Human Enhancement: Perfection, Desire and Capabilities

Whatever ethical stance one takes in the debate regarding the ethics of human enhancement, one or more reference points are required to assess its morality. Some have suggested looking at the bioethical notions of safety, justice, and/or autonomy to find such reference points. Others, arguing that those notions are limited with respect to assessing the morality of human enhancement, have turned to human nature, human authenticity, or human dignity as reference points, thereby introducing some perfectionist assumptions into the debate. In this article, we ask which perfectionist assumptions should be used in this debate. After a critique of views that are problematic, we take a positive approach, suggesting some perfectionist elements that can lend guidance to the practice of human enhancement, based on the work of Martha Nussbaum's Capability Approach. We suggest that the central capabilities can be used to define the human aspect of human enhancement and thereby allow a moral evaluation of enhancement interventions. These central capabilities can be maximized harmoniously to postulate what an ideal human would look like. Ultimately, the aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to make explicit the perfectionist assumptions found in the debate and eliminate those that are problematic. Second, the paper clarifies an element that is often neglected in the debate about human enhancement, the view of the ideal human towards which human enhancement should strive. Here, we suggest that some central capabilities that are essential for an ideal human being can be maximized harmoniously and can therefore serve as possible reference points to guide human enhancement.

Journal of medical ethics, 2013

Both, bioconservatives and bioliberals, should seek a discussion about ideas of human perfection, making explicit their underlying assumptions about what makes for a good human life. This is relevant, because these basic, and often implicit ideas, inform and influence judgements and choices about human enhancement interventions. Both neglect, and polemical but inconsistent use of the complex ideas of perfection are leading to confusion within the ethical debate about human enhancement interventions, that can be avoided by tackling the notion of perfection directly. In the recent debates, bioconservatives have prominently argued against the ‘pursuit of perfection’ by biotechnological means. In the first part of this paper, we show that—paradoxically—bioconservatives themselves explicitly embrace specific conceptions of human perfection and perfectionist assumptions about the good human life in order to argue against the use of enhancement technologies. Yet, we argue that the bioconservative position contains an untenable ambiguity between criticising and endorsing ideas of human perfection. Hence, they stand in need of clarifying their stance on human perfection. In the second part of the paper, we ask whether bioliberals in fact (implicitly) advocate a particular conception of perfection, or whether they are right in holding that they do not, and that discussing perfection is obsolete anyway. We show that bioliberals also rely on a specific idea of human perfection, based on the idea of autonomy. Hence, their denial of the relevance of perfection in the debate is unconvincing and has to be revised.

This article deals with the understanding of human beings in the project of human enhancement. It shows that, in the voices of some representatives of the latter, there is a naturalistic tendency to reduce human beings either to their environment or to virtual reality. In such cases, the resulting entity would lack interiority as well as the first-person perspective. In this paper, it is argued that the possibilities opened up by biomedical sciences cannot release us from employing a multi-dimensional and integral concept of human beings wherein interiority plays an important role. The human enhancement project is not only a matter of technical feasibility; it also fundamentally concerns the essence of humanness. Hence the question of the nature of human beings and their condition is an indispensable part of this enterprise. Keywords: Human enhancement – Human beings – Environment – First person perspective Introduction. In contemporary philosophy, discussions on human enhancement are well advanced. There is a huge body of literature on the topic with new subfields emerging. This debate is in tune with the constant longing of the human beings to improve their lives and wellbeing. Apart from appropriate personal efforts it has found expression in various educational and political programs and undertakings. Contemporary efforts to enhance the human being have the advantage of drawing on the latest discoveries in genetics , genetic engineering, pharmacology and even information technology. Although still at the beginning of their practical implementations and uncertain of how viable they are, relevant discussions between philosophers and futurologists are, by contrast, quite complex and nuanced. There are many aspects of these discussions which are worthy of examining. This paper however concentrates on one issue only, namely who or what is the subject of those enhancing procedures. In other words, what is the understanding of the essence of the human being which is the subject of improvement. This issue is complex and can be approached from many angles. In this paper, the attention is limited to current discussions between different representatives and adherents of human enhancement, and by default their implied understanding of the human being. Finally a critical assessment is offered together with postulates for further discussion. However, at the outset some light should be shed on why such discussions take place at all and how they can be structured in a relatively straightforward way.

Global Journal of Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, 2022

The biotechnological advances obtained in the last decades have configurated a particular scenario about the limits of what we can do with ourselves, especially by revealing that the human enhancement debate still is epistemologically confused and ethically naive. As we intend to discuss, that happens for two reasons: the first one is associated with the moral evaluation of enhancement concepts, in other words, whether or not we would be entitled to promote substantial changes that jeopardize the conservation of our own way of life; the second reason, intrinsically attached to the first one, is to neglect the evolutionary history of human beings and to claim, therefore, that human enhancement should be carefully evaluated because we would not be able to foresee the possible disastrous risks in our future. It is right into these arguments that the debate between bioconservatives and transhumanists becomes epistemologically confused and ethically weak.

A decade of research on the ethics of human enhancement has produced a vast literature. This collection is an excellent contribution to the field; it fulfills and exceeds the promises of its two subsections: understanding and advancing the debate. Section 1, Understanding the Debate includes eight papers and section 2 Advancing the Debate includes seven. The collection also contains a concise introductory essay by Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal, providing a helpful overview of recent developments in the literature. It is a pleasure to read and is appropriate to use in postgraduate courses and advanced undergraduate seminars. The strengths of the collection are the papers' placement of issues in enhancement within broader debates in moral psychology, evolutionary ethics, political philosophy, and metaethics. Contextualizing in this way sheds light on the ways in which debates about novel technological innovations and their applications can provide broader insights into standing philosophical problems in other domains. The volume also strives for conceptual clarity and maps out a course through the topics, which help bypass some stubborn bottlenecks in the debate about human enhancement: 1) talking past each other, 2) conflicting methodologies, and 3) unquestioned assumptions. I highlight three sets of articles that provide ways to move past the aforementioned bottlenecks. I focus here on only a few papers for brevity, but it is worth noting that all other papers in this collection make significant contributions to dealing with bottlenecks or make worthwhile contributions to other issues in enhancement, such as the role of reason, sentiment, and emotion in moral judgments and action; disability theory; future persons; and mind-uploading and personal identity. Defenders of enhancement (and other biotechnologies) often face the objection, in both public discourse and in scholarly work, of playing god. In BPlaying God: What's the

Philosophy Compass, 2014

Ethical debate surrounding human enhancement, especially by biotechnological means, has burgeoned since the turn of the century. Issues discussed include whether specific types of enhancement are permissible or even obligatory, whether they are likely to produce a net good for individuals and for society, and whether there is something intrinsically wrong in playing God with human nature.We characterize the main camps on the issue, identifying three main positions: permissive, restrictive and conservative positions. We present the major sub-debates and lines of argument from each camp. The review also gives a flavor of the general approach of key writers in the literature such as Julian Savulescu, Nick Bostrom, Michael Sandel, and Leon Kass.

Erkenntnis, 2013

Human enhancement-the attempt to overcome all human cognitive, emotional, and physical limitations using current technological developments-has been said to pose the most fundamental social and political question facing the world in the twenty-first century. Yet, the public remains ill prepared to deal with it. Indeed, controversy continues to swirl around human enhancement even among the very best-informed experts in the most relevant fields, with no end in sight. Why the ongoing stalemate in the discussion? I attempt to explain the central features of the human enhancement debate and the empirical and normative shortcomings that help to keep it going. I argue that philosophers of science are especially well equipped to rectify these shortcomings, and I suggest that we may be deeply remiss if we don't do so. Section 1: "The Most Important Controversy in Science and Society" of the Twenty-First Century Human enhancement-the attempt to improve human cognitive, emotional, and physical capacities, especially through technological means-has been part of the human condition right from the beginning.

2015

Is it necessary to have an ideal of perfection in mind to identify and evaluate true biotechnological human “enhancements”, or can one do without? To answer this question we suggest employing the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, found in the debate in political philosophy about theories of justice: the distinctive views about whether one needs an idea of a perfectly just society or not when it comes to assessing the current situation and recommending steps to increase justice. In this paper we argue that evaluating human enhancements from a non-ideal perspective has some serious shortcomings, which can be avoided when endorsing an ideal approach. Our argument starts from a definition of human enhancement as improvement, which can be understood in two ways. The first approach is backward-looking and assesses improvements with regard to a status quo ante. The second, a forward-looking approach, evaluates improvements with regard to their proximity to a goal or according to an ideal. After outlining the limitations of an exclusively backward-looking view (non-ideal theory), we answer possible objections against a forward-looking view (ideal theory). Ultimately, we argue that the human enhancement debate would lack some important moral insights if a forward-looking view of improvement is not taken into consideration.

What is human enhancement all about? Why has it become a major concern in debates about the future of contemporary societies? This book is devoted to clarifying the underlying ambiguities of these major debates. It proposes novel ways of exploring what human enhancement means, what practices and technologies are involved, and what goals are invoked, with their respective justifications and criticisms. It calls on contributors from different countries and backgrounds—sociology, philosophy, bioethics, political science, engineering, medicine, literary studies, science fiction—to examine three fundamental aspects of human technological enhancement: firstly, what the concept of human enhancement means; secondly, what practices constitute human enhancement today, and; thirdly, what it might become in the future.

Science and Engineering Ethics, 2013

Emerging technologies are increasingly used in an attempt to ''enhance the human body and/or mind'' beyond the contemporary standards that characterize human beings. Yet, such standards are deeply controversial and it is not an easy task to determine whether the application of a given technology to an individual and its outcome can be defined as a human enhancement or not. Despite much debate on its potential or actual ethical and social impacts, human enhancement is not subject to any consensual definition. This paper proposes a timely and much needed examination of the various definitions found in the literature. We classify these definitions into four main categories: the implicit approach, the therapy-enhancement distinction, the improvement of general human capacities and the increase of well-being. After commenting on these different approaches and their limitations, we propose a definition of human enhancement that focuses on individual perceptions. While acknowledging that a definition that mainly depends on personal and subjective individual perceptions raises many challenges, we suggest that a comprehensive approach to define human enhancement could constitute a useful premise to appropriately address the complexity of the ethical and social issues it generates.