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Putin is pushing his Eurasian Union as an alternative to the EU. Marcel de Haas explains how the EU can win this game WRI T TEN BY
2009
Despite its undeniable "birth pangs," the Eastern Partnership symbolizes a change of paradigms in the foreign policy of the EU, which, after the inception of the Union for the Mediterranean in the summer of 2008, is now venturing on a new and qualitatively different approach to its eastern neighbourhood. Furthermore, five years after the enlargement of the EU this strategy creates a new situation in eastern Europe, and places its own approach to Russia on a firmer footing.
Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 2021
Journal of European Studies, 2018
While negotiations for the accession of some countries to the European Union (EU) are still underway, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), initiated in 2004, is working to bring the states neighbouring the EU territory in the east and the south, to a closer economic and security coordination. Further, in 2009 the Eastern Partnership (EaP) program was inaugurated with a particular objective of coordinating with the post-Soviet states. In this context, the Soviet successor states – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been approached, and some instruments of partnership have been signed. On the other hand, these countries also form a part of what Russia perceives as her " near abroad " , whose interests Moscow has tactically aligned with its own through many bilateral accords as well as ventures like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 2015, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, Russia announced the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). In order to compete with the European Union, the organisation aims to incorporate other Eurasian states. Against the backdrop of the stated developments, with the help of the 'dualistic operational model', this paper attempts to compare the functionalist and imperialist aspects of the two endeavours (Eastern Partnership and EEU). It questions the viability of the idea of Eastern Partnership. Also, it weighs the possibilities of a confrontation between the EU and Russia, and its repercussions on the concerned states.
‘Reordering the order’ of European security architecture best describes Russian intentions in the post-Soviet space, which have been highlighted during the crisis in Ukraine. The Eastern partners stand in the crossfire of this geopolitical rivalry, between two rival integration areas: the European Union and the newly formed Eurasian Union. However, it is worth asking whether both of these integration areas are playing in this geopolitical game. Five years of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) have produced only limited progress in EaP countries and the main incentive for transformation – the possibility of membership – is still not evident. Furthermore, some EU countries still search for a form of ‘engagement’ with Russia, while others are bargaining for a stricter policy of ‘containment’. Hence, Russia is moving towards becoming an informal ‘veto’ player in EU-EaP relations, in that it may be able to control the geopolitical path of the countries in the ‘shared neighborhood’.
This article examines the nature and implications of the emerging EU-Russia competition in their common neighbourhood. After analysing the two economic integration platforms that the EU and Russia are respectively promoting in the postsoviet space, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Eurasian Economic Union, the discussion focuses on the case study of Ukraine. It is argued that depicting this emerging regional configuration as a geopolitical contest between two cohesive blocs was not fully corresponding to the reality on the ground but that it largely turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy in the case of Ukraine.
Major global power has considered the future of Eurasia after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since 1991, the region has fragmented and decayed. The successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia, is emerging from this period with renewed self-confidence. Yet Russia is also in an untenable geopolitical position. Unless Russia exerts itself to create a sphere of influence, the Russian Federation could itself fragment. For most of the second half of the 20 th century, the Soviet Union controlled Eurasia, which was from central Germany to the Pacific, as far south as the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush. When the Soviet Union collapsed, its western frontier moved east nearly 1,000 miles, from the West German border to the Russian border with Belarus. Russian power has now retreated farther east than it has been in centuries. During the Cold War it had moved farther west than ever before. In the coming decades, Russian power will settle somewhere between those two lines. Therefore, after the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of the 20th century, foreign powers moved in to take advantage of Russia's economy, creating an era of chaos and poverty. Most significantly, Ukraine moved into an alignment with the United States and away from Russia, and this was a breaking point in Russian history. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, from December 2004 to January 2005, was the moment when the post-Cold War world genuinely ended for Russia. The Russians saw the events in Ukraine as an attempt by the United States to draw Ukraine into NATO and thereby set the stage for Russian disintegration. Moreover, quite frankly, there was some truth to the Russian perception. To be concluded, if the West had succeeded in dominating Ukraine, Russia would have become indefensible. The southern border with Belarus, as well as the southwestern frontier of Russia, would have been wide open.
2014
The November 2013 Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit in Vilnius played a key role in the transformation of the concept of the EU as a normative power. The summit was not only a focal point for developing the EU’s eastward policy, it has repositioned the EU as a geostrategic actor. Even Germany, which is usually cast as an “advocate” for Russia, joined other EU member states in support of the “European choice” of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The urge to counter Russian aspirations in these countries has created a rare period of European foreign policy unity. At the same time, the ability of the EU to effectively adopt a geopolitical approach in Eastern Europe is limited because of a series of structural and institutional factors. In the end, the outcome of these contemporary East-West tussles will depend more on actions on the ground than on various balances of power between Brussels and Moscow.
The uncertainties in the new international order, marked by growing interdependence as a result of the processes of globalization, along with fragmentation tendencies in the form of secession and protectionism, together with the numerous threats to international security, contribute to the complexity of the international scenario, raising questions about cooperation and competition, the balancing of norms and interests, and the juxtaposition and coordination of objectives and resources. In this context, the clarification of the relationship between the European Union and its largest neighbor, the Russian Federation, through the identification of competing interests and cooperation opportunities, along with the analysis of the agendas of these distinct actors, are relevant for the understanding of the EU's eastern neighborhood policy in relation to Putin's Russia in a political-security perspective. Realizing they need one another, this relationship has, nevertheless, been marked by many ups and downs. To what extent might cooperation prevail in the midst of competing interests? How far might Putin's growing undemocratic practices affect Moscow's relations with the EU? What impact might the affirmation of a stronger EU security and defense capability have on the EU-Russia link? By seeking to find answers to these and other questions, this paper aims to analyze the complex context in which the EU-Russia relationship takes place, looking for possible ways ahead in the building of cooperation and in the finding of a balance necessary for constructing stability throughout Europe. Looking East: The EU and Russia 2 How has Russia been responding to the new security challenges? Adapting to the changing conditions in a post-cold war context, or changing its security perceptions in response to the European integration process/enlargement policy? And how far might Putin's growing undemocratic practices affect Moscow's relation with the EU? What impact might the affirmation of a stronger EU security and defense capability have on the EU-Russia link? A complex relationship based on distinct principles leaves ample room for cooperation and competition and for an acknowledgment of the benefits of a working strategic partnership, while precluding both the EU and Russia from assuming it as a declared goal, with persisting distrust and animosity. Partners and rivals in the same play: a complex argument where the actors' performance includes both collaborative initiatives and exchange of accusations, seeming like an almost unmanageable "love-hate" relationship.
2009
Despite its undeniable "birth pangs," the Eastern Partnership symbolizes a change of paradigms in the foreign policy of the EU, which, after the inception of the Union for the Mediterranean in the summer of 2008, is now venturing on a new and qualitatively different approach to its eastern neighbourhood. Furthermore, five years after the enlargement of the EU this strategy creates a new situation in eastern Europe, and places its own approach to Russia on a firmer footing.
The uncertainties in the new international order, marked by growing interdependence as a result of the processes of globalization, along with fragmentation tendencies in the form of secession and protectionism, together with the numerous threats to international security, contribute to the complexity of the international scenario, raising questions about cooperation and competition, the balancing of norms and interests, and the juxtaposition and coordination of objectives and resources. In this context, the clarification of the relationship between the European Union and its largest neighbor, the Russian Federation, through the identification of competing interests and cooperation opportunities, along with the analysis of the agendas of these distinct actors, are relevant for the understanding of the EU's eastern neighborhood policy in relation to Putin's Russia in a political-security perspective. Realizing they need one another, this relationship has, nevertheless, been marked by many ups and downs. To what extent might cooperation prevail in the midst of competing interests? How far might Putin's growing undemocratic practices affect Moscow's relations with the EU? What impact might the affirmation of a stronger EU security and defense capability have on the EU-Russia link? By seeking to find answers to these and other questions, this paper aims to analyze the complex context in which the EU-Russia relationship takes place, looking for possible ways ahead in the building of cooperation and in the finding of a balance necessary for constructing stability throughout Europe. Looking East: The EU and Russia 2 How has Russia been responding to the new security challenges? Adapting to the changing conditions in a post-cold war context, or changing its security perceptions in response to the European integration process/enlargement policy? And how far might Putin's growing undemocratic practices affect Moscow's relation with the EU? What impact might the affirmation of a stronger EU security and defense capability have on the EU-Russia link? A complex relationship based on distinct principles leaves ample room for cooperation and competition and for an acknowledgment of the benefits of a working strategic partnership, while precluding both the EU and Russia from assuming it as a declared goal, with persisting distrust and animosity. Partners and rivals in the same play: a complex argument where the actors' performance includes both collaborative initiatives and exchange of accusations, seeming like an almost unmanageable "love-hate" relationship.
While the West continues to support efforts to democra- tize the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), shift- ing international trends threaten to slow the momentum. Increasing confrontation among Western leaders—evi- denced, inter alia, by the outbreak of protectionist trade policies and Donald Trump’s dissociation from G7 positions at the June 2018 summit in Quebec—can have unintended consequences across the EaP region, which needs Western harmony if it is to align with Euro-Atlantic visions of common values and security. Indeed, because most EaP countries are still in the midst of a liberal transition, they remain particularly vulnerable to Kremlin influence. Any extended fragmentation of the liberal order in the West could deceler- ate the democratization process, as it becomes harder for the West to serve as a role model for emerging democracies. Uncertainties about the future of the EaP are exacerbated by disar- ray within the European Union, fueled by Brexit; the growing political legitimacy of Euroskeptic populists in both newer and older member states; and the lack of a harmonious strategy between the European Union (EU) and the United States. For instance, the EU operates with transformational tools such as the Association Agreements in three of the six EaP countries (Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia), while the United States has developed advanced systems of strategic dialogue only with Georgia and Ukraine.
International Relations and Diplomacy, 2015
This article discusses whether the European Union (EU) has engaged in a geopolitical approach when it comes to its Eastern neighbors, now included in the EU's Eastern Partnership. The paper concludes that the EU has not engaged in a geopolitical approach when it comes to its policies towards its Eastern neighbors. Instead, it has approached them through the prisms of inter-connectedness and interdependency. The main reason for that rejection of geopolitical approach lies in the role that the EU has assigned to itself as an international actor, i.e. as a civilian and normative power. Finally, the use of civilian instruments would avoid the EU falling into a geopolitical trap that would lead to a zero sum game situation for its Eastern neighours in their relationships with Russia.
2019
The Russia-driven creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) at the beginning of 2015 has provided the EU with a new range of geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, stemming from Moscow’s predominantly “competitive” view of this new form of regionalism in the Eurasian space. At the same time, a certain level of engagement with the EEU and its member states could also help Brussels create new channels of dialogue with Russia, thereby increasing its ability to effectively address complex regional issues such as the Ukraine crisis. How to strike the right balance? This report starts with a comprehensive analysis of the EEU, focusing on its pillars but also on the main defining features of the stance towards this new form of regionalism held by each country in the Eurasian. Based on this analysis, which also acknowledges and highlights the key role played by China in the region, the report assesses the pros and cons of three possible strategic options for the EU in dealing with the EEU: Full Engagement, Competing Unions, and Tentative Compatibility. The authors come to the conclusion that the most effective and realistic one is Tentative Compatibility, which provides a pragmatic benchmark based on fostering “technical” cooperation across the blocs. In this light, the report offers several recommendations to the EU to adjust its policies (from the ENP to the Security Strategy, to the strategic partnership with China) accordingly.
2010
Balfour , Perspectives from the European Union 29 I n only two years of existence, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has already attracted considerable attention in the world of analysts and think tanks. Much of this focuses on the weaknesses of the new initiative, questioning its added value, and on the resonance of the incentives on offer in the six countries of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. While the EaP shares the deficits of the European Neighbourhood Policy (enp), it has been overlooked how perceptions and attitudes towards Eastern Europe have evolved within the eu. Supported by interviews with (anonymous) eu and civil society representatives, this article aims to uncover some of the views behind the conceptualization of the EaP, which in turn will help us understand some of the policy choices this entails, as well as highlighting possible areas of tension. The divergent views of member states on key themes such as relations with Russia and the debate on future eu enlargement remain a firm boundary to the scope of any policy towards Eastern Europe. However, analysis based on a longer term perspective also shows a growing convergence on raising the profile of Eastern Europe and on stepping up eu responsibility there, through incremental engagement rather than the elaboration of a strategic vision.
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2021
Contestation remains a significant factor in the EU neighbourhood. The aim of this article is to elaborate on the role of external actors-namely the European Union and the Russian Federation-in managing local and regional contestation. The latter is defined as incompatibilities between two or more competing views about how political, economic, social, and territorial order should be established and/or sustained. Competing interests between the EU and Russia concern many issues; the model of political system in the neighbourhood (democracy vs. authoritarianism), the model and direction of the economic integration of these countries (European or Eurasia integration), and the infrastructure and availability of gas and oil (energy disputes). The common neighbourhood, which concerns EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), has become an area of rivalry rather than cooperation between the EU and Russia. The first seeks to stabilise the post-Soviet area, while Russia exploits local destabilisations and conflicts to maintain its influence there.
On 7 May 2009, the EU summit with its Eastern European Partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine) in Prague launched the Eastern Partnership with a view to developing a specific Eastern European dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). However, this EU initiative has been perceived by Russia as a geopolitical process because, on the one hand, of the wide-ranging consequences of what the EU thought to be a purely technical, norms setting process of modernization, and, on the other hand, since it saw it as competing with the Eurasian Union project instrumented by Moscow in the former Soviet space. At present, the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok was hijacked by a new East-West geopolitical confrontation, while powerpolitik rather than cooperative security seems to prevail in shaping the future destiny of Eurasia. Apparently, the Eastern Partnership has been at the core of this dramatic change of the European and Euro-Atlantic security environment. However, other factors, such as the growing ideological gap between Russia and the West; and the chronic persistence of the protracted conflicts have also been at work in bringing up the collapse of the post-Cold War European security system . What role did the Eastern Partnership really play into this tragic evolution on the European continent? What lessons could the EU learn regarding its relations with the Eastern neighbors?
This is a complex report published by London-based Foreign Policy Center. It aslo includes a chapter concerning Moldova, written by me and called "The challenges facing Moldova on its path to Europe".
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