Wittgenstein's Influence: Meaning, Mind and Method

2010

This is the first of two volumes containing the proceedings of the 32 nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg/Lower Austria, August 2009. The overall topic of this conference, "Language and World", can be seen as central to Wittgenstein's philosophy. When he was once asked by Yorick Smythies what he regarded as the greatest problem in philosophy, Wittgenstein's answer was "Subject and predicate". We have decided to dedicate this first volume solely to Wittgenstein's philosophy. The four sections only provide a very basic structure. Several contributions easily fit into more than one section. Some of the contributions even might have needed an altogether different heading. The chapter "Wittgenstein's Nachlass" results from a workshop on new aspects of Wittgenstein's published and unpublished writings. The editors would like to express their gratitude to all the contributors and to those who took part in the many and lively discussions during the conference. Without them this volume would never have happened. We would also like to thank the board of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and our publisher Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann for supporting us all the way through. This volume and the conference were sponsored by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research as well by the Government of the Province of Lower Austria. We are very grateful for their generous funding.

International Philosophical Quarterly, 1978

Many philosophers believe that no problems remain in expounding Wittgenstein's Investigations. What he said, it is thought, is clear enough. The question to be faced now is whether what he said can stand up to contemporary criticism. Alternatively, others believe that what is needful is to make explicit the theory of meaning which Wittgenstein merely hinted at in his "album of sketches". On this view, genius though he was, Wittgenstein was laying the foundations for a properly worked out theory of criteria1 semantics. An Oxfordized Wittgenstein is on the horizon, if not already with us. Finch and Hallett try to rid us of these approaches to Wittgenstein. Hallett draws attention to Wittgenstein's resolution: "I fight continually whether successfully or not I do not knowagainst the tendency in my

Philosophy in Review, 2010

2004

In this introduction to a classic philosophical text, David Stern examines Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. He gives particular attention to both the arguments of the Investigations and the way in which the work is written, and especially to the role of dialogue in the book. While he concentrates on helping the reader to arrive at his or her own interpretation of the primary text, he also provides guidance to the unusually wide range of existing interpretations, and to the reasons why the Investigations have inspired such a diversity of readings. Following closely the text of the Investigations and meant to be read alongside it, this survey is accessible to readers with no previous background in philosophy. It is well suited to university-level courses on Wittgenstein, but can also be read with profit by students in other disciplines.

Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works

Introduction to the anthology Wittgenstein: the Philosopher and his Works, a wide-ranging collection of essays containing eighteen original articles by authors representing some of the most important recent work on Wittgenstein. It deals with questions pertaining to both the interpretation and application of Wittgenstein’s thought and the editing of his works. Regarding the latter, it also addresses issues concerning scholarly electronic publishing. The collection is accompanied by a comprehensive introduction which lays out the content and arguments of each contribution. Contributors: Knut Erik Tranøy, Lars Hertzberg, Georg Henrik von Wright, Marie McGinn, Cora Diamond, James Conant, David G. Stern, Eike von Savigny, P.M.S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock, Allan Janik, Kristóf Nyíri, Antonia Soulez, Brian McGuinness, Anthony Kenny, Joachim Schulte, Herbert Hrachovec, Cameron McEwen.

2008

A revised version of chapter one of my 2004 book, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: an introduction. An exposition of the method that Wittgenstein uses in the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations, a discussion of its place in the broader argumentative structure of the book as a whole, and of the relationship between the argumentative and dialogical aspects of the book.

The article discusses the problem of the unity of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is demonstrated that Wittgenstein applied two methods of study. Changes in his philosophy are correlated with modifications in his method of thinking and investigation. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only correct method is logical proposition analysis. In the early 1930s, he transformed his philosophy into a phenomenological description of experience, defining its aim as the development of phenomenological language. After 1933, Wittgenstein recognised the grammatical dimension of language and created tools of grammatical analysis. He introduced the notions of language-games and life forms. His philosophy turned into morphology and a description of human language practice.

Philosophical Investigations, 2017

Abstract The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and in particular of their inclusion and titling of the material in “Part II”. I argue, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that the Editors have failed to refute the editorial decisions of Rhees and Anscombe – a failure born both of a neglect of the historical circumstances and Wittgenstein’s own expressed hopes and intentions for his writings, and of a myopic understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein’s legacy has not been well served by their interventions, which should be undone in future editions. Further evidence from the diaries of Maurice Drury that Wittgenstein intended the material in "Part II" to be included in his book is presented in the supplemetary paper 'On Reinstating “Part I” and “Part II” to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations – A Supplementary Note'.

2014

In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.

2006

Peter Winch on the Tractatus and the unity Note on the second edition | 9 This collection of original articles was first published in spring 2005 by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen in the series Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, no. 17 (see http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_workingpapers.page). For this edition, the collection has been expanded with an article by James Conant, and the introduction adjusted accordingly. The contributions by Marie McGinn and Hanjo Glock have been revised, and a very few corrections have been made to the other contributions. We thank the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society for the possibility to publish this valuable collection in their Schriftenreihe.