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2021, Facing the new far right in Southern Europe: Analysing the rise of the extreme right after the financial crisis; Coppieters Foundation
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23 pages
1 file
The 2018 general elections in Italy saw the emergence of what has been called the first populist government of Europe (Garzia, 2019). Given the hung parliament after the elections, an alliance between M5S and Lega led to the so-called Government of Change. The new coalition government configuration could be considered part of a broader realignment taking place in the Italian party system post-2008, with the 2013 general elections constituting a turning point. Even if they parted ways after the summer of 2019, the govern experience of Lega under Salvini’s leadership made the party the undisputable leader of the right in Italy. pp. 32-49
In this article we argue that the success of the Italian right can be explained in terms of its populism – which consists of a set of loosely connected but distinctive ideological traits – which has been skilfully connected to other ideological elements that resonate with Italian society , using specific political and extra -political resources to optimise electoral appeal. We will thus identify the central and the peripheral elements of populism and explain their contribution to the success of the right through an analysis of the values of the elect orate and of the electoral programmes of the right -wing coalition, drawing some general conclusions on the fit between the right -wing voting bloc and the political opportunity structure. This article explore s the ideological innovation in which the Italian right has engaged.
Populism and Far-Right. Trends in Europe (Edited by Valerio Alfonso Bruno), 2022
The coalition between Fratelli d’Italia, Lega, Forza Italia and some minor allies is expected to win the Italian general election on 25 September 2022 by a considerable margin, at least according to all the opinion polls. Rather surprisingly, much of the public debate in Italy, including the media, politicians and polling institutes, still refers to the right-wing bloc as a centre-right coalition despite the presence of two fully-fledged far-right parties. In this chapter, we will a) introduce the main political players competing in the September 2022 general election, i.e. the right-wing coalition, the centre-left coalition, the M5S and the ‘third pole’ (terzo polo) composed of Azione and Italia Viva; we will then b) consider the ways in which Fratelli d’Italia and Lega are competing on the same far-right platform and which characteristics may give FdI a competitive edge over Lega; and lastly we will c) reflect on the factors that may have enabled Italy’s far-right coalition to be considered moderate centre-right, a label used since 1994 to describe coalitions led by Berlusconi and which no longer seem fit-ting given the presence of the two far-right parties. In conclusion, we will identify at least two elements, in fact two sides of the same coin, supporting the persistence of the centre-right definition: a) the ambiguous and controversial role within the coalition of Forza Italia, whose alleged moderation has been cleverly sold to grant a sort of continuity to the use of the centrodestra label as opposed to ‘right wing’ or ‘far right’; and b) the skilful way in which the Italian far-right has managed to normalize itself and enter the mainstream over the last decade.
South European Society and Politics, 2005
From its position as the epitome of the 'old' post-war fascist extreme right party, the Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale (AN) has shifted towards the ideological centre and reinvented itself as a proto-conservative party to exploit the new institutional logic of the post-1993 Italian political system. Conversely, the Northern League has shifted from its position as regionalist protest party to an actor more akin to other European extreme right parties, particularly in its authoritarian and antiimmigrant rhetoric. While the AN's evolution under Gianfranco Fini has seen it reintroduced into the political mainstream and included in the Forza-Italia-led government, this article examines the residual extremist views, such as support for fascism, found among the voters and members of the party. Moreover, despite the centre convergence and nationalization of the AN, the implantation of the Northern League in extremist ideological space demonstrates that there is a potential pool of voters receptive to anti-immigrant and populist-authoritarian appeal.
Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 2022
The emergence of the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia [F.d.I.]) in Italian politics has raised debate on the party’s core ideologies. This article addresses these questions on the basis of a qualitative content analysis of its party manifestos and discourses since its foundation in 2012. The development of the F.d.I.’s party ideology is analysed through the categories derived from the literature on the European radical right phenomenon. The findings confirm that F.d.I.‘s ideology is based on a combination of nationalism, sovereignism, authoritarianism and Euro-scepticism. The article demonstrates that the party’s ideology turned to radical right positions after 2017 and explains this shift in light of the instability affecting the Italian party system and the recurring European Union’s (E.U.) crises during the last decade.
Populism in contemporary Italian Politics, 2022
Populism is a chameleonic phenomenon, able to merge with existing and developing models of political organization, and thus underlying the politicization of new political movements (Taggart 2000; Mudde 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). The rise of populism is accompanied, on the one hand, by the depoliticization of large segments of political regulation and the establishment of public policies, especially in the field of finance, that exacerbate the ‘crisis’ of representative politics (Fawcett, Flinders and Hay 2017) and, on the other, by the cartelization of mainstream political parties (Katz and Mair 1995; 2018). In Italy, as in other European democracies, populism goes hand in hand with an increased feeling of resentment towards the political elite. This is an integral part of the silent counter-revolution that determines the polarization of winners and losers of new social processes on a global scale
The Italianist, 2005
Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research, 2020
This paper examines the rise of two Italian populist movements, the cyber-populism of the Five Star Movement under Beppe Grillo, and the nativist populism of the Lega under Matteo Salvini. I first frame the rise of Italian populism and the brief coalition government the two parties formed in 2018-2019 within broader political and institutional trends, and then compare the role of leadership in the two movements and analyse the discursive strategies used in both to mobilize "the people" and win voters' support.
Italian Right Wing Populism, 2017
Right wing populism and Euroscepticism have experienced an important growth in the last decades all around Europe. Italy has also been highly affected by this phenomenon and, since the early 1990s, various populist parties appeared on its political scene. Since the early 1990s Silvio Berlusconi`s Forza Italia, Umberto Bossi`s Lega Nord and Gianfranco Fini`s Alleanza Nazionale became the hegemonic forces of the conservative political area. However, since 2012, Beppe Grillo transformed Italian politics introducing a new form of populism: his Movimento 5 Stelle, not following the traditional left-right paradigm, represented a shock in the static world of the Italian politics. The working paper is going to focus on the phenomenon of right wing populism and Euroscepticism at national level, exploring the reasons for the success of Forza Italia, Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale- Fratelli d`Italia.
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