Gadamer and Hermenuetics (2006)

Between Description and Interpretation: The Hermeneutic Turn in Phenomenology. By Andrzej Wiercinski Ed. Toronto: The Hermeneutic Press, 2005

Hans-Georg Gadamer, who fashioned his philosophical hermeneutics in Truth and Method on the foundations of the phenomenological insights of Heidegger and Husserl, has convincingly demonstrated that the concept of practical experience is already inherent in the sphere of the purest philosophical theory. It is another question, however, to ask whether philosophy, as a theory, is conscious of this and whether it takes this observation into account. In addition to this practical aspect, we could add that there is a poetic or creative dimension that is also inherent in philosophy.

Res Cogitans, 2020

The aim of this paper is to substantiate the view that historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) which is an epistemological presupposition of Gadamer's idea of 'concept history' (Begriffsgeschichte) violates the substance of philosophy considerably, i.e. its problems and conceptuality, because of the limits it sets to the reach of thoughtful consideration (Denken). I argue that if philosophy shall be possible as an epistemic activity intended for knowledge, a theory which defends the universality of thinking must be added to Gadamer's hermeneutics. This paper shows how his theory unjustly ignores 'thoughtful consideration' as a primordial phenomenon of consciousness which is present on higher levels of understanding. After the criticism of Gadamer's inadequate concept of knowledge the paper concludes with a suggestion to rehabilitate the classical notion of thoughtful consideration as the substantive and permanent presupposition of all philosophy. The paper demonstrates how the rise of knowledge from Verstehen to Denken on different levels of reflection must lead to a rehabilitation of the philosophy of subjectivity and of metaphysics and how this epistemological move must affect the idea of a 'destruction of metaphysics' which Gadamer shares with Heidegger. 1. Introduction. Unfolding the argument This paper examines the significance of the notion of historicity for philosophical thought with a critical view to Gadamer's idea of 'concept history' as philosophy. It is argued that the historical criticism of philosophy which Gadamer undertakes by tracking philosophical concepts to their historical context and by exposing them to the philosophical (Socratic) dialogue, does not finish the job. Concept history considered as philosophy leaves philosophy in trouble because it does not proceed to make its product a resource for systematical philosophical reasoning. Firstly, the paper addresses the criticism which Gadamer-by means of concept history-directs at the Neo-Kantian attempts to codify the problems of philosophy. Secondly, it shows how his criticism is based on his theory of the 'historicity of understanding' (Geschichtlichkeit des Verstehens) presented in Wahrheit und Methode.

Within the phenomenological tradition it is Heidegger who is the first to give the notion of historicity decisive importance. As Heidegger describes it, the historical is not only something from which one gets information, but is that which “we ourselves our.” When this notion is taken up by Gadamer in his philosophical hermeneutics he will use the expression Wirkungsgeschichte (effective history). For Gadamer this expression denotes more than the simple relation in which history is read from out of a condition of being in history. It is for him also that differentiating relation which limits the understanding of an historical tradition, in effect designating the historical in relation to a question or problem rather than to any historical totality. One finds a similar configuration in Foucault when he takes over from Nietzsche the term wirkliche Historie. For Foucault, the term l’historie effective conveys the systematic dismantling of any comprehensive view of history. As Foucault employs this term for his own use, it comes to express a practico-political concern that as such appears to be absent from Gadamer’s effective history. This paper explore the precise sense of “effective history” and draws out both the unity and difference of the term as we find it in Gadamer and Foucault. At issue is ultimately the character of critique that is employed in both versions, which, in turn, raises the further question of the degree of continuity or discontinuity that is brought about by effective history.

This essay makes two claims. The fi rst, exegetical, point shows that there are Husserlian elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics that are usually overlooked. The second, systematic, claim takes issue with the fact that Gadamer saw himself in alliance with the project of the later Heidegger. It would have been more fruitful had Gadamer aligned himself with Husserl and the Enlightenment tradition. Following Heidegger in his concept of "effective history," Gadamer risks betraying the main tenets of the Enlightenment by shifting the weight from subjectivity to effective history as the "agent" in history. This is not a wholesale dismissal of Gadamer's project, however. The problem in Gadamer's effective history can be remedied by insisting, with Husserl, on the subjective character of effective history. Gadamer was right to criticize Husserl's idea of a transcendental genesis, but went too far in giving up the idea of human subjectivity as the agent in history.

2019

This essay offers a critical assessment of Dmitri Nikulin's effort to advance a theory of history that avoids the pitfalls of universalism, on the one hand, and historicism, on the other. I focus my attention upon the relationship between three key concepts in Nikulin's study; namely, the fabula, the historical, and logos. On my reading, Nikulin implicitly adopts an epistemological orientation, inherited from late nineteenth-century neo-Kantian philosophers who envisioned history as an object that must be thematized in order to be studied scientifically. As a result, Nikulin comes to characterize history in terms of an untenable schema/content dualism that almost entirely extricates the historical past (or, data) from the contemporary effort to understand (or, interpret) it. By contrasting Nikulin's view with those of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, I show that a hermeneutic conception of history offers a more convincing account of the dynamic relationship betwe...

Crítica (México D. F. En línea)

En este artículo estudio algunas de las versiones más influyentes del historicismo: la teoría de que todos, o casi todos, nuestros conceptos y creencias están determinados completamente por nuestra cultura. En mi opinión, esta teoría es errónea. Enseguida, estudio el intento de Richard Rorty por defender el historicismo combinándolo con el pragmatismo, y descubro que esto sólo empeora las cosas. En contra tanto del historicismo como del pragmatismo, defiendo el punto de vista de que en efecto tenemos conceptos y creencias que corresponden a la realidad. No obstante, aunque éstos siempre aparecen en un ambiente cultural, y muestran la influencia de éste en su forma de expresión y uso, también contienen información que puede ser, y es, reconocida transculturalmente. [Traducción: Claudia Chávez A.]

Continental Philosophy Review, 2017

The Emergence of Relativism: German Thought from the Enlightenment to National Socialism, 2019

The purpose of this chapter is to ask how Gadamer, in Truth and Method, deals with the challenge of relativism in historical thought and how he responds to the issues brought up by the constellation of philosophers he labels historicists. I argue that Gadamer misunderstands both historicism and the relativist challenges to which it responds. This double misunderstanding will shape his hermeneutic contribution in unwanted ways (including his notions of tradition and second nature to which Rorty, McDowell, Brandom, and other anglophone philosophers have recently turned).

European Journal of Philosophy, 2016

In Another Philosophy of History, J.G. Herder claims that his aim is not to compare and judge different cultures, but merely to describe and explain how each came into being and thus to adopt the standpoint of an impartial observer. I argue, however, that there is a tension between Herder's understanding of his own project—his stated doctrine of historicism and cultural relativism—and the way in which it is actually put into practice. That is, despite Herder's stated aims, he is nevertheless unable to avoid justifying premodern forms of life and making context-transcending evaluative judgments in the process of trying to understand cultures on their own terms and holding them up as exemplars vis à vis the Enlightenment. This tension presents the challenge of accounting for it in the most charitable and illuminating way. I argue that this goal can be achieved by appealing to the resources of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which enables us to disclose two enabling conditions for Herder's project of which he was not explicitly aware, viz., the internal connection between understanding and justification and the enabling character of prejudice as the condition for the possibility of understanding as such. In Another Philosophy of History, J.G. Herder develops a distinctive methodology for historical inquiry that poses a challenge to his Enlightenment contemporaries on the grounds that their methods radically distort and, as a result, fail to genuinely understand and learn from premodern cultures and civilizations. Against the assumptions of cultural superiority of Enlightenment historians, based on a historical narrative of linear progress which posits the Enlightenment as history's terminal point, Herder argues that no such comparative, context-transcending evaluative judgments can be made since every culture has to be understood on its own terms and evaluated on the basis of the criteria internal to each. By situating cultures within their own historical context, therefore, we can come to understand and appreciate the particular virtues distinctive of each. As such, according to Herder's historicism, the aim is not to compare and judge different cultures, but rather to describe and explain how each came into being; that is, to adopt the standpoint of an impartial observer in order to avoid the hubris of Enlightenment historians on the one hand, and the tendency to overly romanticize and 'pick favorites' among premodern cultures, on the other.

South African journal of philosophy, 2005

Hermeneutics and historical consciousness: An appraisal of the contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer.