The Psychology of Political Extremism

Perspectives on Politics, 2006

Psychoanalysis has suffered rough treatment in American mass media in recent decades. Dubious sweeping neurological claims have displaced what are regarded as dubious "talking cure" claims. This cultural trend is reflected in the reflex-like skepticism with which especially under-50 scholars behold the works of Sigmund Freud and his schismatic followers. Political scientists rarely bother with psychoanalysis or tend at best to exhibit a "Freud for Beginners' grasp of the enterprise, which is, after all, an exploration, and canny effort at explanation, of our "inner world" and of the rule of unconscious elements over our intentions and best-laid plans. Inasmuch as the study of the unwieldy "inner self " militates against rational modeling, it is little wonder that psychoanalysis has fallen out of favor since Harold Lasswell's heyday. Indeed, psychoanalysts offer some intriguing comments about underlying motives that drive those of us who pursue rationalist models as adequate depictions of reality, but we need not tarry there. Here, we have two adept political scientists, adherents of the British variant of psychoanalysis developed by Melanie Klein, tapping this multifaceted tradition for insights into group behavior, a move that is, as analysts readily acknowledge, speculative and only to be conducted with numerous caveats strewn ahead. A methodology devised to probe the innermost recesses of individuals obviously does not commend itself for the analysis of groups or institutions, too. The greatest care must be taken when appraising the results of such a methodological leap. Freud, after all, cautiously warned that his own meta-psychological excursions (Moses and Monotheism, Totem and Taboo, etc.) were "his own affair." People may have egos, ids, and superegos, but societies certainly do not. The two books under review display certain merits and some weaknesses of psychoanalysis when applied within social sciences. In Rethinking Freedom, Robert Alford employs psychoanalytical lenses, so to speak, throughout a brilliant little volume examining the meaning of freedom among contemporary Americans. The irony is that Alford is so good an observer that one suspects he could have made many of the same interesting judgments without resorting to psychoanalytical concepts at all. His data unapologetically are some 50 extensive interviews with "about twice as many younger informants (18-30) as older

European Psychologist, 2021

This research analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, which is confronted by two substantial crises, namely the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis. These crises have led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among the youth who are specifically vulnerable to discourses that culturalise and stigmatize the "other". Young people between the ages of 18 to 30, whether native or immigrant-origin, have similar responses to globalization-rooted threats such as deindustrialization, isolation, denial, humiliation, precariousness, insecurity, and anomia. These responses tend to be essentialised in the face of current socioeconomic , political and psychological disadvantages. While a number of indigenous young groups are shifting to right-wing populism, a number of Muslim youths are shifting towards Islamic radicalism. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934.

2017

A radical Salafist ideology is attractive to people, especially young people, looking for simple solutions to solve the serious socioeconomic problems with which they cannot cope. Salafism is characterized by a Manichean division of the world on what is good, because it comes from God and what is bad. This in turn implies providing simple answers to complex questions. Actually, the simplest answer to the questions: why the people on Earth live badly? It is the statement "because mankind rejects the law of God revealed in the Qur'an and Sunnah." Therefore, the restoration of these foundations is the only one and the simplest way to solve all problems of mankind. The road to this seems to be simple: total war against "infidels and apostates". The Salafi mullahs as the custodians of “true Faith” have only right to decide who is “infidel of apostate”... Young people undergo indoctrination via the Internet, or in different "Islamic Centres" using freedom of religion (which is something fundamental for the West), are deprived of the ability to take a critical look at the content transmitted. Other are radicalized in prisons. Such circumstances stimulate reflection on the current life of their own, but also may lead to religious radicalism. The question arises: how much we still have to deal with religion as such or if it is a totalitarian political ideology? Of course, Salafism is the offshoot of Islam, but goes far than relations between men and Absolut. From the above reasons can be deduced its totalitarian character. Comparing the proposed by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl Friedrich definition of totalitarianism, we can substantiate such thesis. Guiding ideology is here Salafi interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah. Mass party is Salafi movement, which can take the form of a movement or the classic political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic State tries to have a monopoly on weapons as much as possible, militarizing male part of the population. The Islamic State monopolizes the mass media, reaching new media as a means of attracting new adepts, and where the Salafists tend to power, contests existing media as "godless" encouraging the use of the Internet and underground publications. An example is the so-called Islamic State (the Daesh). It uses legitimate violence against any actual or alleged opponents of the ruling group, such as not only Christians, or Jews, but also people arbitrarily considered as non-Muslims. For this purpose, they create formations that can be called religious-moral police, and used traditional security institutions as well. Salafi vision of the World resembles a totalitarian concepts which Hannah Arendt writes about, as this interpretation of Islam vividly explains both past, present and forecast the future, and also presents a seemingly logical model of the state of God, which wants to put into practice. If we consider Salafi ideology as totalitarian, then we will need to apply the same methods to combat the Salafi preachers as those used to fight the followers of totalitarian regimes after World War II. Declarations of similar firmness in the fight against "Jihadism" appear at various levels of government of countries such as Germany for many years. However, there is lack of sufficient firmness and consistency in their effectiveness.