A Background of One Sautrantika's Theory in the Abhidharmakosa

On a Day of a Month of the Fire Bird Year: Festschrift for Peter Schwieger on the occasion of his 65th birthday, Lumbini International Research Institute, eds. Jeannine Bischoff, Petra Maurer, and Charles Ramble, S 765‒778., 2020

The general context of the present paper is the evaluation of the three afflictions in Mahāyāna literature, i.e., desire, hatred, and delusion. In particular, I would like to investigate within the teachings of the founder of the Drikung Kagyü Tradition, Kyobpa Jigten Sumgön (1143-1217), how he placed delusion in relation to desire and hatred within his system of thought and main work, which has become known as the Single Intention (Tib. dGongs pa gcig pa). Jigten Sumgön is famous for his critical assessment of the complete body of Buddhist teachings that the Tibetans had inherited chiefly from India, that is, he pointed out in his so-called "vajra statements" (Tib. rdo rje'i tshig) what he saw as flawed in the interpretation and adaption of the Indian tradition. In his two vajra statements focussing on delusion, he criticised that some people hold delusion as a less grave fault when compared to the other two poisons. The opinion of these people also implies that desire and hatred, or at least one of them, are worse than delusion. We find statements of this kind, or that may be read to indicate this, in the context of explanations of the disciplined conduct (Skt. śīla) of the bodhisattvas. The understanding of this conduct, in fact, underwent several phases of development in the course of time. Among these developments, one can observe an early phase of Mahāyāna sūtras where desire is-as in Śrāvaka morality-the greatest threat to disciplined conduct. Later, however, the idea of a special conduct of bodhisattvas was increasingly adapting to the newly developing ideal of benefiting all sentient beings and to a new way of viewing reality as characterised chiefly by non-duality. These new developments led, initially, to a gradual devaluation of the Śrāvaka type of morality.

Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1998

2001

0. In the Buddhist scriptures the term ayonisomanas( i )kiira (Pali ayoniso manasikiira), 'incorrect attention, erroneous judgement' appears usually as a negative counterpart of yonisomanas( i)kiira, 'correct attention, right judgement'. In general, the concept of ayonisomanas( i)kiira is connected with the process of defilement; it is listed among the factors conducive to defilement. Its role in the doctrinal expositions has not been comprehensively studied by the scholars yet. The Sarvastivada Abhidharma assigned, it seems, more importance to that factor in its dharma-doctrine than the Theravada. The controversy on the possible conditioning of avidyii, the first member of the twelve-membered formula of the dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida), by the factor of incorrect attention (ayonisomanaskiira), has been treated in some detail in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa. In the present paper, after having sketched in brief the role of the concept of ayonisomanas(...

China Tibetology 36 (Number 1, March 2021): 81–99. , 2021

are attained. 3 Restraint is classified as three kinds: (1) the prātimokṣa restraint, (2) the restraint [co-existing with] meditation (dhyānasaṃvara) and (3) the pure restraint (anāsravasaṃvara). These three classes of restraint can be acquired with regard to three different kinds of actions and concerning sentient beings or non-sentient entities. Moreover, they are obtained in relation to two variants of transgressions, namely the "transgressions by nature" (prakṛtisāvadya) and the "transgressions of disobedience" (pratikṣepanasāvadya). Finally, the restrains differ in terms of being related to entities of either the present, the past or the future. Vasubandhu explains in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that the first category of restraint, that is, the prātimokṣa restraint, belongs to the realm of desire (kāmadhātu) and is applied against the "preparatory" (prayoga), the "actual" (maula) and the "consecutive" (pṛṣṭha) part of an act. In order to illustrate the meaning of these three consecutive steps, Vasubandhu mentions the example of killing an animal. 4 In a first step the person having such an intention prepares the slaughtering by activities like going to the market, buying the animal, and taking a knife. Then, the actual act is carried out, that is, the actual killing of the animal. Consecutive deeds include cooking, eating or selling the animal. The prātimokṣa restraint is, according to Vasubandhu, directed towards sentient and non-sentient beings and prevents the person who complies with it from committing "transgressions by nature" and "transgressions of disobedience." In his Tattvārthā commentary Sthiramati combines these four possibilities and provides examples for each alternative combination: 5 (1) Attainment of a transgression by nature with regard to non-sentient entities, for instance, taking away gold or sexual misconduct with a doll having the shape of a woman (strīpratirūpa). (2) Attainment of a transgression by disobedience with regard to sentient beings, for instance, sleeping together with a woman in a house. (3) Attainment of a transgression by nature with regard to sentient beings (sattvādhiṣṭhāna), for instance, killing living beings. (4) Attainment of a transgression by disobedience with regard to non-sentient entities, for instance, cutting grass. The final statement made by Vasubandhu with regard to the prātimokṣa restraint is that it refers only to entities of the present, not of the past or future. The reason for this classification is that, as Vasubandhu explains, the entities of the past and future can

Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Religion, 2020

It is a well-known fact that the Śaiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925-975) has adopted the Sāṃkhya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sāṃkhya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the Śaiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, in perfect contradiction with the Sāṃkhya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Upaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr̥ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other Śaiva sources, including Somānanda’s Śivadr̥ṣṭi and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sāṃkhya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (śakti), and that his criticism of the Sāṃkhya understanding of causality might target the Śaiva dualists as well as Sāṃkhya authors. [“A Śaiva interpretation of the satkāryavāda: the Sāṃkhya notion of abhivyakti and its transformation in the Pratyabhijñā treatise,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 42(1), 2014, pp. 127-172.]

Dissertation in Buddhist Studies submitted at Hamburg (Sanskrit/Tibetan), 2022

The research findings for this study can be grouped under the following three Categories: 1. First of all, this study includes a thoroughly annotated translation of the opening sections of the fourth chapter of Yaśomitra’s Abhidharmakośavyākhyā IV.1–4, an early sixth century commentary on of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, wherein Vasubandhu offers a basic exposition of Buddhist causality that has remained a pivotal resource in the traditional dissemination of Buddhist thought on that topical cluster. To date, said section in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā had only been available in the original Sanskrit, its Tibetan and Chinese Translations, and, more recently, as a modern translation in the Japanese medium. Burnouf (1876, p. 399), amongst other scholars, had already by the mid-to-late nineteenth century understood Yaśomitra’s commentary to be a philosophically significant and historically impactful work, an early Buddhist commentary that is not only deeply embedded in the academic tradition of Nālandā-University, but that is also the only fully extant Sanskrit commentary to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya known to date. The extract chosen for translation centers on an exposition of early Buddhist causal models that contextualizes and elucidates early conceptions of the relation-ship between cause and effect; Abhidharmakośavyākhyā IV.1–4 has hereby been rendered accessible, for the first time, to the wider academic community, therein allowing for further philosophical, historical, and linguistic analysis by contemporary scholarls. 2. Secondly, this study assesses the philosophical debate between the Sarvāstivāda-school on the one hand, andn the Yogācāras on the other. The former posit that any phenomenon can be broken down into a clearly defined, limited number of ‘basic building blocks’ (dharmā) that in turn, by dint of their causal efficacy, need to be based on a positively established ontology (Dhammajoti 2015b, p. 74); the latter expend effort to refute any inherent link beteween causal efficacy and any such reified, positively established, ontological status. The extract contained in this study has been chosen with a focus on the exposition of the Sarvāstivādin concepts of vijñapti, avijñapti, and avijñaptirūpa—avijñapti in particular being considered by the Sarvāstivādins as indispensable and immutable ‘sustaining link’ between cause and effect. The counterarguments fielded by the Yogācāra-school, are likewise rendered, together with an assessment of the degree and scope of their cogency. 3. The translation of Abhidharmakośavyākhyā IV.1–4 contained in this study is based on a philological study and text-critical edition both of the Sanskrit original and its Tibetan translation. A fully positive apparatus records all variant readings of the seven Sanskrit manuscripts and three Sanskrit Editions, taking into consideration scholarly observations made by Funabashi, Sako, and others. Likewise, the principal transmission lines of the Tibetan commentarial canon (Bstan ’gyur)—inter alia Cone, Derge, Narthang and Peking—have been critically collated and certain readings amended, taking into account novel insights provided in secondary literature. URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-ediss-112160 URL: https://ediss.sub.uni-hamburg.de/handle/ediss/10483