Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Secession: a much contested concept

Abstract

Like many other social and political phenomena, secession has been a subject of inquiry by separate and often unrelated disciplines: legal studies, political science and applied philosophy. This diversity of approaches to secession has yielded different and sometimes incompatible definitions of secession. All definitions however agree that secession involves the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a territory and its populations from an existing state. Restrictive definitions tend to restrict secessions to withdrawals carried out by force, or threat thereof, or to withdrawals subject to the rational choice of secessionists and host states. Permissive definitions allow almost any withdrawal of territory/population, including decolonization, to count as secession. Many legal scholars and a few political scientists advocate restrictive definitions; but there are also scholars from both disciplines who advocate permissive definitions, with similar or the same scope. Permissive definitions seem to suggest that it is not secessions that should be morally assessed but the ways in which they are carried out or the means used to do so; in contrast, restrictive definitions suggest that there are too few secessions to worry about moral assessments. Normative theorists of secession, who aim at a moral assessment of secessions from a philosophical perspective, pay no attention to these suggestions; they usually adopt permissive definitions which would allow them to apply universal moral norms to a variety of secessions. The common ground between the definitions of secession found in legal scholarship, political science and normative theory, it is argued here, may be thus found in permissive approaches to the definition of secession.