Cotterrell (2003)

Information systems (IS) provide a revolutionary technology to support, or perhaps fundamentally change, how our military forces are commanded. This paper is motivated by a search for underlying principles of Command and Control (C2) to provide a firmer footing for understanding how computing and communications advances are, or could be more effectively, applied in the C2 process. Command archetypes identified by researchers such as van Creveld, Czerwinski and Builder are described and related to current military C2 doctrine. The role of C2 research is then examined in relation to these command principles. Based on this analysis, the paper concludes that C2 research conducted without explicitly identifying the command principle could in fact be undermining current military command. By adopting a more principled approach, particularly in the application of IS, two streams of C2 research emerge. The first is that intended to enhance the command type used by the military, and the secon...

Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2009

2000

This paper builds on our efforts to establish a theoretical base for research in Command and Control. We begin by offering two new definitions of Command and Control that are radically different from the ones currently used. These definitions are short, internally consistent and functional: Control is those structures and processes devised by Command to manage risk ; and Command

2024

2003

Major Jack Peterson paced the four cramped steps in each direction, the total distance that his office allowed, as he considered his options for reorganizing CLOAC (Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course) for the next series of classes. He read the new orders again, for the umpteenth time, wondering how he could perform what they commanded: expand the duties of his current staff to cover a 50 percent increase in classes offered. His own extensive training in military procedures, reinforced by 15 years of Army experience, referred him to the traditional, logical, and rational military problem-solving process. However, at the turn of the 21st century he suspected some changes might be in order.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies York University North York, Ontario , 2003

ABSTRACT The relationship between command ability and criminal responsibility was key to a case in a British military court in Singapore in 1946 that convicted Japanese Lt. Col. Hirateru Banno and six others for the deaths of 3,097 British and Australian prisoners of war, part of a group known as “F Force” on the Burma Thailand Railway during the Second World War. Banno was handed a sentence of three years. The reviewing officer upheld the sentence, accepting evidence of Banno’s inability to command his troops. He also questioned the ability of the senior British officers in the POW camp. The Banno case took place a year after the precedent-setting trial of Lt. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, which appeared to hold commanders to a strict liability for war crimes committed by their subordinates. This thesis also examines the status of prisoners and how they are protected by the laws of war as well as the question of fairness in trials by military tribunals.

The Journal of Military Operations, 2012

This article describes an empirical typology, or classification, of command approaches. It does so in order to enable what is perhaps an overdue examination of the variety of command approaches and of their relative merits. The typology relates to a fundamental feature of warfare: friction. It is presented here recognising that many factors affect the preference for, and application of, particular command approaches by different armies. These factors, which may include political expectations, cultural tunnel vision, and technology, merit further discussion. Presenting the typology here may encourage such deeper examination of the subject.

Defense Technical Information Center: Monographs, 2012

Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commander’s intent. The use of mission tactics allowed subordinate commanders like Crown Prince Frederick Karl, Gen. Konstantin von Alvensleben, and Gen. Karl von Steinmetz to interpret how best to achieve the commander’s intent based upon their understanding of the tactical situation. The Prussian use of decentralized command during the Franco-Prussian War acknowledged the risk inherent in this system of command. Despite what modern military theorists often write, Auftragstaktik and mission command are not synonymous terms. Most authors ignore the historical environment that the Prussian military operated in during the Franco-Prussian War. This study examines the influence of the Prussian concept of Auftragstaktik on the modern US Army notion of mission command as defined within the published doctrine. It utilizes archival records and pertinent published histories from the August 1870 battles on the Franco-Prussian frontier, Moltke’s 1869 Instructions for Large Unit Commanders, as well as writings from the 1980s to describe the influence of Prussian system on the modern concept of mission command.

History has seen a fluctuation between centralized and distributed architectures in command and control sy stems due to the available technology. In order to ensure operational success in future battlefields it is necessary that the United States more effectively incorporate Commander's Intent (CI) into visualization and cros stalk systems. As the only invariant component of Operati onal Orders, CI will allow for distributed command struc tures that both coordinate actions and adapt autonomously and instantaneously to ground conditions.

2014

A key requirement for success in any military operation is that the Intentions of the Officer in Command be accurately transmitted down through the command hierarchy. It is these intentions that should convey the commander’s requirements for the proposed operation, and should include a statement both of the purpose, and of the required outcome, of the operation about to be undertaken. Without the accurate transmission of intent, the desired effect may well not be achieved. This paper will discuss a two-stage process directed at assessing the transmission of Commander’s Intent, and which also has potential as a tool for de-risking a proposed operation. There is a further potential for use in the training of junior officers and cadets.