040300 The contours of new Russian airpower thinking

Russia - NATO relations has improved considerably in 2010, what has been clearly shown during the NATO – Russia summit meeting in Lisbon on November 20th. It has represented major change in comparison to the crisis in this relations started with the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. On the road to the Lisbon NATO summit Moscow has intensified its efforts to lobby its interests concerning the European security. As a part of this process the political leadership of the Russian Federation have presented in the last few years several ideas and initiatives on the new European security architecture. Most of them have been directly or indirectly related to the issue of Russia – NATO or Russia – US relations. The purpose of this paper is to analyze briefly both the content and meaning of these Russian policies and initiatives against the background of past and present Russia’s European security strategy. The paper is an attempt to answer the question: to what extent the recent Russian initiatives are new; how they correspond with the strategic goals of Russia’s European security policy in the last 20 years; to what extent it is a continuity or a change of Russia’s policies in that respect.

Black Sea-Caucasus Region: Risks and Opportunities - Economy, Energy and Security, TASAM, Istanbul, 2018

OSW Point of View No. 76, 2019

The collapse of the Soviet bloc’s structures (the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact) and then of the Soviet Union itself in 1989–1991 was a kind of geopolitical earthquake in Europe. The main political and legal successor of the USSR, the Russian Federation, had to determine its place in the European order that was being formed, including the security sphere. The new Russia, which inherited from the USSR its membership in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the newly established North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), declared its attachment to European democratic values, suggesting that it was ready to embark on close co-operation and, at some point in the future, even join the European and EuroAtlantic security structures (including NATO) that had been formed during the Cold War era in opposition to the USSR. However, Russia’s Soviet legacy also included elements of its strategic culture, political concepts and a significant share of personnel whose views had already been formed. This, in turn, meant that both the will and ability of Russia’s most senior state authorities to put these declarations into practice were highly uncertain. Even though, due to the economic crisis and process of disintegration, Russia turned out to be weaker than the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, it did not relinquish either its status as a powerful state or the related idea – viewed in maximalist terms – of political sovereignty (even from the West). The government elites of the Russian Federation (like the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his aides before them) wanted to create a new security architecture in Europe. If constructed according to Moscow’s concepts such an architecture would lead to marginalisation or disbanding of the existing Western security structures (especially NATO) and curbing the US presence and influence in Europe. Above all, it would ensure Moscow’s de facto participation in the decision-making processes concerning European security. In addition, Russia did not wish to relinquish its objective of maintaining its zone of influence in the post-Soviet area (temporarily excluding the Baltic states). It was ready to use military force to foment and capitalise on political and ethnic conflicts in this area to achieve this goal. It also launched a political campaign to counter the efforts of Central European countries – the former (involuntary) participants of the Soviet bloc – to join NATO, attempting to create a more or less formal buffer zone in this region. The overriding goals of Russia’s European security policy have remained unaltered, regardless of the various initiatives taken by Moscow: strategic control of the post-Soviet area, the existence of a security buffer zone in Central Europe and the transformation of the existing NATO-based security system in Europe in a manner that would maximise Russia’s political and security influence and minimise that of the USA. What has changed and been diversified are the institutional solutions Moscow has employed in an attempt to achieve these goals: basing European security on the OSCE (predominant in its policy in the 1990s) or as part of a special partnership with NATO (mainly in the first decade of the 2000s) or through attempts to use the European Security and Defence Policy to enhance security co-operation with the EU. Over time, the Kremlin’s ambitions were gradually curtailed after Russian foreign policy had suffered further defeats. When it was launching the campaign against NATO enlargement eastwards, Moscow initially concentrated its efforts on the Visegrad Group countries, then on the Baltic states and finally, as the enlargement process continued, on Ukraine and Georgia. Initially, the security buffer zone in Central Europe was intended to separate the areas of NATO and Russia (and other CIS countries). However, when this proved impossible, it was to be established inside NATO on its eastern flank. From today’s perspective, it can be concluded that none of the strategic goals of Russia’s European security policy have been achieved. Even through Russia has created economic, political and security structures controlled by it in the post-Soviet area, their range, effectiveness and scale of real control of the member states’ policy is far from meeting Russian expectations. The NATO–Russia Founding Act, which imposes quite imprecise restrictions on the deployment of the Allied forces on NATO’s eastern flank, albeit politically dead, is still formally respected by NATO. However, the regular reinforcement of the Allied (and bilaterally US) military presence on the eastern flank – formally as part of the so-called ‘regular rotation’ – undermines the buffer zone idea. Regardless of discussions that recur from time to time, Russia has also been unable to create any European security system as an alternative to the existing one, especially a system that would offer Moscow veto power. Furthermore, the aggressive and revisionist foreign policy that has been sustained since the second half of the 2010s on President Vladimir Putin’s initiative has led to a crisis in relations with the West, in some respects even more serious than the one that prevailed during the Cold War era. The causes of this include: Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) regime; undermining the system of measures for building trust and security in Europe (blocking further adaptation of the Vienna Document and violations of the Treaty on Open Skies); the erosion of the system of nuclear weapons control, provoked by Russia due to violating the INF treaty and, most importantly, Russia’s acts of military aggression in Europe (in 2008 against Georgia and in 2014 against Ukraine), involving real territorial annexations and Russia’s numerous military provocations and ‘hybrid’ actions against NATO member states and nonaligned countries. At present, Russia needs to choose: whether it should continue the present confrontational approach in its European security policy or even toughen it, thus taking the risk of increasing political, economic and security costs, or seek détente with the West, probably at the expense of certain concessions (including those as part of the Minsk process covering the conflict with Ukraine in Donbass), and by starting once more to honour at least some of the agreements concerning European security. Moscow’s decisions may be affected by a number of factors. The most essential of these seem to be the factors linked to the domestic situation in Russia, possible personnel changes inside the Russian government and an evolution of the perception and understanding of the international and regional situation by the Russian government. The present aggressive policy pursued by Russia seems incapable of being altered without major changes in these areas.

1998

How is Russian security policy changing in the course of the 1990s?1 After an initial period of confusion following the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia began to reassert its interests as a great power. What sort of Russian policy do we now see emerging? Is this policy something new or simply a return to a traditional power policy? And, finally, what are the consequences of this policy for Europe? These are the questions that will be discussed briefly in this chapter.

Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 61-85., 2018

The current state of coexistence in international arena is contested. Russian Federation (RF) cannot come to terms with the fact that following the dissolution of the USSR, it sustained substantial losses, especially with regards to its role globally. The team of Putin is striving to rebuild the power of their country. The Russian society, used to sacrifices for the homelands, offers its invaluable support. A lot of effort is put in the development of the armaments sector. As a result, the structure, command and mobilization the Armed Forces have substantially improved. The RF Armed Forces prepare for a possible armed conflict. Various types of exercise are conducted; frequently maneuvers take place in proximity to the borders of NATO member-states. This paper examines these developments and suggest possible ways of bypassing the emerging challenges.

Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie, 2017

In number of Russian analysis the NATO is treated as a relic of the Cold War world's division and as a tool of U.S. policy to protect their global dominance. Russia's position towards NATO can be perceived as ambivalent. On one hand, Russia stresses her willingness to collaborate with NATO and the European Union (almost every member of the EU participates also in the Alliance). It also emphasizes the importance of relations with the United States. However, on the other hand, Moscow recognizes NATO as an organisation destabilizing the world order and the balance of power. In Russian meaning NATO is an organization that creates a serious threat for her interests. First of all, Moscow emphasizes NATO's expansiveness, its military character and desire to reinforce the influence of this organization. Russia's approach towards NATO is so critical because the Alliance is regarded as a tool in Washington's hand, which wants to diminish the importance of Russia in global politics. It explains the peculiar dichotomy of Russia's view on the Pact and its members. On one hand, NATO invariably is described as a threat for Russian interests, but on the other hand, Russia underlines her willingness to develop relations with Western Europe-primarily with Germany, France and Italy which all are members of the Pact. Russia also differentiates between members of the Alliance; she differentiates allies of the

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”. Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia. Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems. Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine. Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear. The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”. Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army. Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.

2002

1. A crucial issue for Russia has always been such a shaping of the European security architecture which would guarantee the possibility of its participation in decision-making in issues referring to European security, especially crisis management. Moscow, still perceiving itself as a great world power, even in times when its ambitions are gradually being limited, would like to solve the problem of security architecture by creating akind of directorate, which would manage European security and would consist of the main European powers, the USA, and Russia. It seems that after the attempts to base this architecture on the OSCE model fell through, Russia has set its hopes on co-operation with the EU and above all with NATO, the key dominator in the European security problem. It has been Moscow’s interest to make NATO gradually evolve in the direction of a collective security system.

2015

On 26 December 2014, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin finally endorsed the new version of the Military Doctrine, which had been announced months before This brief explains the contents of this edition. Furthermore, it provides an analysis of the new doctrine and a forecast of its possible consequences. Finally, I discuss what the significance of this new Russian security document might be for Central Asia.