Beyond Russia's Versailles Syndrome

2014

In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine, West-Russia relations have so dramatically deteriorated that talk of a new Cold War has become routine. NAtO’s role in Europe is again in the spotlight, with experts and policymakers pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical roots and re-calibrate itself as an instrument of defence from and containment of Russia. At the same time, cooperation between Russia and the West has not collapsed altogether, with the two still able to coordinate on issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme. Clearly, tensions over Ukraine are so strong that the risk of a breakdown in relations cannot be ruled out. Against this disturbing backdrop, the Center on the United states and Europe (CUsE) at the brookings Institution in Washington and the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome organized an international conference to discuss ways by which Russia and the West can contain tensions, manage competition, a...

2017

The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imagin-able: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine. Policy Implications • The way how the 'losers' of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security). • Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO's prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable. • American and European interests sometimes overlap, but not always, also within NATO. One can observe a pattern whereby the US pushes the Europeans to accept the American view. For instance on NATO extension (certainly in 2008), as well as on missile defence. This article implicitly argues that the European member states within NATO should be more careful to agree with the US view if it does not fit their own interests.

International Journal, 2022

Ukraine is existential to Russia, but peripheral to American interests. The “escalation dominance” advantage is with Moscow, and no amount of military aid or economic coercion, short of an actual war, will deter Moscow, given the asymmetry of interests and differing threat perceptions. American public opinion remains firmly opposed to risking a potential great power war. That said, a Ukraine—if it exists as a state after the war—at peace with its neighbours is in everyone’s interest, as is a decreased risk of a great power conflict. This policy brief identifies some confidence-building measures that might, in a similar situation in the future, result in a more realist grand bargain. A potential war might be a short punitive campaign by Russia, in which case the central thesis of this policy brief, a neutral zone in Ukraine, will remain intact. It might also be a war of occupation and conquest, in which case this paper might be considered a study in a counterfactual history of what could have been.

PONARS Policy Memo 861, 2023

The ongoing war against Ukraine has cast into relief the dilemma of choosing between an imperfect peace, on the one hand, and continued fighting in pursuit of a fairer solution, on the other. Aside from the moral aspect, the main argument against peace through negotiations with Russia has been the challenge of achieving security for Ukraine in a post-conflict environment. What kind of guarantees of peace can Ukraine get through a negotiated settlement should NATO membership not be immediately available? More broadly, can security postwar be achieved through negotiation-a give-and-take process-in the absence of firm guarantees from major powers? Autocratic regimes usually loath principled negotiations of the type necessary for ending conflicts short of a decisive victory by one of the sides. Russia, one such regime, has a limited record of abiding by principle-based international agreements-due in no small part by Russia's reluctance to bind itself by consensual formulas. This makes the outlook bleak for a negotiated solution to the war in the foreseeable future. Indeed, it may take a dramatic change in Russia's approach to conflict resolution to stop the fighting.

OSCE Yearbook 2015, 2016

Russia’s approach towards relations with Ukraine since early 2014 heralds a major shift in Russian foreign policy. It has crossed a Rubicon that it will be difficult – though not impossible – to uncross. Indeed, Russian officials have themselves stated on more than one occasion that Russia’s relationship with Europe and the United States has undergone an irreversible change and will 1 misreading the other’s intentions, or does the conflict in and around Ukraine result from a clash of interests, with each side determined to win and pre- pared to pay the necessary price? This is not an idle question. Our response has profound implications for the process of conflict resolution – both within Ukraine and between Russia and the West. A security dilemma type of con- flict can usually be resolved by confidence-building measures. In such cases, the contradictions are usually not difficult to overcome. In contrast to that, reconciling opposed interests requires a substantive bargain. In the absence of such a bargain, the balance of forces will need to change in order for the controversy to subside. Before that happens, recurrent spikes of tension are to be expected, at times resulting in open hostilities.

2015

The conventional wisdom of the Cold War era was that, even in times of ultimate tensions, arms control served as a kind of bridge over seemingly intractable differences between two rival alliances ostensibly immune from ideological or geopolitical rows. In the period of the post-Cold War “New World Order” illusions, with their maverick schemes of the “End of History” or the “Clash of Civilizations”, arms control seemed to be eclipsed by wider geopolitical ambitions or hopes that it was just a relic of the Cold War and did not need judicially enforceable mechanisms in the era of collaboration and trust between the West and Russia (predictably, that ended quite soon). The “End of History”, even if it really happened in its initial Hegelian sense, only meant the advent of a new set of crises, competition and conflicts in a new phase of international development.

This article suggests that both the EU and Russia sought to achieve the great power status by enhancing their presence in the post-Soviet space. Conflict has arisen as the status seeking efforts of the two have been transformed into a dangerous zero-sum game. Moscow's actions in Ukraine prompted the EU to adopt a more conflictual attitude, where it now actively aims to counteract Moscow's influence. This transformed Russia and the EU's status seeking efforts into a deep security dilemma. Both actors perceive that maintaining their influence in the region is crucial for maintaining their status. Rather than seeking a mutually and sustainable agreement that would give equal importance to Ukraine's interests, the EU and Russia draw more red lines, and revert to Cold War rhetoric. In the short term this behavior will put their status seeking efforts even more at odds with each and deepen the conflict.

Global Policy, 2016

The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imaginable: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine. Policy Implications • The way how the 'losers' of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security). • Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO's prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable.

Security Dialogues. Journal in the field of Security, Defence and Peace Studies, 2015

As the relations between the West and Russia seem to spill-over into worst, a dilemma comes into one's mind: is the world facing resurgence of the Cold War? The fear has become realistic since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and worsening of the situation in east Ukraine. The article analyzes the European security and its prospects in the light of the growing tensions between the West and Russia. Particular emphasis is given to the key international treaties such that the Conventional Forces Treaty and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Treaty. The author argues that although the relations between the West and Russia are to its lowest point and possibly heading for worse, one can hardly talk about a new Cold War. There is military buildup, and strong rhetoric accompanied by some measures towards condemnation of another party's moves-yet there is still certain level of communication and consent over some issues such as the Iranian nuclear program or fight against terrorism. For a New Cold War to resurge it would be necessary to see the adversaries more or less on equal footing, which does not seem to be the case. The West (NATO) has enlarged since the end of the Cold War but also has become stronger, while Russia does not even remotely resemble the USSR, and its alternatives in Asia cannot compensate for it.

2022