Psychology defined

Journal of Clinical Psychology, 2004

Psychology," like many abstract terms, is difficult to define precisely. Henriques' (this issue, pp. 1207-1221) argument that psychology, though unified and coherent, actually spans two realms-psychological formalism ("the science of mind," this issue, p. 1211) and human psychology ("the science of human behavior at the individual level," this issue, p. 1208)seems likely to improve the clarity of the concept. The strongest contribution of his analysis may be its placing "psychology" in the larger conceptual framework of the Tree of Knowledge taxonomy.

Psychology is a modern discipline in a state of crisis. As a science still in its "pre-paradigmatic" stage of development, psychology has not yet settled on a paradigm (or model) of behavior that satisfies, even tentatively, the fundamental questions that have been raised about psychological life. The previous century marked a period of proliferation of theories and methods in the social sciences, leading to a confusing state of affairs for the person who wishes to be introduced to current scientific perspectives on human nature.

2020

We comment on the article by Zagaria et al., which explicates the ““soft” nature of psychology: a minor consensus in its “core”” (Zagaria et al., p. 1), manifested by the discordant character of definitions of psychological “core-constructs”. Zagaria et al. build on the assumption that psychological science should reside in the status of a paradigm, meanwhile the real state of things they consider as pre-paradigmatic, imperfect and unhealthy, from which a transition to a paradigm is necessary.We cannot agree with this provision. We argue that not internal coherence and consistency, but the ability to reflect multifaceted reality, to answer its innovative manifestations in various dimensions and solve tasks that life poses to humanity with an adequate set of different tools not reducible to a single approach, is what makes the value of science. Psychology originally developed as poly paradigmatic science, because its subject has a most complex nature, holistic, yet incorporating many aspects different in their essence and, therefore, requiring different versions of the methodology. Considering epistemology of psychological science from the philosophical perspective implying special focus on the ontological issues, we argue that poly paradigmatic structure of psychology is a virtue, not weakness. Thanks to such a structure, modular, like a Swiss knife, our science may offer the most effective solutions for a variety of problems. Multiplicity of relative approaches is best fit for life and innovation, even though we have to sacrifice rigor and concordance of definitions in introductory textbooks.

A New Unified Theory of Psychology, 2011

The 19th-century belief that psychology can be an integral discipline, which led to its institutionalization as an independent science, has been disconfirmed on every day of the 112 years since its presumptive founding. When the details of that history are attended to, the patent tendency has been toward theoretical and substantial fractionation (and increasing insularity among the "specialties"), not toward integration. Moreover, there are many principled considerations that underline the futility of seeking theoretical, conceptual or even paradigmatic unification. Sigmund Koch (1993, p. 902)

Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2016

I examine some of the key scientific precommitments of modern psychology, and argue that their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychological analysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, because these precommitments sanction an "authority of the biological," explanation of phenomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully subsumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these precommitments and suggest that there are good reasons to question their applicability to psychological science. I conclude that experiential aspects of reality (reflected in mental construct terms such as memory, belief, thought, and desire) give us reason to remain open to the need for psychological explanation in the treatment of mind.

2023

Nothing is the truth nor a lie. Of the crystal through which one sees it. To begin with, I would like to explain why I titled my paper 'reflections' and not 'opinion' or 'review'. Because I don't feel smarter than Dr. Mika Suojanen, and therefore I don't feel qualified to point out what's right and wrong. His article simply prompted me to take a closer look at the psychological and cognitive aspects of human behaviour as a kind of fleeting glance at the much more general problem of the relationship between philosophy, psychology and anthropokinetics; the latter is my main field of interest. The question asked by Dr. Mika Suojanen is undoubtedly provocative. Science as a whole, as well as its individualdisciplines, are 'woven' from theories. The world is too complex to be understood in all its complexity, hence simplifiedimages -theories -are necessary to understand it. However, for any theory to become reasonable and useful, it must be somehow connected to facts, experimental or observed, in what may be called 'free reality.' More precisely, somefragment of reality which is the area of interest of a given discipline of science. 'Fragment' -because no theory, which bydefinition is a simplification, can be fully universal. Therefore, in the 'tangible' reality we are dealing with facts, and inthe heights of abstraction -with theories, by means of specific interpretations somehow related to the facts. Nevertheless, "since the seventeenth century, modern science has been possible only to the extent that theoretical progress precedes experiment" [Sorman, 1993, p. 61]. Physicists are in the best situation. Their 'fact field' is relatively easy to observe, and the theory is placed not very high on the abstraction scale. In addition, they have a very elegant and user-friendly tool for combining facts and building theories based on them: mathematics. In this field of human knowledge, the 'Queen of Sciences' creates a very reliable and

Theory & Psychology, 2019

What are the epistemic projects of psychology? What insights does psychology seek to produce, and what kinds of knowledge are adequate for the psychological challenges of contemporary worlds? These are the fundamental questions we address in this special issue. Dating back more than a century, psychology emerged as a discipline in a specific context with specific challenges and tasks. Since then, societies, humans, and the world have changed, and the pace itself at which changes take place has accelerated considerably over the past couple of decades. It is time to pause and revise psychology’s epistemic projects. More than finding solutions to particular shortcomings, the discipline needs to reflect on how psychology comes to define particular phenomena as areas of scientific concern, what kinds of phenomena are relevant and for whom, and how the disciplinary shaping of psychological concerns has a bearing on what can and will be researched.

Abstract The disciples of Psychology and Sociology and the social sciences more generally, are and have been for some time, in a state of flux, especially with regard to research methods. The tension, in the view if many, is between the approaches to research in terms of positivist verses naturalist [1,2]. This tension has to a considerable degree remains unsolved and has been exacerbated by the postmodernist’s discourse as exemplified in the works of Foucault [3] and Lyotard [4] (see Rosenberg, 2003 for an overview of this discourse). This short commentary cannot address all of these issues. Instead, it will [5] provide an introduction to the history of 19th century and early 20th century social sciences focusing on key differences and similarities in research methods and their philosophic underpinning [6]. This will be followed by a short statement regarding the nature of mid 20th century evolution of the social sciences, touching on both the philosophical and practical aspects of research [7]. This essay will end with an overview of some psychology research conducted within the parameters of the Human sciences. Keywords: Jerome Bruner; John Dewy; GH Mead; Shawn Rosenberg; Michael Westerman; Peter Wench; Cultural psychology; Social psychology; Psychological anthropology; Meaning; Narrative, Mind, Culture