19th Century Continental Philosophy

FROM THE BACK COVER: What is the essential nature of meaning? . . . . . This book answers by examining interpretive theories from the past and present. It finds that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation, a struggle that reaches crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand, this crisis is mollified by Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, which argues that we are always already in a meaningful relationship to the objects of the world. On the other hand, this crisis is exacerbated when phenomenology, structuralism, and aesthetic theory directly make meaning into an object of study. . . . . . . . . These historical developments culminate with the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whose non-hermeneutical phenomenology delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity. Intriguingly, Lacan's work reveals meaning to be sexual in nature. By integrating his notion of sexual difference with his work in discourse theory and topology, this book demonstrates how the subject's struggle with meaning can be suspended.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Broadly speaking, the majority of books on Jacques Lacan focus on the earlier periods of his career. They also tend to target the psychoanalytic clinical community, or else discuss his work in various political, social, and cultural contexts. But in almost all cases these books refrain from a detailed exegesis of his actual texts. They instead prefer to comment on his theoretical apparatus as a whole before turning to its practical implications. . . . . . This book positions itself against this grain. Firstly, it closely analyzes some half-dozen key Lacanian texts. This analysis is organized under a single thematic – the question of meaning – in order to advance the reader's understanding of the trajectory of Lacan's thought across his entire career, as well as to promote the book's thesis that the field of meaning can be suspended. Accordingly, an initial chapter takes up the hermeneutical tradition from Flacius onward. This is then supplemented by a chapter which surveys phenomenological, structuralist and aesthetic theories of meaning and their differing methods of textual analysis. Together these two chapters provide a unique context for the sustained analysis of Lacan's texts which begins in the third chapter, an analysis that forms the bulk of the book's content. This contextualization potentially widens the book's appeal to any scholar wishing to explore his relationship to those textual objects he interacts with on a daily basis. And because this book assumes the reader has little to no familiarity with Lacan, the reader will find patient explanations of the basics of his theories before slowly being led up to the more difficult theories of his late years. Again the argument is that Lacan has something to offer all scholars. His work is not just reserved for psychoanalysts. . . . . . It is with his late theories that the serious student of Lacan will find the book's most original contribution. For in the fourth chapter a detailed account is provided of how Lacan derived his infamous formulae of sexuation from Aristotelian logic. These formulae are then extensively discussed against the backdrop of interpretive theory and textual analysis, showing how these formulae capture much more than just the difference between the sexes. Strikingly, this difference is also found to run through meaning itself, something the final chapter aims to demonstrate. It does this by amalgamating three key components of late-Lacan: sexuation, discourse theory and his use of topological spaces. This amalgamation is a first in the literature. But this amalgamation is not just useful in demonstrating the book's thesis. It further suggests how seemingly divergent aspects of late-Lacanian theory can be made to work together.

Nihilism poses grave problems for those who seek directives to lead their lives. In this article, the three most important ways to deal with nihilism are inquired, with an emphasis on their credibility. Both nihilism from a metaphysical perspective and the emphasis on pleasure from nihilistic considerations are given attention. The acceptance of nihilism can have far-reaching consequences, which are evaluated at various points. Nietzsche’s approach must also be considered. He accepts what he calls a sort of nihilism, but as a means to ‘new’ values. This alternative to nihilism is examined no less critically than the other two stances.

Hegel repeatedly identifies rational self-consciousness as a real example of the concept, and its tripartite constituents: universality, particularity, and individuality. In what follows I will show that the concept as such, along with its tripartite constituents, are constitutive of rational self-consciousness. On the one hand, by showing how Hegel’s concept of the concept applies to rational self-consciousness, I aim to provide a concrete example of the concept of the concept in a real being whose being is not merely logical. On the other hand, I aim to show that Hegel’s application of the concept to rational self-consciousness is motivated by a problem within the philosophy of mind. For this reason, Hegel’s application of the concept of the concept to the mind is not arbitrary, but motivated by significant philosophical problems.

Although its origins stem from theological debates, the general will would ultimately become one of the most celebrated and denigrated concepts emerging from early modern political thought.  Jean-Jacques Rousseau would make it the central element of his political theory, and it would take on a life of its own during the French Revolution before being subjected to generations of embrace or opprobrium.  James Farr and David Lay Williams have collected for the first time a set of essays that track the evolving history of the general will from its origins to recent times.  These essays include attention to the general will’s theological, political, formal, and substantive dimensions with a careful eye to the concept’s virtues and limitations as understood by its expositors and critics, among them Pascal, Malebranche, Locke, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Constant, Tocqueville, Adam Smith, and John Rawls.

Nietzsche's recognition of existence as an ever-shifting play of surface appearances presages his "revaluation of all values," his response to those who would stabilize becoming by metaphysically reifying it as being. Nietzsche arguably provides Levinas with his deepest ethical challenge. Consequently, Levinas himself undertakes a similar revaluation of the ground of traditional values and of the subject. Both put forth heterodox notions of subjectivity insofar as the subject is constituted by a radical exteriority that is paradoxically realized as such interiorly. However, Levinas repudiates the postmodern conception of the subject as an empty, fragmented phantasm (a position often attributed to Nietzsche), the hollow legacy of a now debunked and defunct modernist project, characterizing his ethical philosophy as a "defense of subjectivity." Nietzsche and Levinas simultaneously invert and intertwine the traditional hierarchical relation between seeing and hearing. In doing so, they reveal essential dimensions of the ethical relationship that would appear to be contradictory, self-negating, or at least incompatible. However, they also have their sights set on a similar site -that of the "eye that listens." This essay interrogates the role that the metaphor of the "listening eye" plays in determining their respective conceptions of subjectivity and ethics. Both employ this provocative and necessarily ambiguous metaphor to emphasize the radical role that teaching plays in their philosophies.

Objectivity and Disagreement in Nietzsche"s Perspectivism Nietzsche"s perspectivism, taken as a description of human cognition and not as a theory of truth or knowledge, seems to imply an unacceptable form of global relativism about epistemic justification. i This is because human cognizers, in virtue of their situatedness with respect to the objects of cognition, never have access to the way things are in themselves but only with things as they appear. ii Furthermore, what determines how the objects of cognition appear to a particular human cognizer are dependent on contingent factors such as natural language, culture, values, and morality, which can and do vary from individual to individual and from culture to culture. This means that the content and structure of appearance may vary, and the standards of rationality according to which an individual makes judgments may vary. If the only kinds of justification for our judgments are relative to the contingent cognitive makeup of an individual and no absolute standards of justification are available, then Nietzsche"s perspectivism seems to imply an unacceptable global relativism about justification. It appears to be the case that when someone makes a claim about the world and justifies it only by affirming that it coheres with his or her perspective"s standard of rationality, someone who wishes to argue for a competing, incompatible claim has no way to respond to his or her interlocutor. This is a problem for the defender of Nietzsche"s perspectivism. To put the point colloquially, Nietzsche"s perspectivism seems to entail that one may justify anything by claiming, "This is how it seems from my perspective." This is a problem for Nietzsche because as virtually every commentator on perspectivism has pointed out, Nietzsche advocates his own philosophical positions, including perspectivism itself, as epistemically superior. If he wishes his philosophical positions to carry any normative weight, i.e., if he wants to recommend them to his readers as not merely what he wants them to believe, but also what they ought to believe, then Nietzsche"s perspectivism must not entail the kind of "anything goes" global relativism about justification I have described above. To put the problem in other

Un estudio histórico que sigue la reflexión de Nietzsche sobre el fenómeno del sueño a través de todas sus obras, mostrando las transformaciones generales de su pensamiento y, en especial, las inflexiones y cesuras que en tal desarrollo se hacen visibles de la mano del tratamiento del fenómeno onírico y demás procesos psicológicos.-

In a note to G.R.S. Mead’s "Quests Old and New", where he found a section devoted to Hans Vaihinger’s main ideas, Fernando Pessoa reflects on the consequences of the fictionalist approach to both our perception of the I and the value of consciousness. These questions correspond to some statements that we find in Nietzsche’s writings, which in particular Vaihinger refers to in his Die Philosophie des Als-ob. Our aim is thus to compare Nietzsche’s and Pessoa’s view of the I and consciousness, and to deal with their psychology by making reference to Vaihinger’s fictionalism.

Se trata de un estudio histórico sobre la filosofía juvenil de Nietzsche (hasta la publicación de Humano, demasiado humano - 1878), siguiendo el hilo de su reflexión sobre el problema del lenguaje y el conocimiento, a partir de sus principales fuentes: Schopenhauer, Lange, Spir, Gerber, etc.
Se publicó por primera vez en 1999, como separata de circulación restringida para los estudiantes de Filosofía de la Escuela de Filosofía (UNC). Como libro, con ligeras modificaciones, se publicó en 2001. Aquí, la segunda edición de 2005, realizada sobre la primera, sin modificaciones.

In this essay, I argue that Søren Kierkegaard’s oeuvre can be seen as a theater of ideas. This argument is developed in three steps. First, I will briefly introduce a theoretical framework for addressing the theatrical dimension of Kierkegaard’s works. This framework is based on a distinction between“performative writing strategies” and “categories of performativity.” As a second step, I will focus on Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology, by Constantin Constantius, one of the best examples of Kierkegaard’s innovative way of doing philosophy. This strange and elusive book introduces the difficult and counter-intuitive notion of repetition. Repetition is a category of performativity that aims to activate the subjectivity of the reader. This performative effect is achieved by confronting the reader with an “unresolved”existential problem that is not yet drawn into clarity but is staged in all its confusions and contradictions. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantius relies here on a performative writing strategy that is animated by a dialectic of advance and withdrawal. In the last and third step, I will analyze Constantius’s own reflection on the performative dimension of his text. Constantius has left several clues behind, each of which suggests that he deliberately developed a performative writing strategy.

Indagación sobre el alcance y sentido que cobra en Nietzsche la comprensión schopenhaueriana de la animalidad como "esencia" del hombre. La exposición sigue el hilo de la reflexión nietzscheana del fenómeno onírico, y culmina con el anàlisis del aforismo 119 de Aurora.

Il contenuto dei paragrafi conclusivi della "Genealogia della morale" può essere considerato il nucleo di una rete di concetti che costituisce l’intelaiatura della tarda filosofia di Nietzsche. In questo saggio si mostrerà in particolare come la problematizzazione della verità annunciata in GM III, 24 e 27 rappresenti per Nietzsche un passaggio fondamentale per portare a maturazione le istanze critiche del proprio pensiero e permettere la realizzazione della «filosofia dell’avvenire» di cui "Al di là del bene e del male" doveva costituire il preludio.

This paper shows that Hegel's ontology of living beings provides us with indispensable conceptual resources for making sense of his account of the ontology of human action. For Hegel, living bodies are ontologically distinct in that their objective presence is thoroughly permeated by the self-reflexivity characteristic of subjectivity, and as such they cannot be adequately conceived in terms of categories (mechanistic, chemical, or generally causal categories) that are appropriate to inanimate, " subject-less " objects. It is argued that actions are similar in this regard, and like organic bodies they need to be conceived as self-realizing, self-articulating, dynamic wholes whose various material parts cannot be thought independently of their internal relations and their place in the whole. It is argued, further, that the categories Hegel appeals to in conceiving how organisms develop through stages are useful for making sense of how the objective shape of an action unfolds over time.

Se trata de un estudio del tratamiento nietzscheano del problema de la verdad y de la creencia a partir de la reconstrucción de la lectura del filósofo ucraniano Afrikan Spir realizada por el autor de Humano, demasiado humano. Se aborda críticamente, en tal contexto, las múltiples interpretaciones (especialmente angloamericanas) que ven en la reflexión nietzscheana sobre la verdad una teoría de corte pragmatista. La edición, hace mucho agotada, es de 2000 y es la única que se hizo.

During his late period, Nietzsche focused on the problem of the " value of truth " , since according to him it plays an important role on Western culture and its anthropology. That reflection had been influenced by some outcomes of the late-nineteenth century scientific research, and can be therefore compared with other strategies that, during those years, faced the relativism implied in modern epistemology, e.g. William James's Pragmatism. This paper aims to explore the pragmatic feature of Nietzsche's investigation on truth. As will be shown, Nietzsche's perspectival thought can indeed be compared with classic Pragmatism on several aspects, e.g. the cultural context out of which both these philosophical position arised, and the broad consequences of their impact on European culture.

Traducción de UNA SOBRIA INQUIETUDINE. KARL LÖWITH E LA FILOSOFIA, FELTRINELLI, MILANO, 2004.
Primera biografía dedicada a Karl Löwith. Apoyado en un vasto archivo inédito y en la correspondencia del filósofo con grandes protagonistas de la cultura europea (Heidegger, Jaspers, Strauss, Arendt, Bultmann, Voegelin, Gadamer, Horckheimer, entre otros), el libro reconstruye la vida de Karl Löwith desde sus años de cercanía con Husserl, Weber, el George-Kreis y, sobre todo Heidegger, hasta el exilio impuesto por el nazismo, primero en Italia, luego en Japón y finalmente en EEUU, y su retorno a la Alemania de posguerra.-

The paper aims to show that, even though Nietzsche strongly criticizes the value of ordinary truths (both on the theoretical and on the moral plane), he nevertheless considers that a practical assessment of them is still possible. This view can be compared with William James's pragmatist approach to truth. As will be shown, that approach is grounded on the conception of knowledge developed by Ernst Mach, one of the main representatives of post-kantian epistemology, whose 1886 work Nietzsche read in his late years.

El presente trabajo se propone analizar la relación de Auseinandersetzung de Nietzsche con el filósofo ucraniano African Spir, una de las más importantes fuentes de su filosofía. Se centra en el contraste entre la reflexión filosófica de Humano, demasiado humano y el “eleatismo” de Spir, buscando precisar el alcance y sentido de la “inversión del platonismo” presente en la filosofía de Nietzsche de fines de los años setenta. Subraya asimismo el modo en que Nietzsche concibe el status de la lógica y el valor del conocimiento en el horizonte escéptico de los textos posteriores a dicha obra.

The aim of this paper is to analize Nietzsche’s Auseinandersetzung relationship with the ucranian philosopher African Spir, one of the more important sources of his philosophy. It focuses on the contrast between the philosophical reflexion of Human, All too human and Spirs’ “Eleatism”. It is also intend to define the import and scope of the “inversion of Platonism” present in Nietzsche’s philosophy at the end of the 70’s. Finally, it it points out in which way Nietzsche conceive the status of Logic and the value of knowledge in the skeptical horizon of his texts after Human, All too human.

«¿Qué podemos decir hoy del superhombre a la luz del estudio crítico de los textos de Nietzsche y de sus fuentes de lectura? Si su perfil sigue siendo en gran parte indeterminado, ¿se ha de desechar sin más, en la visión del filósofo alemán, la hipótesis del superhombre como etapa concreta – y por tanto, en un cierto sentido biológica y “evolutiva” – de una humanidad renovada o tal vez “otra” que la actual?»
El primero de los ensayos de este libro intenta responder estas preguntas reconstruyendo el escenario cultural y las ideas en boga en la época en que se gestó uno de los filosofemas más controvertidos y peor comprendidos del autor del Zarathustra.-
El segundo ensayo, se centra en la figura de Alfred Fouillée (1883-1912), intérprete polémico de Nietzsche, a quién éste estudió atentamente, llevado por un desacuerdo tan neto con lo central de sus doctrinas, que puede decirse que éstas representan un precipitado ejemplar de todo cuanto rechaza en materia de moral y de evolución.
Ambos trabajos, resultados de una prolongada y fina indagación de la obra del filósofo alemán y sus fuentes, contribuyen a renovar su lectura expurgada de simplificaciones e hipotecas ideológicas.

[Vol. 2 de la Colección Nietzscheana, dirigida por Sergio Sánchez]

In Getting Causes from Powers, Mumford and Anjum argue that (1) powers or dispositions, as inherently tendential, have a modal status irreducible to more familiar notions of necessity or possibility and (2) we have a direct experience of this sui generis modality in our experience of agency. What they call the "dispositional modality" is, they contend, a phenomenological datum, and this datum can serve as the basis of a general theory of powers. In this essay, I respond to this argument with reference to two nineteenth-century philosophers seldom studied in the anglophone world but no less pivotal in the development of French philosophy: Pierre Maine de Biran and Félix Ravaisson. Maine de Biran, I contend, allows us to see how the appeal to voluntary agency in Getting Causes from Powers is unconvincing and ultimately illegitimate, whilst Ravaisson's account-in his 1838 De l'habitude-of agency becoming, in the acquisition of a habit, a function of inclination, provides one way of thinking about what is required if we are to justify and cash out Mumford and Anjum's interesting ideas concerning the modality of dispositions.

The paper explores the few occurrences of the expression “will to nothingness” (Wille zum Nichts) in Nietzsche’s writings, and its relationship with the notions of “will to truth” and “ascetic ideal.” Aim of this research is to show that these notions are mutually related, and that they outline the objectives of Nietzsche’s late thought. The investigation will focus in particular on the concept of “realism” that appears in Nietzsche’s late writings, and that can be interpreted as an existential
attitude towards life that contrasts pessimistic nihilism.

In this paper I will discuss the role played by Ernst Mach on Nietzsche’s thought. Starting from the contents of his Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, I’ll show the close similarities between their view on both human knowledge and the scientific world description. In his writing on science Nietzsche shares Mach’s critique to the 19th century mechanism and its metaphysical ground, as much as his way of defining the substantial notions such as matter, ego and free will. Moreover, my investigation will make it clear that Mach cannot be seen as a direct source of Nietzsche’s thought, since the latter wrote many times on the same subjects long before his first reading one of his works. Rather, it is possible to consider the writings of Lange, Spir and Spencer as the first sources of Nietzsche’s views on the main themes Mach dealt with in his work from 1886.

Para apresentar a leitura de Giuliano Campioni, destacam-se aqui dois aspectos centrais de seus trabalhos sobre Nietzsche: em primeiro lugar, a perspectiva de leitura filológica. Em segundo lugar, os resultados específicos alcançados por essa leitura de Nietzsche, resultados esses que contribuíram para o estabelecimento do perfil do Nietzsche histórico, colocando em crise aspectos-chave das imagens mais difundidas do filósofo.

Il presente contributo muove dalle osservazioni sul linguaggio che Nietzsche svolge in Umano, troppo umano, I, § 11, con lo scopo di riflettere sulla posizione anti-realista che Nietzsche sostiene in quell’aforisma e di evidenziare il ruolo che essa svolge nelle sue più tarde considerazioni relative alla cultura occidentale e alla sua antropologia.
Come si avrà modo di mostrare, la critica nietzscheana al realismo del senso comune è in linea con alcune epistemologie pragmatiste sorte tra Otto- e Novecento. Questo elemento di “attualità” non mina però l’originalità della riflessione di Nietzsche su quell’argomento. Piuttosto, è possibile sostenere che l’idea che il pensiero filosofico intervenga in una correzione dell’impegno metafisico proprio del senso comune sia lo strumento teoretico che permette a Nietzsche di operare sullo sviluppo della cultura e società europee.

In her innovative take on G.W. F. Hegel's The Encyclopaedia Logic, Julie E. Maybee uses pictures and diagrams to cut through the philosopher's dense, difficult writing. Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic utilizes diagrams in order to rehabilitate Hegel's logic for serious consideration by showing how each stage develops step-by-step from earlier stages according to definite, logical patterns. This interpretation makes Hegel's work accessible and understandable for new and experienced readers alike. Because Hegel uses the same logic in all of his works, Maybee's analysis and defense of the logic will capture the attention of those readers interested in Hegel's ethics, politics, history, philosophy of religion, and phenomenology.

Through the included diagrams, Maybee is able to define central Hegelian concepts such as "being-in-itself," and "being-in-and-for-itself" with a new level of precision. Maybee argues that Hegel's logic does not include the one logistical pattern most often attributed to him; namely, the pattern "thesis-antithesis-synthesis." Rather, Hegel's model of logic was more scientific than formalistic in nature, as the philosopher himself pointed out. Hegel considered himself an encyclopedic culmination of Western philosophy in some ways, and indeed his work summarizes many of the presuppositions of Western philosophy. By picturing Hegel's logic, we can gain a greater understanding of ourselves.

In virtual empiricism the relationship is one of contraction and expansion of the virtual. There is the opening and closing of the virtual field. The conditions of experience are no longer abstract conditions of possible experience; they are the virtual conditions of real experience. They are not theoretical conditions , but the conditions are immanent and contextualized to what they condition. These conditions are no longer Kantian like conditions of all possible experience rather they are the empirical circumstances of actual experience in all its singularity. In their singularity the circumstances of real experience are not broader then what they contextualize. Experience arises and manifest through them by extending within them by means of intuition, by opening awareness to vibrations of duration, by remaining within the human experience and experiencing within the unbound and uncontained field of immanence.. The circumstances of experience are less determined by concepts than the actual manifestations of virtual field of pure awareness. And while these experience's are understood within concepts, the conceptual model is modeled on the thing itself which only suits that thing. Deluze utilization of the Bergsonian method of intuition or direct perception supports the overcoming of endless framing of transcendental idealism of Kantian thinking and eastern philosophical idealism that so dominates certain forms of Buddhism and Hinduism. Virtual empiricism which things are no longer modeled after concepts but concepts are modeled after things. Virtual empiricism helps us understand the manifestation of the ground of being or the dharmakaya. The ground of being or the dharmakaya is the realm of potentiality or no thingness manifesting everything and anything. This is the language of dzogchen and the understanding of dzogchen.

Special thematic issue of the journal Fichte-Studien, volume 49 (Leiden: Brill/Rodopi Publishers, 8 April 2021), on the topic of "The Enigma of Fichte's First Principles", edited by David W. Wood: https://brill.com/view/title/59923

This article presents a new reading of Fichte’s aesthetics that differs from a primarily functionalist interpretation of the imagination and art. It demonstrates that the “hovering” (Schweben) of the creative imagination should be viewed as the first principle of Fichte’s aesthetics, in which the latter consists of a triad of the pleasant, the beautiful and the sublime. Moreover, it argues that in the text Ueber Geist und Buchstab in der Philosophie (1795/1800) Fichte created a real and original monogram of the hovering creative imagination, a monogram whose theoretical basis stems from Kant’s concept of the monogram in the 1st Critique as a “wavering sketch”. It contends that this overlooked but key artistic and practical example of a monogram opens up new perspectives for Fichtean aesthetics, further confirming that its first principle should be explicitly identified with the theory of the hovering imagination in the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/95.