de yaşayan Ermenilerin kültürlenme süreçleri “değerler” kapsamında ele alınmıştır. 
2010 yılında 698 kişi ile yapılan bu araştırma sonucunda, Türkiye’de yaşayan “Abhaz-Abaza” ile “Adiğe-Çerkes-Kafkasyalı” etnik kimlik gruplarının değerleri, ülkedeki diğer gruplarla benzeşirken, Abhazya’da yaşayan “Abhaz-Abaza” grubuyla farklılaştıkları saptanmıştır. Diğer taraftan yaklaşık 50 yıl farkla benzer süreçleri yaşamış Ermenilerin değerlerinin, ülke içerisindeki diğer etnik kimlik gruplarla benzeştikleri ancak diğer Ermenilerle olan benzerliklerini sürdürdükleri bulunmuştur. Sonuç olarak aynı ülkede yaşayan ve farklı etnik kimliğe sahip bireylerin, farklı kültürlenme süreçlerinin olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Türkiye’de yaşayan Abhaz-Abaza ve Çerkeslerin Berry’nin (1997) kültürlenme stratejilerinden “asimilasyona”, diğer taraftan hem Türkiye hem de Abhazya’daki Ermenilerin ise “entegrasyona” tabi oldukları söylenebilir

While various debates have arisen on the relationship between non-recognition and democratisation, empirical case studies on elections in de facto states are extremely rare. This article examines recent presidential and parliamentary elections in two unrecognised or partially recognised de facto states in the South Caucasus, namely Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabakh. Accordingly, the emphasis is on the Abkhazian presidential elections of August 2011 and August 2014 and parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2012, along with the most recent executive and legislative elections in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) in July 2012 and May 2015 respectively. On the basis of extensive interviews and participant observation, this article demonstrates how although both parliamentary and presidential elections in Abkhazia are competitive, they favour the titular nation, while in homogeneous Nagorny Karabakh fear of a renewed conflagration has until recently produced relatively uncompetitive presidential contests. The dynamics of majoritarian versus party list, party, ethnic and gender representation are examined in each case. The case studies reveal weak political parties, but the NKR has made incremental changes to the electoral law that might encourage a less personality-based parliamentary system. Available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23761199.2015.1086571

Executive Summary
1. Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes. These grey areas have resulted in uncertainties about the capabilities and
activities of irregular and stationed forces, produced unchecked risk perceptions and aggravated sub-regional instability and insecurity.
2. At the same time, disputes over the status of de facto regimes and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces in disputed territories have also obstructed the development of all-European arms control mechanisms and produced spillover effects detrimental to security and stability.
3. There is no unified opinion in international law about the position of de facto regimes. In ceasefire agreements and informal talks, de facto regimes are sometimes referred to as “parties to the conflict”, with limited rights and obligations. It is an incontrovertible fact that, in the absence of international recognition, only recognized
central governments are entitled to carry out state functions in international relations
and to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of States Parties to international agreements, such as arms control treaties and CSBMs. However, de facto regimes can
also be included in agreements if there is the political will to do so.
4. De facto regimes categorically reject central governments’ claims to implementing these rights in territories under their actual control, such as acting as the host state for observations of or collecting and distributing data on armaments, which are subject to international information exchanges or limitations and are held by
irregular forces. De facto regimes either want to exercise such rights themselves or deny that the disputed territories belong to the area of application of arms control and CSBM agreements.
5. Third states that have not recognized de facto regimes are not permitted by international law to neglect the positions of central governments seeking to implement such agreements in disputed territories, even if de facto regimes do not object to inspections on the spot. Thus, third states are not allowed to elevate their status by agreeing to procedures that would cede to their representatives' state functions, such as the rights of a “host state” (e.g. determining the points of
entry/exit, providing escort teams, signing inspection reports etc.).
6. Consequently, state-centric CSBMs can be implemented in disputed territories only if all sides involved are prepared to make compromises that value transparency and stability more highly than status-related positions. In practice, almost all attempts to bring about a compromise on mutually acceptable procedures have
failed.
7. The recognition by certain states of the independence of breakaway regions and
their claim that de facto regimes have provided “host nation consent” to the stationing
of forces in such territories have complicated the situation. By contrast, central
6 | CORE Working Paper 28
governments of internationally recognized states categorically reject this
interpretation and regard stationing in disputed territories as unlawful occupation in
violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. Ceasefire agreements usually have only limited transparency and limitation
provisions, which are mainly confined to small, partially demilitarized, “security
zones” or “restricted weapon zones”. However, wider geographical areas, which are
relevant to transparency and the restraint of military capabilities and activities in the
sub-region, remain unrestricted and inaccessible. In the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has access only to areas controlled by
the Georgian government adjoining the two breakaway regions.
9. Against this background, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs aim at enhancing
sub-regional security in and around disputed territories and creating a peaceful and
stable environment for talks without detriment to status-related positions of
principle by parties involved and without pre-empting the outcome of conflict
settlement processes, which will ultimately define the eventual political status of
such territories.
10. To that end, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs avoid any procedures and
terms that could be interpreted as providing political status, such as references to
state functions or rights and obligations reserved for states (“inspecting”/“inspected
state”, “host state”, official titles of persons, “borders” or contested geographical
names of disputed territories, etc.).
11. Consequently, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should be formulated
beyond the existing framework of state-related international agreements. This
requires facilitation by an impartial third party that is trusted by both sides, such as a
neutral state, an international organization or a private enterprise. In such a
framework, status-bound functions and personnel would be replaced by statusneutral
functions and personnel.
12. Status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should provide for information,
observation and, as far as possible, limitation of certain military capabilities and
activities, particularly in areas close to the Lines of Contact. In such areas, reciprocity
of rights and obligations may be an indispensable condition for an agreement,
provided it can be attained without compromising government positions that reject
equality vis-à-vis breakaway regions. At the same time, both sides may see the value
of increasing trust and stability and, thus, enhancing security in a fragile political
environment without relinquishing status-related positions of principle.
13. To ensure smooth implementation, avoid misunderstandings and prevent
escalation, the establishment of an impartial coordination and conflict resolution
mechanism is advisable. It can be linked to existing informal formats geared to
enhancing the implementation of ceasefire agreements or other relevant mechanisms
to prevent and respond to incidents.
14. This paper discusses the limitations of existing international arms control and
CSBM agreements and outlines, in considerable detail, a status-neutral approach
towards increasing security and stability in and around disputed territories. An
illustrative example of how such an approach could be modelled is given in the
annex.

This paper proposes a theoretical framework for explaining the democratization dynamics in unrecognized states. It is argued that lack of recognition and pressure from the parent state oblige de facto states to depend on a patron state. In return for economic and military assistance, patron states expect to control the decision-making process in de facto states. It is stated that this limits these entities' democratization potential to a maximum of being a tutelary democracy.

В архитектуре грузинских и абхазских земель в послеарабское время не наблюдалось не только общего единства, но даже единства внутри каждого из регионов. Их взаимовлияние не привело к созданию архитектурной школы, общей для всех регионов. Более того, даже векторы архитектурного развития в них оказались разными: основные из них можно обозначить как автохтонный и заимствующий, а также усложняющий и упрощающий. С точки зрения же выбора типа храма для репрезентативного строительства общие тенденции в вышеперечисленных регионах, наоборот, просматриваются. Во-первых, это выбор в пользу купольного храма перед базиликой, что было обусловлено отчасти доарабским опытом Закавказья. Во-вторых, это движение в сторону крестово-купольного храма со столпами.

With the ratification of the Association Agreements with Georgia and
Moldova in 2014, the European Union (EU) has been confronted in its integration policies with several post-Soviet de facto states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria). The paper clarifies the concept of the de facto state and discusses how non-recognition affects the sustainability and international position of these entities. It will be argued, that de facto states can be considered as a permanent part of the international system rather than just temporal anomalies and that they confront the EU with a serious action dilemma. Based on the Abkhazian case study, I will analyse the strategies and instruments the EU is implementing to achieve its policy objectives, identify key obstacles such as the growing Russian presence in the region and highlight the practical consequences of the action dilemma.

Focusing on the diasporic characteristics shown by ancestral return migrants, this case study looks at the Abkhaz-Adyge (Circassian) returnees from Turkey to the Caucasus and how they become the “diaspora of the diaspora.” The next generations of diasporans continue to dream of return, and, with recent developments in communication technologies and cheaper transportation, many find ways to realize this dream. There are many different forms of return, but some “return-migrate” and settle in an unfamiliar ancestral home. The relocation creates new experiences as the homeland turns out to be very different from that which they imagined, and the return migration is transformed into a new form of migrant experience that, in fact, produces renewed diasporic characteristics.