Critical Theory and International Law

New Approaches to International Law (later referred to as NAIL) or International Critical legal theory is a school of thought that spurred from of the school of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) Like CLS, NAIL scholars focused on the underlying politics of law, countering claims of the formalism and subjectivism of the law. This research will examine the main premises of CLS and NAIL in relations to other schools of legal philosophy, in this quest the research will start with a general introduction to the school, to derive from the discourse on the sources of International Law two moves of critique that are at the core of NAIL's reasoning, accordingly addressing their conception of the indeterminacy theory, comparing it to realist conceptions of the same theory. In parallel discussing their reflections on the nature of 'principles' within International rules which are then compared to Dowrkinian conceptions of principles, later the analysis is taken a step further by inquiring into their views on the autonomy of the International law.

Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets, 2000

Indian Journal of International Law, 2015

Reflecting upon critical international scholarship and its evolution through time, this review essay focuses on a volume co-edited by José María Beneyto and David Kennedy, along with as sistant editors, Justo Corti Varela and John Haskell, on the history of the new approaches to international law (NAIL) and the work of David Kennedy. Considering the individual contributions to this book, this essay argues that while the influence of NAIL upon younger scholars, critical or 'mainstream', is beyond contestation, it is questionable to what extent the intellectual priorities and institutional anxieties of the discipline (should) remain the same. Drawing heavily on the theme of professional responsibility that underlies most of the contributions to this volume, this essay proposes a reorientation of critical inquiry in the light of the implication of international law and institutions in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. Echoing Kennedy's call to engage with questions of political economy and global governance, this review essay suggests that for critical international law to reclaim its radical and innovative character, it is imperative to engage with the concerns of a post-crash world and to identify and disrupt the role of international law in the constitution of an unstable and unjust international economic order.

Journal of the History of International Law

Though recent years have seen a proliferation of critical histories of international law, their normative significance remains under-theorized, especially from the perspective of general readers rather than writers of such histories. How do critical histories of international law acquire their normative significance? And how should one react to them? We distinguish three ways in which critical histories can be normatively significant: (i) by undermining the overt or covert conceptions of history embedded within present practices in support of their authority; (ii) by disappointing the normative expectations that regulate people's reactions to critical histories; and (iii) by revealing continuities and discontinuities in the functions that our practices serve. By giving us a theoretical grip on the different ways in which history can be normatively significant and call for different reactions, this account helps us think about the overall normative significance of critical histories and how one and the same critical history can pull us in different directions.

This essay is a friendly response to the colloquium on From Apology to Utopia (FATU). It restates the way critical research examines the exercise of power through analysis of (legal) language. Attention is directed especially to the empowering and enchanting effects of the law. The main point has to do with the continuing power of structuralism as a form of legal analysis. It would be truly daunting to try to respond to the many good points made in the above articles – daunting but also perhaps unnecessary. I am struck by the continued critical attention that this work from the 'over-theoretical 1980s' continues to receive as a contribution to 'theory'. To be sure, many abstract discourses are woven into its fabric. But it is still in my mind above all an intervention in the practical world of international law that seeks to understand how to separate good and bad arguments in that field and how that competence might be used to deal with a profoundly unjust world. The articles above rightly stress the many ambivalences in From Apology to Utopia (FATU). I welcome the effort to think beyond the work and to draw new generations of international lawyers and other internationalists to engage critically with today's many injustices. Even as these are not identical with the injustices of the 1980s, the difficulties of dealing with them have not changed very much. On the contrary, it seems to me that the type of analysis employed in that work is still far superior to any rival I am aware of to the extent that its objective would be, as it was in the 1980s, to examine international law's role in the reproduction of the political and economic conditions of the world and to find out what room there might be for progressive transformation. So I want to use this occasion to spell out as clearly as I can the power of the type of analysis employed in that work that may be called 'structuralist'. This is a form of analysis that separates phenomena of social life that are immediately visible from others that are usually 'hidden' but in some way contribute to producing the former so that once the operation of that 'hidden' background is revealed, we feel we 'understand' the more familiar phenomena better and are better able to deal * Academy Professor Erik Castr´en Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki [[email protected]].

in, Prabhakar Singh, and Benoît Mayer (eds), Critical International Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism, and Transnationalism, 2014

The Paradoxes in International Law Law is not an exact science. 2 Although international law hides many paradoxes, it provides opportunities to rethink the nature and function of the current world order. Considering the latent paradoxes within the discipline of international law, our edited volume raises more questions than it answers. As such, we endeavour to start a debate rather than settle one as the 'critical' element of 'critical international law' rests primarily in the sense of 'involving or exercising careful judgement or observation'. 3 Discernment is essential to the legal professions. Th e word 'critical' itself stems from the Greek word for 'judge' or 'κριτής'. Discernment is also central to scholars. Th e statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognizes the 'teachings of the highly qualifi ed publicists 1

2012

This formal statocentrism is, of course, not without its exceptions and contestations. International Humanitarian Law, for example, can be said to ascribe rights to individuals, while International Criminal Law attributes responsibility to them. However, according to orthodox accounts, the state is still the key actor in the field, either because instances of individual rights and responsibilities are highly specific to a particular issue or situation, or because the treaties and rules of customary law which confer individual rights/responsibilities (and upon which such rights/responsibilities are dependent) are made by, and bind, only nation-states. For a more detailed discussion of this particular issue, see

Díkaion, 2023

Fundamentos teóricos y técnicas para realizar investigaciones en derecho internacional desde enfoques críticos Fundamentos teóricos e técnicas para realizar pesquisas em Direito Internacional a partir de abordagens críticas * This article is part of the research project "La respuesta del Derecho internacional a la corrupción asociada al crimen transnacional organizado, a la luz de las dinámicas de comportamiento del sistema de narcotráfico marítimo por medio de simulación de sistemas sociales"

Bill Bowring's book attempts to argue for a Marxist account of international law that embraces it as a tool for progressive politics and revolutionary change. He argues it is necessary to give a substantive account of both, locating them in the real struggles of the oppressed. Specifically, he locates human rights in the three great revolutions - the French, the Russian and the anticolonial. However, this revolutionary heritage has been 'degraded' by recent events. As such, it is necessary to adopt 'revolutionary conservatism', invoking international law's origins against its current degradation. This review argues that, owing to international law's indeterminacy, Bowring's project is susceptible to imperial appropriation. This means, however, that Bowring cannot give an account of why we should use international law. It then argues that Bowring's account of Pashukanis is wrong, and that Pashukanis's work can better make sense of Bowring's insights and international law more generally.