Against Symmetry Fundamentalism

SYMMETRY: THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING, 1997

This paper is critical of reductionist theories of everything (TOE) and proposes instead an outline for a holistic TOE based on symmetry. Symmetry is entirely omnipresent in the universe, it has a relational architecture and can be characterised by its formative, energetic and infinite potentials as well as its basis in meaning and consciousness. These inclusive and generic features combine to provide the necessary holistic attributes for a successful theory of everything. The history of physics is a history of the unification of science. Newton, Maxwell, Einstein, and Bohr each developed a series of symmetrical connections which were previously unknown. Perhaps because of these isomorphic developments the search for a theory of everything (TOE), a theory that can explain the basic laws of the entire universe in all its infinitely subtle detail, appears more than an act of faith. At the heart of a TEO are the concepts of unity and unification and these have been the outcomes of physics for the last three hundred years.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Symmetry-based inferences have permeated many discussions in philosophy of physics and metaphysics of science. It is claimed that symmetries in our physical theories would allow us to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world, a view that I call ‘symmetry inferentialism’. This paper is critical to this view. I claim that (a) it assumes a philosophically questionable characterization of the relevant validity domain of physical symmetries, and (b) it overlooks a distinction between two opposing ways through which relevant physical symmetries become established. My conclusion is that symmetry inferentialism loses persuasive force when these two points are taken into consideration.

Foundations of Science, 2016

Over the past few decades the notion of symmetry has played a major role in physics and in the philosophy of physics. Philosophers have used symmetry to discuss the ontology and seeming objectivity of the laws of physics. We introduce several notions of symmetry in mathematics and explain how they can also be used in resolving different problems in the philosophy of mathematics. We use symmetry to discuss the objectivity of mathematics, the role of mathematical objects, the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics and the relationship of mathematics to physics.

The paper discusses the invariance view of reality: a view inspired by the relativity and quantum theory. It is an attempt to show that both versions of Structural Realism (epistemological and ontological) are already embedded in the invariance view but in each case the invariance view introduces important modifications. From the invariance view we naturally arrive at a consideration of symmetries and structures. It is often claimed that there is a strong connection between invariance and reality, established by symmetries. The invariance view seems to render frame-invariant properties real, while frame-specific properties are illusory. But on a perspectival, yet observer-free view of frame-specific realities they too must be regarded as real although supervenient on frameinvariant realities. Invariance and perspectivalism are thus two faces of symmetries.

The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2006

HB) ISBN-13 978-1-4020-4875-3 (HB) ISBN-10 1-4020-4876-9 (e-book) ISBN-13 978-1-4020-4876-0 (e-book) Published by Springer,

2022

My main aim in this paper is to introduce symmetry deflationism as a viable philosophical position towards symmetries in physics, paving the way for future developments. To locate symmetry deflationism and its sub-varieties in the philosophical landscape, I first outline a map of alternative philosophical positions along with their main theses. I then introduce symmetry deflationism, which takes symmetries as indispensable for physical theorizing and empirical research, but not as part of the physical ontology. This position is in turn divided into two more concrete sub-varieties: symmetry epistemicism and symmetry normativism, which naturally fit in Humeanism and neo-Kantianism respectively.

2010

This review is a critical discussion of three main claims in Debs and Redhead's thought-provoking book Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention. These claims are:(i) Social acts impinge upon formal aspects of scientific representation;(ii) symmetries introduce the need for conventional choice;(iii) perspectival symmetry is a necessary and sufficient condition for objectivity, while symmetry simpliciter fails to be necessary.

arXiv: History and Overview, 2013

We state the defining characteristic of mathematics as a type of symmetry where one can change the connotation of a mathematical statement in a certain way when the statement's truth value remains the same. This view of mathematics as satisfying such symmetry places mathematics as comparable with modern views of physics and science where, over the past century, symmetry also plays a defining role. We explore the very nature of mathematics and its relationship with natural science from this perspective. This point of view helps clarify some standard problems in the philosophy of mathematics.

2021

We state the defining characteristic of mathematics as a type of symmetry where one can change the connotation of a mathematical statement in a certain way when the statement’s truth value remains the same. This view of mathematics as satisfying such symmetry places mathematics as comparable with modern views of physics and science where, over the past century, symmetry also plays a defining role. We explore the very nature of mathematics and its relationship with natural science from this perspective. This point of view helps clarify some standard problems in the philosophy of mathematics.

Contemporary Polish Ontology, 2019

The main goal of the paper is to revisit the concept of a symmetry for relational structures in the light of the ontological position dubbed “essentialist structuralism”. It is argued that the standard definition of this concept commits us to the existence of non-qualitative, haecceitistic differences between possible worlds. An alternative notion of symmetry is developed, based on the distinction between essential and contingent structures. It is claimed that this new concept is better suited for the doctrine of structuralism, and moreover it offers a new perspective on some well-known problems in the foundation of physical theories, such as the problem of permutation invariance in quantum mechanics and diffeomorphism invariance in general relativity.