Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
2022
Populism has been a key concept in recent political theory. Trying to navigate through the multiplicity of theoretical and political connotations and in view of the terms’ different uses, I will try to combine the concept of governmentality with that of populism in order to: a) outline significant differences between the right- and left-wing populism concerning its governmental perspective. b) Construct an alternative way of understanding aspirations, hopes and failures of left-wing populist parties that rose due to the recent anti-austerity political movements (e.g. square movements) and their difficulty coping with a global neoliberal governmental authoritarianism. c) Distinguish neoliberal, anti-democratic governmental techniques from radical democratic popular demands.
Journal of Economic Issues
If the Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti or the President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy are not regarded as populist figures in the public imagination or in the scientific community, then it should be quite easy to identify their opposite. Cases like those of Juan Perón, Hugo Chávez, Pym Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, Martine and Jean-Marie Le Pen, or Corneliu Vadim Tudor are well-known examples of populist leaders. The problem is that these manifestations cannot all be treated as a unitary phenomenon, with a similar programmatic discourse, a common Weltanschauung, or an organisational structure that consistently reproduces the pre-eminence of a charismatic leader. Moreover, the situation gets complicated when we consider the variable of the past and, in particular, the genealogy of these leaders. Often referred to as a phenomenon that is viscerally related to the extremisms of the 20th century, populism is arguably coterminous with right-wing radicalism, in more or less direct connection with interwar extremism, and, in some cases, with left-wing radicalism, such as espoused by Fidel Castro or other Latin American leaders. And yet, an in-depth analysis may reveal that the genealogical approach has a limited heuristic capacity. The situation becomes truly difficult when the label “populist” is used for some of the political leaders of the institutionalised parties. A relevant example in this sense is that of Ségolène Royal and the Socialist Party in France or of Traian Băsescu and the Democratic Liberal Party in Romania.
2024
Populism as Governmental Practice illustrates how populism functions as a phenomenon of power and draws attention to the brighter and darker consequences of populist rule for ordinary people across the world via bottom-up analyses of populist experiences of government in remarkably different national contexts including Turkey, Venezuela, Greece, India, Philippines, Egypt, and the United States. By proposing an understanding of politics that is broader than the one embraced in current populism research, it focuses on a realm stretching beyond the electoral high politics of ideas/ideologies, discourses, public performances/styles, and mobilization efforts. The book theorizes populism as a responsive political/governmental practice in congruence with the material and symbolic expectations of populist audiences and analyses it as a rich praxis of governing people and things that is blurring the boundaries between public and the private as well as formal and the informal while embracing swiftness in temporal terms. Through an interpretive perspective focusing on the bounded rationalities and moral economies embedded in the populist rule and popular obeyance to it, this book would appeal to researchers and students of politics and its sub-disciplines as well as to the non-expert audience curious about the micro dynamics of populist rule.
Critical Discourse Studies, 2014
National Institute Economic Review, 2022
Much of the media coverage in relation to populism has focused either on populist moments like the Brexit vote or on populist leaders such as Donald Trump or Boris Johnson. Meanwhile, the academic literature on populism is divided between two broad approaches. First, an emphasis in economics on policy (e.g. Dornbusch and Edwards, 1992) and, second, an accentuation in political science on ideology (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Both approaches capture important aspects, including the rejection of orthodox monetary and fiscal policy positions and a repudiation not only of established elites but also of pluralism and some of the key institutions on which the rule of law and democracy depend. However, these perspectives risk under-exploring some of the long-term structural patterns that are political, economic and social all at once. They include the decline in voter turnout, the collapse of centreleft and centre-right political traditions, the rise in popular support for populist parties or candidates, the effects of deindustrialisation on long-term unemployment and of low wages on falling living standards as well as a sense of powerless and a loss of both community cohesion and identity. The roots of populism go deep and stretch back in time-the economic recessions in the 1980s and early 1990s and the structural upward shift in joblessness, the social crises of the 2000s and 2010s linked to fiscal retrenchment as well as cultural change and the resurgence of extremes such as nationalism and xenophobia (e.g. Aiginger, 2020). The electoral success of populists tends to be a symptom rather than the cause of populism, while the consequences of populist politics (and technocratic responses) are often further to divide countries along both older cultural and class lines as well as newer cleavages of education, age and assets. It is also the case that populist methods, such as the use of demagogic speech in public discussion and political debate, can be deployed by established elites and emerging insurgents alike. Establishment leaders from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair and David Cameron resorted to populist rhetoric in ways that were not entirely dissimilar to right-wing populist leaders from Silvio Berlusconi to Donald Trump and Boris Johnson or left-wing ones such as Venezuela's late President Hugo Chavez or the leaders of Syriza and Podemos in Europe. The demon of demagoguery besets democracy that is variously more liberal or more authoritarian (Pabst, 2019). This NIER Special Issue explores the complex phenomenon of populism and popular support for populists from a broad perspective of political economy (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2021). The twin focus is on the drivers of populism and the implications for democracy and the market economy. Although the various contributions differ in terms of their methodology or findings, they share a number of closely connected arguments. One argument is the importance of both formal structures and informal norms to support a functioning democracy, economy and society. Another argument relates to the need for existing political and economic systems to address the grievances underpinning the appeal of populists. A third argument is that populism claims to defend democracy against 'corrupt' and 'unaccountable' elites, but, in reality, it tends to advance authoritarianism, undermines the institutions of representative government and fails to help the most vulnerable groups in society.
Routledge, 2020
In this book, Enrico Padoan proposes an original middle-range theory to explain the emergence and the internal organisation of anti-neoliberal populist parties in Latin America and Southern Europe, and the relationships between these parties and the organised working class. Padoan begins by tracing the diverging evolution of the electoral Lefts in Latin America and Southern Europe in the aftermath of economic crises, and during the implementation of austerity measures within many of these nations. A causal typology for interpreting the possible outcomes of the realignments within the electoral Lefts is proposed. Hereafter, the volume features fi ve empirical chapters, four of which focus on the rise of anti-neoliberal populist parties in Bolivia, Argentina, Spain and Italy, while a fi fth off ers an analysis on four 'shadow cases' in Venezuela, Uruguay, Portugal and Greece. Scholars of Latin America and Comparative Politics will fi nd Anti-Neoliberal Populisms in Comparative Perspective a highly valuable resource, off ering a distinctive perspective on the impact of diff erent populisms on party systems and on the challenges that such populisms posed to syndicalism and to traditional left-of-centre parties.
Italian Sociological Review, 2018
Although populism has many references and various definitions as an elusive and ambiguous concept, this article approaches it as a political strategy which has the potential to destabilize democracy in some ways. This approach enables a broader comprehension of populism rather than confining it to certain ideological tenets or a few undisputed populist movements. This study attempts to reveal the logic of this political strategy through a tripartite analysis which consists of the sense of democracy inherent in populism, its way of thinking and reasoning, and the political circumstances which enable and strengthen populism. It is argued that the analysis performed here can offer an outline of the ground on which the struggle against the features of populism, that threatens democracy, can be carried out. Finally, in the light of the aforementioned analysis and some ideas which are borrowed from the works of Habermas and Mouffe to a large extent, it is aimed to re-read democracy in order to deal with the populist challenge in liberal democracies.
Populism,' virtually by definition, can be or can do no good. Whatever the meaning attached to it (and there have been many), it is always invoked as an epithet. Politicians and political scientists invariably use it to designate persons or movements they do not like or would not like to have come to power. In other words, to be called a 'populist' is to be insulted and, if possible, excluded from 'respectable' liberal democratic practice. In this short essay, I will try the impossible: (1) to define populism in a 'neutral' fashion; and (2) to explore its virtues, as well as its (much better known) vices. To conclude, I shall attempt to draw up a balance sheet between its contrasting contributions to contemporary political life in Europe.
2012
The vast majority of the papers on populism describe this political phenomenon as one which is very difficult to explain and to analyze due to its discursive versatility and behavioural chameleonism. The increase of scientific interest around this issue reflects a presence in the growing empirical reality of the populist discourse in the global political landscape. And that is because this phenomenon occurs in the most unexpected forms in areas that seem to have nothing in common with each other. Despite these facts, the paper aims to demonstrate that populism in Central and Western Europe is not exactly the same, because populism is a discourse, a discourse that adapts to its public and feeds from its context. The populist discourse, therefore, took on different forms.
The objective of this essay lies in an exploration of the nexus between populism and neoliberalism. More specifically, I will try to explore if the overlapping appearance of the two phenomena is rather a coincidence or if neoliberal rationality produced favourable conditions for populism as it appears since the late 1980s. I will argue that there are at least three common elements of three strands of approach for a definition of populism that each relate and connect with neoliberalism to a certain degree. The argument is thus twofold: First, I argue that, despite considerable disagreement in scholarly research on the definition of populism, there are common elements which are of analytic use. And secondly, I argue that the common elements of conceptualisation of populism that I found all somehow connect to neoliberalism.2 In sum, the argument points to the creation of favourable conditions by neoliberal rationality to the appearance of a new wave of populism.
Derecom, Revista Internacional de Derecho de la Comunicación y de las Nuevas Tecnologías, 2020
Attempting to account for the rise of populisms in the West, this paper starts with a summary statement of liberal democracy’s basic principles and requirements. It suggests that Western countries have deviated in a number of ways from its central tenets over the last decades, depriving majorities of a say on collective destiny under the influence of globalization, neoliberalism and the major trend towards the individualization of social relations that has marked the last half-century. After briefly tackling the problems raised by the nature and substance of populism in general, it characterizes the three main varieties it identifies and assesses the imbalance of their respective forces. It then hypothesizes that the civic variety, the least politicized of the three, plays a key role as a natural attractor whose influence is fuelled in part by the other two’s strategies of convergence to expand their support base, but more importantly by the ways in which the current state of affairs – economic insecurity of the lower and middle classes, social inequalities and polarization, unresponsive elites, excessive external and judicial constraints on the popular will, disproportionate normative influence of small minorities, restricted freedoms, harassment of law-abiding citizens, absence of a political way out of the system’s current predicament – affects the everyday lives of majorities irrespective of political leanings. This may account for the astonishing extent, revealed by opinion polls even more than by voting results, of the discontent and malaise evinced by Western populations, whose predominant response is a mix of derision and cynicism giving the Zeitgeist its distinctive flavour. What’s more, electoral contexts marked by tight results turn a reduced but not insignificant proportion of potential civic populists without entrenched political leanings into kingmakers, or at least put them in a position to help populist leaders achieve political prominence as a sign of protest. The article goes on to probe the evidence in support of its contentions by examining the various identified drivers of populisms as well as the historical genesis of individualization, plus the disruption of the delicate balance between individual rights and citizenship norms that liberal democracy implies. This is followed by a critical review of possible remedies envisaged to restore that balance. Finally, the author relies on recent country studies conducted on behalf of the More in Common Project to try and locate in Western nations’ social, cultural and political landscapes the potential civic populist middle whose existence forms his central conjecture. The paper’s conclusion summarizes its main points before turning to a critical evaluation of the pragmatic feasibility and sociopolitical worth of what civic populists yearn for (and may well constitute the ultimate meaning of populisms) – a return to citizenship and the nation-state – in circumstances that are substantially different from those which prevailed in their previous heyday.
Journal for the Study of Radicalism 16(2):77-93, 2022
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 2019
Following a previous article where I defined how a concept becomes a weapon of ideological wars, this article seeks to clarify why there are semantic connections of the actual concept of 'populism' with the semantics of the concept of crisis (illness, destruction of democracy, salvation or condemnation). My key argument is to focus on how actors use the concept of populism on the public sphere with the goal to inspire fear instead of allowing citizens and theorists to understand what is behind our present political-economic crisis. In my view, both theorists and politicians should be aware how a concept that lacks any precision does not help us to understand our present moment of crisis. We must use other tools and the help of historians to understand why has neo-liberal politics unleashed this present crisis.
Populism and Contemporary Democracy. Old Problems and New Challenges, 2022
The relationship between populism and contemporary constitutional democracy seems to escape any form of categorisation. The normative proposals of populists concerning how democracy should be reformed, which go under the name of populist constitutionalism, do not compose a coherent alternative vision to liberal democracy. Rather, they are piecemeal propositions constantly re-elaborated according to the changing social reality, and characterised by an extreme simplification of the message (Tudela, in this book).
Elgar Research Handbook on Populism, 2023
Populism in Europe, Cambrige University Press, 2022
In this article, we explore the consequences of the increasing presence of both left-and right-wing populist parties in government, critically reflecting on the recent scholarship on the topic, underlining promising venues for future research and outlining a conceptual framework which constitutes the background of this special issue entitled 'Populism in Power and its Consequences'. Our main contribution is empirical, sinceby reflecting on the various articles hosted in the special issuewe assess the impact of populist parties in government on politics, polities and various policy domains. We also provide an account of potential moderating factors of the influence of populists in government, focus on different ideological underpinnings of types of populisms (left-wing and rightwing) and discuss their relevance. We conclude by identifying four possible scenarios for European populist parties in governments: radicalization, compromise and moderation, splintering, or loss.
G. Pallaver, M. Gehler, M. Cau (eds.), "Populism, Populists, and the Crisis of Political Parties A Comparison of Italy, Austria, and Germany 1990-2015", Il Mulino -Duncker & Humblot, 2018, 2018
Sociologia, 2019
In this short essay, I will try to define contemporary populism in a “neutral” fashion; and to explore its virtues, as well as its (much better known) vices. To conclude, I shall attempt to draw up a balance sheet between its contrasting contributions to contemporary political life in Europe. To accomplish this, I will have to speak “generically” and, therefore, to ignore or set aside the traits populism has had and the outcomes it has produced in specific cases. I begin with the (hazardous) position that it can be good or bad for democracy… depending. And I will finally try to address the issue of the conditions under which it is more likely to harm or benefit the polity in which it has emerged.
Loading Preview
Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.