In the middle of Zeitenwende

2019

»Die Auswirkungen der Weltwirtschaftskrise auf die Muster von Demokratieunterstützung in Deutschland«. Has there been a decline in support for democracy in the aftermath of the 2007/08 fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession in Germany? This is the general research question dealt with in this article. Based on a differentiated theory of support for democracy results show that levels of support are high and change over time does not support the decline expectation. We conclude that the political culture of Germany's established democratic political regime has cushioned the impact of the fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession in the time period under consideration. German democracy has weathered the crisis well. Keywords: Support for democratic values, support for the German democratic regime, generalized support for political parties, impact of economic crises, partisan differences in support for democracy.

2017

During Angela Merkel's time as Germany's Chancellor, the country has seen the largest inflow of migrants in its postwar history, but overall attitudes to immigration in Germany have been remarkably stable and, if anything, have actually become slightly more positive (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017; Eurobarometer, 2017). On the surface, stability seems to be the word that best describes attitudes to immigration in Germany. Yet, the anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) political party has seen a surge in its opinion poll ratings, enjoyed some electoral success, and could enter the Bundestag after the 2017 federal elections. This brief explains how generalized favourability to immigration can combine with growth in support for an anti-immigration party by highlighting the importance of issue salience. To explore the structure of attitudes to immigration in Germany, this policy brief addresses four key features: the overall increase in positive attitudes to immigration; levels of issue salience; different perceptions of immigration among eastern and western Germans; and, finally the role played by wider trust in Germany's social and political institutions in reducing anxiety around immigration.

Reclaiming action — PRogRessive stRategies in times of gRowing Right-wing PoPulism in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Germany, 2018

The spelling, grammar, and other linguistic conventions in this volume reflect American English usage. The judgments and opinions expressed in the articles collected for this book are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or of the editors.

Political Change in Greece

It is difficult to write about changes in public attitudes from the 1960's to the 1980's, as there were practically no public opinion surveys in Greece until 1974; furthermore, even since then, most of the relatively few surveys conducted have focused on party political and ideological matters, and only occasionally one finds questions on social attitudes. It is therefore unavoidable that parts of this chapter will be based on impressionistic and subjective interpretations of public opinion trends, hopefully often convergent with the views of other students of Greek politics and society. Consequently, one can fairly describe the prevailing public mood in Greece during the 1960's on the basis of the positions of the two larger political families, the Right and the Center, which commanded the support of more than 80% of the voters in relatively freely contested elections. The dominant common characteristic was anti-communism and the resultant unconditional commitment to the Western alliance. Following the Civil War that lasted longer and cost more lives than World War II, the victors, to which both right and centre belonged, opted for a continuous persecution and practical exclusion from public life of the vanquished, rather than for a gradual reconciliation. Besides, 'the fear of communism reinforced the role of the Monarchy rightly thought, because of the actual allegiance of the Army to the Crown, as the pillar of the established order 1. In addition and for the same reason, 'many politicians formerly of republican convictions rallied to the Monarchy 1 (Meynaud, 1965, p.315). This exaggerated and monolithic belief in a communist threat made all reformist and progressive ideas suspect. The two main political parties, the 64

European Journal of Political Research, 1992

Based on the theory that explains the neoconservative upsurge of the 1980s as a reaction against the post-materialist changes in values of the preceding decades, this paper analyzes the relationship between neoconservatism and the rise of the New Right parties in West Germany at the end of the 1980s. Secondary analysis of survey data demonstrates the differentiation of the political spectrum into the Old Politics and New Politics dimensions and related variants of conservatism. The New Right and in particular the Republicans are neither a 'radicalization of the centre' of German society nor a simple mobilization of right-wing extremists. Rather, they are the product of the disintegration of the established parties which are in the process of losing voting support to the parties of the New Left and the New Right in an almost symmetrical fashion.

Political Culture in Germany, 1993

The analysis' point of reference is the hypothesis that an increasing dissatisfaction among the citizens poses a challenge to the representative democracy. This dissatisfac tion can either refer to the basic structure of the regime or just to the democratic process which is taking place within the frame of that structure. Empirical analyses in the Fede ral Republic of Germany have shown that this hypothesis cannot be confirmed for the population aggregate, even in the more restricted variant. Albeit, a clear below average satisfaction with the democratic process can be perceived for the postmaterialist left. That is the section of the population where, for theoretical reasons, this was to be expected. It is to be assumed that the extent of that below average satisfaction and its further development rather depends on the informal rules of the game of the democratic process as such than on the institutional structure of the representative democracy. Bezugspunkt der Analyse ist die Hypothese einer Herausforderung der repräsentativen Demokratie durch eine zunehmende Unzufriedenheit der Staatsbürger. Diese Unzufrie denheit kann sich entweder auf die grundlegende Struktur dieses Regimes beziehen oder lediglich auf die demokratischen Prozesse, die im Rahmen dieser Struktur stattfin den. Empirische Analysen für die Bundesrepublik zeigen, daß sich diese Hypothese im Bevölkerungsaggregat auch für die eingeschränktere Variante nicht bestätigen läßt. Allerdings kann für die postmaterialistische Linke eine eindeutig unterdurchschnittliche Zufriedenheit mit dem demokratischen Prozeß festgestellt werden, bei derjenigen Bevölkerungsgruppe also, bei der das aus theoretischen Gründen auch am ehesten erwartbar war. Das Ausmaß dieser unterdurchschnittlichen Zufriedenheit und ihrer weiteren Entwicklung hängt vermutlich eher von den informellen Spielregeln des demokratischen Prozesses selber ab als von der institutioneilen Struktur der repräsenta tiven Demokratie.

2018

»Die Auswirkungen der Weltwirtschaftskrise auf die Muster von Demokratieunterstützung in Deutschland«. Has there been a decline in support for democracy in the aftermath of the 2007/08 fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession in Germany? This is the general research question dealt with in this article. Based on a differentiated theory of support for democracy results show that levels of support are high and change over time does not support the decline expectation. We conclude that the political culture of Germany's established democratic political regime has cushioned the impact of the fiscal crisis and the subsequent economic recession in the time period under consideration. German democracy has weathered the crisis well. Keywords: Support for democratic values, support for the German democratic regime, generalized support for political parties, impact of economic crises, partisan differences in support for democracy.

2012

The concept of party identification is central to our understanding of electoral behavior. This paper builds upon the functional logic of party identification and asks what occurs when more Germans manage the complexities of politics without needing to rely on habitual party cuesdwhat we label as Apartisans. We track the distribution of party mobilization and cognitive mobilization within the German electorate from 1976 until 2009. Then, we demonstrate the importance of these mobilization patterns by documenting strong differences in electoral commitment, the content of political thinking, and electoral change. The results suggest a secular transformation in the characteristics of the public has led to a more differentiated and dealigned German electorate. 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Samuel Barnes once said that the only constant in electoral research is that things change. The 2009 Bundestagswahl is an ideal example of this maxim. Even though the eventual outcome – a go...

East Central Europe, 1984

Studies in Communication | Media, 2012

The scope of this paper is twofold: On the one hand, it offers an empirical based insight into the developments of public opinion in Germany in the 19 th and 20 th century. On the other hand, it reflects theoretically on problems concerning the interpretation of historical sources related to public opinion (theory). The article concentrates on German history between 1866 and 1945, a period serviced by a huge amount of historical sources and archival material. The starting point of 1866 marks the beginning of German unification while 1945 marks the end of this era. For the empirical insight into developments in public opinion, the findings presented here indicate that public opinion was deeply influenced by a set of socio economic variables. This paper assesses variables of intervening impact such as trust, tradition, information costs and external costs, while the article also considers the measurability of media impact on public opinion in the past. Furthermore, the paper offers explanations for the interdependence of public opinion and election results. For the theoretical considerations of interpretational problems, this article reflects the fabrication both of public opinion and of public opinion sources. Furthermore, it tries to isolate ingredients of frames in public opinion theory. In doing so it forwards a new notion, namely that "public mood" is derived from the historical sources. The paper also tries to integrate the public mood concept in public opinion theory. The empirical findings share with the theoretical framing the fact that both the theory and reality of public opinion can sometimes be easily explained, as sometimes they provide strange loops of interwoven causes and consequences.